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CHAPTER 1. SMALLER IS BETTER BUT COMPROMISE IS NECESSARY 
Prevailing wisdom has it that electronic digital computers exist because governments 
sponsored their development. Computers have indeed received public backing, but the private sector 
played a larger role than acknowledged, and moreover, there is considerable evidence that it did not 
need help to invent computers or take them to market. A history of computers suggests that Adam 
Smith, the eighteenth-century Scottish philosopher, had it right. He believed that minimal and aloof 
government best served society, and with that, the inherent genius and diligence of citizens are 
themselves enough to ensure invention and the general prosperity. 
The first modern computer has been widely reputed to be the ENIAC,1 a machine of such 
awesome size and complexity that only government, it is believed, could have mustered the initiative 
and money to create it. The ENIAC weighed thirty tons, occupied a large room, and contained 
approximately 18,000 vacuum tubes.2 It cost $750,000, or so, a huge sum at the time.3 The U.S. 
Army gave the University of Pennsylvania funding to build the ENIAC for calculating artillery tables 
during World War II, although the computer was not completed until afterwards. John W Mauchly 
and J. Presper Eckert, a physics instructor and an electrical engineering graduate student, respectively, 
and closely identified with the project, won acclaim as the inventors of the computer. 
The federal government continued to support computer projects generously. The financial 
largess came mostly through defense agencies and resulted in a bewildering number of one-of-a-kind 
computers, many with playful names, some from acronyms, like ILLLAC, ORDVAC, ORACLE, 
1 ENIAC is an acronym for Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer. 
2 Arthur W. Burks. "Electronic Computing Circuits of the ENIAC," Proceedings of the l.R.E. 35. no. 
8 (August 1947). 756-757. Strictly speaking, the ENIAC contained about 18,000 vacuum tube 
envelopes, or containers, many with two triodes. Most tubes were in accumulators, the main 
computational components of the ENIAC. Many of those tubes were of the twin-triode type. 
3 The cost estimate is from Nancy Stem, who has written the most frequently cited account of the 
ENIAC. See. Stem, From ENIAC to UNIVAC: An Appraisal of the Eckert-Mauchly Computers 
(Bedford, Massachusetts: Digital Press, 1981), 50-51. The figure is from a table entitled, "ENIAC." 
Saul Rosen, another historian, agreed in a more recent account of the ENIAC. Specifically see, "The 
Origins of Modem Computing," Computing Reviews 31, no. 9 (September 1990), 450. Other 
estimates on the cost of the ENIAC have gone to $1 million but most are less. Historian Paul Ceruzzi 
put it at $500.000. See, The Reckoners: The Prehistory of the Digital Computer, From Relays to the 
Stored Program Concept (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1983). 123. See, "Table 5.1. 
The ENIAC." Herman H. Goldstine. Army liaison to the ENIAC project, cited an exact cost of 
S486.804.22. See, The Computer from Pascal to von Neumann (Princeton. New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press. 1972). 154. footnote 10. John W. Mauchly also estimated the cost at $500.000. 
See. "Mauchly on the Trials of Building ENIAC," IEEE Spectrum 12. no. 4 (1975), 76. It is likely 
that no one knew its true cost. 
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MANIAC, JOHNNIAC, and others.4 The ENIAC helped inspire this frenetic activity in publicly 
financed computer building but served only incidentally as a model for any other machine. Nothing 
like the ENIAC was built again. It was too limited in capabilities, too complex, too difficult to use, 
and too expensive to be worth replicating. The designs of two other early computers constructed 
largely under the auspices of the federal government defined the direction computers took. Neither 
had much in common with the ENIAC. although they had major similarities with one another. 
The team building the ENIAC initiated the first of the two truly influential machines that 
followed. Recognizing serious deficiencies in the yet unfinished ENIAC, Eckert. Mauchly. and 
others began computer design anew with the EDVAC.5 Mathematician John von Neumann joined as 
a consultant in late summer 1944 and the next spring wrote First Draft of a Report on the EDVAC. It 
dealt not with nuts-and-bolts issues as much as it formulated a fundamental theoretical framework for 
electronic digital computers that continues as their basis to this day. Notable is that von Neumann 
chose the logic and language of the "logical calculus of the ideas immanent in nervous activity" of 
biophysicists Walter Pitts and W. S. McCulloch to explain and systematize computer components and 
circuits. Rather than vacuum tubes and specialized electronics, von Neumann used human organ and 
neuron analogies to discuss alternative designs and make recommendations. Among the most urgent 
was that the EDVAC, "should be as simple as possible, that is, contain as few elements as possible."6 
The EDVAC was not completed by the University of Pennsylvania until 1952 and cost an estimated 
S467.000. with funding again provided by the Army, but it reflected the principles advocated by von 
Neumann. With a spare design including approximately 3.600 vacuum tubes, the EDVAC handily 
met goals of being simpler, smaller, and easier to use than the ENIAC.7 
The EDVAC was also more versatile and powerful. In particular, the EDVAC had stored-
program capabilities while the ENIAC did not. Programming the ENIAC entailed resetting a myriad 
of switches and relocating numerous jumper cables. The physical setup alone could take a couple of 
days. The EDVAC was programmed in much the same manner as computers today. Instructions and 
data were fed into the EDVAC. converted to binary code, and stored and manipulated as the 
instructions commanded. That capability made the EDVAC a computer in the complete sense. A 
i The computers specifically mentioned here derived from one particularly influential machine, the 
IAS computer. As another of those, and a name topper, the University of Sidney completed the 
SILLIAC in 1956. 
5 EDVAC is an acronym for Electronic Discrete Variable Automatic Computer. 
6 John von Neumann. First Draft of a Report on the EDVAC. 1945; reprinted in Papers of John von 
Neumann on Computing and Computing Theory, ed. William Aspray and Arthur Burks (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press. 1987). 23-25 and 28-29. 
Stern. From ENIAC to UNIVAC. 94-95 and 133. 
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computer as the word means today is automatic, general purpose, and stored program.8 Besides not 
having the latter characteristic, the ENIAC was neither automatic nor fully general purpose, and 
therefore, not a true computer. 
Von Neumann defined an automatic computer as one that when given instructions, "must be 
able to carry them out completely and without any need for further intelligent human intervention."9 
That did not describe the ENIAC. Data—always numbers—entered and left ENIAC as patterns of 
punched holes in paper cards, except for constants and initial values entered as switch settings. The 
ENIAC had little internal memory, so its operation required streams of data cards. Not only did 
initial and final values have to be dealt with manually, so did partial results, because the small 
memory meant they often could not be stored internally for use in the next steps of an ongoing 
calculation. Moreover, its miniscule memory limited the range of problems the ENIAC could 
handle.10 ENIAC is best defined as an ultra-complex electronic calculator." The EDVAC had a 
fraction of its physical size but one hundred times the memory.12 The extra memory was essential to 
making the EDVAC automatic, general purpose, and stored program. The EDVAC thus gets credit as 
the first true electronic digital computer by conception. 
Another machine, perhaps the EDSAC,13 deserves the honor of first one built. A product of 
scientists at Cambridge. England, the EDSAC. finished in May 1949 with funding from Cambridge 
University and J. Lyons, a food catering company, borrowed the basic design of the EDVAC.14 
Computer historians have speculated that the first completed true computer came in England because 
3 Fred Gruenberger. "What's In a Name?" Datamation 25. no. 5 (1 May 1979), 230. 
9 Von Neumann, First Draft of a Report on the EDVAC, 17. 
10 Allan G. Bromley. "What Defines a 'General-Purpose' Computer?" Annals of the History of 
Computing 5. no. 3 (July 1983). 303-305. See also comments by Konrad Zuse and Brian Randell at 
the end of Arthur W Burks and Alice R. Burks. "The ENIAC: First General-Purpose Electronic 
Computer." Annals of the History of Computing 3. no. 4 (October 1981), 396-397. For a listing of 
types of problems the ENIAC solved, see W. Barkley Fritz. "ENIAC—A Problem Solver." Annals of 
the History of Computing 16. no. 1 ( 1994). 41-45. 
11 No distinction will be made here between calculators and computers in ordinary usage. 
Brian Randell. ed., The Origins of Digital Computers: Selected Papers, 3rd ed. (New York: 
Springer-Verlag. 1982). 377. 
13 EDSAC is an acronym for Electronic Delay Storage Automatic Calculator (not computer). 
14 The first stored-program computer may have been a small, experimental one completed at 
Manchester, England, in 1948. Dubbed later the "baby Mark I." it had no working value but led the 
following year to a full-scale version, the Manchester Mark I. S. H. Lavington. "Computer 
Development at Manchester University." in A History of Computing in the Twentieth Century: A 
Collection of Papers. ed. N. Metropolis. J. Howlet. and Gian-Carlo Rota (New York: Academic 
Press. 1980). 433; Kenneth Flamm. Creating the Computer: Government, Industry, and High 
Technology (Washington. D C.: Brookings Institution, 1988), 138-141. 
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scientists there had less money. They focused on getting the job done, unlike in America, where 
scientists had public money to burn and could afford to be less diligent.15 
The relationship of Eckert and Mauchly with von Neumann began cordially but deteriorated 
after First Draft. which drew immediate interest. Von Neumann enjoyed a reputation for exceptional 
genius even before coming to the U.S. from his native Hungary in 1930. His lifetime work in 
mathematics, physics, economics, and beginning with the EDVAC. computer science is astonishing 
in its brilliance and scope. His services were in such demand during the war that he shuttled among 
governmental agencies providing scientific advice. He had an instrumental role in the Manhattan 
Project promoting the detonation of a plutonium bomb by implosion, for example.16 In fact, the 
atomic bomb project pushed von Neumann to search for better computational methods. A chance 
encounter at a train station with Herman Goldstine. a Ph.D. in mathematics and Army liaison officer 
to the ENIAC and EDVAC projects, led him to become involved with the two computers.17 
Von Neumann contributed little of a technical nature to the ENIAC, because its design had 
already been frozen. Eckert and Mauchly welcomed him. however, because he gave the project 
credibility. Few scientists who knew of the ENIAC had a favorable opinion.18 However, von 
Neumann encouraged colleagues from Los Alamos to give the computer its first problem. Nuclear 
weapons by then had a higher priority than ballistics. Theoretical physicists Stanley P. Frankel and 
Nicholas Metropolis thus traveled to Pennsylvania with 1 million paper cards to test a theory by 
physicist Edward Teller on the feasibility of the hydrogen bomb, or "Super."19 The ENIAC began the 
calculations in late 1945 and ran them intermittently over several months. A good solution exceeded 
the meager capabilities of the ENIAC. but it managed approximations—albeit, "insufficient and 
inaccurate"—that suggested Teller's theory might be flawed.20 
15 Martin Campbell-Kelly and William Aspray. Computer: A History of the Information Machine 
(New York City: BasicBooks. 1996). 99. 
16 William Aspray. John von Neumann and the Origins of Modern Computing (Cambridge. 
Massachusetts: MIT Press. 1990). 28-36. 
1 
' Goldstine. The Computer from Pascal to von Neumann, 182. 
18 Stem. From ENIAC to UNIVAC. 72: John G. Brainerd. "Genesis of the ENIAC." Technology and 
Culture 17. no. 3 (July 1976). 488. 
19 Goldstine. The Computer from Pascal to von Neumann, 214-215 and 226-227. 
~° Edward Teller quoted in Clark R. Mollenhoff, Atanasoff: Forgotten Father of the Computer 
(Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1988). 177; Honeywell v. Sperry Rand, United States 
District Court. District of Minnesota. Fourth Division. Civil Action File No. 4-67 Civil 138. Earl R. 
Larson. "Findings of Fact. Conclusions of Law and Order for Judgment," 19 October 1973. sections 
1.1.4.3-1.1.4.17. ISU. Parks. "Henry L. Hanson Papers" (box 5, folders 4-8). 
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The Army interrupted the calculations in February 1946 to unveil the ENIAC with no sparing 
of expenses, including a sumptuous five-course dinner featuring lobster bisque and filet mignon.21 
The Army did not disclose how the ENIAC computed, because that information remained classified. 
However, with the glowing publicity touting it as an "electronic brain."22 and the reputation of von 
Neumann behind it, the ENIAC won accolades, although still not from scientists in the know.23 As 
for Teller, he helped develop another hydrogen bomb theory that worked.24 
Eckert and Mauchly gained stature from their association with von Neumann, and his 
participation in design of the EDVAC provided welcomed inducement for the Army to fund its 
construction. However, when not cited in First Draft, Eckert and Mauchly became resentful. The 
two men considered themselves sole inventors of the EDVAC. and it infuriated them not to get credit. 
To make matters worse. Eckert and Mauchly had hoped to patent the EDVAC, but copies of First 
Draft put descriptions of much of its technology into the public domain too soon for them to meet the 
deadline for filing an application.25 Patent law stipulated a filing must occur no later than one year 
from a public disclosure. Von Neumann's paper constituted a disclosure, even if unintentional, and 
Eckert and Mauchly waited too long after its distribution to apply. They did patent features not 
detailed in the report, but those patents were all invalidated later for other reasons. 
The EDVAC was not solely, or mainly. Eckert and Mauchly's invention, but historians agree 
that von Neumann should have cited them and others in First Draft. Goldstine concurred in that 
opinion but nonetheless found von Neumann the only "indispensable" participant in the design of the 
Scott McCartney. ENIAC: The Triumphs and Tragedies of the World's First Computer (New 
York: Walker and Company. 1999). 106. 
~ Quoted in Campbell-Kelly and Aspray, Computer. 98. 
23 With the publicity, the University of Pennsylvania came under pressure to explain the ENIAC. 
The school therefore presented an eight-week computer course in summer 1946, after the electronic 
marvel had been declassified apparently. A number of students expected the ENIAC to be the main 
topic, but although it was the only commonly known electronic digital computer at the time, 
dedicated discussion was completely absent from the syllabus. The school preferred topics relating to 
the EDVAC and other advanced ideas, in particular numerical methods, which deal with how 
computers perform mathematics. For instance, one lecturer spoke of a machine under design at the 
Naval Ordnance Laboratory. The NOL computer was probably the most sophisticated computer at 
the time but never completed. On the other hand, another lecture went to the ASCC, an 
electromechanical computer completed before the ENIAC. Students complained about the absence of 
information on the ENIAC but were told. "Its (the ENIAC) no good, so why talk about it." The 
school eventually relented and included lectures on the ENIAC. Martin Campbell-Kelly and Michael 
R. Williams, eds.. The Moore School Lectures: Theory and Techniques for Design of Electronic 
Digital Computers (Cambridge. Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1985), xiv-xv and 490. 
"
4 Ceruzzi. The Reckoners. 127. 
25 Stem. From ENIAC to UNIVAC. 72 and 96-97. 
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EDVAC. He pointed out that von Neumann had not intended for First Draft to be copied widely. It 
did not get published formally until long after his untimely death from cancer in 1957. Indeed, 
brilliant though the report was. von Neumann never completed it. He left gaps of information 
throughout. And although he did not cite others in First Draft. von Neumann otherwise selflessly 
attributed the EDVAC to a team effort.26 However, he rightfully considered himself responsible for 
some ideas and tried to patent features of the EDVAC using First Draft as evidence.27 His attempt 
failed for the same reason that Eckert and Mauchly could not apply. Had either von Neumann or 
Eckert and Mauchly submitted on time, an acrimonious legal battle would likely have ensued.28 
Disheartening though the situation over the EDVAC must have been for both parties, neither 
had time to dwell on it. Eckert and Mauchly and von Neumann had already turned their attentions to 
other projects they separately had underway. Many people associated with the EDVAC left to follow 
one or other of the two parties, which was another reason why it took the University of Pennsylvania 
so long to finish it. 
In the case of von Neumann, he searched for funding to build a more advanced computer. He 
made the issue more troublesome by demanding potential sources impose few restrictions on how the 
computer be used. He had in mind a strictly scientific computer capable of solving large sets of linear 
algebraic equations and partial differential equations, especially non-linear ones. Such equations had 
been largely ignored because of the near impossibility of finding solutions using standard methods, 
but they represent much of the phenomena of the universe in hydrodynamics, quantum theory, 
aerodynamics, and other breaking areas of interest. 
Von Neumann avoided asking industry for help because he believed it, "would be influenced 
by its own past procedures and routines, and ... not be able to make as fresh a start as desirable."29 
~
6 Campbell-Kelly and Aspray. Computer. 96. 
~
7 According to Herman Goldstine. in design of the EDVAC. "Eckert and Mauchly unquestionably 
led on the technological side and von Neumann on the logical." Von Neumann believed himself 
specifically responsible for the programming code, serial architecture, and use of a cathode ray tube 
as memory. The latter found use in certain computers after the EDVAC. Goldstine. The Computer 
from Pascal to von Neumann. 196-198 and 224. Eckert specified what he believed to be his and 
Mauchly* s contributions in J. Presper Eckert. "The ENIAC." in A History of Computing in the 
Twentieth Century: A Collection of Papers, ed. N. Metropolis, J. Howlet. and Gian-Carlo Rota (New 
York: Academic Press. 1980). 530-535: Aspray. John von Neumann and the Origins of Modern 
Computing. 43. 
J8 Stern. From ENIAC to UNIVAC. 96-97. 
"
9 Von Neumann to Frank Aydelotte. director of the Institute for Advanced Study, memorandum. 5 
September 1945. Quoted in Aspray. John von Neumann and the Origins of Modern Computing. 54. 
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Even so, he allowed the Radio Corporation of America (RCA) to spend $100,000 developing a new 
type of memory, with resulting patents as its compensation. Much of the rest of the funding he 
received from the military by promising that problems the computer solved could have defense 
ramifications. Moreover, he suggested that the military should save money overall by building 
additional computers based on the one he planned. The other computers could be directly applied to 
military interests, including substituting for physical testing. For example, he claimed that 
computerized models could substitute for up to 75 percent of the work done in wind tunnels but cost 
less. Von Neumann thus procured funding from the Army, Navy, and later, the Atomic Energy 
Commission. In late 1945. he began development at the Institute for Advanced Study (IAS) at 
Princeton, where he had been associated before the war, and which added another $100,000 to his 
funding.30 The design of the IAS computer used that of the EDVAC as a starting point, but von 
Neumann relaxed his gospel of simplicity espoused in First Draft and made changes that complicated 
its architecture to improve its performance. 
Computer architecture is a concept that emerged later, but among other things, refers to how 
components of a computer are organized.31 The ENIAC. EDVAC. and IAS computer represented the 
range of architectures. The ENIAC had a parallel architecture, which meant it could perform multiple 
computations simultaneously. For example, the ENIAC could at any given instant be adding several 
separate number sets. Furthermore, the ENIAC calculated with all digits in those number sets 
simultaneously. This ability to perform operations in parallel with multiple number sets and all their 
digits made the ENIAC an architectural extreme. The EDVAC represented the other extreme. 
Computers that calculate by one operation at a time have a serial or, as it is usually called, sequential 
architecture. Humans consciously solve problems sequentially, so it is not surprising that von 
Neumann was predisposed to give the EDVAC a serial architecture.32 Parallel architecture has the 
promise of advantage in overall speed of computations but in practice has not worked well. 
Programming a parallel computer is generally much more difficult than a serial machine. In fact, the 
J
° Aspray. John von Neumann and the Origins of Modern Computing, 49-61; George Stibitz, 
"Introduction to the Course on Electronic Digital Computers." 8 July 1946; reprinted in The Moore 
School Lectures: Theory and Techniques for Design of Electronic Digital Computers, ed. Martin 
Campbell-Kelly and Michael R Williams (Cambridge. Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1985). 15. 
Richard E. Smith. "A Historical Overview of Computer Architecture," Annals of the History of 
Computing 10, no. 4 (1989), 277. 
Von Neumann was well aware that the brain is much more complex than a sequential computer. 
He though the brain might actually operate more like a parallel computer. See Aspray, John von 
Neumann and the Origins of Modern Computing, 206-209. 
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operators of the ENIAC modified it to compute sequentially after a few months attempting to 
program it in its original form.33 
By contrast, the IAS computer had a mixed architecture. Like the EDVAC. the IAS 
computer dealt with one number set at a time, or serially. Like the ENIAC, the IAS computer 
calculated with all digits in that set in parallel, at forty binary digits per number. The IAS computer 
represented a compromise, but a highly satisfactory one. With Julian Bigelow as chief engineer 
through most of its development, the IAS computer was finished in 1951. It cost approximately 
S650.000.34 used about 2.600 vacuum tubes, and needed less hardware overall than the EDVAC but 
paradoxically was at least five times faster.35 The design of the IAS computer thus improved on the 
EDVAC. which had improved markedly on the ENIAC. A comparison of these three early machines 
demonstrates principles still considered basic to design of computers: "smaller is faster." and "good 
design demands compromise."36 
Papers published jointly by von Neumann. Goldstine. and Arthur Burks built on First Draft 
to describe the theory behind the IAS computer and define what became known as the von Neumann 
architecture. If von Neumann was the guiding genius, the other two men had eminent qualifications 
for computer design. Besides duties as Army liaison. Goldstine had contributed technically to the 
ENIAC and EDVAC projects, particularly in programming. Burks had been a principal designer of 
both computers before following von Neumann to Princeton to help with the IAS computer. As 
Fritz. "ENIAC—A Problem Solver." 25. Fritz worked with the ENIAC through much of its 
history, so he knew its architecture. In describing the ENIAC as a sequential computer, he probably 
meant that it had been modified to perform computation with numbers serially, and that its ability to 
compute with digits in parallel remained unchanged. See. for example. Ceruzzi. The Reckoners, 147 
The purpose of the modification to the ENIAC was to make it a stored-program computer. This 
upgrade was completed by fall 1948. which made the modified ENIAC one of the first stored-
program computers. The change also slowed down the ENIAC by a factor of six to nine. See Fritz. 
ENIAC—A Problem Solver." 31-33. 
Kent C. Redmond and Thomas M. Smith. Project Whirlwind: The History of a Pioneer Computer 
(Bedford. Massachusetts: Digital Press. 1980), 166. 
35 Goldstine. The Computer from Pascal to von Neumann, 263; Julian Bigelow, "Computer 
Development at the Institute for Advanced Study." in A History of Computing in the Twentieth 
Century: A Collection of Papers, ed. N. Metropolis, J. Howlet. and Gian-Carlo Rota (New York: 
Academic Press. 1980), 307; Aspray. John von Neumann and the Origins of Modern Computing. 87. 
See. "Table 4.1 Specifications of the IAS computer": Aspray reports in another source that the IAS 
computer had 2.300 vacuum tubes. See. "The Mathematical Reception of the Modern Computer: 
John von Neumann and the Institute for Advanced Study Computer." in Studies in the History of 
Mathematics, ed. Esther R. Phillips. Studies in Mathematics (Mathematical Association of America. 
1987). Vol. 26. 177. 
"
6 David A. Patterson and John L. Hennessy. Computer Organization and Design: The Hardware / 
Sofnvare Interface (San Francisco: Morgan Kaufmann. 1994). 97-105 and 149. 
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Goldstine suggested later without exaggeration, the papers the men co-authored provided nothing less 
than "the blueprint for the modem computer."37 The vast majority of computers continue to use 
variations of the von Neumann architecture. Preliminary Discussion of the Logical Design of an 
Electronic Computing Instrument, published in June 1946, dealt with the hardware design of the LAS 
computer. Planning and Coding Problems for an Electronic Computing Instrument provided a 
formal foundation for programming. The second paper was written without Burks and published in 
several parts in 1947 and 1948.38 
The von Neumann architecture divides a computer into distinct input, output, logic and 
arithmetical processing, control, and memory units, or as von Neumann put it, organs. A von 
Neumann machine solves problems and makes conditional decisions using switching or 
combinational (computer) logic.39 It executes instructions sequentially but stores and retrieves bits of 
information in parallel. Data and instructions are both expressed internally in binary form and 
handled in identical fashion by both the memory and processing units.40 The ramification is that a 
computer is able to modify instructions in the same way data are modified and can use programs to 
build other programs.41 This allowed eventually the creation of special programs called compilers to 
translate high-level computer languages that are easy for humans to grasp to more abstruse assembly 
language. Other programs called assemblers are used in turn to translate assembly language to the 
zeros and ones of machine language that a binary digital computer understands directly, although 
each early binary computer used a unique version of machine language. 
Von Neumann created a code of a few simple instructions for the EDVAC.42 He used his 
code to write a "sort and merge routine" that probably constituted the first program for a stored-
program computer and intended as an experiment in conditional logic.43 Coding for von Neumann 
meant binary code; he did not help develop higher languages and cared nothing about them. He used 
,7 Goldstine, The Computer from Pascal to von Neumann, 255-256. 
38 The papers are reprinted in full in Papers of John von Neumann on Computing and Computing 
Theory, ed. William Aspray and Arthur Burks. 
39 Paul Ceruzzi. "Crossing the Divide: Architectural Issues and the Emergence of the Stored Program 
Computer. 1935-1955." Annals of the History of Computing 19, no. 1 (1997), 6. 
40 William Aspray. "The Stored Program Concept." IEEE Spectrum 27. no. 9 (September 1990). 51. 
41 According to historian of computers Allan G. Bromley, the idea of using programs to build other 
programs perhaps should be attributed to Maurice Wilkes and D. J. Wheeler as part of their work 
building the EDSAC at Cambridge in England. Bromley, "What Defines a 'General-Purpose' 
Computer?" 305. 
4
" Von Neumann, First Draft of a Report on the EDVAC, 76-82. 
43 Donald E. Knuth. "Von Neumann's First Computer Program," reprinted in Papers of John von 
Neumann on Computing and Computing Theory, ed. William Aspray and Arthur Burks (Cambridge. 
Massachusetts: MIT Press. 1987). 83-96. 
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code to the extent that he did, not to make programming easier, but to use memory more efficiently.** 
The IAS computer was thus programmed in machine language, an annoyance posing no particular 
obstacle to von Neumann, legendary for his ability to do complex calculations in his head.45 
Scientists from Los Alamos got first use of the IAS computer, like for the ENIAC. for calculations 
related to development of hydrogen bombs. 
After the discouraging battle with Eckert and Mauchly over the EDVAC patent rights, von 
Neumann insisted that all new concepts emanating from the IAS computer be placed into the public 
domain.46 There is no evidence that von Neumann ever sought undue personal benefit from his work 
with computers. It is likely that he had attempted to patent parts of the EDVAC to ensure the general 
availability of the technology and not for profit. 
As another aside, the main exceptions to computers based on the von Neumann architecture 
are supercomputers, which are highly parallel machines. Supercomputers might thus be thought to 
follow the ENIAC. However, supercomputers actually have architectures more closely related to von 
Neumann machines except they have multiple processors. 
While von Neumann concerned himself with the IAS computer and a variety of other weighty 
intellectual endeavors, Eckert and Mauchly also continued to develop computers. They resigned, or 
were fired—it is not clear which—from the University of Pennsylvania in March 1946 in a dispute 
over ownership of patents. Von Neumann attempted to hire Eckert as chief engineer for the LAS 
computer but rescinded his offer. International Business Machines (IBM) proposed to fund a 
computing laboratory for Eckert and Mauchly. The men turned the proposition down, deciding 
instead to form a business manufacturing and selling computers.47 That venture is regarded as the 
pioneering transition of the computer to the commercial market. 
Eckert and Mauchly knew the Census Bureau intended to acquire a computer and had a 
budget of S300.000, with money coming from the Army through the National Bureau of Standards. 
The two men estimated that a suitable computer could take at least $400,000 to build. They 
nevertheless formed a partnership, submitted a bid as the Electronic Control Company (ECC) for the 
amount available to the Census Bureau, and won the contract. Another bidder was Raytheon 
44 Paul Ceruzzi. "An Unforeseen Revolution: Computers and Expectations. 1935-1985." in 
Imagining Tomorrow: History. Technology, and the American Future. ed. Joseph J. Com 
(Cambridge. Massachusetts: MIT Press. 1986). 198-199. 
45 Bigelow. "Computer Development at the Institute for Advanced Study." 309-310. 
40 Aspray. John von Neumann and the Origins of Modern Computing, 45 and 85. 
47 Stem. From ENIAC to UNIVAC. 91-92. 
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Corporation, which presented a realistic bid. Raytheon went on to build the Hurricane computer, also 
known as the RAYDAC. for the Navy for an estimated S460.000.48 Eckert and Mauchly took a 
calculated risk that they could recoup the initial loss by selling additional computers. However, their 
bid set an unfortunate precedent. They found themselves time and again in desperation selling 
computers at ruinously low prices to generate enough cash flow to temporarily forestall insolvency. 
ECC made its second sale in October 1947. The fledgling partnership struggled financially 
from its onset, because the Census Bureau agreed to pay for its computer only in stages with 
completion of corresponding work. Needing money, Eckert and Mauchly contracted to build the 
BINAC 49 for the Northrop Aircraft Company. The ultimate user was to be the Air Force, which 
wanted a small, reliable computer to operate onboard an aircraft. The contract had a May 1948 
delivery and S 100,000 price. The enticement to Eckert and Mauchly was that Northrop paid $80.000 
up front. The BINAC finally got delivered in September 1949 at a cost of $278.000. Worse, it did 
not work, at least not after being shipped across the country. The BINAC could not be taken 
airborne, but Northrop eventually got some use of it on the ground and paid the remainder of the 
contractual price. Eckert and Mauchly had to absorb the cost overrun. 
The BINAC has historical interest as one of the first true computers completed (loosely 
speaking) in the United States.50 A notable feature was use of plastic magnetic tape to move data in 
and out of the computer more efficiently than with punched cards. The BINAC. with 1.400 vacuum 
tubes, was essentially two, modified, small-scale EDVACs linked together and likely had good 
commercial prospects, never mind its poor performance. Mauchly investigated and found a number 
of universities and businesses interested in buying copies. Despite its advanced state of development, 
however. Eckert and Mauchly abandoned the design of the BINAC in favor of that of the UNTVAC,51 
the much larger computer on the drawing board for the Census Bureau. 
The UNTVAC. too. started with the design of the EDVAC. With 5.400 vacuum tubes.52 the 
UNIV AC was bigger in part because of its use of a less efficient, hybrid number system. Where the 
48 Redmond and Smith, Project Whirlwind, 166; Saul Rosen. "'Electronic Computers: A Historical 
Survey," Computing Surveys 1. no. 1 (March 1969), 15. 
49 BINAC is an acronym for Binary Automatic Computer. 
50 Given that the BINAC apparently never did work satisfactorily, some historians of computers 
consider the first stored-program computer in the United States to have been the Standards Eastern 
Automatic Computer (SEAC). built by the National Bureau of Standards and completed in 1950. 
Also notable about SEAC was its use of germanium diodes to replace many vacuum tubes. Solid 
state diodes thereafter became common in computers. Flamm, Creating the Computer. 15-16 and 70. 
5
' UNIV AC is an acronym for Universal Automatic Computer. 
5
" Stem. From ENIAC to UNIVAC. 133. See the table entitled, "A Comparison of Architecture, 
Performance, and Physical Characteristics of the Eckert-Mauchly Computers." 
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EDVAC and BINAC were binary machines and the ENIAC decimal, the UNTVAC calculated in 
binary-coded decimal arithmetic.53 Decimal was believed superior for accounting-oriented 
computers.54 and Eckert and Mauchly designed the UNTVAC with businesses in mind. A customer 
bought a UNTVAC system, including computer and choices of peripheral equipment. Among these 
were input and output devices using metallic magnetic tape—plastic tape proved yet too flimsy. 
Magnetic storage proved key to the success of computers for processing information for 
businesses. Calculations in business applications are usually rudimentary, although that makes no 
difference to a digital computer, which cannot tell the difference between bookkeeping and calculus. 
For all its sophistication, the only operations a digital computer actually does are the most elementary 
kind. As far as there was a difference in hardware requirements between scientific and business 
applications, it was assumed the former needed greater precision and the latter needed to handle 
larger volumes of data as input and output.55 Thus, performing calculations in decimal avoided the 
conversions necessary for binary arithmetic. Differences in applications were otherwise in 
programming. A business computer had to read large amounts of data; manipulate, sort, and 
rearrange it as desired; and record results, all done accurately. 
Eckert and Mauchly did not intend originally to include punched-card equipment with the 
UNTVAC. because of IBM's domination of such equipment and because of the difficulties in 
perfecting it. However, when an early customer insisted that card-to-tape and tape-to-card converters 
be provided, they developed them. Businesses performed accounting functions on electromechanical 
punched-card equipment, and the availability of the converters explains much of UNTVAC's ultimate 
success by easing transition to the new computer and tape-storage technologies. Eckert and Mauchly 
were prescient in recognizing the great market for computers lie not in scientific computing but in 
information processing for government and business. Of course, their initial contract with the Census 
Bureau pushed them in that direction. Moreover, a long tradition in business applications already 
existed for digital calculating machines. 
Prescient or not, sales of the UNTVAC only trickled in even at give-away prices. That greater 
sales did not result probably reflected less a reluctance of businesses to buy computers than more a 
5
" Alice R. Burks and Arthur W. Burks, The First Electronic Computer: The Atanasoff Story (Ann 
Arbor. Michigan: University of Michigan Press. 1988). 276. 
54 Charles J. Bashe. et al.. IBM's Earlx Computers (Cambridge. Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1986). 
439. 
55 Rosen. '"Electronic Computers. " 14; Bashe, et al., IBM's Early Computers. 115. Beyond the 
explanation given, business applications involved standardized and periodic operations, and both 
input and output had to be kept for reference. On the other hand, engineering and scientific 
applications tended to be individualistic and ad hoc. Records were discretionary. 
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concern with the dismal financial state of the Eckert-Mauchly enterprise. Prudential Insurance 
Company contracted to buy a system for $150,000, including twenty pieces of peripheral equipment. 
Eckert and Mauchly offered to sell the A. C. Nielsen Company a system for $100,000. Not only were 
these prices far too low to cover costs, but the men also promised impossibly close delivery dates. 
They incorporated in December 1947 to obtain more operating funds. As the Eckert-Mauchly 
Computer Corporation (EMCC), they gained temporary respite when American Totalisator 
Company,56 which had interest in computers for pari-mutuel betting, moved to purchase 40 percent of 
the voting common stock and loaned money in the interim until the sale went through. Circumstances 
within American Totalisator then caused it to withdraw. Probably nothing could have saved EMCC 
in any case, and Eckert and Mauchly sold their company to Remington Rand in 1950.57 
Remington Rand may have wondered if it had made a smart purchase. EMCC had contracted 
for six UNTVAC systems for $1.2 million total. Estimated average deliver cost was $500,000 each. 
Remington Rand placed Leslie Groves, former Army general who headed the Manhattan Project, in 
charge, retained Eckert as chief engineer, and eventually relegated Mauchly to sales. The company 
could not break its government contracts, but bullied firms with orders into canceling them by 
threatening nuisance lawsuits. It shipped the first UNIV AC to the Census Bureau in March 1951 and 
sold additional ones for about $1 million each. Selling became easier with a publicity windfall when 
a television network used early return statistics and a UNTVAC to predict Dwight D. Eisenhower 
1952 presidential election winner. UNTVAC became synonymous with computer for some time, and 
the original model was an outstanding machine for its day. Total sales reached forty-six and might 
have been more if Remington Rand had greater manufacturing capacity. As it were, the initial 
UNTVAC line never returned a profit.58 It fell to IBM to make computers commonplace. 
56 Australian G. A. Julius invented the totalisator for keeping track automatically of bets on 
racehorses. His entirely mechanical machine was first used in 1913. Subsequent totalisators 
contained electromechanical telephone switching components and became quite sophisticated. It was 
therefore natural for American Totalisator Company to be interested in computers. See Randell. ed.. 
The Origins of Digital Computers. 241-242. 
57 According to Mauchly, he and Eckert sold their interests in EMCC. including patent rights, to 
Remington Rand for '*$200,000 or S250.000" each. Mauchly quoted in John Costello. "He Changed 
the World." The Washingtonian (December 1983). 96 and 98. 
58 Stem. From ENIAC to UNIVAC, 105-159; The selling price for a UNTVAC system comes from a 
corporate brochure by J. H. Rand entitled, "Remington Rand Progress in the Field of Electronics for 
Business. Industry and Government." 4 February 1955. 22. A copy is contained in ISU, Parks, "John 
Vincent Atanasoff Papers" (box 49. folder entitled "Sperry Rand Corporation v. Control Data 
Corporation"); Campbell-Kelly and Aspray. Computer. 125. 
14 
The EDVAC and. more directly, the LAS computer furnished the basic pattern for subsequent 
computers. Remington Rand. IBM. National Cash Register (NCR), and Burroughs, all established 
manufacturers of data-handling machines, began building commercial computers by the mid-1950s. 
General Electric (GE). RCA. Philco. Honeywell, and other companies also started producing 
commercial machines. New corporations, such as Control Data and Digital Equipment Corporation 
(DEC), were created by end of the 1950s specifically for manufacturing computers. 
However, the computer industry became economically significant only after a great more 
development beyond that manifested by the UNTVAC or IAS computer. A good share of that 
development came accompanied by government support. Kenneth Flamm, a researcher at the 
Brookings Institution, studied government funding of computer technology and the rise of the 
industry. He found that of twenty-five principal innovations in computer-related technologies 
between 1946 and 1965. all but seven received money from a government to cover some costs of 
development. Furthermore, first sales of nineteen of the innovations were to a government. This was 
normally the Federal Government of the United States, but the British Government also invested 
heavily in computers and related research in the early years. Actual research and development tended 
to be by universities or corporations.59 Flamm argued convincingly that the most crucial of the 
twenty-five inventions were transistors, integrated circuits, rotating magnetic storage, and magnetic 
core memory. These four technologies proved essential for computers to become widely used, and all 
involved government funding.60 
Speed of operation and size of memory are often cited to indicate the performance potential 
of a computer. Actual performance depends also on architecture and other design attributes that fit 
together in complex relationship. The best measurement of performance is thus job completion time 
and is application specific.61 Vacuum tubes could operate quite fast: The clock rate on the ENIAC 
averaged 100.000; the EDVAC, 1 million: and the BINAC, 2.5 million pulses per second.62 Despite 
its faster clock speed, the EDVAC performed a calculation in about the same time as the ENIAC 
because of differences in architecture. For example, both computers took approximately three 
59 Flamm, Creating the Computer. 260-261. The information is contained in '"Table A-l. Principal 
Developments in Computer Technology." 
60 Flamm. Creating the Computer. 13. 
6
' Patterson and Hennessy. Computer Organization and Design. 52-53. 
b
~ Stern. From ENIAC to UNIVAC. 133. The information is contained in a table entitled "A 
Comparison of Architecture. Performance, and Physical Characteristics of the Eckert-Mauchly 
Computers." 
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milliseconds to complete a multiplication.63 The EDVAC would nonetheless give superior 
performance in most applications because of its larger memory and more effective design, not to 
mention easier programming. However, as a general rule, speed and size of memory are the main 
factors of performance, particularly within a given architecture, and the four technologies noted by 
Flamm have been essential to increasing either speed or size of memory, or both. They have also 
been key to reducing costs, energy consumption, and size of computers, and for improving reliability. 
John Bardeen, Walter Brattain. and William Shockley of the Bell Telephone Laboratories 
(BTL) are credited with inventing the transistor in the late 1940s and shared a Nobel Prize in physics 
for their genius. Transistors substituted for vacuum tubes and thus are used as simple switches and 
amplifiers. Manufacture of transistors begins with semiconductors, which are elements such as 
germanium or silicon that are not in themselves good conductors of electricity. Other materials are 
carefully added to the semiconductor raw material to make the transistor either conduct or halt the 
flow of electricity upon command. The manufacturing process proved difficult to master, and the 
first transistors were unsatisfactory: They were unreliable, prohibitively expensive, and slower 
reacting than vacuum tubes. Government assisted with the development of transistors because, 
compared to vacuum tubes, transistors are small, use little power, and require no warm up.64 Flamm 
reported that government paid about 25 percent of the BTL's research budget in semiconductors for 
1949 through 1958.65 The TRADIC. built by the BTL in 1954 for the Air Force, used only transistors 
but performed at speeds close of computers with vacuum tubes.66 The first commercial computing 
machine with transistors was the IBM 608 Calculating Punch, an updated punched-card calculator.67 
Before it began shipping in late 1957. IBM decided that all their new computers would incorporate 
so Id-state circuitry.68 
An integrated circuit is a complete electronic circuit, including transistors, often many 
millions of them, manufactured on a small monolithic piece of semiconductor called a chip. Jack 
Kilby of Texas Instruments and Robert Noyce of Fairchild Semiconductor independently invented the 
6j Flamm. Creating the Computer, 9. Information on arithmetic-processing speeds of select early 
computers is contained in "Table 2-1. Progress in Machine Computation Speeds." 
64 Michael Riordan and Lillian Hoddeson, Crystal Fire: The Birth of the Information Age (New 
York: W. W. Norton. 1997). 202-203. 
65 Flamm. Creating the Computer. 15-16. See also "Table 3-1. Early U.S. Support for Computers." 
76-77. 
66 Riordan and Hoddeson. Crystal Fire. 204. TRADIC is an acronym for TRAnsistorized Digital 
Computer. 
6
' Rosen. "Electronic Computers." 21. 
68 Bashe. et al.. IBM's Early Computers. 386-387. 
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integrated circuit in the late 1950s. For their achievement, Kilby, but not Noyce, won a Nobel Prize. 
Noyce died before the award was made in 2000. Neither man used public funding for their invention 
but knew the military provided a certain market.69 As with transistors, government directly or 
indirectly paid some subsequent development costs. One year after inventing integrated circuits. 
Texas Instruments used them in a computer for the Air Force.70 Integrated circuits then became the 
essential ingredient of the extraordinarily advanced and relatively cheap computers of today. 
Integrated circuits are commonly used in both processors and memories. Those in memories are 
specially designed with millions of microscopic capacitors to hold the charges that represent data. 
Improving memory has been more difficult than increasing computational speed and has 
meant making complex compromises between access speeds and costs. Von Neumann recognized 
that although a computer designer might wish for a "memory organ" of infinitely large capacity, a 
workable alternative could consist of. "a hierarchy of memories, each of which has greater capacity 
than the preceding but is less quickly accessible."71 Computer engineers have indeed found that 
carefully designed memory hierarchies, based on fundamental principles of compromise and the 
inverse relationship between speed and size, can create the "illusion of unlimited fast memory." 
Many refinements to the von Neumann architecture have defined configurations of memory hierarchy 
and how the levels interact together and with the processor. 
At the top of a typical memory hierarchy, designers place a relatively small, expensive, but 
fast-access memory to work directly with the processor. In fact, it can be said that the highest 
memory is an integral part of the processor. A computer uses a small number of registers within its 
processor to hold data immediately before being logically manipulated or moved to the next lower-
level memory. All data in an electronic digital computer are contained in discrete voltage signals 
referred to as strings of zeros and ones. Each zero or one is called a bit.7" The number of bits in a 
register is called a word, even when the data represent numbers or other symbols other than letters of 
the alphabet. Besides being more remote, each consecutive lower level of the memory hierarchy is 
larger, slower, and less expensive. First is cache memory, perhaps several levels, which operates 
immediately with the processor, at its speed, and functions as a buffer with the main memory. Main 
69 Riordan and Hoddeson, Crystal Fire. 254-275. 
70 Flamm. Creating the Computer. 17-18. 
71 Arthur W. Burks, Herman H. Goldstine. and John von Neumann, Preliminary Discussion of the 
Logical Design of an Electronic Computing Instrument, 1946: reprinted in Papers of John von 
Neumann on Computing and Computing Theory, ed. William Aspray and Arthur Burks (Cambridge. 
Massachusetts: MIT Press. 1987). 101. 
7
~ Bit is an acronym for Binary diglT. 
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memory is random access memory (RAM), by which is meant that access time is the same no matter 
where in memory data is stored. Beneath main memory and at the bottom of the hierarchy is 
secondary memory. It usually includes magnetic discs or tape.73 
The memory hierarchy of the ENIAC had at bottom a secondary memory of punched cards, 
just as used in accounting equipment. Cable connections and switch settings comprised a memory of 
sorts, and the ENIAC also had three function tables as read-only storage. The function tables were 
constructed from special resistive-matrix circuits that did not require vacuum tubes. However, Eckert 
and Mauchly used vacuum tubes to construct a main memory of equivalent capacity to about that in 
the registers of a computer today. The ENIAC had in fact no higher memory, so its main memory, 
technically dual-function accumulators, served as registers. A vacuum tube memory was fast acting 
but necessarily limited in capacity, because vacuum tubes were expensive, bulky, and prone to 
failure. They also took lots of electricity and generated large amounts of heat. As it was, the ENIAC 
had an inordinate number of vacuum tubes. Experts in electronics thought the ENIAC had exceeded 
the practical number of tubes, and though it worked well given its limitations, no one thought it 
feasible to add more. The main memory of the ENIAC was thus pitifully insufficient and not 
expandable.74 Overall, the ENIAC stored up to twenty words of ten decimal digits each in main 
memory and less than 400 words in function tables.75 
A computer needs far more high-speed memory, so Eckert developed mercury delay tubes as 
elements for the main memory of the EDVAC. The mercury delay tube derived from an invention by 
him during the war for use with radar, but based on an earlier invention by William Shockley of the 
BTL. the same person who helped invent the transistor. The mercury delay tube converted electrical 
signals to slower speed pressure waves in mercury and then back to electrical impulses. By 
amplifying its output and recycling that signal as input back into itself, the mercury delay tube could 
regenerate and store data indefinitely in sequential mode. The device was thus not random access, 
but that seemed to pose little problem for the EDVAC with its serial architecture and 1 million pulses 
'
3 Patterson and Hennessy. Computer Organization and Design, 16-20, 97. and 454-455. 
4 That is. not expandable with vacuum tubes. One modification to the ENIAC added a magnetic 
core memory. See. Randell. The Origins of Digital Computers. 299. 
75 More precisely, according to Eckert. the ENIAC contained the storage equivalent of 227 decimal 
digits in its accumulators and 3.952 decimal digits in its function tables. Counting various program 
controls. Eckert estimated total internal memory to have been about 7,000 digits. J. Presper Eckert, 
Jr.. "A Preview of a Digital Computing Machine," 15 July 1946; reprinted in The Moore School 
Lectures: Theory and Techniques for Design of Electronic Digital Computers, ed. Martin Campbell-
Kelly and Michael R. Williams (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1985), 112. 
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per second clock rate. The EDVAC contained 256 mercury delay tubes, each of which could store 
thirty-two words of thirty-two bits each.76 It used a variety of devices for secondary memory and 
input and output of data. These included Teletype tape, punched cards, and eventually, a magnetic 
drum 77 
Von Neumann and his group chose a primary read-write regenerating memory for the IAS 
computer based on the Williams tube, at heart an ordinary cathode ray tube, after giving up waiting 
on a similar but more sophisticated memory to be developed by RCA.78 A cathode ray tube is the 
main component of a television and may seem odd to use as a memory, but a television picture serves 
as a kind of temporary memory. The Williams tube swept the phosphor on its five-inch screen many 
times a second with an electron beam,79 but instead of a picture left a charged pattern of dots and lines 
or other two-form combination representing zeros and ones. Wire mesh mounted opposite the screen 
established a capacitive coupling to help hold the charges. Cathode ray tube memories were also 
called electrostatic memories for that reason. Memory was periodically read by having the electron 
beam generate only one form as it swept the screen. If the form matched that stored at the location 
being read, no change in voltage was detected at the wire mesh. If the form did not match, a voltage 
change occurred. The signal that resulted at the wire mesh as the beam moved from location to 
location across the screen was amplified and either routed to the processor or used to regenerate the 
pattern in memory.80 The Williams tube originally stored data serially like the mercury delay tube 
and held the same number of bits. Engineers at Princeton modified the Williams tube to make it 
random access and give it an access speed sixty times faster than the mercury delay tube. They linked 
forty of the cathode ray tubes in parallel as a main memory.81 
The Williams tube did not make a satisfactory memory either, however. Memories made 
from vacuum, mercury delay, and cathode ray tubes all suffered reliability problems. Magnetic 
'
6 Arthur W. Burks. "From ENIAC to the Stored-Program Computer: Two Revolutions in 
Computers." in A History of Computing in the Twentieth Century: A Collection of Papers, ed. N. 
Metropolis. J. Howlet. and Gian-Carlo Rota (New York: Academic Press, 1980), 335-339. 
S. E. Gluck. "The Electronic Discrete Variable Computer," Electrical Engineering 72. no. 2 
(February 1953). 162. 
78 F. C. Williams of Manchester. England, invented the Williams tube. RCA went on to perfect the 
Selectron, or "selective electrostatic storage tube." It was more complex than the Williams tube but 
used in a number of computers, including the JOHNNIAC. See Jan Rajchman. "Early Research on 
Computers at RCA," in A History of Computing in the Twentieth Century: A Collection of Papers, ed. 
N. Metropolis, J. Howlet. and Gian-Carlo Rota (New York: Academic Press. 1980), 468. 
79 Goldstine. The Computer from Pascal to von Neumann. 310-311. 
80 J. P. Eckert. "A Survey of Digital Computer Memory Systems," Proceedings of the I.R.E. (October 
1953). 1397-1399. 
81 Goldstine. The Computer from Pascal to von Neumann. 312. 
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memories perform better, although rotating magnetic storage devices actually work at intermediate 
speeds. The IAS computer had as its secondary memory an early magnetic drum memory.82 
Engineering Research Associates (ERA) built the first rotating magnetic memories for the Navy and 
National Security Agency. Ex-Navy scientists had formed ERA after the war to build cryptanalytic 
equipment for the Navy. 
Among magnetic memories and other devices it built. ERA is notable for another early 
stored-program computer. Unlike the BINAC. the Atlas worked reliably from its delivery to the 
Navy in late 1950. The Atlas contained 2.700 vacuum tubes and used a rotating magnetic drum as 
main memory. ERA also produced commercial versions of the Atlas and a more advanced computer, 
the ERA 1103. 
ERA, like Eckert and Mauchly's EMCC, had financial problems, in large part because its 
major program developing cryptanalytic equipment had little relationship to digital computers and 
ultimately failed.83 Even so. ERA was the most successful commercial producer of computers until 
also bought by Remington Rand in 1952.w Acquisition of EMCC and ERA made Remington Rand 
the largest manufacturer of computers until IBM took the lead in the mid-1950s. 
Magnetic or ferrite core memories were a great improvement for high-speed applications, 
considering storage density, access speed, reliability, and cost. Core memory consisted of arrays of 
tiny rings of ferrite material with multiple fine wires threaded through their hollow centers. The wires 
carried current that magnetized the rings in a clockwise or counterclockwise direction corresponding 
to a zero or one. The wires also read the magnetic states of the rings. Another big advantage to core 
memory was that it did not need regeneration except when read. Moreover, the cores tended to retain 
their magnetic states even through a power loss. Historians of computers attribute the invention of 
core memory to the Whirlwind computer project at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), 
with funding from the Navy and Air Force.85 Magnetic core memories remained popular into the 
1970s, when integrated circuits completely took over as high-speed memory elements of choice.86 
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84 Flamm. Creating the Computer. 19 and 43-46. See also, "Table A-l. Principal Developments in 
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Flamm noted in summary that from 1945 until 1955 the federal government contributed the 
great share of money for computer development. Private sources funded no more than 25 percent in 
1950. for instance. The public sector also purchased most computers, about 70 percent in 1953. 
Two years later the situation had changed dramatically: Government operated less than 40 percent of 
all computers in 1955. Ten years after that, however, public sources still provided about half of all 
money for computer research in the U.S.87 The decreasing percentage involvement did not mean less 
federal money: on the contrary, while other research areas had funding reduced occasionally, 
government expenditures in computer development grew almost every year. The federal government 
spent over SI billion in computer research in 1995. the big share for supercomputers.88 Rather, the 
lower involvement as a percentage by government reflected spectacular growth in computer and 
related industries and huge expenditures by those industries in research. The result has been steady 
innovation and dramatically lower prices. 
Forbes magazine reported in 1997 that the chief business of thirteen of the top one hundred 
U.S. companies was computers or associated technologies. The list included corporate giants such as 
Microsoft. Intel, Oracle. Computer Associates, and Compaq Computer, which did not exist in 1955.89 
One company that did, IBM. had most of its sales then from typewriters, time recording devices, and 
punched-card tabulating equipment.90 Impact of the computer industry went beyond sales of 
computers and related items, of course, since much of the equipment was put to work as aids to boost 
productivity. Technological innovation is a major factor in productivity, which must increase for 
standard of living to improve.91 Some evidence suggests that computers may be paying great 
productivity dividends. According to one account, manufacturers who computerized saw about 5.7 
percent per year growth in productivity between 1990 and 1996. Those that did not use computers 
had 2.6 percent annual growth.92 Since approximately 85 percent of workers used computing 
s Kenneth Flamm. Targeting the Computer: Governmental Support and International Competition 
(Washington. D C.: Brookings Institution. 1987). 25. 42-43. 95. 96-97. 107-108. and 241. 
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these companies "silicon-based companies" because of their dependence on integrated circuits. 
90 Emerson W Pugh. Building IBM: Shaping an Industry and its Technology (Cambridge. 
Massachusetts: MIT Press. 1995). xi. 
9
' "A Survey of Innovation in Industry." The Economist 350. no. 8107 (20 February 1999). 7. 
9
~ Matt Siege I. "Do Computers Slow us Down?" Fortune 137. no. 6 (30 March 1998). 34. The 
information is contained in a table entitled. "Labor Productivity in U.S. Manufacturing: Annual 
Growth Rates." 
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technology in some form.93 it was commonly believed to have been one key to the stellar performance 
of the U.S. economy through most of the 1990s."4 
Computers themselves have changed. They fundamentally tend to be von Neumann 
machines, but smaller and more sophisticated then he could have imagined. Advancements in 
integrated circuits have led to microprocessors that have extensive computing capabilities on single 
silicon chips. Use of microprocessors has helped shrink computers from the size of the first large 
mainframes to that of personal or notebook computers or smaller. Yet computers have become ever 
more powerful. It is axiomatic that the power of new computers doubles every twelve to eighteen 
months. This relationship is known as Moore's Law.95 Tasks given computers have moved so far 
beyond data processing or mathematical modeling that it is not hyperbole for historian of computers 
Paul E. Ceruzzi to claim: A computer is universal machine; it can do 'anything'—that is. whatever 
we can program it to do."96 Microelectronics has furthermore promoted merging of computing with 
instrumentation and communications devices. An estimated 41 percent of American households in 
1997 had computers, but they are more common than that figure indicates. Microprocessors are 
embedded in everyday appliances and services, such as automobiles, wristwatches. thermostats, 
telephones, and the Internet, integrating computing capabilities in ways not necessarily obvious. The 
term ubiquitous computing has been coined to describe a pervasive but unseen computer environment 
that looks to be our future. 
Little wonder, therefore, that advocates of state funding of science tout the computer as an 
example of its fruit. Government spent massively on information-processing technologies during 
World War II. spent ever increasing amounts thereafter, and the computer is today of tremendous 
importance. Historians agree that without that support computers simply could not have developed. 
As one put it. speaking a near-unanimous view: "The failure of large corporations to take the 
initiative in developing computers during the immediate postwar period meant that if these devices 
were to be developed at all. the government would have to become the principal financial agent."97 
9* James W. Cortada. "Commercial Applications of the Digital Computer in American Corporations. 
1945-1995." IEEE Annals of the History of Computing 18. no. 2 ( 1996). 18. 
94 
"A Survey of Innovation in Industry," The Economist. 8. 
95 The law is attributed to Gordon Moore, a founder with Robert Noyce of Intel Corporation, a major 
manufacturer of microchips. 
96 Ceruzzi, The Reckoners. 151. 
97 Stem. From ENIAC to UNIVAC, 160. 
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Nor is the computer the only major technology alleged to have resulted from federal monies 
dispensed for research during the war. Jet engines, rockets, DDT, and penicillin were others.98 
Inspired by successes epitomized by the computer, it became a fact of life for federal 
government to spend enormous amounts of money for research. Many innovations have been created 
and commercialized. The United States has prospered. Nonetheless, contrary to prevailing wisdom, 
history suggests that the same computers would exist today without that government involvement but 
with less money having been spent. Economic efficiencies were of secondary importance at best, of 
course, since support initially came during national crises. The computer is in that sense a weapon 
converted to plowshare. The issue is not to question the need for defense, but to consider whether 
spending on computer development by government was otherwise warranted. 
Evidence that public support was unnecessary is of various kinds. First, there is the history of 
invention generally. People were prolific innovators before lavish support by government became 
commonplace. There is no reason to think inventing would have stopped if not for the new 
assistance, although the invention rate did decline. That is. counterintuitive though it may seem, 
patents awarded per capita decreased approximately coincident with the rise of government support. 
Second, examination of innovations related to computers and developed with government support 
suggests the private sector was quite willing and able to perfect them on its own. Third, review of the 
experiences of other nations gives evidence that government intervention in computer development 
was not only unnecessary but also counterproductive. Fourth, a data-handling industry existed before 
World War II. It was cautious but nevertheless innovative and highly responsive to customers, who 
were notoriously price sensitive.99 The history of the industry, particularly of IBM. suggests it would 
have built computers to meet growing information-processing needs of corporations and 
governments. Finally, the history of modern computers begins not with the ENIAC, but earlier. The 
foundation of electronic digital computers lies in the seemingly unlikely depths of the Great 
Depression, which were actually highly productive years for innovation generally. So important were 
the achievements of the prewar years that it could be said that the commercial success of the 
computer was due not to government, but rather, the successes of government-developed computer 
98 Science Policy Study Background Report No. 1: A History of Science Policy in the United States. 
1940-1985 (Washington. D C.; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), 20. 
99 James W Cortada. Before the Computer: IBM, NCR, Burroughs, and Remington Rand and the 
Industry they Created, 1865-1956 (Princeton. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), 4-5 and 
105-110. 
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technology depended on privately funded work. The computer in that sense can better be described 
as a plowshare converted to sword. 
Notable in prewar work was that of John Vincent Atanasoff and Clifford Berry, a young 
professor of mathematics and physics and one of his graduate students, respectively, at Iowa State 
College (now University) in Ames, Iowa. A federal district judge ruled in 1973 that they, not Eckert 
and Mauchly, invented the first automatic electronic digital computer. Although Eckert and Mauchly 
could not patent the ED VAC, they did eventually patent the ENIAC. They then sold a large share of 
the rights to that and other of their patents to Remington Rand, which in 1955 merged with Sperry 
Corporation to become Sperry Rand. Honeywell. Inc., challenged the patents and uncovered 
evidence of the primacy of the computer by Atanasoff and Berry. At the time of its invention in the 
late 1930s and early 1940s, that computer did not have an official name, or at least none with lasting 
historical resonance. It has since come to be called the Atanasoff Berry Computer, or ABC.100 Earl 
E. Larson, presiding judge over Honeywell v. Sperry Rand, found not only the ABC to have been first 
computer, but also that Eckert and Mauchly used ideas from it key to the ENIAC without giving 
credit. As it happened. Mauchly had visited Atanasoff in Iowa, stayed as a guest in his home, and 
conducted a thorough study of the ABC as it neared completion nearly two years before he and Eckert 
began the ENIAC. 
Historians of computers have been skeptical of Judge Larson's decisions. They accept that 
Mauchly got ideas from Atanasoff and Berry but have not believed them crucial to the ENIAC, which 
they think the more influential machine. In defense of that position, Mauchly vehemently denied 
learning or using anything important from the ABC. Adding substance to his denial is that the earlier 
computer had little in common with the ENIAC. Almost its opposite, in fact, the ABC was about the 
size of a desk and weighed approximately 750 pounds. It cost about $3,600, although a less probable 
reading of records gives a cost of S5.460, at least of those expenses recorded.101 Moreover, while the 
100 R. K. Richards coined the name Atanasoff-Berry computer (with a hyphen and a small c) in 
Electronic Digital Systems (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966). In some legal documents, the 
computer is referred to as the Atanasoff-Berry Computer (with a hyphen and a capital c). John V. 
Atanasoff subsequently decided the name should be Atanasoff Berry Computer (with no hyphen and 
a capital c). That name is used here per his wish. John V. Atanasoff and Alice Atanasoff. letter to 
Clark Mollenhoff. 7 December 1986. ISU. Parks. "Clark Mollenhoff Papers, 1968-1990" (box 1, 
folder 20). 
101 As of August 1940. 51.460 had been spent on construction of the ABC. See John V. Atanasoff, 
"Computing Machine for the Solution of large Systems of Linear Algebraic Equations," August 1940; 
reprinted in Brian Randell. ed.. The Origins of Digital Computers: Selected Papers, 3rd ed. (New 
York: Springer-Verlag. 1982). 334. Atanasoff then received a grant of $5,330 from the Research 
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ENIAC performed a variety of computational tasks, the ABC did only one thing directly: solve sets of 
linear algebraic equations, which it did at an operational rate of sixty pulses per second as timed by an 
electric motor. Finally. Atanasoff and Berry never finished or patented the ABC That was because 
they saw little potential in it, according to a commonly held opinion. If Mauchly said he learned 
nothing from the ABC, it has seemed safe to conclude that the ABC had no further impact. Rather 
than first electronic digital computer, the ABC was more historical curiosity. 
It is a pity historians have not seriously studied the ABC. because the truth is quite different. 
The ABC did not resemble the ENIAC. because it had more in common with modern computers. 
Unlike computers today, the ENIAC did computations by counting with decimal numbers in 
accumulators, which served dual purpose as main memory. Besides being highly parallel, the ENIAC 
had features including function tables, a multiplier, and other components that added clutter. Design 
of the ENLAC emphasized operational speed, narrowly defined, above all else, and Mauchly believed 
big equipment necessary to attain it.102 By contrast. Atanasoff and Berry understood instinctively the 
value of compromise and that bigger is not necessarily better. They gave the ABC a simple, efficient, 
and effective design. Like computers today, the ABC did not use function tables or a multiplier. 
Rather, presaging von Neumann machines, its mixed architecture included, besides input and output 
devices, distinct arithmetic processing, controls, and memory units. 
The memory in particular caught people's attention. Atanasoff had wanted a magnetic 
memory.103 Because he anticipated a small budget, however, he settled on a more economical one 
consisting of banks of capacitors mounted in wax inside two identical drums turned by the same 
motor that provided timing. Despite its much smaller size, the ABC had over four and one-half times 
Corporation. Best estimate is that S2.134 of that was spent. The estimate comes from a hand-written 
accounting slip labeled "Research Corporation Grant to Anatasoff (sic)," 25 May 1948. and which 
indicated a balance of S3.196.10 in the account. It is possible the figure actually indicated the amount 
spent. If so, it is closer to Atanasoff s recollection as noted in unsigned memo entitled "Electronic 
Computers" and dated 26 June 1948. According to the author (an ISC official assumed to be R. E. 
Buchanan: see, John Vincent Atanasoff. New Market. Maryland, transcript of interview with B. 
Kaplan, 23 August 1972, 130-132. Smithsonian), Atanasoff reported about three-quarters of the 
money from the Research Corporation grant had been spent. ISU, Parks, "John Vincent Atanasoff 
Papers" (box 47. folder 3). 
I0
" John W. Mauchly, "Digital and Analogy Computing Machines" 8 July 1946: reprinted in The 
Moore School Lectures: Theory and Techniques for Design of Electronic Digital Computers, ed. 
Martin Campbell-Kelly and Michael R. Williams (Cambridge. Massachusetts: MIT Press. 1985). 32. 
103 Atanasoff. "Computing Machine for the Solution of large Systems of Linear Algebraic Equations." 
318; Honeywell v. Sperry Rand. United States District Court, District of Minnesota. Fourth Division, 
Civil Action File No. 4-67 Civil 138. "Transcript of Proceedings." 2.658. ISU, Parks. "John Vincent 
Atanasoff Papers" (box 44, folder 1). 
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the read-write memory of the ENIAC.104 To ensure integrity of data, the ABC had a mechanism for 
automatically refreshing, or regenerating, charges in the capacitors. Integrated circuit memories of 
today likewise use capacitors as storage elements that are continually refreshed. And like computers 
today, decimal numbers were entered into the ABC and automatically converted to their binary 
equivalents. The ABC then did computations electronically in binary using switching logic. 
Atanasoff and Berry's computer was a most ingenious and elegant machine, one whose characteristics 
are fundamental to computers still. 
While the ABC solved only linear simultaneous equations, those equations have many 
applications. A major purpose for the IAS computer was to deal with sets of linear algebraic 
equations, which are impossibly laborious to solve with pencil and paper in sets larger than ten 
equations and ten unknowns.105 Design of the ABC allowed solution of equations sets up to twenty-
nine unknowns. The tiny memory of the ENIAC made it an extremely cumbersome tool to attempt 
such large equation sets.106 Furthermore, the smaller word size of the ENIAC meant much less 
accurate answers. The ABC had a binary word size equivalent to fifteen or sixteen decimal places, 
compared to ENIAC's normal ten. 
Nor would the ENIAC necessarily have solved problems faster than the ABC. As discussed, 
the best measure of computer performance is not pulses per second but application completion time. 
The ENIAC did calculations electronically in its accumulators, but with so little read-write memory it 
had to transfer partial results through input and output devices at slow electromechanical speeds. The 
transfers significantly compromised performance. The ENIAC could on average complete seventy 
multiplications in the time it took to produce one output.107 a mismatching described as "absurd" even 
by one research associate on the ENIAC project.108 The ABC could also have performed calculations 
at electronic speeds, but Atanasoff and Berry chose instead a balanced design that orchestrated all 
components precisely in harmony.109 
104 The ABC had sixty words, or 3,000 binary digits, of read-write memory. That was equivalent to 
about four and one-half times the capacity of the ENIAC. which had twenty words, or 200 decimal 
digits, of read-write memory. 
105 Atanasoff. "Computing Machine for the Solution of large Systems of Linear Algebraic Equations." 
316. 
106 Burks and Burks. The First Electronic Computer. 268. 
10 
' Aspray. John von Neumann and the Origins of Modern Computing. 62. 
108 Chuan Chu. "Magnetic Recording." 31 July 1946: reprinted in The Moore School Lectures: Theory 
and Techniques for Design of Electronic Digital Computers. ed. Martin Campbell-Kelly and Michael 
R. Williams (Cambridge. Massachusetts: MIT Press. 1985), 310-311. 
109 Atanasoff estimated the electronic circuits in the ABC could complete an operation in about 
twenty-five microseconds. Honeywell. "Transcript of Proceedings." 2.080-2,081 ; 2,629-2.655; and 
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It is estimated therefore that the ENIAC could have been no more than seven times faster 
than the ABC from initial input to final results in solution of simultaneous equations.110 That estimate 
is based on relative speeds of data handling and calculations, however. Organization of the solution 
method posed an additional problem for the ENIAC. Two complete equations with twenty-nine 
unknowns each could be loaded into the ABC and dealt with simultaneously, but the ENIAC could 
have handled about a third as many unknowns at best. Thus, in equations sets that mattered—the 
large ones—the ENIAC might not have been as fast as the ABC. The difference in true 
computational rates of the two computers was nothing like that suggested by their difference in 
operations per second. 
The ABC might also have been faster than the ENIAC in solution of many differential 
equations. Atanasoff and his students developed a method for approximating linear differential 
equations using linear algebraic ones. In fact, the main purpose of the ABC was to deal with complex 
differential equations whose solutions could not be solved analytically, but only approximated. 
Atanasoff therefore observed that the initial application of the ENIAC, the hydrogen bomb problem, 
which took some weeks over several months to solve, likewise by an approximating method, might 
have been completed faster and more accurately on the ABC.111 The problem involved three 
simultaneous partial differential equations. If the equations were linear, the ABC was better suited 
for their solution. The ABC had impressive powers, even if it could not have handled the assortment 
of tasks of the ENIAC. Reprogramming the ABC meant rewiring its controls. That was also true of 
the ENIAC, but rewiring it was easier. 
In short, the relative advantages of the ABC and ENIAC depended on application. For all 
practical purposes, the ABC was the better machine for linear algebraic equations. In solution of 
other problems, especially differential equations, another major task for early computers, the ENIAC 
2.671; John V. Atanasoff. New Market. Maryland, transcript of interview with Henry S. Tropp. 24 
May 1972. 123-124. Smithsonian. 
110 Charles G. Call, of Bair. Freeman and Molinare. memorandum to Henry Halladay. of Dorsey, 
Marquait. Windhorst. West and Halladay, 1 October 1968. The details are explained in an attachment 
entitled. "Comparing the Operating Speeds of ENIAC with the Atanasoff-Berry Computer," 1-8. 
ISU. Parks. "Henry L. Hanson Papers" (box 2. folder 7). 
111 Call, attachment to memorandum to Halladay. 1 October 1968, 8-9. The "Los Alamos problem" 
involved the use of "three simultaneous partial differential integral equations" to investigate mixtures 
of deuterium and tritium needed to create a hydrogen bomb. See also comments by Kay McNulty 
(later Kay Mauchly). who helped program the ENIAC for the hydrogen bomb problem: McNulty 
quoted in Fritz. "ENIAC—A Problem Solver." 32-33. Further discussion is contained in John V. 
Atanasoff. transcript of interview with Henry Halladay, et al.. Dorsey, Marquait. Windhorst. West 
and Halladay. 25 July 1968, 29-56. ISU. Parks, "John Vincent Atanasoff Papers" (box 33. folder 2). 
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served better in simple and repetitive applications needing low accuracy, such as ballistics tables. For 
scientific problems involving more complex equations and demanding higher accuracy, the ABC was 
better suited when the equations could be transformed into linear algebraic equations. The distinction 
of the ABC being special purpose, or slower, is not particularly meaningful given the limitations of 
both machines and the state of applied mathematics. More to the point, in effectiveness of 
technology, the ABC greatly bested the ENIAC costing over one hundred times more. 
It is true that Atanasoff and Berry did not apply for a patent on the ABC. but the reason was 
not because they thought it lacked value. They knew it held great promise. In fact, rather perversely 
considering patents are intended to facilitate availability of inventions. Atanasoff stifled notice of the 
ABC to avoid the type of situation that prevented patenting the EDVAC. That is, Atanasoff 
understood that premature disclosure could disqualify the ABC for patenting, and he and Berry very 
much wanted to patent it. 
As it happened, the U.S. entered World War II before the ABC could be completely 
debugged and placed into regular operation. Both Atanasoff and Berry left Iowa State College (ISC) 
by mid-1942 because of the war. They believed that the ABC worked mostly satisfactorily, although 
it did have a problem with a custom-designed input-output mechanism. Like the ENIAC. the ABC 
depended upon paper cards as secondary memory. Instead of punching holes, the ABC charred spots 
with high voltage arcs. An input device similarly used electric arcs to detect differences in resistance 
associated with the charred spots. Occasionally the read-write mechanisms failed. The two men 
thought the trouble was in the paper, and as they prepared to depart from ISC, they asked a student 
helper to procure a type that they believed might work without error. The student failed, and neither 
Atanasoff nor Berry returned permanently to ISC. The ABC got set aside amidst the turmoil and 
exigencies of the war and eventually scavenged for parts and scrapped without approval from 
Atanasoff. 
Furthermore. Atanasoff made arrangements for a patent attorney to prepare an application. It 
did not get filed fora number of reasons. These included lack of qualified personnel remaining at 
ISC during the war who could assist, questions of how to deal with a radical invention, Atanasoff s 
total commitment to urgent and difficult wartime projects, his separation from family, and marital 
problems that led to a divorce. The war years were highly stressful for Atanasoff. He seemed to 
have assumed the war would be brief and he could return quickly to ISC. With so much going on. the 
ABC simply got away from him. The sad truth is that the ABC became a casualty of the war, just as 
the ENIAC was its progeny. 
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The ABC was not a true computer, being neither general purpose nor stored program. Nor 
was it any more automatic than the ENIAC. Operating the ABC required constant manipulation of 
data cards and controls. Judge Larson had a false choice to make in having to decide whether the 
ABC or ENIAC was the first modem computer in the sense the term now means. Atanasoff designed 
and built the ABC with substantial help from Berry. The two men knew such computers could do a 
wide range of tasks and even be made general purpose. However. Atanasoff candidly admitted that 
they had not by themselves made the intellectual leap to the essential stored-program concept,112 even 
as they defined its prerequisite technology, a large and effective memory. Related, a true computer 
must make conditional decisions, and the ABC could not do that in a meaningful sense. Atanasoff 
understood conditional branching, but his computer did not need that capability.113 He and Berry 
cannot therefore be credited with conception of the computer in total. Resemblance of the ABC to 
the modem computer is probably not coincidence, however. Atanasoff and Berry, directly and 
indirectly, influenced subsequent computers through Eckert, Mauchly, and others. 
Even if not obvious and though Mauchly refused to admit it, essential features of the ENIAC 
did come from the ABC. as Judge Larson correctly found. More important, when weaknesses in the 
ENIAC design finally became apparent to Eckert and Mauchly, they returned to concepts pioneered 
in the ABC. They used some of Atanasoff and Berry's ideas in the ENIAC; they used more in the 
ED VAC. It is unfortunate for that reason that the ED VAC did not get patented. The lawsuit that 
would have inevitably followed might have helped sort through the origins of the ED VAC as the 
Honeywell trial did for the ENIAC. Eckert and Mauchly did patent the mercury delay tube memory 
of the ED VAC, and Judge Larson ruled that patent unenforceable because of its derivation from the 
ABC. Except for its stored-program capability and serial architecture, which von Neumann 
championed, the EDVAC's basic characteristics were also those of the ABC. In its internal number 
base, division into distinct units, regenerating memory, use of switching logic in computations, and 
overall elegant design, the ED VAC reflected the ABC. 
Eckert briefly considered building a computer with a magnetic memory to improve on the 
ENIAC. In an early-1944 memorandum, he proposed a "numerical calculating machine ... driven by 
n
~ John Vincent Atanasoff. "Advent of Electronic Digital Computing." Annals of the History of 
Computing 6. no. 3 (July 1984). 230; Atanasoff, interview with Kaplan, 23 August 1972, 64-67. 
113 John V. Atanasoff, transcript of interview with Henry Halladay. et al., Dorsey, Marquant, 
Windhorst. West and Halladay, 10 July 1968. 51-61. ISU. Parks, "John Vincent Atanasoff Papers" 
(box 32, folder 4). 
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an electric motor" that incorporated magnetic discs for read-write storage. Eckert said he got the idea 
from Perry Crawford, a graduate student at MIT who in 1942 wrote an influential thesis that sketched 
out fundamentals for an electronic digital system for control of antiaircraft guns.lu The thesis 
discussed binary numbers, electronic switching circuits, motor-driven timing, and magnetic storage of 
data on discs, among other things.115 The proposal by Eckert also sounds like a version of the ABC 
with magnetic memory, the computer Atanasoff wanted to build had he the resources and of which 
Mauchly knew. For example, Eckert's proposed computer stored numbers serially on magnetic discs 
the same way the ABC stored numbers serially in its memory.116 
Eckert. like Mauchly. claimed to have learned nothing from Atanasoff and the ABC. 
However, in ajournai article published in 1953, Eckert credited Atanasoff for developing the "first 
example of what might generally be termed regenerative memory," meaning the capacitor memory of 
the ABC.117 The admission came back to haunt Eckert when presented as a portion of the evidence 
that the mercury delay tube memory derived in part from the regenerating memory of the ABC.118 
Furthermore, contact of Eckert and Mauchly with Atanasoff did not end with Mauchly's visit 
to ISC. Both Eckert and Mauchly went to him for additional guidance. Eckert shelved the idea of a 
magnetic disc memory in favor of the mercury delay tube, whose faster-acting vital elements were 
quartz transducers that converted electrical energy to sound waves in mercury and vice versa. Unable 
to get the delay tubes to function properly, he and Mauchly sought assistance in August 1944 from 
Atanasoff, then doing research in acoustic mines at the Naval Ordnance Laboratory (NOL) near 
Washington. D C. Atanasoff had studied the physics of quartz crystals at ISC, and combined with his 
acoustics, electronics, and computer experience, there was no one more qualified with whom they 
could consult. Atanasoff recalled the two men saying they had "difficulty getting a signal of 
114 J. Presper Eckert. "Disclosure of Magnetic Calculating Machine." 1944; reprinted in "The 
ENIAC. " 530-531 and 537-539. 
115 Perry Orson Crawford. "Automatic Control by Arithmetical Operations," unpublished M.S. thesis, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1942. 
116 Eckert's 1944 memorandum is otherwise significant because it gives evidence that he thought of 
the rudimentary stored-program concept before meeting von Neumann, having instead gotten the idea 
from organs of the music-making kind. Eckert proposed discs be "engraved." so as to permanently 
store, "such pulses or other electrical signals as were required to time, control and initiate the 
operations required in the calculations. This is similar to the tone generating mechanism used in 
some electric organs." See. Eckert. "Disclosure of Magnetic Calculating Machine." 537. 
117 Eckert. "A Survey of Digital Computer Memory Systems," 1.394. 
118 Sperry Rand Corporation v. Control Data Corporation. United States District Court. District of 
Maryland. Civil Action No. 15.823 and No. 15.824. "Deposition of Dr. John William Mauchly," 161-
168. ISU. Parks, "John Vincent Atanasoff Papers" (box 19, folder 6). 
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sufficient strength."'19 He obligingly explained that the problem likely resulted from interference 
among the pressure waves as they flowed down the tubes, and he suggested that the best solution 
meant redesigning the transducers to introduce "plane wave(s) without distortion" into the delay 
lines.120 When Eckert persisted. Atanasoff agreed to take time from his already brutal schedule of 
top-secret military research to help further if arrangements could be made through channels. A 
request was initiated through the Army by Eckert's supervisor, John G. Brainerd, but no contract 
materialized at the NOL.121 
Mauchly had more contact with Atanasoff, including discussions on computers.122 He began 
visits at the NOL early in 1943 that continued, often once or twice a week, until after the war. 
Besides helping with the ENIAC. Mauchly also worked as an instructor at the University of 
Pennsylvania. He then lost his teaching position, because he said, he suffered from anemia. Despite 
his health problem, he wanted to work full time on the ENIAC. but administrators agreed to increase 
his salary only modestly beyond his half-time pay. Mauchly took that to imply that he "wasn't worth 
very much to the project." With his former total salary of $5,800 reduced to $3.900. he obtained 
through Atanasoff a part-time position at the NOL beginning September 1944. Mauchly at first did 
statistical analysis for the Navy under contract to Iowa State College, in effect becoming an employee 
of ISC. He later became a civil service employee.123 Mauchly had opportunities during those months 
to learn more from Atanasoff useful in the EDVAC.12-1 
119 John V. Atanasoff, transcript of interview with Henry Halladay, et al.. Dorsey. Marquait. 
Windhorst. West and Halladay. 23 July 1968. 38. ISU. Parks. "John Vincent Atanasoff Papers" (box 
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"John Vincent Atanasoff Papers" (box 30). 
121 Honeywell, "Transcript of Proceedings," 2.231-2.234; 2.769-2,771; 2,774-2,778; and 2.890-2,894. 
See. in particular. J. G Brainerd, transcript of letter to Captain H. H. Goldstine, Ballistic Research 
Laboratory. Aberdeen Proving Ground. Maryland. 31 August 1944, 2,891-2.893; and transcript of 
letter excerpt from Leslie E. Simon, Colonel. Ord. Dept. Director. Ballistic Research Laboratory 
Division. 2 September 1944. 2,894. ISU. Parks "John Vincent Atanasoff Papers" (box 43. folder 5. 
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122 Honeywell, "Deposition of Dr. John V. Atanasoff, " 864. 
123 Honeywell, "Transcript of Proceedings." 2.228-2,230; 2.753-2,764; 2,775; and 11,912-11.926. 
See especially, John W. Mauchly, memorandum entitled "Situation as of September 10. 1944." 
quoted 11,918-11.919. 
1-4 Actually, how Mauchly came to be employed at the NOL and what he did there has never been 
satisfactorily explained. Mauchly claimed Atanasoff asked him for assistance. Atanasoff could recall 
little of the situation but thought Mauchly had sought help from him. Atanasoff, "Advent of 
Electronic Digital Computing." 265; Sperry Rand, "Deposition of Dr. John William Mauchly." 183; 
Atanasoff. interview with Halladay. et al.. 23 July 1968, 22-43; Honeywell, "Deposition of Dr. John 
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The ABC had striking similarities with the ED VAC. It had more in common with the IAS 
computer. This again was probably not entirely coincidence. Von Neumann obtained practical ideas 
from Eckert and Mauchly. who had appropriated freely from Atanasoff and Berry. Von Neumann 
also exchanged ideas directly with Atanasoff. For a few months before he began design of the IAS 
computer, and for about a year thereafter, von Neumann consulted with Atanasoff, who had 
responsibility for developing a computer for the NOL. Atanasoff estimated their discussions 
numbered perhaps no more than five but covered basic computer theory.125 One meeting between the 
two men took place over three or four days.126 
The NOL had decided in April 1945 to establish a centralized computing facility.127 It asked 
a couple of scientists before Atanasoff to take charge of the design and construction of a computer,128 
but no one wanted the extra work.129 Atanasoff, in tight time constraints himself, volunteered 
reluctantly and gave wide latitude to scientists assigned to it. Even so. under his leadership the NOL 
computer started to shape into what the ABC might have been given a $300,000 budget and several 
years* progress in technology. The NOL computer team decided as a start to use internal binary 
numbers and switching logic. As advancements, the members intended the electronic computer to be 
general purpose and stored program. It also was to have floating-point number arithmetic (also called 
scientific notation), convenient for handling very large or small numbers. In floating point, a number 
is transformed into two components: one for digits and the other to indicate magnitude, that is, the 
position of the decimal point in relation to the digits. Timing would have come from an electronic or 
electronic-quartz clock to make it extremely fast. 
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At first. Atanasoff considered a capacitor memory like on the ABC but with electronic 
switching. The team finally decided on cathode ray tubes to comprise a main memory of about 8.000 
words, each fifty binary digits. Secondary memory was to use magnetic wire.130 The NOL 
unfortunately aborted the ambitious project in late 1946 for lack of personnel to see it to 
completion.1"1 Little progress had been made on the details of the computer, although more got 
accomplished on its cathode ray tube memory, the most critical component.132 
As an aside. Mauchly also worked on the NOL computer project. He claimed he had been 
involved in general discussions, but Atanasoff had no memory of that. Mauchly did help write job 
descriptions for the project, however.133 Perhaps not coincidentally, he stopped visiting the NOL 
after it canceled the computer.134 Moreover, despite whatever involvement Mauchly had. the NOL 
computer project team never considered duplicating the ENIAC. recognized to have an inferior 
design.135 
As for Atanasoff. he had little time to devote to the NOL computer. His main duties lay 
elsewhere. As head of the Acoustics Division for the NOL, he had to give priority to Project 
Crossroads, tests of two atomic bombs at the Bikini Atoll in summer 1946. The nuclear devices were 
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the first to be detonated postwar and thus first to allow a full complement of measurements. The 
Navy had special interest in the effects of the explosions on some eighty-five surplus or captured war 
vessels of all kinds anchored in the target area. One blast was atmospheric and the other, several 
weeks later, underwater, and Atanasoff had responsibility for making acoustical measurements in air 
and water. His group also conducted a detailed seismic survey of the atoll. Atanasoff and his 
technicians spent months preparing, made measurements during eight weeks on location in the South 
Pacific, then needed more months to analyze data and write reports. As it happened, the NOL 
computer project was active concurrent with Project Crossroads.136 Giving Atanasoff no rest, among 
other special projects, the NOL then assigned him to head another priority project developing a 
guided missile fired from large naval guns.137 
The IAS computer evolved into much the same machine that Atanasoff and his NOL team 
had envisioned, although the IAS computer had less memory and fixed rather than floating-point 
number representation. Von Neumann decided the more complex circuitry and larger memory 
required for floating-point representation outweighed its advantages.138 Computer designers 
thereafter became cautious about adopting floating-point. Nonetheless, by the late 1950s the majority 
of computers had the feature.139 
Despite the similarities between the NOL and IAS computers, it is unknown how much 
influence Atanasoff and von Neumann had on each other. Atanasoff, never known for false modesty, 
stated that he had learned from von Neumann.140 On the other hand, he found the famous 
mathematician interested in theory of computers but less so in practical design aspects.141 Another 
participant remembered the relationship of the two men as that of relative equals, so undoubtedly von 
Neumann learned a thing or two from Atanasoff.142 Indeed, at the formal termination of the NOL 
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computer project, von Neumann praised Atanasoff s knowledge.143 Atanasoff and Berry had been for 
a time the foremost experts in electronic digital computers. Three years passed before work began on 
the NOL computer, but the interim thinking by others did little to shape the IAS computer.144 First 
Draft, written by von Neumann before he met Atanasoff, overviewed the best ideas, and Atanasoff 
was an early recipient. The basic concepts it advocated coincided with many of his and Berry's ideas 
from the ABC. although von Neumann expressed them within a larger context. 
Von Neumann explained the stored-program principle to Atanasoff. who believed that the 
concept had originated with him. However, when Atanasoff asked for suggestions to improve the 
logic system he and Berry had developed for the ABC. von Neumann could think of none. He instead 
recommended that the NOL computer use circuits of the same type.145 Moreover. First Draft 
advocated serial architecture, but von Neumann adopted a mixed architecture for the IAS computer. 
Since the ABC also had a mixed architecture, this similarity possibly was connected to his association 
with Atanasoff. The two computers did not have the same architectures, however. The ABC 
transmitted numbers serially and calculated in parallel. The IAS computer transmitted numbers in 
parallel and calculated serially. The architecture of the ABC fit its purpose of solving linear algebraic 
equations, one application for which parallel computing is well suited. The architecture of the IAS 
computer worked better for general-purpose applications. Another connection between the NOL and 
IAS computers is that both Atanasoff and von Neumann promoted use of cathode ray tube memories. 
The concept was generally known, though no one had yet perfected such a memory. It is intriguing 
that von Neumann described the cathode ray tube memory as "nothing more than a myriad of 
capacitors." an obvious observation but reminiscent of the design of the ABC.146 
Aside from Mauchly. Eckert. and von Neumann, there were other likely conduits for 
dissemination of ideas of Atanasoff and Berry. Historians have assumed that Atanasoff and Berry 
labored in isolation without recognition beyond ISC. Atanasoff actually encouraged that view. A 
number of authorities in computers learned of the ABC. however, including the most prominent in the 
United States. These included Samuel Caldwell of MIT. Thornton Fry of the BTL, and others. 
Representatives of IBM and similar manufacturers also knew of it. Experts were usually interested 
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and often enthusiastic. For instance. Caldwell gave the ABC a solid endorsement. He went to ISC in 
1941 to meet Atanasoff and came away so impressed that he made a recommendation to the Research 
Corporation, a private organization dedicated to funding research, that it provide money to finish the 
ABC.147 Caldwell later became advisor to Perry Crawford on his important thesis on digital controls. 
Fry. Mathematical Research Director for the BTL. said of the ABC that it was. "entirely realistic, and 
there is no doubt at all that the machine, when built, will find a wide range of usefulness."148 
Raytheon Manufacturing Company told Atanasoff that when, "this machine (the ABC) is 
ready for any commercial applications, we would like very much to have an opportunity to discuss it 
with you."149 GE took "considerable interest" in the ABC and asked about "acquiring the right to 
make and use the machine or in cooperating with the college in its further development."150 
Remington Rand also wanted to negotiate a contract with Atanasoff on the ABC 151 IBM and 
Atanasoff had frequent correspondence from early 1937 through construction of the ABC. IBM even 
supplied several hundred electrical contact brushes for the ABC for free.152 The company had interest 
in Atanasoff and Berry's work and allegedly wanted patent rights.153 It had started its own 
exploratory efforts in electronic circuits and calculators about the same time as Atanasoff.154 
Support for the ABC stands in stark contrast to the negative opinions experts had later for the 
ENIAC. They typically warned the ENIAC was a bad investment. Harold Hazen, Chief of Division 
7 of the National Defense Research Committee (NDRC), was one critic. The NDRC had 
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responsibility for directing most wartime research work. Division 7 involved fire control for 
antiaircraft guns and included some digital control technologies. After reviewing the ENIAC 
proposal for the Army, he observed that the techniques proposed were sadly outdated." 
Furthermore, he did not have, "any reasonable hope that such a device could be brought into use early 
enough in any case."155 Caldwell also worked for the NDRC. He indicated mild interest in the 
ENIAC and thought it similar to a computer considered at MIT and deemed impractical.156 The 
Army funded the ENIAC despite advice from outside experts, and even though its own chief scientist 
in ballistics, Thomas Johnson, recognized the ENIAC proposal as being "a long way behind present 
art."157 Flush with public money, the Army backed almost any project with even a remote chance to 
help with the war.158 
That the ABC failed to be cited by people who made subsequent advancements does not 
mean it had no impact other than on the ENIAC. ED VAC, and IAS computer. War-related research 
took precedence for some years. George Stibitz, active in computers before the war at the BTL with 
Fry. thought it "strange" that wartime computing development got little support. After all. he 
reasoned, the need to do mathematical calculations drove the earlier civilian computer advances, and 
that need intensified with the crisis.159 Actually, many improvements in prewar calculating machines 
came about to improve data handling, but Stibitz otherwise had a point. However, it was a question 
of priorities. Proximity fuses, atomic bombs, and acoustic mines had to be dealt with first. Most 
wartime work in computing circuitry was not in computers per se but in controls or test equipment for 
antiaircraft guns. The work of Atanasoff and Berry could easily have been overlooked in the 
confusion and press of activity, especially since there is not necessarily a straightforward connection 
between antiaircraft guns and computers, and since no paper had been published and no patent issued 
on the ABC. 
When work in electronic digital computers began again in earnest, the ABC was in the dim 
past but still in working memory. Mauchly's failure to cite the ABC provides a case in point. 
Another example is that of Crawford, who wrote his thesis on antiaircraft gun controls and then 
became an advisor to Whirlwind. Historians of that project noted that Crawford and others involved, 
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"paid little heed to the historical background of the state of the art."160 An English computer pioneer, 
Tom Kilbum. likewise recalled: "Computers were in the air, the subject was very exciting, and 
unfortunately one did not stop to record sources of information, but simply got on with the job."'6' In 
the heady excitement of building the early computers, crediting others got no thought. Crawford did 
mention in his thesis that others had "made a number of contributions" in electronic computation, but 
did not elaborate beyond noting that he understood little progress had been made.162 
There is another less sanguine explanation for the ABC not attracting lasting official notice. 
The same reason may explain why Atanasoff did not get asked to work on digital computing projects 
earlier than the one for the NOL. As he and Berry labored on the ABC, Atanasoff began a second 
project at ISC for the NDRC that took priority for him and Berry. Atanasoff had been given the 
project by Warren Weaver. Director of Mathematical Analysis in Division 7, including subcommittee 
D-2. which developed antiaircraft gun directors. As noted, this was one area where digital devices 
had some application. Developed mechanisms tended to be electromechanical, although NCR. RCA. 
and Eastman Kodak explored electronic devices. However, the urgent priority was design and 
construction of analog mechanisms for tracking aircraft and predicting their future locations. 
Atanasoff was assigned to develop such a mechanism and given wide latitude. 
As Atanasoff worked on the NDRC project, he and Weaver had a disagreement, and 
unfortunately. Weaver became extremely bitter over the incident and remained so for the years 
through the Honeywell trial. If Atanasoff hoped to do other computer work during the war. he made 
precisely the wrong enemy. Weaver then became Chief of the Applied Mathematics Panel (AMP) of 
the NDRC. Computing was part of the diverse responsibilities of the newly created AMP. Fry. 
Caldwell, and others who knew of the ABC worked for Weaver. Companies doing digital device 
development also tended to work with Weaver.163 In effect. Atanasoff was blackballed from wartime 
computer-related projects. It was also unlikely that Weaver's supervision facilitated open 
consideration or attributing of ideas that came from Atanasoff. The University of Pennsylvania 
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began the ENIAC project independent of Weaver—another scientist who had originally favored the 
ABC but allegedly saw little value in the ENIAC164—but Mauchly did not encourage participation of 
Atanasoff either.165 However, it must be noted that there is no evidence Atanasoff attempted to 
become involved in computers after the ABC. He left ISC for the NOL, where he immersed himself 
in acoustic science. Even his participation in the NOL computer project was not by choice, given the 
crush of his other duties. 
The legacy of the ABC has therefore likely been significant but hidden in history. On the 
other hand, the impact of the ENIAC has been all too evident. The ENIAC did not provide 
precedence in technology, and better computers from private sources were coming along 
independently. Indeed, superior electronic circuit concepts existed before the war. It is probably true 
that only government would have built the ENIAC. because only it could afford to be so careless with 
money. The true legacy of the ENIAC has been that it gave impetus for extravagant and unnecessary 
government financing of research that continues to this day. 
Historians of computers have been struck by how limited the future of computers appeared in 
the late 1940s. Extraordinary as it sounds, the pioneers may have thought that demand for computers 
could be completely satisfied by a handful of machines. Ten computers at most in the world were 
sufficient, according to some accounts. This has seemed a paradox: How could the brilliant men who 
created the computer not see more of its potential? Myriad uses are taken for granted even by 
children today, so why did people not grasp some of those possibilities upon the unveiling of the 
ENIAC? Historian Paul Ceruzzi identified three reasons why the utility of the computer went largely 
unrecognized in its initial years. As a first concern, scientists believed that any machine with so many 
vacuum tubes could never be reliable. However, vacuum tube failures turned out to be tolerable, 
because even the early computers worked so fast that they could on average do a lot of work between 
failures. Moreover, computer designers learned to incorporate conservative design principles that 
included redundant systems and check (and self-correction) mechanisms. Computers became error 
free for all practical purposes. A second reason for the lack of foresight had to do with the pioneers 
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themselves, principally an elite cadre of specialists. Narrowly focused, they built computers to solve 
problems in mathematics and did not foresee other uses. They did not yet grasp the ramifications of 
the power of digital computers for manipulating any symbol transformable to zeros and ones. Finally, 
no one understood how people would come to interact with computers. Before the monitor, mouse, 
and high-level languages, communicating in machine language with mathematical algorithms and 
paper cards was esoteric and labor intensive, not something for most people. 
The analysis by Ceruzzi is trenchant but incomplete. There was also the issue of name, 
which he mentioned but did not explore fully. Before the ENIAC, the word computer occasionally 
denoted a machine, but often meant a human who solved mathematical problems with paper, pencil, 
and desktop calculating machine.166 The Army employed people, mostly women, as computers to 
solve ballistics problems using more advanced algorithms than the ENIAC could handle.167 Even so. 
the ENIAC was formally designated a computer to emphasize its supposed human-like capabilities. 
Other early computer builders were more humble. The EDSAC was a calculator by name, although 
recognized today as perhaps the first computer. IBM deliberately avoided the word computer for 
years, even for machines far more capable than the ENIAC. Its Selective Sequence Electronic 
Calculator, or SSEC, is a contender for title of first true computer. It was built independently of 
Eckert, Mauchly, and von Neumann but finished early in 1948. The IBM 701, modeled on the IAS 
computer for general use by the military, had the formal name Defense Calculator. The IBM 650 
became the most popular computer of the 1950s. Some 2,000 were built as Magnetic Drum 
Calculators. Concerned for the sensibilities of its customers, IBM worried that the word computer 
evoked too great of emotions, conjuring up disquieting images of dark mysterious technology and 
people out of work, replaced by electronic brains.168 No doubt the reluctance of IBM to call 
computers by that name is one reason that historians of computers regard the company as having been 
stodgy, hesitant of the new technology, when in fact it stayed close to the forefront. 
The upshot of all this was that, until the UNIVAC. a computer (machine) popularly meant the 
ENIAC. That being the case, the question becomes obvious: Why would anyone think the world 
needed more computers (ENIACs)? Indeed, the world did not and built no more. Historians of 
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computers have assumed that scientists who disapproved of the ENIAC were simply old fashioned, 
wedded to old technologies. On the contrary, scientists who thought like Caldwell. Hazen. and 
Weaver proved right: The ENIAC was outdated, impractical, and did not get finished in time to help 
with the war. The world did not require more computers when the word meant ENIAC. but it had 
urgent need for high quality, truly innovative, electronic computing machines, especially if they could 
be had for a reasonable price.169 Businesses and government agencies snapped up such machines as 
they became available, even at high prices. Vendors were somewhat surprised but fully prepared to 
move cautiously toward more powerful computing machines. IBM. as a case in point, began 
designing electronic calculators in the early 1940s but had to put plans aside during the war. It then 
introduced electronic calculators into its product line, got an enthusiastic response, and needing no 
prodding from government, began designing electronic computers. Atanasoff. as a scientist, 
anticipated a future for computers commercially.170 Writing to a tube manufacturer in 1940. he 
asserted. "If this machine (the ABC) is manufactured in any considerable number, the tube and 
condenser manufacturers stand to do a good business."171 Atanasoff in fact expected the ABC. or 
rather commercial versions, to be built in large numbers. He did not plan to manufacture the 
computers himself but anticipated selling the right, and a number of corporations expressed interest. 
There looks in retrospect to have been a natural evolution that led inevitably to computers, 
given progress in technology generally, impetus in information-processing specifically, and growing 
need for them by scientists, governments, and businesses. Moreover, those who assume computers 
169 One computer pioneer alleged to have said that only a few machines were needed was Howard 
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could only have been developed by government, or big business, for that matter, misunderstand the 
circumstances of invention. Bureaucracy is its enemy. Telling is that only fifteen of the one hundred 
largest companies in 1917 survive today.172 Through a process that economist Joseph Schumpeter 
termed "creative destruction." businesses spring to life as if from nowhere to create and exploit new 
technologies, and old. ossified corporations whither away, often to be absorbed into more aggressive 
companies. 
The process is coldly evident even in the short history of electronic digital computers. There 
were twelve major U.S. producers of commercial computers a decade after World War H. Four 
remained by 1986, although numerous new ones emerged in the meantime.173 Where today are NCR, 
DEC, or Sperry Rand, or any of dozens of formerly significant but now mostly defunct computer 
producers?174 IBM has been an exception, and it has suffered notable stumbles. In fact, it is 
estimated that most innovation comes from industries in existence for no more than about ten years.175 
Corporations rise and fall on their ability to innovate, but government, the ultimate bureaucracy, 
grows regardless. Indeed, much growth in government in the twentieth century countered what had 
been considered flaws in capitalism. In smoothing the vicissitudes of the free market, however, 
governments may have also stifled its ability to create. The state is ordinarily the least likely entity to 
promote economically viable innovation, contrary to prevailing wisdom. 
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CHAPTER 2. J. V. ATANASOFF: COMPUTER PIONEER 
Historical emphasis on the ENIAC has popularized the notion that the existence of computers 
is due to Mauchly and Eckert and government sponsorship of research beginning with World War H. 
On the contrary, the ENIAC was the fruitless offshoot from a vigorous growth in information-
handling technologies flourishing before the war thanks to private initiative and money A full 
accounting for computers must include seminal inventions as far back as the early nineteenth century 
or before. The combined momentum of numerous efforts in the private sector was heading into true 
digital computers by 1940 and was only interrupted—temporarily—by war. No early project 
advanced more of what computers became than the ABC. Arguably, it ranks with the ED VAC and 
IAS computer as the machines that shaped modern computing. 
Centering the history of early computers anew on the ABC highlights Atanasoff and Berry's 
achievement, all the more noteworthy for its likely impact on subsequent computers. It also helps 
shift focus to a long evolution of technologies leading into true computers. Furthermore, the story of 
the ABC illuminates factors that made the computer necessary, of which a requirement for ballistics 
tables is but one example. As a bonus for anyone interested in the fundamentals of computer design, 
the ABC included basic features still part of computers. Study of the ENIAC is less instructive, so 
different was it from computers today. Most important here, however, a broad history including the 
ABC illustrates that government funding had little true importance to the invention of the computer. 
Of the ABC's two inventors. Berry got involved after Atanasoff. Berry refined the design and 
had responsibility for fabrication, including supervising the other students and craftsmen who did 
much of the work. However, Atanasoff conceived the ABC's underlying concepts and sketched out 
its overall design.1 It is with him that a full and inclusive history of modern computing might 
therefore begin. 
John Vincent Atanasoff was bom into a lower middle-class family, at once unique, but with 
characteristics not untypical of the time. His mother, Iva Purdy Atanasoff, traced her ancestry to 
Jeremiah Purdy, who fought under George Washington in the Revolutionary War. She took normal 
training and taught at a rural school close to her parents' farm near Hamilton. New York. It was in 
Hamilton where she met her husband, an immigrant from Bulgaria named at birth Ivan Atanasov (no 
1 J. V. Atanasoff. transcript of interview with B. Kaplan, Smithsonian Institution, 17 July 1972. 1-7. 
Smithsonian. 
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middle name).2 Turkish soldiers had shot and killed his father, who died allegedly carrying him. a 
young child and apparently also wounded in the incident.3 His mother remarried some years later and 
shipped the then thirteen-year-old Ivan to America with her brother.4 
Ellis Island immigration officials changed the lad's name to John Atanasoff. His uncle had 
come to sell attar, or fragrant oil. and went back to Bulgaria two years later. He may have returned 
once.5 The boy stayed and worked at menial jobs to put himself through the Peddie School for Boys 
in Hightstown, New Jersey. Upon advice from a Baptist minister. Ivan (now John) attended Colgate 
College (later University) in Hamilton, with intent of also becoming a Baptist minister.6 Originally 
Greek Orthodox, he instead became a Methodist about the time he met his future wife, a Methodist, 
and went on to receive a Bachelor of Philosophy degree. His education at Colgate emphasized Latin 
and Greek but included basic science. He later became an electrical engineer on that foundation 
through correspondence courses and self-study. As much as this sounds the quintessential American 
success story. John Vincent (henceforth Atanasoff) believed his father's experiences as a youth 
caused him to feel "intense insecurity" the rest of his life. 
Feelings of insecurity perhaps were a factor in frequent moves the Atanasoff family made, 
although tough economic circumstances provided a more immediate reason. Atanasoff was the eldest 
of ten children, eight of whom survived childhood. His parents had married about the time his father 
graduated from Colgate College. His father worked for. first, Edison Company and then the Utica 
Gas and Electric Company.7 Atanasoff was born about that time on 4 October 1903 in his maternal 
grandparents' house near Hamilton. Several years and towns later, young Atanasoff began school in 
Lyndhurst. New Jersey, where his father had taken employment with the Delaware, Lackawanna and 
Western Railroad. Because members suffered respiratory problems, the family relocated to Osteen, 
Florida, when Atanasoff was eight. His father worked for Amalgamated Phosphate Company. 
Atanasoff moved around the area with his family four more times before graduating from high school 
in 1920 in Mulberry, Florida, at age sixteen and having completed eleven grades. 
Clark R. Mollenhoff. Atanasoff: Forgotten Father of the Computer (Ames. Iowa: Iowa State 
University Press. 1988). 12. 
Joanne Gather. Laguna Miguel, California, tape-recorded interview over telephone, Paul Mobley, 
30 June 1998. 
4 J. V. Atanasoff, New Market. Maryland, transcript of interview with Uta C. Merzbach, 5 May 
1969. 6. Smithsonian. 
5 John Vincent Atanasoff. Monrovia, Maryland, transcript of tape-recorded interview with William 
R. Turner. 27 October 1986. 38-39. ISU, Parks. "John Vincent Atanasoff Papers" (box 20. folder 3). 
6 Mollenhoff. Atanasoff. 12-13. 
7 Atanasoff. interview with Merzbach. 5 May 1969, 1-6. 
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Atanasoff did not care for sports and had little opportunity to participate in extracurricular 
school activities, but he was a precocious and studious boy.8 At an early age he took an avid interest 
in mathematics and science and loved reading books from his father's library. He began studying 
college algebra and the slide rule at about age ten.9 His father supported his studies, but his mother 
had greater patience and helped more. Atanasoff mostly taught himself. He developed great powers 
of concentration and tolerance for drudgery. Late in life, he reflected that colleagues had credited 
him with having a superior intelligence that allowed him to learn anything easily. "It isn't true," he 
averred modestly, "It's just that I labor so intensely in the vineyard, but by myself." Atanasoff s 
intelligence unquestionably ran deep, but he spoke candidly in admitting that he had made the most of 
his mental gifts from an early age by laboring "almost continuously."10 
Young Atanasoff stayed out of school to earn money for over a year between high school and 
college. Much of that time he worked on a crew prospecting for phosphate, living in makeshift camps 
in the Florida woods, and studying solid geometry at night by light of campfires." He saved $530 by 
the fall of 1921 and entered the University of Florida at Gainesville. 
Atanasoff had decided long before that he wanted to be a theoretical physicist. Physicists 
tended to be applications and experimentally oriented. By contrast, a theoretical physicist, or 
mathematical physicist, was as much mathematician as physicist. "It is an armchair profession," 
according to Atanasoff, "You do the job sitting in a preferably soft chair and thinking as hard as you 
can."'" Atanasoff kept a large, comfortable armchair in his office at ISC for that purpose.13 
The University of Florida did not offer theoretical physics as a major, so he selected electrical 
engineering as the most theoretical major available.14 His default choice proved serendipitous. 
8 Honeywell v. Sperry Rand. United States District Court, District of Minnesota, Fourth Division. 
Civil Action File No. 4-67 Civil 138. "Deposition of Dr. John V. Atanasoff," 36, 39. 57. and 58. 
ISU. Parks. "John Vincent Atanasoff Papers" (box 29 folder 1). 
9 Mollenhoff, Atanasoff, 14. 
10 Atanasoff. interview with Merzbach. 5 May 1969. 16 and 56 (actually unnumbered). 
11 
"Atanasoff Chronology Event List (Master Copy)," compiled by Dorsey, Marquait, Windhorst, 
West & Halladay, 16 September 1968. ISU, Parks, "John Vincent Atanasoff Papers" (box 27, folder 
5). 
I_ Honeywell. "Deposition of Dr. John V. Atanasoff." 33 and 60-61; Honeywell v. Sperry Rand, 
United States District Court. District of Minnesota. Fourth Division. Civil Action File No. 4-67 Civil 
138. "Transcript of Proceedings." 1.624. ISU. Parks, "John Vincent Atanasoff Papers" (box 43). 
13 Charles J. Thome. Camarillo. California, tape-recorded interview over the telephone with Paul 
Mobley, 2 April 1998. 
u John Vincent Atanasoff, "Advent of Electronic Digital Computing," Annals of the History of 
Computing 6. no. 3 (July 1984), 231; John V. Atanasoff, transcript of interview with Henry S. Tropp. 
Smithsonian Institution. 18 February 1972,4-5. Smithsonian. 
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because the curriculum gave him. in addition to mathematics and theory of electricity, practical 
instruction that served him well through his career, notably in design of the ABC. He did not study 
electronics, but among his engineering courses were machine shop and foundry practices, drafting, 
and other hands-on classes. He also had a course in contract law.15 
Atanasoff worked part time after his freshman year for money to continue his studies. His 
varied employment included waiting on tables in a college mess, helping in a storeroom, serving as a 
campus electrician, and surveying streetcar lines in Jacksonville. Florida. Most notably, he taught 
physics, chemistry, and general science in the Gainesville high school. A desperate principal, 
suddenly short an instructor, sought him out midway through his junior year. At first Atanasoff 
hesitated, remembering that teaching required a certificate. Undeterred, the principal told him that 
examinations for teachers were to be given in two days, and if he could pass three areas of 
concentration, the job was his. Atanasoff excused himself from classes, studied biology for the two 
days, took examinations in physics, agriculture, and biology, and easily passed all three. He taught 
school the remainder of his time at the University of Florida, even becoming "Head" of the high 
school science department. He nonetheless graduated on schedule in 1925 with a Bachelor of Science 
in electrical engineering and outstanding overall marks of 97.6 (out of 100).16 
Atanasoff received offers of employment as an engineer, including one from the newly 
organized Bell Telephone Laboratories (BLT),'7 but he had his career goal set.18 ISC responded first 
to his applications to graduate schools of mathematics as preparation to obtaining a Ph.D. degree in 
physics. The college offered him a teaching fellowship but demanded a commitment. Atanasoff 
accepted and then received other offers, including one from Harvard. True to his word, he began 
studies at ISC the next fall.19 He also taught undergraduate mathematics half time for a stipend of 
$800 for the academic year.20 
Atanasoff completed a Master's degree in August 1926 with a major in mathematics and 
minor in physics.21 In his thesis he attempted to develop a theoretical explanation of the behavior of 
15 Atanasoff. interview with Merzbach. 5 May 1969. 20-26 and 32-33. 
16 Atanasoff. interview with Merzbach. 5 May 1969, 34; Honeywell, "Deposition of Dr. John V. 
Atanasoff." 63-69; "Atanasoff Chronology Event List (Master Copy)." compiled by Dorsey, 
Marquait. Windhorst. West & Halladay. 16 September 1968. 
17 Daniel J. Kevles, The Physicists: The History of a Scientific Community in Modern America (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1978). 188. 
18 
"John Vincent Atanasoff Reference Chronology," compiled by Dorsey, Marquait, Windhorst. 
West & Halladay. circa 1968. ISU, Parks, "Clark Mollenhoff Papers, 1968-1990" (box 1, folder 27). 
19 Atanasoff. interview with Tropp. 18 February 1972, 7-8. 
20 Honeywell. "Deposition of Dr. John V. Atanasoff," 80. 
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gases that conformed better to experimental observations. He noted that all existing models were 
"wooden, unnatural affairs with no physical background."22 As an alternative. Atanasoff expanded 
upon the virial of Clausius, a seldom used expression of kinetic energy which he learned reading 
English physicist J. H. Jeans's The Dynamical Theory of Gases. Rudolf Clausius. a nineteenth-
century German, laid much of the foundation of thermodynamics. His virial accounted for the 
properties of gases by the statistical sum of forces of interaction and without considering molecular 
motion. Jeans downplayed the virial as giving inaccurate results,23 but Atanasoff saw potential for it 
after he studied Clausius in original German.24 Atanasoff tried to construct an improved 
mathematical model based on the virial. consistent with known atomic structure, and that satisfied the 
characteristics of a close-to-ideal gas such as neon or argon.25 He did not succeed as well as he hoped 
but had the consolation of seeing his judgment confirmed when, with improved understanding of the 
atom due to developments in quantum mechanics, the virial evolved into a common tool for kinetic 
analysis of gases.26 Jeans accepted applicability of the virial by 1940.27 Atanasoff s thesis also helped 
prepare him for study in quantum mechanics, although his thesis did not include it. 
Atanasoff stayed at ISC after graduation, working as a full-time instructor of mathematics for 
$1.800 per year. He read extensively on his own28 and continued taking coursework that he hoped to 
apply toward a doctorate at another school.29 ISC did not yet give doctorates in physics or 
mathematics. He also married Lura Meeks, three years his senior and originally from Quanah, Texas. 
Poor, hard working farmer-ranchers, the Meeks settled near Cheyenne, Oklahoma, still the rough 
frontier town. Lura taught for several years and saved money to study home economics and the arts. 
Independent and ambitious, she selected ISC because she understood that it had the best home 
economics program in the world. John and Lura met at Thanksgiving at the Dixie Club on campus 
~ John V. Atanasoff, "On the Dynamics of a Certain Type of Molecule Possessing Spherical 
Symmetry." unpublished M.S. thesis, Iowa State College, Ames, Iowa. 1926, 8. 
23 J. H. Jeans, The Dynamical Theory of Gases (London: Cambridge University Press, 1904), 143-
148. 
" Atanasoff, interview with Merzbach, 5 May 1969, 42. 
25 Atanasoff, "On the Dynamics of a Certain Type of Molecule Possessing Spherical Symmetry," 8-9 
and 33. 
"
6 Atanasoff, interview with Merzbach, 5 May 1969, 41-42; Atanasoff, interview with Tropp, 18 
February 1972, 8-9; Atanasoff, interview with Kaplan, 17 July 1972. 26-27; J. V. Atanasoff. New 
Market. Maryland, interview with B. Kaplan, 23 August 1972. 17-19. Smithsonian. 
"
7 James Jeans, An Introduction to the Kinetic Theory of Gases (New York: Macmillan Company. 
1940), 69-77. 
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and married the following June. The couple faced an early crisis when she left to fulfill a 
commitment made before their engagement to teach the 1926-1927 school year in Montana. She had 
taken the job to earn money to finish her education. Halfway through the school year, begged by her 
husband. Lura returned to Ames.30 She then finished her degree.31 
It was a heady time to study physics, that March 1929. when Atanasoff and family, now 
including daughter Elsie, moved to Madison, Wisconsin, for him to complete a doctorate at the 
University of Wisconsin. Physics reverberated with excitement still over Albert Einstein's theories of 
relativity. A field of study with even more profound implications had coalesced less than two years 
earlier. In October 1927, the world's most distinguished physicists had gathered at the Solvay 
conference in Brussels to agonize over a growing accumulation of bewildering propositions in 
quantum mechanics. The debate at Solvay formalized an extraordinary overall formulation known as 
the Copenhagen interpretation. Skeptics abounded, including Einstein, but even he had to finally 
accept the peculiar logic of the new branch of physics. Key contributors included such European 
intellectual giants as Arnold Sommerfeld, Louis de Broglie, Paul A M. Dirac, Wolfgang Pauli, and 
Erwin Schrodinger. Max Born, Werner Heisenberg, and, especially, Neils Bohr contributed most to 
the Copenhagen formulation.32 Bohr headed an institute of physics in Copenhagen; hence, the name 
for the theory. 
Quantum mechanics is said to be concerned with explaining physical phenomena at the 
minute size of molecules or smaller. Since its effects can involve large distances, light years even, 
quantum mechanics more fundamentally can be defined as that area of physics dealing with 
extremely small changes of energy at the atomic level.33 Perhaps to his regret, Einstein played a 
major role in stimulating creation of quantum mechanics by suggesting in 1905, the same year he 
postulated special relativity, that light sometimes acts more like particles, or quanta, than waves. A 
30 Gather, interview with Mobley, 30 June 1998; Honeywell v. Sperry Rand, United States District 
Court. District of Minnesota. Fourth Division. Civil Action File No. 4-67 Civil 138, "Deposition of 
Lura Atanasoff." 4. ISU. Parks, "Clark R. Mollenhoff Papers, 1968-1990" (box 8, folder "Dep-
Lura"). 
31 A more serious situation occurred when Atanasoff suffered what has been described as a nervous 
breakdown, although exhaustion seems more probable, the result of his driving himself so hard. He 
sought treatment as an outpatient but did not stop working. "John Vincent Atanasoff Reference 
Chronology." 6; J. V. Atanasoff, II. Boulder, Colorado, tape-recorded telephone interview with Paul 
Mobley, 21 July 1998. 
32 Kevles. The Physicists. 159-168. 
33 Roger Penrose. The Emperor's New Mind: Concerning Computers, Minds, and the Laws of 
Physics (New York: Oxford University Press. 1989). 237. 
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specific example was that of the photoelectric effect, or the emission of electrons from the surface of 
a metal due to impingement of light. Quanta of light and other radiation came to be called photons. 
American Robert A. Millikan confirmed Einstein's quantum model for the photoelectric effect by 
1916. Even so, few physicists thought the idea credible until an exasperated Arthur Compton, 
another American, having no more plausible explanation, embraced quantum energy in 1922 as a 
means to describe X-ray scattering upon impact with metals. De Broglie turned Einstein on his head 
in a 1924 dissertation in which he conjectured that particles of matter could also behave like waves. 
Einstein by then had become a major scientific figure. Observations made during a solar 
eclipse in 1919 indicated that light from stars bent slightly as it passed near the sun and confirmed 
general relativity, which he had articulated in 1916. Einstein then won a Nobel Prize in 1921 for his 
work on the photoelectric effect. His stature had become such that when he accepted de Broglie's 
thesis, others reluctantly did too.34 
The initial primitive formulation of the radical new science came in 1925 from Heisenberg, 
who developed an algebraic framework using matrices for calculating values of the intensities and 
frequencies of the spectral lines of light.35 Schrodinger took the idea of wave-particle duality the 
following year and formulated wave mechanics, in which the characteristics of atoms and photons 
were expressed as wave equations. Bom interpreted the square of the solution of a wave equation to 
be the statistical probability of a subatomic particle being found at a particular location at a given 
time. The bizarre implication was that a particle only becomes a point in space once a measurement 
is made to locate it. Schrodinger demonstrated the equivalence of his wave mechanics with 
Heisenberg's matrix mechanics, and Dirac shouldered much of the burden of subsuming both into a 
general theory. Dirac also combined quantum mechanics with special relativity to better explain the 
spin of electrons.36 Based on the implications of Bom's interpretation of wave equations, Heisenberg 
enunciated the principle of uncertainty, which stated that it is impossible to calculate simultaneously 
and accurately both location and velocity of a subatomic particle. Bohr built on uncertainty with a 
principle of complementarity, which proposed that at the quantum level complete descriptions 
required mutually exclusive but complementary concepts: waves and particles, for example, or 
position and velocity. 
34 Kevles. The Physicists, 85-86, 157-159, and 163-164. 
35 Linus Pauling and E. Bright Wilson, Introduction to Quantum Mechanics: With Applications to 
Chemistry (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1935), 48. Atanasoff used this text by Pauling and Wilson in 
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36 Penrose, The Emperor's New Mind. 153. 
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The Copenhagen interpretation amounted to the greatest upheaval in the physical 
understanding of the universe since Isaac Newton postulated gravity. Where classical physics, even 
relativity, depicted the world as continuous and causally predictive, the new quantum mechanics, at 
least at its deepest level, had it to be discontinuous, indeterminate, and statistical. Applications of 
quantum mechanics accordingly demanded employment of mathematics of great sophistication. 
Furthermore, physics became more mathematical overall. 
Herman Goldstine observed that physicists expended most their theoretical efforts explaining 
the world qualitatively until the late 1920s.37 They visualized concepts in ideal terms that could be 
articulated with relatively simple mathematical expressions. Emphasis shifted to the quantitative 
coincident with the Copenhagen interpretation. As Atanasoff put it, with quantum mechanics a whole 
range of problems for the first time "became understandable and capable of solution," at least for 
those who managed to master the mathematics.38 In their excitement, physicists began to put even 
classical physics on a more rigorous mathematical foundation.39 Many of the old guard fell by the 
wayside intellectually, unwilling or unable to make the transition.40 Atanasoff was fortunate in 
finding at the University of Wisconsin a number of outstanding instructors, but in particular, 
theoretical physicists in touch with the revolutionary and increasingly mathematically, and 
statistically, oriented thinking from Europe. 
One of Atanasoff s professors was J. H. Van Vleck, a young man about four years older than 
he. Van Vleck had a curious hobby of memorizing passenger train schedules, a hobby he acquired 
when ill as a boy on a trip to Italy with his parents. While confined to bed. he put to memory 
timetables for all Italian trains.41 His wealthy and well-connected father later gave him a fat volume 
of tables for trains in America as a Christmas present. When Atanasoff knew him. Van Vleck gave 
upon request current schedules off the top of his head for trains between any two stops in the U.S.42 
Van Vleck might have distinguished himself as a travel agent, but he also had considerable 
aptitude in physics. He earned a Ph.D. degree at Harvard in 1920 with a dissertation on the ionization 
37 Besides helping develop early computers, Goldstine wrote extensively on the history of applied 
mathematics and computers. 
38 John V. Atanasoff (attributed), "What is the Quantum Theory," circa 1940, 9. ISU. Parks, "John 
Vincent Atanasoff Papers" (box 9, folder 5). 
39 Herman H. Goldstine, The Computer from Pascal to von Neumann (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1972), 34 and 102. 
40 Kevles. The Physicists, 159-169. 
41 Frederick Fellows. "Van Vleck. John Hasbrouck," in Dictionary of Scientific Biography. 
Supplement n, 1990. 
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energy of the "cross-orbit" model of the helium atom. Bohr had suggested the topic in part, and the 
resulting dissertation was the first purely theoretical one in the U.S. Van Vleck left Harvard to teach 
at the University of Minnesota, where he secured his reputation with publication of Quantum 
Principles and Line Spectra in 1926.43 The state of affairs prompted Van Vleck to lament that 
physicists had been forced into "contortions" attempting, "to explain the simultaneous appearance of 
quantum and classical phenomena." He consoled himself with the belief that, "paradoxical theories 
are required to explain paradoxical phenomena.'*44 Van Vleck's monograph was regarded as 
authoritative,45 but Heisenberg and Schrodinger had in fact already rendered his conclusions 
archaic.46 To his credit. Van Vleck strove to stay abreast of the whirl of activity in Europe. Walter 
Brattain, a student in Minnesota and future co-inventor of the transistor, recalled that, "quantum 
mechanics was changing so fast that every student audited Van Vleck's course every year."47 
Van Vleck accepted a position at the University of Wisconsin early in 1928. in part because it 
had instituted a program of hosting a theorist from Europe for a semester each year.48 Atanasoff 
therefore had the great luck his first semester at Wisconsin of attending lectures by both Van Vleck 
and Dirac.49 However, he got off to a rocky start with Van Vleck, who disliked that Atanasoff 
insisted on entering mid-term. ISC was on the quarter system, so end of winter quarter at ISC in 
March was halfway through spring semester at the University of Wisconsin. Atanasoff refused to be 
intimidated but nonetheless despaired of the situation. Despite having attended but one-quarter of the 
sessions in the notoriously difficult two-semester class, he was one of five out of about twenty-five 
students willing to attempt the final exam. He received a high score in Van Vleck's quantum 
mechanics, as he typically did in all his classes.50 
Interestingly, Van Vleck also taught quantum mechanics to another of the three primary 
inventors of the transistor. John Bardeen likely was in the same class at Wisconsin with Atanasoff 
that spring and certainly attended the guest lectures by Dirac, who made such an impression on him 
4j Fellows. "Van Vleck," Dictionary of Scientific Biography. 
44 John H. Van Vleck, Quantum Principles and Line Spectra in Bulletin of the National Research 
Council 10, no. 54 (March 1926), 287. 
45 Kevles. The Physicists, 197. 
46 Fellows. "Van Vleck." Dictionary of Scientific Biography. 
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York: W. W. Norton, 1997), 51-52. 
48 Fellows. "Van Vleck," Dictionary of Scientific Biography. 
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that he changed his major. Bardeen eventually got a doctorate in physics at Princeton, but in 1929 he 
was a graduate student in electrical engineering at the University of Wisconsin and taking electives in 
physics.51 As further crossing of paths, in 1941 Bardeen went to work for the NOL near Washington. 
D C., doing research related to mines, although not involving acoustic science.52 Atanasoff and 
Bardeen collaborated only indirectly at the NOL,53 but Atanasoff did express disappointment that he 
had not been the one to invent the transistor. His interests in quantum mechanics and crystals made 
that not a farfetched possibility. According to Atanasoff, he had the "very kernel and heart of the 
transistor" right before his eyes, and "wondered about it and spent hours on it," but neglected to 
pursue it fully.54 
Atanasoff s relationship with Van Vleck improved over the summer, when Atanasoff took a 
class on magnetic susceptibility from him.55 Roughly that area of research led to Van Vleck sharing 
the Nobel Prize in 1977 with two other physicists.56 Atanasoff also began his dissertation under Van 
Vleck. American physicists, including those who considered themselves theoretical, had particular 
interests in the late 1920s in applications of the pure theory emanating largely from Europe.57 
Atanasoff chose in like fashion to explore the effects of an electrical field on the helium atom, a topic 
suggested by Van Vleck.58 Van Vleck then left for Europe to study developments in physics. 
Atanasoff became anxious when Van Vleck scheduled a meeting with all his graduate students for 
simultaneous final discussions of their work. He had a difficult topic and wanted his advisor's full 
attention one last time. Surmising his concern. Van Vleck told him not to worry, no one else would 
come to the meeting. Sure enough, none of the other students did. confirming Atanasoff s suspicion 
that he was not the only student who found Van Vleck a difficult mentor.59 
The University of Wisconsin obtained the services of Gregor Wentzel in the absence of Van 
Vleck. Wentzel, a German, had studied at the University of Munich under Sommerfeld and 
continued postgraduate work with him, particularly on interpretation of atomic spectra. Wentzel had 
posts at the Universities of Leipzig and Zurich before his year at the University of Wisconsin.60 
51 Besides the Nobel Prize in physics that Bardeen shared in 1956 with Shockley and Brattain for the 
transistor, Bardeen shared another Nobel Prize in physics in 1972 for work in superconductors. 
5 Riordan and Hoddeson. Crystal Fire. 77 and 118-119. 
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Atanasoff recalled that Wentzel had just gotten married and looked at his time in Wisconsin as 
something of a honeymoon. He had a poor command of English, so Atanasoff occasionally served as 
his translator.61 Wentzel is best remembered as one of the formulators of the Wentzel-Kramers-
Brillouin (WKB) approximation method used in certain situations to solve the Schrodinger wave 
equation.62 Atanasoff found him congenial and felt fortunate to have the guidance of a distinguished 
theorist fresh from Europe.63 
Atanasoff s dissertation entailed solution of the Schrodinger wave equation for helium 
perturbed by an electric field. The Schrodinger wave equation in basic form is a simple partial 
differential equation describing the wave functions of subatomic particles over time. A differential 
equation is one containing one or more derivatives, where a derivative relates the rate of change of 
one variable with respect to another. An ordinary (or total) differential equation contains a single 
independent variable; a partial differential equation contains two or more. In either case, few 
differential equations outside of textbooks have solutions that can be found analytically. Rather, 
differential equations often are solvable only indirectly and imprecisely by laborious approximation 
methods. Applications of the Schrodinger wave equation are of the latter sort, except for hydrogen, 
the simplest atom, and then only in ideal cases and in the absence of external fields, or perturbations. 
Furthermore, approximate solutions to the Schrodinger wave equation often evolved to solutions of 
systems of linear algebraic equations. This was frequently done by a technique of separation of 
variables, which led to combinations of an infinite number of solutions.64 The accuracy of the final 
answer depended on the number of terms and how they were defined. On the other hand, solution of 
a problem in quantum mechanics through alternate use of matrix mechanics necessarily meant solving 
simultaneous algebraic equations.65 
Extensive calculations had been completed on hydrogen by the time Atanasoff began his 
dissertation. As the next least complex atom, helium had come under heavy attack. Egil Andersen 
Hylleraas. a Norwegian and protege of Bom. accomplished impressive pioneering work calculating 
the ground state of helium. The ground state of an atom is its condition of lowest energy.66 The 
approximation method Hylleraas developed was particularly important for several reasons. First, it 
61 Atanasoff. interview with Merzbach, 5 May 1969, 51-52 (actually unnumbered). 
62 David J. Griffiths, Introduction to Quantum Mechanics (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice 
Hall, 1995), 274. 
63 Atanasoff, interview with Merzbach. 5 May 1969, 52 (actually unnumbered). 
64 Griffiths, Introduction to Quantum Mechanics, 20-24. 
65 Pauling and Wilson. Introduction to Quantum Mechanics, 112-151. 165-175. 186-188. and 416-
418. 
66 Griffiths, Introduction to Quantum Mechanics, 26. 
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gave good results compared to values measured experimentally. Second, the method had wide 
applicability. Finally. Hylleraas made extensive use of a calculator, probably for the first time in 
physics.67 
Atanasoff s problem involved perturbation theory, in which an approximate solution was 
found in a perturbed state by building on that in the unperturbed case.68 Atanasoff thus took the work 
of Hylleraas as his starting point for the more complicated problem he faced calculating the dielectric 
constant of helium. Deriving an extension, he obtained a result about 5 percent below the accepted 
experimental value; with further work, he managed a solution with about 2 percent error.69 That 
compared favorably with results of other researchers doing similar types of calculations.70 and 
Atanasoff published an abbreviated version of his dissertation in The Physical Review.71 Like 
Hylleraas, Atanasoff used a desktop calculator to make his calculations. The experience of spending 
weeks manipulating a mechanical calculator was what "ultimately motivated" him to invent the 
electronic digital computer.72 
The University of Wisconsin accepted Atanasoff s transfer credits from ISC and required 
minimal additional coursework. Atanasoff also had to pass a reading proficiency examination in 
French, which he managed after two weeks intensive study despite having little of the language 
previously. The examiner commented on his odd reading of French,73 but Atanasoff could thus 
graduate after completing his dissertation at end of summer 1930. 
Warren Weaver stood with Atanasoff at the ceremony in the absence of Van Vleck.74 
Weaver was a native of Wisconsin and son of a druggist. An unhappy boy with few friends, too small 
to pass a military physical during World War I, he found his calling as a teacher. He had earned a 
B.S. degree in civil engineering (1916) and doctorate in mathematical physics (1921) from the 
University of Wisconsin. After a short stint at the newly opened California Institute of 
67 Per Stromholm. "Hylleraas. Egil Andersen" in Dictionary of Scientific Biography, 1972; 
Goldstine. The Computer from Pascal to von Neumann, 102-105. 
68 Griffiths, Introduction to Quantum Mechanics, 221. 
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70 Honeywell, "Deposition of Dr. John V. Atanasoff," 94-95; Pauling and Wilson, Introduction to 
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1930), 1.232-1,242. 
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Technology (Caltech) working for Miliikan. Weaver returned to Wisconsin and had become cnairman 
of the Department of Mathematics by the time Atanasoff met him. Weaver disliked quantum 
mechanics as incompatible with electromechanical theory; rather, he made his name in classical 
physics by publishing The Electromagnetic Field with Max Mason in 1929. The book became a 
standard text for graduate students.75 Weaver is better remembered for The Mathematical Theory of 
Communication, written with Claude Shannon and published in 1949.76 The book was a seminal 
study in information theory, which has grown concurrently with digital technology and deals with 
how information is reliably measured, stored, and transmitted. Atanasoff had taken two classes from 
Weaver, including electrodynamics,77 and served under him as an instructor of mathematics from fall 
1929 until he graduated.78 Atanasoff liked Weaver,79 even if Weaver came to detest him. 
Many freshly minted physics Ph.D.*s in 1930 applied for coveted postdoctoral fellowships to 
continue studies in Europe or, increasingly, at one of the four or five universities in the United States 
with greatest prestige. The lucky recipients incurred few responsibilities but could pursue their own 
research for up to two years while working under the tutelage of renowned physicists. The 
fellowships were privately funded, fairly plentiful, but awarded on merit. The National Research 
Council and the John Simon Guggenheim Foundation gave most of them.80 As a top student of top 
professors and with a successful dissertation, and highly ambitious to boot, Atanasoff certainly could 
have been expected to apply for. and win. one of the fellowships. There is no evidence that he 
applied, however. He returned to Ames instead to take a position as an Assistant Professor of 
Mathematics. The reason may simply have been that he had a leave of absence from ISC and an 
75 Warren Weaver. Scene of Change: A Lifetime in American Science (New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons. 1970). 1. 11. 33, 55, 57, and 209. 
76 More precisely, Claude Shannon published "The Mathematical Theory of Communication" in the 
Bell System Technical Journal in 1948. The next year, that article and one by Weaver, "Recent 
Contributions to the Mathematical Theory of Communications," were published together as The 
Mathematical Theory of Communications. 
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obligation to return. Doubtlessly more important. Atanasoff had to support his growing family, made 
more difficult by the Depression. 
What makes Atanasoff s decision to return to ISC nonetheless surprising was his ambivalent 
attitude toward the school. At least in darker moments, he regarded it as a "second-rate institution"81 
and the Midwest as "staid."82 In the former opinion he was unfairly harsh if he meant the school as a 
whole. ISC, officially Iowa State College of Agriculture and Mechanic Arts, had a clear sense of 
mission as a land-grant college, focusing on engineering, home economics, industrial science, 
veterinary medicine, and above all. agriculture. It conferred its first Ph D. in 1916 and ranked 
thirteenth in the nation in number of doctorates given in 1932. ISC had awarded 636 doctorates by 
1942 in fourteen major fields, many related to agriculture or biological sciences. Over one-third 
(221) was in one major area, chemistry, but generally in sub-fields associated with agriculture and 
biology.83 Likewise, chemical engineering at ISC had achieved international recognition exploring 
commercial uses for agricultural wastes.84 In entomology, genetics, bacteriology, soil science, animal 
nutrition, plant pathology, botany, civil engineering, chemistry, and chemical engineering, ISC had a 
solid reputation.85 
On the other hand, physics and mathematics at ISC were regarded as support to engineering 
and industrial science (and, of course, agriculture). More to the point, under pressure from the Iowa 
Board of Education to restrain expenses and school rivalry, the foremost planning objective in 
graduate studies at ISC was to avoid duplication of programs with the State University of Iowa (now 
University of Iowa), particularly in basic sciences.86 Chemistry proved an exception. It had been 
expanding since 1913 under the dynamic leadership of agricultural chemist Winfred F. Coover.87 
Biology was another exception, but it was not politic for ISC to attempt much in mathematics and 
81 Atanasoff. interview with Merzbach, 5 May 1969. 45. 
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physics because of relatively strong departments at the State University. Therefore, research at ISC in 
physics stressed areas with "economics utilization" potential.88 The physics faculty during the 1930s 
could boast of published papers exemplified by the following: "The lighting of a home under various 
color conditions" (1932). "Practical physics for agriculturists" (1935). "Thermal conductivity of 
stored oats with different moisture content" ( 1935), "The electrical conductivity of cod liver oil" 
( 1937), and "Measurement of the viscosity of eggs by the use of a torsion pendulum" ( 1937).89 
Atanasoff published the latter paper. 
To jump ahead a moment. World War II dramatically changed ISC, as it did the nation. Like 
Atanasoff, some faculty and staff departed during the war. For example, Gerald W. Fox had joined 
the physics faculty as an associate professor the same year that Atanasoff came back as an assistant 
professor. Fox left to help at the deliberately misnamed (for security reasons) Radiation Laboratory 
at MIT developing radar, but as an administrator and not a physicist. He later served for several 
months as a scientific advisor on the staff of General Mac Arthur in Japan.90 He returned to ISC in 
1947 and became head of the physics department after Atanasoff refused the position.91 
The department was transformed under Fox, but largely thanks to Frank Spedding. a highly 
capable and strong-willed physical chemist specializing in rare-earth elements. Spedding had 
responsibility for a massive effort at ISC to provide uranium to the Manhattan Project. After first 
discovering a practical refining process, Spedding and his group produced about 2 million pounds of 
uranium metal from ore. The purified uranium went to facilities at Chicago or Oak Ridge, Tennessee, 
for processing into component isotopes.9" The Ames Project, as it was called, also conducted basic 
research into uranium and related elements.93 Federal money continued to surge into ISC after the 
war, not least because Spedding and ISC successfully sought establishment of a permanent Atomic 
Energy Commission laboratory (Ames Laboratory) on campus. Theoretical physics fit into 
Spedding's research plans, so he splashed money into the physics department. That allowed the 
88 Buchanan. Twenty-Year Development Program. 38. 
89 Iowa State College Library, List of Publications of Members of the Staffs of Iowa State College 
(Ames, Iowa: Iowa State College, 1932-1937). 
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department to install a 70 million electron volt synchrotron. A synchrotron is an apparatus designed 
to permit the study of subatomic particles by accelerating them to high speeds. Fox brought in new 
blood to strengthen the department and use the synchrotron.94 Theoretical physics had thus arrived at 
ISC in a big way. Infusion of government money similarly transformed universities across the nation. 
ISC eventually implemented a program in theoretical physics, but it was not prewar the best 
institution for someone with Atanasoff s interests. As late as 1942, Raymond M. Hughes. President 
Emeritus, declared categorically that ISC offered no graduate work in theoretical physics, rather, 
"doctoral work has been confined to applied physics."95 Graduate students in physics did projects in 
fact that could be considered theoretical, but it is understandable that, as the only theoretical physicist 
at ISC, Atanasoff sometimes felt "very lonesome."96 He had no doubt upon his return from 
Wisconsin that he could compete technically with the rest of the faculty, but he had not remembered 
the mathematics and physics departments being so distressingly "old-fashioned." The established 
members of the physics faculty had little understanding of advanced mathematics, and most had 
tentative grasp of the calculus, to Atanasoff s keen disappointment. Furthermore, to his thinking at 
least, there was too little research, and it of mediocre quality. He judged the mathematics department 
also in need of improvement, with that faculty failing to do justice to applications of mathematics. 
Looking back from old age, Atanasoff recollected that the austere circumstances of the 
Depression colliding with his ambition had colored his opinions, and that he was happy at ISC 
overall. If the faculty refused to mandate the teaching of undergraduate physics using the calculus, it 
at least gave him considerable freedom to teach what and how he wanted.97 Atanasoff may have paid 
a price for independence, however, because judging from reports that ISC presidents made 
periodically to the Board of Education, he received little recognition. The reports listed brief news 
items of interest. Atanasoff s name rarely appeared in the reports; others in the mathematics and 
physics departments made it occasionally. 
Fox, who Atanasoff regarded as his chief rival at ISC, won frequent plaudits. For example. 
Hughes reported in 1933 that Fox and his students built a 400-watt "radio-phone" to communicate 
with a polar expedition.98 Later Fox designed classroom hearing aids for students hard of hearing. 
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and that was duly noted." After Fox toured Eastern universities, it pleased Hughes to convey Fox's 
impression that ISC was. "doing just as good work in our particular fields at a very small cost to the 
institution as compared with the older universities."100 Fox managed to stay in tune with the college 
administration, but he also accomplished quality research. The physics department emphasized 
crystal research.101 and Fox spent several months in late 1934 with Linus Pauling at Caltech. Pauling, 
a chemist and. eventually, two-time Nobel Prize winner,102 earned his early reputation in X-ray 
analysis of crystals, one of Fox's research sub-fields. Pauling came to ISC the following spring to 
deliver a series of lectures.103 Fox published more than anyone in physics did, and Hughes judged 
him in 1946 to be best known nationally of that faculty (Atanasoff was not considered).104 In fairness 
to Atanasoff and Hughes, Atanasoff did copious amounts of worthy research, but it did not lend itself 
to news briefs of general interest. 
Atanasoff evoked strong emotions from people. Most found him approachable and amiable, 
but upon further exposure, sometimes overwhelming and domineering. His self-confidence, frank 
honesty, and unconventional opinions offended some, but he left others, particularly subordinates and 
those with whom he worked closely, awestruck by his brilliance. He found it difficult to talk on 
subjects he thought frivolous and had an annoying tendency to bluntly curtail a conversation once it 
ceased to interest him.105 If not in contemplation, then he was in frenetic motion, and he rarely 
hesitated to speak his mind. Furthermore, Atanasoff loved animated debate, especially those 
infrequent occasions when someone bested him in an argument.106 
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Atanasoffs independence of thinking fostered creativity and had other positive aspects, even 
as he ruffled feathers. As a minor but telling example, a student from Idaho, Philip J. Hart, belonged 
to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (Mormons) and found many people he met in 
Ames (which, truth be told, was rather staid) did not accept him because of it. Atanasoff. an agnostic, 
listened with an open mind.107 He became so intrigued that he purchased books on the Mormons and 
became expert on that topic, as on many others.108 Thereafter, he rose in scholarly defense of 
Mormons whenever he heard them criticized without sufficient regard to facts.109 
Atanasoff believed he raised more eyebrows over his political leanings. He claimed an 
inclination toward socialism from birth, although that did not stop him from creating a corporation in 
the early 1950s to improve proximity fuses. He later diversified his company. The Ordnance 
Engineering Corporation, into non-defense areas. Atanasoff also had a string of shrewd real estate 
and other financial investments. The sum of his business activities left him comfortably situated, but 
he seemed little troubled by any inconsistency between his ardent pursuit of profit and the supposed 
higher ethics of socialism. Anyway, his long association in classified military research makes it 
unlikely he embraced socialism too obviously. In regard to obtaining security clearance, he claimed 
that he had come within, '"the hair of my teeth being associated with Red organizations." He did not 
elaborate, other than to recall that in 1938 when workers at the Maytag appliance factory in Newton, 
Iowa, went on strike, he sided with labor and went to investigate. That he took off from work was 
extraordinary in itself and indicates how passionately he regarded the issue. He thought that by doing 
so he incurred the displeasure of the ISC administration, however.110 
One former student likened Atanasoff to Don Quixote, "tilting at windmills." Robert Mather 
graduated in spring 1942 with a B.S. degree in physics. For the year before that, he did wiring on the 
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ABC under Berry's direction. He then served at the NOL with Atanasoff, although not directly under 
him. There were a number of ISC students at the NOL, and Mather recalled that Atanasoff tried to 
keep them together, presumably to make it easier to resume their research at ISC after what he hoped 
would be a short war. For their part, the students enjoyed sharing "JV (Atanasoff) stories" when 
together socially. By comparing him to the foolish, if noble, ersatz Spanish knight. Mather did not so 
much mean Atanasoff was impractical, although he did find him a bit "unrealistic" at times. Rather. 
Mather meant that Atanasoff had a stubborn independence that led him in unorthodox directions, 
paying little heed to established procedures or what others thought.111 
Atanasoff admitted his problems with Weaver on Project X. the secret NDRC project that he 
did for him at ISC, stemmed from obliviousness on his part to Weaver's sensibilities.112 Still intensely 
angry thirty years later testifying in Honeywell v. Sperry Rand, Weaver considered Atanasoff as 
"rather bright but queer and opinionated," a "wild guy who would get enthusiastic ideas."113 
People at the NOL agreed. Atanasoff had little exposure to acoustics before assignment as 
Chief of the Acoustic Section, Test Division. Unconcerned, he made hasty study and forged ahead 
confidently.114 Worse, he set a research agenda at odds with that preferred by the old hands, most 
with experience in magnetic mines. An observer recalled the consequences: Atanasoff "was 
attacked, probably viciously, as a driving individual with 'screw ball' ideas. He regarded his acoustic 
testing assignment as requiring a much different approach than had been possible for the magnetic 
mines and was unwilling to accept the suggestions of his strongly 'magnetic' colleagues."115 One 
offended scientist characterized Atanasoff as, "articulate, aggressive, immodest, opinionated, and 
unwilling to see any error in any of his ways." Moreover, Atanasoff "was also inclined to try to 
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Robert Mather. Oakland. California, tape-recorded interviews made over the telephone with Paul 
Mobley, 2. 4, and 9 March 1998. 
112 Honeywell, "Transcript of Proceedings, ' 2.738-2,739. 
113 Honeywell v. Sperry Rand. "Summary of Testimony of Dr. Warren Weaver," 6 March 1972, 5-6. 
ISU, Parks. "Henry L. Hanson Papers" (box 5, folder 2). 
114 Atanasoff, "Advent of Electronic Digital Computing," 256. 
115 William R. Turner, "John Vincent Atanasoff: A Reminiscence of His Early Years at the Naval 
Ordnance Laboratory." unpublished manuscript. Silver Springs, Maryland, 23 July 1987, 2. ISU, 
Parks. "John Vincent Atanasoff Papers" (box 20. folder 5). 
61 
carry his point by shouting." Not impressed with Atanasoff s new ideas gleaned from books, the 
scientist scolded sarcastically that: "he could learn a lot about underwater acoustics by just sticking 
his head under water and holding his breath."116 Atanasoff prevailed and his program became quite 
successful and important to the war effort, even if acoustic mines lacked the glamour of atomic 
weapons or radar.117 
Atanasoff* s supervisors felt fortunate to have him but probably not without mixed emotions. 
Ralph Bennett. Technical Director for the NOL, remembered Atanasoff as "one of our best idea 
men," but one who had trouble following procedures. According to Bennett, his "freewheeling" often 
got him in trouble with the commanding admiral.118 Even so, in 1945, the Navy presented Atanasoff 
with its highest award to civilians, the Distinguished Service Award, for among other things, 
inventing a pressure sweep to destroy a type of underwater mine deployed by the Germans and 
thought invulnerable to sweeping.119 The award, without exaggeration, cited him for, "outstanding 
theoretical knowledge ... unusual imagination and exceptional mechanical ingenuity, his enthusiasm 
and indefatigable energy and zeal."120 
The Navy brass appreciated Atanasoff s ability to accomplish tough assignments and 
promoted him to Chief, Acoustics Division.121 His attendance at Project Crossroads exemplified the 
regard in which the Navy held him. Atanasoff had not planned to witness the atomic bomb blasts 
since he had a crew to handle onsite details and a surfeit of activities at home base, including the 
NOL computer project.122 His commander ordered otherwise because of the primary importance of 
the tests to the Navy. While admitting that Atanasoff s continued presence in Washington was 
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"highly desirable," the officer decided the NOL had to have a man at the Bikini Atoll who could 
ensure that "silly things are not done," and who was not "afraid of God, the Devil, Man. or the 
Navy."123 In fact, Atanasoff made a surprisingly good administrator. For example, the NOL was 
often desperately short of personnel, and Atanasoff turned out to be an outstanding recruiter of 
technical talent.124 
If some people resented Atanasoff. many admired him. Robert Stewart worked with him for 
several months at the NOL in early 1949. Stewart, who went on to earn a Ph D. in physics and teach 
at ISC. eventually becoming chairman of its computer science department, counted Atanasoff as a 
great influence on his life.125 When Stewart met him. Atanasoff had recently completed a formidable 
project to measure vibrations resulting from destruction by the British of German fortifications on the 
Island of Helgoland, off Denmark, by detonating four or five thousand tons of old. unstable 
munitions. Other organizations had been asked and refused the project because of the impossibly 
short preparation time. Atanasoff was warned not to attempt it for that reason and because he had 
limited experience in seismology. Undaunted, he hastily fabricated twenty-two seismographs he 
invented and positioned them down the length of Europe. Although not officially requested, he also 
installed a microbarograph at each station. The devices measured low-frequency sonic vibrations and 
were also invented for the project. The measurements were made successfully, and Atanasoff was 
awarded a Citation of the Seismological Society of America and an Admiral's Citation.126 
The urgency had not abated appreciably when Stewart joined the acoustics group, which had 
to incorporate what had been learned from the Helgoland and various nuclear explosions into a viable 
means to detect detonation of atomic bombs around the world.127 The U.S. had specific concerns 
about the Soviet Union, although it assumed the totalitarian empire remained technologically so far 
behind that several years would be required before it could bring a nuclear weapon to fruition. Aided 
by stolen information, the Soviets actually tested their first atomic bomb later in 1949. and the U.S. 
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125 Stewart, interview with Mobley. 14 and 18 November 1997. 
126 J. V. Atanasoff. B. L. Snavely. and John Brown, "A New Instrument for Subsonic Frequency 
Measurements," abstract in The Journal of the Acoustical Society of America 20, no. 2 (March 1948), 
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discovered it from residual air pollutants. The stunning news led to considerable worsening of Cold 
War tensions. 
Before the U S S R, tested that first bomb, Stewart recalled sitting in daily staff meetings with 
the acoustics group and listening in awe as Atanasoff presented his thoughts, "one after the other. 
each more brilliant than the last, and each requiring a reorientation in thinking on the part of the 
listeners." Trying to follow his thinking, according to Stewart, "was like trying to get a drink out of a 
fire hose." Stewart had never met anyone like Atanasoff, who for all his drive and intelligence was 
also accessible and supportive.128 On the other hand, Mather, more experienced with Atanasoff. 
recalled that he made uncompromising demands, and anyone falling short was dressed down in no 
uncertain terms. That happened often enough that he acquired an unflattering nickname, used behind 
his back, consisting of a phrase based on his name Atanasoff but that meant to get chewed out.129 
Whatever faults Atanasoff had, however, lack of humanitarianism was not one. For example, 
he decided illiteracy in the U.S. must be blamed largely on difficulties inherent in written English. As 
a cure, he created a replacement binary alphabet with thirty-five letters to precisely cover most 
sounds, or phonemes, in spoken English. Something like bar coding, letters were comprised of dots, 
easily "read by man or machine."130 Atanasoff began the new alphabet during the war as an antidote 
to his involvement in weapons research. He spent thousands of hours on it spanning many years. 
More than anything, it represented his life's major work. He pitched it to anyone who listened, with 
no success finding people willing to give it a try. He thought he had at last the perfect test case with 
the birth of a grandchild, but his son refused, not wanting his daughter to learn an alphabet no one 
else would know.131 
Even if unconventional. Atanasoff gained a reputation at ISC for being progressive and 
intelligent. People often went to him for advice on research problems; so many sought help that it 
hindered his own work. For instance, his research on the viscosity of eggs came at the request of the 
agriculture department. If Atanasoff nonetheless believed some colleagues ignored him.'32 he 
conceded that he got "great inspiration" from others.133 And though he complained of intellectual 
128 Stewart, interview with Mobley, 14 and 18 November 1997. 
129 Mather, interviews with Mobley, 2, 4, and 9 March 1998. 
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isolation,134 he made frequent trips to professional conferences.135 For example, the University of 
Michigan had instituted popular annual summer symposia in theoretical physics, and Atanasoff 
attended regularly.136 He thus came to know many of the big names in physics, including most of the 
originators of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics.137 
Of course, there were no conferences on electronic digital computers, a passion for Atanasoff 
by the late 1930s. If there had been such conferences, Atanasoff would have had to give the lectures. 
A number of people had interest in calculators and were moving the technology along smartly in the 
years before World War II (and, in fact, met to discuss their work), but no one had progressed as far 
as Atanasoff and Berry, at least in the practical attainment of what computers became. 
Atanasoff began as an assistant professor in 1930 teaching the same undergraduate courses in 
mathematics that he had taught as an instructor. He made no secret of his desire for promotion, 
particularly since his starting salary of $2,700 for the academic year was reduced to $2,305 due to the 
Depression.138 He began developing advanced courses to improve his position about a year after 
returning to ISC. Most of his classes soon were at the graduate level, including thermodynamics, 
mathematical physics, kinetic theory, and quantum mechanics, and were courses he developed, 
representing aspects of physics not taught at ISC previously. He received a joint appointment in the 
Departments of Mathematics and Physics around mid-decade.139 When a colleague in physics 
committed suicide, Atanasoff took the office of the deceased as his private office—so spacious it later 
served as a classroom but which no one else wanted—and arranged all his classes to meet 
conveniently in the Physics Building. Depression era budget constraints made promotions infrequent, 
but Atanasoff became an Associate Professor of Mathematics and Physics in 1936.140 His promotion 
to full professor came in absentia while he was at the NOL in 1942. 
Atanasoff was a demanding teacher, famous on campus for his hyperactivity. Charles 
Durham, ISC engineering graduate, remembered Atanasoff as a "standout," a common sentiment 
134 As an example, see Atanasoff, interview with Merzbach, 5 May 1969, 14. 
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among better students. Durham was sometimes tardy for his calculus class, an infraction invariably 
punished with good-natured ribbing. Atanasoff always came dressed in a clean and neatly pressed 
blue suit but got so "enthusiastic" lecturing at the blackboard that he left heavily dusted with chalk.141 
Not everyone appreciated his teaching style, heavy on participation. He liked to give each student a 
problem to solve at the blackboard and then walk around offering encouragement. Some people 
found him impatient, even arrogant, but never students. In an era of formality between professors and 
students, colleagues and students alike called Atanasoff, "JV." On the other hand, Atanasoff seemed 
to relish flunking students who earned it.142 
Graduate students in particular liked Atanasoff and marveled at his mental abilities.143 
Atanasoff claimed they flocked to him because he was the toughest man in the department and 
devised interesting and topical projects.144 No doubt the allure of theoretical physics had something 
to do with his popularity, even if no one could pursue pure research in physics at ISC. Students also 
appreciated his accessibility. He could often be found in his office late into the evenings, long after 
other faculty had left, and available to anyone who stopped by. Atanasoff inspired great loyalty from 
his graduate students, and some felt that he made a family of them.145 In any case, it was for them 
that Atanasoff began the ABC. 
ISC conferred its first doctorates in both mathematics and physics in 1933. The first 
doctorate under Atanasoff went to Charles Wells, who graduated in 1935 in applied mathematics. 
Wells calculated in his dissertation an approximate solution to the Schrodinger equation for the 
ground state of lithium. He thus selected much the same problem that Atanasoff had for his 
dissertation. Lithium, with three electrons, one more than helium, posed a greater mathematical 
challenge in absolute terms. Wells had to his advantage more work by others as precedent. His result 
differed from the experimentally measured value by .86 percent, slightly better than other researchers 
had obtained.146 
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The next year, Robert G. Wilson became the first of three students to complete dissertations 
under Atanasoff with topics on the piezoelectric oscillations of quartz plates. Piezoelectric refers to a 
phenomenon inherent within certain crystalline materials to become electrically charged when placed 
under stress. The amount of charge is proportional to the degree of deformation, or strain. 
Piezoelectric crystals also exhibit the converse effect: they become strained when subjected to an 
electric field. Piezoelectricity was little more than a curiosity until World War I, when French 
scientists discovered that quartz plates could be excited electrically and made to vibrate and emit 
high-frequency sound waves underwater. When they produced quartz transducers that could convert 
the pressure waves that echoed back into electrical signals, sonar was bom. Incidentally, the primary 
motivation for invention of sonar was detection of icebergs, not enemy submarines, as might be 
supposed. Other uses for piezoelectric crystals were in electrical circuits as filters and oscillators, 
notably for radio transmitters.147 
Wilson developed differential equations that rigorously described the vibrations of 
anisotropic quartz plates and solved them using approximation techniques.148 Isotropic materials are 
those with the same physical characteristics regardless along which axis measurements are taken. By 
contrast, anisotropic crystals have asymmetrical properties along different axes and are the only ones 
that exhibit piezoelectric effects.149 Because of the complexity of mathematical analysis, equations of 
motion for even isotropic oscillating plates had not until then been rigorously defined and solved. 
Equations of vibration for quartz before Wilson were instead empirical and special purpose.150 
Philip Hart continued in much the same vein as Wilson. Using experimental measurements 
from plates he painstakingly cut to exacting specifications from a quartz crystal. Hart worked out the 
mathematical relationships between the six elastic constants and the higher harmonic frequencies for 
piezoelectric vibration at constant temperature.151 He confirmed his original results in postdoctoral 
research with plates shaped from a second quartz crystal and then investigated how the elastic 
147 Walter Guyton Cady, Piezoelectricity: An Introduction to the Theory and Applications of 
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constants changed with temperature variations ranging from 20 to 70°C.152 Hart and Atanasoff 
published the results in The Physical Review.153 
Research through that of Hart on the piezoelectric properties of quartz had been confined 
mostly to alpha quartz, or low quartz. Alpha quartz is the usual form of quartz found at temperatures 
below 573°C. At temperatures between 573 and 870°C, alpha-quartz becomes beta quartz, or high 
quartz, by metamorphosing from a trigonal crystal structure into a hexagonal one.154 Erwin Kammer 
extended the work of Wilson and Hart into beta quartz, confirmed that it too is piezoelectric, and 
calculated its five elastic constants and other values.155 Kammer finished his dissertation in 1942, the 
last one under Atanasoff at ISC. 
Wilson, Hart and Kammer had dissertations officially in applied physics. Their work had 
obvious applications, such as in radio broadcasting and accurate timekeeping mechanisms,156 but it 
might well have been termed theoretical. The other four dissertations completed under Atanasoff at 
ISC were officially in applied mathematics. All seven dissertations had a fundamental commonality, 
however: They investigated approximate solutions to partial differential equations.157 The difficulties 
Wells encountered in calculating the ground state of lithium brought back "full force" to Atanasoff 
the problem that he had experienced with his own dissertation.158 Wilson's mathematical model for 
the oscillations of quartz plates likewise involved partial differential equations solvable only by 
exceptional effort with approximation methods. The dissertations that followed those of Wells and 
Wilson also centered upon finding approximate solutions to differential equations. Recognizing that 
the progress of his students and of science generally was being seriously impeded by the limitations 
of applied mathematics, Atanasoff made a quest of discovering a better solution method.159 He 
15
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embarked specifically on a research program to devise with his students a better approximation 
method for solving differential equations through functional analysis. 
A functional is not the same thing in mathematics as the familiar function, although the two 
concepts are related. A function provides a rule for how numbers from one set, the domain, are to be 
paired with a second set of numbers, the range. Mathematicians use the word mapping to describe the 
matching of numbers from the domain with those in the range as defined by the function. Key to the 
concept of function is that any point in the domain corresponds to only one point in the range.160 
Somewhat similarly, a functional describes an operation in which a family of functions is 
mapped into a set of numbers so that each function corresponds to a unique number.161 That is. the 
domain for a functional is a family of functions and the assigned unique numbers constitute the 
range.16' The concept of functional originated in 1887 with Italian mathematician Vito Volterra. 
Atanasoff fell more directly under the influence of Stefen Banach. a Polish mathematician regarded as 
the founder of modem functional analysis. His Theory of Linear Operations (1932. in French) was 
particularly important. 
Among the applications for functionals is that of a polynomial used to approximate another 
function.163 For any continuous function or derivative a polynomial exists that approximates it to any 
desired degree of accuracy.164 Polynomials have the advantage over many other functions that they 
are simple to manipulate, although different polynomials are used in practice to describe in piecewise 
fashion different subintervals of the function being modeled. A complex function can thus be 
approximated by a family of carefully chosen polynomials, whose functional is usually linear and 
relatively easy to evaluate. The functional could be used to analyze the amount of error introduced by 
the piecewise polynomial approximation, for instance.165 
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Atanasoff and his students designed their functional method as a general replacement for 
approximation procedures then commonly in use. including the Ritz. Treffiz. Boussinesq (or least 
squares), and Schrodinger perturbation theory methods. Their technique was intended for both 
differential and integral equations under linear conditions. Instead of substituting a family of 
polynomials per se for the original equation, their method involved selecting a finite number of terms 
from an expansion function. This was often a Taylor series.166 A Taylor series is based on a 
polynomial in the form of a power series, that is, an infinite summation in which terms containing 
identical differences are taken to incrementally higher exponential powers. A Taylor series can 
sometimes precisely and conveniently represent another function. In more cases, the original function 
can be approximated with a finite version called Taylor's formula with a remainder. Whether they 
used a Taylor, Frobenius. or other power series.167 Atanasoff and his students defined a functional for 
the terms of the expansion function in such a way that the problem resolved into finding a solution to 
a set of linear equations. The resulting number of equations and the overall accuracy of the answer 
depended upon various factors, particularly the number of terms included from the approximating 
expansion function.168 
Summarizing the functional approximation method, Atanasoff and his students conceived of 
a differential or integral equation as an infinite number of algebraic equations, from which they 
selected a subset to represent the original equation. By careful attention to conditions of the 
transformation, a close approximation could be made of the true solution, which could be verified by 
applying certain tests. Their functional method covered the great portion of important applications, 
even if limited to linear problems.169 When the resulting linear equation sets were small, they could 
be solved by standard methods, such as the common Cramer's Rule. However, equation sets 
typically became large and difficult to solve as the approximate solution approached the true solution. 
The first related work under Atanasoff came from Wells, who explored a technique known as 
the separation of variables in a 1932 Master's thesis. The method involved reducing a partial 
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differential equation to a system of ordinary differential equations for further, presumably easier, 
solution.170 Several years later, based on Atanasoff s concept of a functional approximation 
method,171 George Lloyd Gross outlined an initial formulation in a Master's thesis entitled 
"Approximate Solution of Linear Differential Equations" (1937).172 The next year, Charles J. Thome 
applied the method to a problem of elastic plates. The result was also a Master's thesis: "Functional 
Approximation Methods for the Solution of Linear Differential Equations as Applied to Thin Plates." 
Thome anticipated the ABC in his thesis, pointing out that better "machine methods for solving a 
large number of linear equations" would give use of Junctionals wider applicability.173 The previous 
summer. Atanasoff had written to him, noting that he had "put in considerable time this summer to 
develop the theoretical aspects," and wanting to know how Thome, in Utah, was coming with 
calculations. According to Atanasoff. "what we need, more than anything else, in developing our 
methods is some practical experience with it."174 
In, "Use of Junctionals in Obtaining Approximate Solutions of Linear Operational 
Equations" (1939), a dissertation for a doctorate. Gross continued development of the functional 
method.175 So did, "Errors in the Approximation of Functions by the Use of Functional" ( 1940) by 
Roy Herbert Cook. His dissertation provided guidelines on how Junctionals could best be selected to 
represent a function.176 Finally, in "The Approximate Solution of Linear Differential Equations by 
the Use of Functionals" (1941). the culminating dissertation on the topic, Thome again applied the 
functional method to plate theory.177 
Construction of the ABC had progressed a long way by the time Thome finished his 
dissertation. He remembered it as the Linear Equations Machine. He had hoped that the electronic 
computer would be ready for use with his problem, but Atanasoff warned him not to delay work 
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waiting.178 Thome eventually transformed his initial partial differential equation to an algebraic 
equation set including thirty-one unknowns, far too large for hand solution or computing methods of 
the day. Even the ABC could not quite have handled that large of equation set. The desired answer 
remained beyond his reach, but Thome did get satisfactory results to a lower degree of accuracy.179 
The situation of Atanasoff and his students was hardly unique. The growing complexity of 
engineering and science demanded corresponding mathematical tools of greater sophistication, but 
mathematicians neglected applications before World War H. Instead of addressing topics thought 
most important, therefore, engineers and scientists tended to pose problems in more elementary terms 
to allow solutions with available methods.180 To attack many topical problems forthright, Atanasoff 
recognized that a combination of more advanced approximation methods and computational devices 
was the "only way out."181 
Mathematical approximation is broadly defined as the solution of mathematical problems by 
methods that do not yield exact answers and is generally used in cases where precise answers are 
more difficult or impossible to find. It is a complex field of study in its own right but might mean 
something as simple as discarding less significant parts of an equation in order to solve analytically 
what remains.182 Numerical analysis is an area of mathematical approximation based entirely upon 
arithmetic. 
Various numerical methods have been known since before Newton, who added many 
innovations, most notably the invention of the calculus. Classical numerical techniques depended 
heavily on the method of finite differences, which involves only additions or subtractions once a 
problem is set up.183 The method of finite differences is inherent in the concept of differentiation, in 
fact, although more specifically. Newton conceived of differentiation in terms of infinite series.184 
Numerical analysis underwent rigorous development in the nineteenth century but necessarily was 
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confined to relatively minor problems.185 The common application was interpolation. Before 
computers, engineers, mathematicians, and scientists depended heavily on tables of values. Creating 
such a table began with the laborious calculation of a relatively few pivotal values from fundamental 
formulae. Simpler numerical techniques were then used to tabulate intermediate values by 
interpolating between the pivotal values. Moreover, since no table could include all values, the end 
user often had to interpolate to get specific values.186 Note that interpolation usually gave only 
estimates of the true answers. 
Numerical analysis in more advanced applications consists mainly of huge numbers of 
repetitive calculations, which became practical to any extent with the perfecting of electronic digital 
computers with large memories. Digital computers do only arithmetic operations directly, but by 
doing them quickly and storing partial results for further use, can be made to contrive solutions to 
problems in higher mathematics through numerical methods. Conversely, since calculus by definition 
involves infinite processes, but a digital computer is a discrete device, most computerized solutions to 
problems in mathematics can only be approximated. 
Atanasoff was thus on the cutting edge of not just computers, but what became an important 
area of mathematics. As an example of the lengths to which Atanasoff went in pursuit of better 
approximation methods, he arranged for one of his graduate classes to study Nikolay Mitrofanovich 
Krylov, a specialist in approximation techniques. The readings were in Russian, so Atanasoff found a 
translator to sit in class.187 Furthermore, he had translations made of works on approximation theory 
by Krylov and another mathematician, Mykhailo Pilipovich Krawtchouk.188 Atanasoff tried to 
correspond directly with Krawtchouk, but unfortunately, at that time in the midst of the Stalin purges, 
he was accused of being a Polish spy, arrested, and sent to a labor camp in Siberia, where he died 
several years later.189 
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War diverted Atanasoff from the related fields of computers and mathematical 
approximation, including numerical analysis. Early modern computers and numerical analysis 
advanced concurrently. The initial success of electronic computers was as much about development 
of numerical methods as about hardware. One pioneer admonished his eager postwar students: 
"Design of the machine for the mathematics and design of mathematics for the machine cannot be 
separated, as they will have their mutual effects on one another."190 As it happened, others besides 
Atanasoff, particularly the protean von Neumann, adapted numerical analysis for computers. 
The small internal memories of the first computers complicated the task. Goldstine noted that 
traditional economies of computation reversed with electronic digital computers. Where data storage 
in the form of hand notes on paper or holes in punched cards had been cheap and multiplication 
expensive, data storage now became expensive and multiplication cheap.191 Thus, numerical methods 
had to be revised consistent with the new economy. In the meantime, and until large, fast memories 
became available, digital computers had smaller capabilities than commonly understood. Indeed, 
based on the example of the ENIAC. some authorities thought best use of computers might be to 
generate tables of values of elementary functions for approximate solutions done manually.192 That 
was another reason why the computer pioneers saw need for only a handful of the machines. 
Atanasoff found the functional method superior to other methods for transforming differential 
equations into linear algebraic ones, but like the ABC. even if well developed, it remained a work in 
progress when he left for the NOL.193 The functional method might have found wide use, but general-
purpose computers programmed with numerical algorithms eventually came to solve differential 
equations more conveniently. To repeat: the functional method did not produce final answers, but 
rather, sets of algebraic equations that required further manipulation. As a practical matter, this 
second part of the solution meant use of a computer programmed with a numerical method 
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specifically for solving sets of linear algebraic equations. That was the purpose of the ABC. of 
course. It was also a major purpose for the IAS computer. 
Fully computerized numerical solutions are faster but not necessarily better. William Kahan. 
an authority in computer error analysis, tellingly rewrote Gresham's Law ("bad money drives out 
good") for computers: "the fast drives out the slow even if the fast is wrong."194 No matter how done, 
numerical solutions give only approximate answers in most applications. The inaccuracy that results 
because the numerical formula cannot yield precise answers is called method error. 
Worse, there are other sources of error inherent in computer-generated solutions. Foremost 
among these is rounding error. Digital computers are restricted by word size, that is. the number of 
digits available to represent a number. This limitation precludes preciseness in most calculations. 
Numbers typically must either be truncated or rounded up or down to fit the available spaces in a 
word. Because of the tremendous number of arithmetic operations a digital computer must complete 
in the solution of a typical mathematical problem, such errors can accumulate to seriously 
compromise the accuracy of the final answer.195 The ENIAC needed to complete about 750 
multiplications in a ballistics problem. The IAS computer might have performed 250,000 
multiplications for a reasonably good answer to a more complex problem expected of it.196 
Furthermore, rounding is a problem whether a computer uses fixed or scientific notation.197 
Von Neumann was initially pessimistic about the usefulness of digital computers because of 
rounding error.198 In this opinion he took his lead from Harold Hotelling.199 a statistician who. in 
1943. warned about "the neglected question of limits of error." Hotelling had in mind machine 
methods then available and anticipating when solution of linear equation sets by standard elimination 
194 William Kahan quoted in David A. Patterson and John L. Hennessy, Computer Organization and 
Design: The Hardware / Software Interface (San Francisco: Morgan Kaufmann. 1994). 249. 
195 Ralston and Rabinowitz, A First Course in Numerical Analysis. 2-4. 
196 Herman H. Goldstine and John von Neumann, On the Principles of Large Scale Computing 
Machines." 1946; reprinted in Papers of John von Neumann on Computing and Computing Theory. 
ed. William Aspray and Arthur Burks (Cambridge. Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1987). 325 and 327-
328. Where the ENIAC needed about 750 multiplications to complete a problem in ballistics, 
Mauchly noted that a human computer using a mechanical calculator could complete the problem in 
"no more than 100 steps." See, John W. Mauchly, "The Use of High Speed Vacuum Tube Devices 
for Calculating," August 1942; reprinted in Brian Randell, ed.. The Origins of Digital Computers: 
Selected Papers, 3rd ed. (New York: Springer-Verlag. 1982). 357-358. 
197 Patterson and Hennessy, Computer Organization and Design, 249-256. 
198 Aspray, John von Neumann and the Origins of Modem Computing, 95-96. 
199 V. Bargmann. D. Montgomery, and J. von Neumann. "Solution of Linear Systems of High Order," 
25 October 1946; reprinted in John von Neumann, Collected Works, ed. A. H. Taub (New York: 
Pergamon Press. 1961). Vol. V. 422 and 430-431. 
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procedures could be substantially automated. Due to rounding error alone, he estimated that at least 
seven decimal places of accuracy were needed in calculations to ensure an accuracy of one decimal 
place in the answer of an equation set with no more than eleven unknowns.200 Like Atanasoff. von 
Neumann considered large systems of linear algebraic equations fundamental to numerical analysis. 
He believed solutions of particularly tough partial differential equations might require sets of 100 
linear equations or more to approximate adequately. He therefore explored alternate methods of 
solving linear equations because of Hotelling's dismal conclusion.201 This changed after British 
mathematician Alan Turing expressed skepticism about Hotelling s analysis. With Goldstine and 
others, von Neumann reconsidered rounding error and found it not nearly as big a problem as 
Hotelling thought in most situations when precautions were taken.202 
Hotelling knew of the ABC when he issued his dire warning on rounding error and may have 
been thinking of it. If so. he did not know enough. As President of the Institute of Mathematical 
Statistics. Hotelling invited Atanasoff to lecture at a national symposium in 1941 dedicated to new 
calculating machines.203 Statisticians had great need for better calculating machines, particularly for 
solving large sets of linear algebraic equations. Atanasoff turned down the invitation upon advice of 
his patent attorney.204 Had he not. Hotelling might have learned that the ABC, which used a variation 
of the common Gaussian elimination method, allowed adequately for rounding error. Atanasoff gave 
his computer a word size of fifty binary digits to be assured of answers accurate to at least five 
decimal digits even with twenty-nine unknowns.205 
By contrast to purely numerical methods in solution of differential equations, the functional 
method of Atanasoff and his students demanded considerable effort by a mathematician in its 
"°° Harold Hotelling, "Some New Methods in Matrix Calculations," Annals of Mathematical Statistics 
14, no. 1 (March 1943), 3 and 7. 
^°' V. Bargmann, et al.. "Solution of Linear Systems of High Order," 421. 
20
~ Goldstine, The Computer from Pascal to von Neumann, 124 and 287-292. 
"°
3 Harold Hotelling. President. The Institute of Mathematical Statistics, letter to J. V. Atanasoff, 28 
April 1941. ISU, Parks, "John Vincent Atanasoff Papers" (box 11, folder 20). 
204 Honeywell, "Deposition of Dr. John V. Atanasoff," 284-285; John V. Atanasoff, copy of letter to 
John Mauchly. 7 October 1941. ISU. Parks. "John Vincent Atanasoff Papers" (box 25, folder 14). 
205 Actually. Atanasoff worried that even a fifty binary digit word size might not be large enough, but 
for a different reason. Because the ABC used fixed-point notation, he was specifically concerned 
more with number drift than rounding error. During the course of calculations on any fixed-point 
computer, numbers can get smaller and smaller until they disappear from representation. This is 
called underflow. Conversely, numbers can also expand until they get too large for representation. 
This is called overflow. Atanasoff. "Advent of Electronic Digital Computing," 253; Atanasoff, 
interview with Tropp, 11 May 1972, 168-170; Atanasoff, interview with Kaplan, 10 August 1972, 47-
49; Atanasoff. interview with Kaplan, 23 August 1972. 33-34. 
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application and resulted in linear simultaneous equations that could be difficult or impossible to solve 
themselves before the ABC. The advantage was that the mathematician could ensure the accuracy of 
the final answer. Furthermore, the numerical method of the ABC avoided method error. If Atanasoff 
and Berry had gotten the ABC fully operational, and if progress in computers had then halted even 
temporarily, the functional method could have filled a critical need. As it was. the only published 
article depicting the functional method was one by Thome and Atanasoff on its application to thin 
plate problems.206 
In addition. Atanasoff presented a paper on a related topic dealing with generalized Taylor 
expansions to the American Mathematical Society in Columbia, Missouri, in December 1939. Struck 
by the simplicity of formulae for remainders in a Taylor expansion compared to other types of 
expansions, Atanasoff in later work sought to show that all expansions could be equated to 
generalized Taylor expansions.207 The Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society published an 
abstract of the 1939 paper.208 
Atanasoff had every reason to expect computers based on the ABC to be a commercial 
success even if restricted to scientific applications. He anticipated that the ABC would be useful for 
the considerable number of problems that can be solved explicitly as linear algebraic equations, as 
well as for those more numerous problems whose solutions could be approximated with such 
systems. His major interests lie in the latter, of course. He asserted in 1940 that "approximate 
methods using large systems of linear algebraic equations constitute the only practical method" of 
solving many differential and integral equations.209 
Of course, once Atanasoff and Berry realized the viability of the ABC, they recognized that 
similar computers could be built for other particular mathematical problems or, with flexible controls, 
for general-purpose applications. The major difficulties involved expanding the memory and 
devising suitable numerical methods. As an intermediate step, it occurred to Atanasoff how the ABC 
206 C. J. Thome and J. V. Atanasoff, "A Functional Method for the Solution of Thin Plate Problems 
Applied to a Square. Clamped Plate with a Central Point Load," Iowa State College Journal of 
Science 14. no 4 (July 1940), 333-343. 
*0, Atanasoff. interview with Merzbach. 5 May 1969. 73-75 and 77-78 (actually unnumbered); 
Atanasoff. interview with Tropp, 11 May 1972. 126-129. 
208 J. V. Atanasoff, "Generalized Taylor Expansions" (preliminary report), American Mathematical 
Society 46 (January 1940), 5-6 and 27-28. 
209 John V. Atanasoff. "Computing Machine for the Solution of large Systems of Linear Algebraic 
Equations," August 1940; reprinted in Brian Randell, ed.. The Origins of Digital Computers: Selected 
Papers. 3rd ed. (New York: Springer-Verlag. 1982), 315-316. 
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could be combined with a special attachment to solve integral equations.210 He was too occupied to 
pursue his idea, but it did stimulate Mauchly. With the concept of electronic digital computing 
crystallized in the ABC, and given the momenta of the age, it was all but inevitable that general-
purpose electronic computers followed, if not by Atanasoff and Berry, then by others. War impeded 
developments. 
The ABC resulted from Atanasoffs concern for his students and their requirements to solve 
differential equations. His knowledge of electronics came about much the same way. Since research 
in physics at ISC focused on applications, Atanasoff decided early that he needed a good grasp of 
electronics to design measurement apparatus and instrumentation. In 1930, he therefore began 
intensive study of electronics, learning on his own from The Thermionic Vacuum Tube and its 
Applications, by H. J. Van der Bijl, and the Radio Amateur's Handbook. He put together a couple of 
radio receivers as exercises before beginning apparatus as aids to his students in their experiments.211 
In particular, research in crystals required complex measuring equipment. For example, for Wilson's 
work on the resonance frequencies of quartz. Atanasoff and Wilson designed two different measuring 
devices that included variable-frequency electronic oscillators, tuning circuits, amplifiers, and 
detectors.-1" They also built an oscilloscope, based on the cathode-ray tube, as an instrument to 
precisely measure electronic signals.213 Oscilloscopes became available commercially in the 1930s 
but were often built by users before about 1940.214 Thus. Atanasoff had acquired a sophisticated 
working understanding of electronics well before he began the ABC. 
"
10 Honeywell, "Deposition of Dr. John V. Atanasoff." 844-847; Atanasoff, interview with Merzbach. 
5 May 1969. 81-82. 
"'
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CHAPTER 3. COMPUTING BEFORE WORLD WAR II 
If ours is the Information Age. nothing symbolizes it like the electronic digital computer. 
Computers are in fact at the heart of information processing. Sophisticated machines for managing 
information had everyday usage long before modem computers, however. Invention of computers by 
Atanasoff and Berry and others began only after the earlier devices proved inadequate in some 
applications. Nevertheless, the older equipment to a surprising degree provided the basis for attempts 
to create more powerful information-processing machines, of which computers represented by the 
ABC. ED VAC, and IAS computer ultimately dominated. As important, the original machines 
established a pattern of development and commercialization repeated by computers, irrespective of 
the greater involvement by government in computers. Understanding that history is key to understand 
how and why computers evolved, and why direct government support was unnecessary. 
Among the close ancestors of electronic digital computers can be counted adding machines, 
calculators, and above all, tabulating equipment. Less obvious but also important were typewriters, 
cash registers, telegraph equipment, and telephones. Commercial developments of these seminal 
technologies emerged independently but practically simultaneously in the mid- to late-nineteenth 
century. All attained essential forms by the twentieth century and were commonplace in factories, 
stores, and offices by the 1920s. The enterprises that manufactured and sold data-handling machines 
by then had become identified collectively as the office appliance industry. Facets of office 
appliances are part of computers still. Furthermore, while the original data-processing machines 
established a technological foundation for computers, the business practices of the office appliance 
industry in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries evolved into those of the information-
processing industry after World War II. Office appliance companies discovered early that they had to 
maintain close associations with customers and competitive prices, while continually offering 
productivity-improving enhancements. 
No corporation had greater influential on the office appliance industry than National Cash 
Register. As its name indicates. NCR made cash registers. It held about 95 percent of the market into 
the 1920s.1 The link between cash registers and other office appliances and computers may seem 
tenuous, but at the start of the twentieth century, NCR introduced electrically driven cash registers 
1 James W. Cortada, Before the Computer: IBM, NCR, Burroughs, and Remington Rand and the 
Industry They Created, 1865-1956 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), 3-4, 
63, 65, 87. and 178. 
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whose outputs combined to give ongoing total sales for a store.2 The company diversified into adding 
machines, calculators, accounting machines, and finally, computers.3 NCR was awarded two of the 
three earliest patents in the United States for electronic computing circuits in 1940. IBM won the 
other patent that year and two more the following year/ 
More important, NCR pioneered management practices that came to characterize the 
industry, particularly at IBM. Thomas J. Watson got fired from NCR before taking charge in 1914 of 
the company that became IBM. A casualty of office politics at NCR, the legendary Watson admitted 
frankly that he had learned core policies from his former employer that he implemented at IBM.5 
Those policies played as key a role in making IBM the largest manufacturer of computers as they had 
at NCR helping it become the foremost producer of cash registers. Furthermore, when NCR lost 
primacy in cash registers beginning in 1987, it was to IBM.6 
The success of NCR was principally due to one man: John Patterson, regarded as the "grand-
daddy of all corporate innovation champions."7 Patterson did not invent the cash register or found 
NCR. He bought controlling interest in the nascent firm in 1884 and then ran it brilliantly. As a 
fundamental innovation, he vertically integrated his corporation before the adoption of that 
organizational structure at other office appliance companies. Activities from engineering, to 
manufacturing, to sales were centrally and closely managed at NCR. 
Patterson is most famous for recognizing salesmen as the crucial link with customers. 
Patterson became head of the National Manufacturing Company (the name was changed to National 
Cash Register in 1894) as cash registers were being introduced to the world. Reluctant customers had 
to be persuaded of their benefits and taught their operation, because they were not obvious at first. A 
storeowner typically kept cash in a cigar box or a special drawer mounted under the checkout counter, 
making it easy to pilfer money. It fell to NCR's salesmen to convince storeowners that stealing by 
Emerson W. Pugh. Building IBM: Shaping an Industry and its Technology (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1995), 110. Charles F. Kettering invented the electrically driven cash 
register. He then left NCR and invented the electric starter for automobiles based on the same 
concept as a cash-register drawer opener he had perfected using a high-torque electric motor. He 
later became Director of Research for General Motors. 
3 Cortada. Before the Computer, 5 and 178. 
4 RCA was awarded the next two patents on electronic computing circuits in 1942. However, 
RCA s patents were associated with control of antiaircraft guns. Pugh, Building IBM, 325. See, 
"Appendix C: Early Electronic Computing Circuit Patents." 
5 Pugh. Building IBM, 29-31. 
6 Cortada, Before the Computer, 177. 
7 
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employees warranted purchases of cash registers. Clerks opposed the new machines unsurprisingly. 
Adding to their disadvantage, the salesmen had an unsavory reputation themselves. 
Patterson understood that a vendor of machines for safeguarding cash needed to convey an 
image of integrity. Accordingly, he elevated the status of salesmen within the company and instilled 
in them a sense of professionalism. He implemented a dress code and rules of conduct, had salesmen 
memorize low-pressure and standardized sales pitches at a company Marketing School, and sent them 
out burdened with tough sales quotas. In return, he guaranteed exclusive sales territories and 
provided extensive and creative corporate-wide advertising support. NCR salesmen delivered sales in 
spades, and the company's cash registers soon became ubiquitous around the globe. 
NCR salesmen had another essential task besides selling and teaching, without which NCR 
could not have been so successful: they kept corporate headquarters abreast of customer 
dissatisfaction. This was important because another part of Patterson's business plan was product 
development. He believed engineering as crucial as selling. From the time Patterson took over until 
World War II, NCR applied for around 2,400 patents. Most innovations originated in response to 
customer complaints and immediate needs.8 However, the fact that NCR filed early patent 
applications on electronic calculating circuits suggests it looked ahead. 
NCR set the standard for the practices of the office appliance business, but typewriters better 
than cash registers illustrate the general pattern of product development. While the typewriter, like 
the cash register, might seem too humble of antecedent for the computer, historian of computers 
James Cortada maintained that it played a crucial role in the rise of the office appliances industry, and 
thence to electronic digital computers. Indeed, the history of the computer has had notable 
similarities and connections to that of the typewriter. 
The typewriter was the initial identifiable technology to emerge into what became the office 
appliance industry. Its rapid acceptance encouraged manufacturers to diversify. Companies 
successful at producing typewriters often expanded into other office appliances. The engineering and 
manufacturing requirements of typewriters and other appliances were similar, and features transferred 
from typewriters to the other devices: the keyboard being an obvious example. Most important, 
customers for typewriters often purchased other office machines. Therefore, typewriter vendors 
became attuned to the idiosyncrasies of the office appliance market as it formed. 
8 Cortada, Before the Computer, 12 and 65-70; Pugh, Building IBM, 29-31. 
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A history of the typewriter might go far back into the eighteenth century. Patents were filed 
in the United States and Europe on "writing machines" before the mid-nineteenth century. However, 
the first commercially successful machine is attributed to Christopher Latham Sholes. an American, 
who began its development in the 1860s. Sholes sought help from financier James Densmore when 
ready to begin production. Densmore turned to E. Remington and Sons, a weapons manufacturer 
wanting to diversify. Sales of what became the Remington No. 1 began in 1874. The No. 1 looked 
something like a sewing machine, because it owed part of its design to that already mass-
manufactured domestic appliance. It was not much of a typewriter by later standards and produced 
capital letters only. Interestingly, the original market was not thought to be businesses, but authors, 
lawyers, and clergymen. Moreover, although the typewriter is strongly identified with female 
secretaries, women were not at first considered strong enough to use it. It was only after too few men 
could be found to operate typewriters, and after improvements allowed less exertion in their use, that 
women became typists. 
The typewriter business grew quickly but not fast enough for Remington. The company 
preferred manufacturing to marketing, so in 1878 it enlisted another firm, Fairbanks and Company, to 
do the selling. Meanwhile, other manufacturers entered the business and competition depressed 
prices. Remington typewriters remained most popular. Even so, the arms maker opted out, 
unprepared to put the emphasis on marketing needed to continue competing effectively. Densmore 
severed ties and set up a new company with a similar name—the Remington Standard Typewriter 
Company—to continue making Remington typewriters. The enterprise suffered ups and downs but 
thrived overall. It never dominated the typewriter market as NCR did that of cash registers but stayed 
the largest producer. 
A manufacturer of typewriters had to scramble to sustain the steady stream of innovations 
necessary to ensure its ongoing existence. Around 6.200 patents were issued on the typewriter in its 
first forty years of commercialization. The basic features of manual typewriters had been conceived 
by 1900. by which time hundreds of manufactures had sold some 100,000 machines. Standardization 
of design and quality followed, resulting in typewriters becoming a commodity. That meant 
customers bought mainly on cost, placing further downward pressure on prices even as manufacturers 
fought to distinguish their typewriters by bringing out better features. Competition also caused 
ongoing consolidation of manufacturers. Cortada noted that in 1904 there were some one hundred 
makers of typewriter in the U.S. The number had shrunk five years later to eighty-nine firms, but 
astonishingly, most had been created since 1904. American manufacturers of typewriters dwindled to 
four major ones in the 1930s. 
82 
The same trend of consolidations extended to and among other office appliances and their 
manufacturers, although it became increasingly difficult for new firms to enter the industry as 
advantages to economies of scale became overwhelming. As an example, four of eight bookkeeping 
machine vendors in 1924 had typewriters as their primary product. The main product of another three 
was adding machines. Shared characteristics aided consolidation. All the office machines were high­
tech products for their day. Typewriters, no less than calculators or other office appliance, required 
sophisticated engineering in design and precision machining in manufacture. Moreover, the 
appliances had similar features. More important, although targeted originally for different customers, 
the various appliances came to be purchased by the same ones and entailed similar marketing 
problems. Fundamentally, the office appliance industry strove to sell equipment in volume that dealt 
more quickly, reliably, and cost effectively with growing quantities of information. 
More demanding data-handling requirements coincided with increases in sizes and activities 
of businesses and government. The U.S. economy grew by leaps and bounds from the Civil War 
onward, periodic economic downturns notwithstanding. The GNP of the nation went from $9.1 
billion per year in the late 1860s to around $67.7 billion annually by 1921. Moreover, the rate of 
growth of investments in office machines is estimated to have exceeded that in manufacturing by as 
much as four times in many years.9 
On a less productive note, much market growth for office appliances came from, or because 
of, federal government, which expanded markedly, particularly beginning with the Great Depression. 
The relationship between the federal government and office equipment was complex, however. On 
one hand, government provided a huge market. It became IBM's largest customer by end of the 
1930s. On the other, it is doubtful that many ambitious government programs could have been 
implemented without the machines. With the New Deal, for example, the newly created Social 
Security Administration began mailing out millions of checks printed on punched tabulator cards. 
Moreover, legislation stimulated purchases of office appliances both inside and out of government. 
An example was federal income taxes, first imposed in 1913, which forced many businesses to 
upgrade accounting tools. As another example, NCR introduced a bookkeeping machine specifically 
to handle the records involved when Washington started backing home loans. As yet another 
influence, standardization of government forms further stimulated vendors to standardize appliances. 
9 Cortada. Before the Computer. 5-8. 10. 13-18, 20-22, 23-24, 59, 79. 83,91. 101, and 280-281. 
Some information is from, "Table 1.1 Gross National Product for the United States, 1869-1921 
(dollars in billions), " 8. 
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Finally, antitrust actions by the federal government reined in the expanding information-
processing industry and. while it may have furthered competition, in other respects likely had an 
adverse effect on innovation. NCR. Burroughs, IBM, Remington Rand, American Telephone and 
Telegraph (AT&T), and Microsoft have all been targets over the years. Fear of the government 
probably kept IBM from bidding on EMCC, for example. As another example, a 1956 antitrust 
agreement precluded AT&T from venturing into commercial computers.10 
As epitomized by the cash register, but more by the typewriter, the pattern of development for 
an office appliance can be summarized as follows: An inventor brought a prototype to market after a 
long gestation involving many inventors. The commercializing inventor then lost control of his 
enterprise to professional managers with better grasp of production and marketing considerations. 
Other firms entered the market and the originally identified customers became less important as the 
market broadened. Ensuing competition meant low profit margins, fostering consolidations in 
attempt to increase sales volumes. Competition also forced ongoing innovation. 
Cortada stressed that innovation was not uncontrolled or reactive, but adopted by 
manufacturers as a deliberate and essential business strategy. An appliance developed rapidly until it 
reached a standard form. Innovation continued with discovery of unanticipated uses by both vendors 
and customers. New applications spawned new features and vice versa. However, an innovation 
gave only short-term advantage until others copied or improved upon it. Manufacturers ordinarily 
refined a technology incrementally as far as possible before making a radical improvement. Dramatic 
changes typically raised risks and costs, and vendors could not afford for their products to become 
expensive relative to others that satisfactorily handled the applications of economy-minded 
customers. 
Finally, an office appliance maker needed to be adept at dealing with customers and could no 
more slight marketing than product development. Indeed, a connection existed between the two. 
Most successful innovations derived from interaction with customers, who then had to be coaxed into 
trying them and taught their use. Moreover, employees of customers typically saw new equipment as 
a threat, and their resistance had to be overcome. As further need for vendor-customer interaction. 
10 Tom Watson Jr. quoted in Martin Campbell-Kelly and William Aspray, Computer: A History of 
the Information Machine (New York City: BasicBooks, 1996), 118; Pugh, Building IBM, 57; Cortada, 
Before the Computer, 74-78, 116-117, 112-113, 145-147, and 242-246; Kenneth Flamm, Creating the 
Computer: Government, Industry, and High Technology (Washington, D C.: Brookings Institution, 
1988), 120-121. 
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although increasingly reliable, appliances required servicing by manufacturers* representatives. 
The computer has followed about the same pattern of development as an office appliance, 
although at a faster pace. Consider that Eckert and Mauchly did not invent the computer but were 
among the first to attempt to take it to market. They proved unable to retain control of their company, 
losing it to Remington Rand. The computer attained standard form with the von Neumann 
architecture. Even so, the computer has undergone extensive innovation, including several 
generations of technologies." The market for computers has expanded from a few entities to include 
potentially everyone for all kinds of uses. Meanwhile, manufacturers faced intense competition, 
resulting in considerable turnover. Moreover, the trend of merging technologies has continued, so 
that the whole of information processing has become dependent on the computer. The computer, like 
an office appliance, is now (largely) standardized, affordable, and plentiful. All this suggests that 
digital computers took the technologies of data handling to higher levels but remain fundamentally 
the same business as office appliances. 
If the connection between typewriters and computers seems a stretch, note that two typewriter 
manufacturers between the world wars became the major vendors of computers afterwards.12 One 
was Remington, which became Remington Rand in 1927. The other company, IBM, created the 
market for electric typewriters in the 1930s.13 Typewriters remained a larger source of revenue than 
computers for IBM through the 1950s. The corporations moved into computers somewhat 
differently, however. Remington Rand began delivering internally developed electronic calculators in 
1951 but purchased most of its computer technology by acquiring EMCC and ERA.14 IBM bought 
numerous related patents and sponsored research by others;15 even so, it developed substantial 
capabilities internally. 
11 Computer generations refer to commercial computers and their underlying technologies. 
Commercial computers with vacuum tubes constituted the first generation, those with transistors the 
second generation, and so on. Some experts say that the latest generation, the fifth, are computers 
based on microprocessors. David A. Patterson and John L. Hennessy, Computer Organization and 
Design: The Hardware / Software Interface (San Francisco: Morgan Kaufmann, 1994), 38-40. 
u More generally, of twelve major manufacturers of commercial computers in the U.S. in 1954, 
seven were office appliance manufacturers. Flamm, Creating the Computer, 82. See, "Table 4-1. 
Chief Producers of Digital Computers, 1954." 
13 Cortada, Before the Computer, 5, 18, 63, 88, 96, 150. 155-157, 222, and 273-275. 
14 Saul Rosen, "Electronic Computers: A Historical Survey," Computing Surveys 1, no. 1 (March 
1969), 12. The earliest Remington Rand electronic calculator was the 409-2. With 1,476 vacuum 
tubes, the 409-2 probably compared to the IBM 604 Electronic Calculating Punch. 
15 Pugh. Building IBM, 77. 
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Experience with typewriters helped Remington Rand and IBM market computers, but 
tabulating equipment led most directly to computers. Tabulators, also called accounting machines, 
were high-speed adding machines designed to manipulate large amounts of data from punched cards. 
Tabulators and accessories constituted the founding technology for mass data processing and did the 
job of computers in a less demanding age. Such equipment comprised only a small part of the office 
appliances business as late as the early 1920s. Its popularity grew proportionally with need to handle 
more data, so its development was especially vigorous between the world wars. It had become the 
most significant sector of the office appliance market by World War II. By then, punched-card 
equipment was identified collectively as EAM16 equipment to include a variety of related machines. 
It was not a coincidence that the first organizations to adopt computers tended to be those 
most dependant on EAM equipment. The close relationship explains why customers for the 
UNTVAC demanded that Eckert and Mauchly offer accessory equipment that could import data from 
punched cards. The data-handling equipment they already operated used such cards, and card-to-tape 
and tape-to-card converters made the transition to computers easier and less costly. Moreover, when 
Eckert and Mauchly developed the UNTVAC as a system, as IBM and other manufacturers also did 
with their computers, they kept with a tradition established with tabulating equipment. An 
installation of EAM equipment similarly involved a system: a series of machines including, at a 
minimum, tabulators, keypunches, and sorters. It could include a host of other accessories, but all 
stored and shared information on punched cards.17 
IBM and Remington Rand had the early advantage in computers because they dominated the 
EAM equipment market worldwide and thus already understood the essence of the technology and 
market that computers came to fill. Even so, the transition proceeded slowly. IBM had greater sales 
in EAM equipment than computers until 1962. More telling, Sperry Rand did not break even on 
computers until the next year, 1963. and did so then only because it introduced the UNIVAC 1004, a 
machine more related to EAM equipment. The first computers were expensive and difficult to use, 
and many organizations continued to find EAM equipment satisfactory and a better value.18 
16 EAM stands for electric accounting machine. 
17 W. J. Eckert, Punched Card Methods in Scientific Computation (New York: Thomas J. Watson 
Astronomical Computing Bureau. Columbia University. 1940), 12; Cortada, Before the Computer, 
44-45, 91, and 131; Pugh, Building IBM. 91-92. 
18 Cortada, Before the Computer, 266-267; Campbell-Kelly and Aspray. Computer, 130 and 135-136. 
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The inventor of tabulating equipment, and arguably the founder of IBM, was Herman 
Hollerith. He graduated from the Columbia School of Mines and obtained employment with the U.S. 
Census of 1880 analyzing data on water and steam power use by the iron and steel industry. Most 
information for the census was compiled by hand, and another employee suggested that a machine 
using paper cards could be built to do much of the work. Hollerith agreed. He left in 1882 to 
become, first, an instructor of mechanical engineering at MTT; next, an assistant examiner for the U.S. 
Patent Office: and then, a self-employed patent consultant. He thought meanwhile on the problem of 
the census and submitted his first of many patent applications on tabulating equipment in 1884. 
His initial setup involved recording data in paper tape with a pattern of small round holes 
made with a hand punch. He reverted to the original idea of cards to gain flexibility in handling 
data.19 His tabulating machine worked like a press. It consisted of a hard rubber base upon which a 
punched card to be read was laid against stops to ensure its correct position. Inserted into the base 
and arranged to coincide with all possible hole locations were small open cups partly filled with 
mercury. The matching component of the press was the reciprocating box. Spring-loaded retractable 
pins protruded underneath, spaced exactly to mate with the mercury cups. Each pin was part of a 
separate electrical circuit that included its corresponding mercury cup and dedicated 
electromechanical counter. 
To tabulate, the operator lowered a handle that brought the box into precisely positioned 
contact with the base. The card forced the retraction of the pins. At a hole, however, a pin dipped 
unrestrained through the card and into the mercury, completing its circuit, and incrementing the 
corresponding counter by one. Thus, a tabulator counted holes at each location in the cards. As 
simplistic as that may sound, complicated arrangements of data could be analyzed using combinations 
of circuits.20 
Hollerith's ingenious concepts were not entirely his own. Storing information by holes in 
cards went back a long way. most famously to Joseph Marie Jacquard, a Frenchman, who early in the 
nineteenth century invented the Jacquard loom that automatically wove patterns in cloth following a 
program of instructions formulated as holes in cards. Furthermore, Hollerith's tabulator resembled an 
automatic telegraph system invented some years before. Even if his ideas were not exactly new, the 
application was, and Hollerith won his patents. 
'
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With basic tabulating equipment thus defined, endless improvements began, first by 
Hollerith, then by others. The sorter was a related invention. The first one consisted of a wooden box 
divided into compartments. Each tabulating circuit could both activate its counter and open a lid on a 
corresponding sorter compartment. The operator then picked up the card, placed it into the open 
compartment, and closed the lid. This procedure allowed sorting of cards by attribute. The table-
mounted punch was another invention essential to the success of tabulating equipment. Making holes 
with a hand punch was simply too fatiguing. Later versions called keypunches incorporated 
typewriter-like keyboards. 
Hollerith borrowed money from a brother-in-law to build his first equipment. Its shakedown 
trial came in 1886 compiling vital statistics for the Baltimore Department of Health. Other relatively 
small jobs followed, all completed successfully. The big break for Hollerith came with a huge 
contract for the U.S. Census of 1890. It involved over ninety of his machines, which the Western 
Electric Company fabricated, except for punches, built by Pratt and Whitney Company. 
Hollerith leased about half of the tabulating equipment for $500 each per year and the rest for 
$1,000 apiece per year. The equipment allowed the government to analyze more data in more ways 
and complete the total job faster and more accurately than in the past. It is doubtful the government 
saved money, however. Costs per capita rose from 11.5 cents for the 1880 census to 18.4 cents for 
the census of 1890.21 Thus, the first major use of computing equipment manifested a phenomenon 
evident even today. It is still questionable that computers save money overall, but they 
unquestionably permit analysis of data impossible any other way. 
The results coming from the 1890 census prompted various foreign governments to place 
orders. These included Austria, Italy, Norway, and Canada. Russia used Hollerith equipment in its 
census of 1897 for compiling data on its 129 million citizens.22 
Meanwhile, Hollerith incorporated as the Tabulating Machine Company in 1896. He also 
solicited orders from commercial interests, hoping to create a steadier business than intermittent 
census compiling permitted. He redesigned his equipment to that end. Most significant, he replaced 
the original simple dial counters with accumulators that added all digits simultaneously. 
Additionally, he reconfigured the cards and developed an automatic sorter.23 
The first major order from business came in 1895 from the New York Central Railroad. 
Contracts with other railroads followed. The Pennsylvania Steel Company was the first industrial 
21 Pugh. Building IBM. xi, 6-14. and 21. 
" Cortada, Before the Computer. 49. 
23 Pugh. Building IBM, 15-16. 
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concern to order. In 1902. Marshall Field, a Chicago department store, became the first retailer. 
Insurance companies then discovered Hollerith's equipment. Slowly a market for tabulators formed, 
although the expense of the equipment meant only organizations with large data-handling 
requirements could justify it. Moreover, accountants and clerks often resisted its installation, seeing 
potential for job loss on the assumption that a low-skilled operator and tabulator setup could replace 
several clerks. Whether or not unemployment actually resulted due to office machines is uncertain.24 
For the census of 1900. the U.S. government again leased Hollerith equipment, including 311 
tabulators, 20 sorters, and 1,021 punches. The processing rate of tabulators had improved markedly 
and advances had been made in the automatic operation and reliability of all equipment. Hollerith 
was paid $428,239 for his machinery and services, including cards used. He may have only have 
begun to break even on his development costs,25 but some regarded the expenses as unjustified. The 
perception intensified when Hollerith started charging rental based on card use. For every 1.000 
cards tabulated and sorted, he demanded 65 cents and 18 cents, respectively. With increases in card-
processing rates, total expense of leasing went up significantly. A year's lease could run more than 
the cost of the machine.26 Another sore point for users was that Hollerith insisted they purchase cards 
from him. The policy was at least partly justified to ensure card quality, but at 85 cents to $1.00 per 
thousand cards, Hollerith made a handsome profit. Customers used many millions of cards.27 
Adding controversy within the Census Bureau was suspicion that Hollerith had obtained his 
contracts unfairly. Some believed the worst confirmed when a former director of the Census became 
head of the British Tabulating Machine Company. The new director removed all the company's 
machines from the Census Office, and with money specifically appropriated by Congress, ordered 
development of its own tabulating equipment based on Hollerith's designs. Hollerith could do little 
against the government. The U.S. Census of 1910 thus used Hollerith-derived equipment without 
compensating him.28 However, problems with the new machines forced the reinstallation of the old 
Hollerith equipment to complete the census. 
Nonetheless. Hollerith had lost the business of the Census Bureau. Worse, the agency 
allowed its employees to apply for patents as their own. James Powers, a prolific inventor for the 
Census, took advantage of that policy and left in 1911 to establish the Powers Accounting Machine 
"
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Company to compete head-on against Hollerith. Powers initially offered only a keypunch and sorter. 
In 1914, he added a printing tabulator. The Tabulating Machine Company did not have a printer, 
which became a major selling item for Powers. Powers eventually developed a full line of EAM 
equipment with evidently superior but nevertheless intrinsically limited features. Hollerith's patents 
prevented Powers from incorporating electrical components. Furthermore, Powers equipment proved 
less reliable.29 It never gained more than a fraction of the total market for EAM equipment despite 
the preference given it by the Census. Nor did Remington Rand's purchase of the Powers 
Accounting Machine Company substantially improve its market share. 
In 1911, Hollerith participated in merging his company with the International Time 
Recording Company and the Computing Scale Company of America ro create the Computing-
Tabulating-Recording Company (CTR). The name was changed to the International Business 
Machines Corporation in 1924. Hollerith stayed for a time as autonomous inventor and member of 
the board. Watson got the job of general manager in 1914. -He became president the following year, 
by which time Hollerith had resigned from the board of directors and exerted little further influence 
on the company.30 
Watson concluded that tabulating equipment had greater potential than most other products 
made by IBM. Over the years he dropped less profitable or strategic lines, such as meat scales, 
podiums, and microphones, to focus more on punched-card equipment.31 Furthermore, Watson kept 
key policies implemented by Hollerith, including his preference for leasing rather than selling 
equipment. Leasing tended to generate a more stable revenue stream, because customers accepted 
and retained the expensive tabulating equipment more readily if they could avoid capital 
expenditures. IBM predominantly leased equipment into the 1970s,32 long after computers had 
become its major product. Watson also continued to demand that customers purchase punched cards 
exclusively from IBM. About three-quarters of revenue for CTR in 1915 came from card sells, so it 
is not hard to see why.33 
Most important, Watson, like Hollerith, took keen interest in product development. He had to 
build an engineering department from scratch with only a small initial budget, however, because 
"
9 Cortada, Before the Computer. 43, 57-58. and 62-63. 
30 Pugh, Building IBM, 26-28, 35. and 39. 
31 Cortada. Before the Computer, 150. 
32 Pugh. Building IBM, 45. IBM typically offered to either rent or lease its equipment, with rent 
defined as a short-term lease. Cortada. Before the Computer. 152-153. 
3j Cortada. Before the Computer, 54 and 58. 
90 
Hollerith had contracted out equipment development and manufacturing. As one brilliant decision, 
Watson hired James W. Bryce, who became chief engineer in 1922. Bryce had studied mechanical 
engineering at New York City College and was already an accomplished inventor before joining 
IBM. He accumulated some 500 patents in his lifetime and was honored by the U.S. Patent Office in 
1936 as one of the "greatest living inventors." Bryce supervised a number of similarly talented 
engineers who produced many innovations. Most of their creative efforts went into EAM equipment. 
Unfortunately, IBM engineers did not publish and have received little recognition from historians.34 
Besides its inventions, IBM aggressively purchased related patents by others. In fact, most of its 
patents for years originated outside the company.35 
IBM held the lion's share of the market for tabulating equipment, but its rivalry with 
Remington Rand was no less intense for that. Other companies also tried to compete. Thus, 
tabulating equipment had to abide by the same market rules as other office appliances. Lower prices 
and better features meant more customers, who always demanded improvements but purchased only 
those offering good value. IBM and Remington Rand had to bring new features out constantly while 
struggling to keep prices competitive. Both companies went to great expense to completely refurbish 
their lines of punched-card equipment in the 1920s and again in the 1930s.36 
Powers bested the Tabulating Machine Company at the start with its popular tabulating 
printer. CTR developed an equivalent and cheaper printing attachment in 1917, although it did not 
become generally available until after World War I. Also to its advantage. Powers had a mechanical 
linkage system that permitted easy change of applications. Changes on a Hollerith tabulator involved 
laboriously rewiring the machine. IBM took the lead by adding a plugboard with quick-change 
connections, like a telephone switchboard. IBM then made the plugboards themselves quick-change. 
Customers could keep inventories of detachable plugboards, each pre wired for a different 
application. IBM published a bulletin of useful wiring configurations, many devised by customers.37 
Other milestones for punched-card equipment included the electric keypunch (1917); 
typewriter keypunch for punching and typing simultaneously (1928);38 and tabulators with full 
alphanumeric printing capabilities (1930s). In 1928, IBM patented an 80-column card for use with 
rectangular punches. IBM and Remington Rand had used a variety of cards previously, but most 
34 Brian Randell, ed.. The Origins of Digital Computers: Selected Papers, 3rd ed. (New York: 
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common for both were similar 45-column cards for round punches. IBM's new card offered greater 
data-recording flexibility, strength, and other advantages. Most notably, it prevented mixing of IBM 
and Powers equipment, and in effect, furthered IBM's market dominance. IBM standardized on the 
80-column card as the "IBM card." It proved a big success and remained in common usage into the 
1970s for computer systems. As another milestone. IBM in 1931 brought out the first EAM device to 
perform multiplication. The Type 600 Multiplying Punch took two numbers from a punched card, 
multiplied them, and punched the answer into the same card. A more sophisticated version was 
introduced two years later.39 
On the whole, customers regarded Remington Rand and IBM as having similar products. 
Nevertheless. Remington Rand never came close to matching IBM's market share in EAM 
equipment. The federal government estimated that IBM had about a nine-to-one advantage at one 
point. One reason was that IBM for a time used its patents to prevent Powers from converting its 
machines to electricity and thus limited its potential. Remington Rand never proved as proficient an 
innovator, however. 
More of the reason IBM enjoyed market advantage, according to Cortada, was it became a 
focused corporation earlier than Remington Rand, which suffered ongoing internal turmoil as it 
attempted to absorb acquisitions. Remington Rand as consolidated in 1927 had roots in thirteen 
companies. It added Powers the same year and continued to acquire companies through 1933. 
Remington Rand thus offered greater diversity of products than IBM. That also made it more 
difficult to manage, particularly with the Depression, a challenging time even for well-established 
companies.40 Finally. IBM proved better at manufacturing and. especially, marketing.41 IBM 
salesmen were legendary for applying skills derived from NCR. 
EAM equipment by World War II performed all the operations of arithmetic and was adept at 
handling large quantities of data; that is. it essentially did what a computer does. Even the most 
advanced EAM equipment was not a true computer, of course, lacking efficient electronic logic 
circuits, large memories, and attributes anything like the von Neumann architecture. Still, driven by a 
commercial market with insatiable demands for better data-handling machines, IBM and other 
39 Pugh. Building IBM, 48-52; Cortada, Before the Computer, 106. 
40 Getting its acquisitions to work in harmony continued to be a problem for Remington Rand. After 
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companies had begun experimenting with electronic computing circuits before World War H. Bryce 
is alleged to have started considering them in 1915/' By the war, his company had developed, and in 
several cases, patented computing circuits using vacuum tubes. 
As one achievement, an engineer for IBM invented an electronic circuit in 1941 that used 
binary code to represent decimal numbers. The hybrid system handled decimal numbers with about 
half the vacuum tubes needed in the much bulkier circuits of the ENIAC several years later. Binary-
coded decimal circuits became common after the war, particularly for calculators requiring frequent 
number entries.43 Eckert and Mauchly switched to binary-coded decimal for the UNTVAC. 
Moreover, although serving a conservative and cost-conscious market, IBM expended a great 
amount of effort and money in computer research even before World War II. Beginning in 1939, it 
developed the ASCC,44 more commonly known as the Harvard Mark I. General purpose and 
programmable, the ASCC was the largest electromechanical digital computer ever built. It weighed 
about five tons and contained seventy-two accumulators. It has been attributed to Howard Aiken, a 
graduate student in physics at Harvard at project's start, but who is best described as architect. He 
laid out the general design but believed electronic circuits unreliable and refused to consider them. 
IBM did the difficult engineering of the ASCC but quite unjustly has received little credit. The 
company invested several hundred thousand dollars in the design, construction, and startup of the 
giant computer. IBM donated it in 1944 to Harvard, and the Navy acquired its use. The ASCC 
allegedly did calculations for the first atomic bomb, although, like the ENIAC, it served better to 
compute mathematical tables.45 
The ASCC initiated a long-term, informal strategy by IBM to extend its capabilities by 
exploring "supercalculators." either on its own or by funding research by others. World War II 
interrupted those efforts, although IBM built a couple of fast relay calculators for the Army during the 
war.46 IBM's reach into computers continued along two lines afterwards. Its more immediate, 
business-oriented approach involved electronically upgrading its EAM equipment. In September 
1946, IBM introduced the 603 Electronic Calculating Punch. It was the first commercial electronic 
42 Randell, The Origins of Digital Computers. 293. 
43 Pugh, Building IBM. 81-84. 
44 ASCC is an acronym for Automatic Sequence Controlled Calculator. 
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calculator and contained approximately 300 vacuum tubes. Due to unexpected customer interest, 
IBM limited production to 100 machines and brought out an advanced model. The 604 Electronic 
Calculating Punch became available in 1948. It contained more than 1,400 vacuum tubes and fifty 
digits of internal storage. Within ten years, 5.600 had been placed into service. Finally, IBM built 
the CPC,47 the ultimate tabulator. It consisted of a 604 Electronic Multiplier connected to a standard 
IBM accounting machine. It went to market a couple of years before the UNTVAC, which competed 
against it. The CPC might thus be said to have been the first commercially available computer, even 
if not a true computer. While the UNTVAC had greater capabilities generally, over 700 CPC systems 
were in service by the mid-1950s compared to fourteen UNTVAC systems. 
IBM did a lot with EAM equipment after World War H, but simultaneously continued the 
experimental work in supercomputing for scientific applications begun with the ASCC. Its next 
project was the SSEC, built entirely within IBM and completed in early 1948. The SSEC contained 
12.500 vacuum tubes, 21,400 relays, and storage for 3,160 digits in intermediate- and high-speed 
memory. It gave IBM crucial patents as the first computer with stored-program capabilities, although 
it lacked the elegant simplicity of the EDVAC.48 The SSEC found a major use computing positions 
of the moon and prepared the tables used in the first manned moon landing.49 
The success of electronic EAM equipment convinced IBM of the viability of a full-fledged 
commercial computer. Watson ordered development of one in 1948. Changes at IBM intervened, 
however. Control was passing from Watson to his son of the same name. The younger Watson has 
received credit for IBM's move into computers, but that was happening anyway, although perhaps not 
as energetically. Watson Jr. had greater impact in pushing IBM to accept government money for 
research. He worried that the huge amounts of money the federal government was dumping into 
computers might cause IBM to fall behind. With Watson Jr. making the decision, IBM temporarily 
shelved plans for a commercial computer and shifted focus to scientific machines for government. 
The change distressed IBM salesmen. 
IBM therefore developed the NORC 50 for the Navy. The company received its costs plus 
one dollar for the supercomputer, which after completion in 1954 was for several years the world's 
fastest computer. More significant, IBM built the 701 Defense Calculator. The company paid for its 
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development, but modeled it on the IAS computer and employed von Neumann as a consultant.51 The 
Defense Calculator first shipped in 1952 and did well enough that it went through several advanced 
models and evolved into the 7000 series of transistorized computers. Meanwhile, IBM returned to 
computers for businesses. The IBM 702 Electronic Data Processing Machine (EDPM) specifically 
targeted heavy users of EAM equipment. IBM limited production to fourteen machines in favor of 
the 650 Magnetic Drum Calculator, the first of many enormously popular IBM computer lines 
beginning mid-1950s.52 
Considering the demanding business environment in which EAM manufacturers operated— 
forcing them to continually upgrade technologies—IBM's move to electronic tabulators, and thence, 
to true computers seems natural and inevitable. World War II was more hindrance than help. For 
example, IBM might have advanced its position considerably if it had the chance to follow through on 
a series of contacts initiated before the war. Notably, an IBM laboratory manager wrote to Atanasoff 
in May 1942 in regard to the ABC: "When your development work has proceeded to a point where 
you feel that it is proper for representatives of our Company to look over your machine, we would 
appreciate an opportunity to do so."53 IBM never did examine the ABC officially.54 Before that 
could happen, both IBM and Atanasoff had their efforts shunted into war-related work. Otherwise, 
IBM might have combined technologies inherent in the ABC, or computer work by others, with its 
own considerable capabilities and built efficient true electronic digital computers before actual 
circumstances allowed. 
Atanasoff gave calculators and accounting machines thorough consideration before beginning 
the ABC. Moreover, if he had chosen an institution for its suitability to foster invention of the 
51 Von Neumann was not hired as a consultant specifically for the IBM 701, however. 
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electronic digital computer, he could have made few wiser selections than ISC. He believed the 
college had little empathy for his work in computing. He probably did encounter skepticism from 
faculty and staff, but the concepts and implications of the ABC were radical enough that it might have 
been the case no matter where he attempted it. Nevertheless, ISC officials supported Atanasoff, 
notably with a modest amount of money in tough times. Officials may not have understood the 
principles underlying the ABC, or its implicit purpose of solving complex differential equations, but 
certainly they grasped the need for improved methods of performing computations. In fact, ISC had a 
history predating Atanasoff of exploring computing machinery for scientific purposes. 
Iowa State researchers had early interest in computational equipment because of their desire 
to do statistical analysis, increasingly important in biological-related research. Rediscovery of 
Mendelian genetics around 1900 served as a major spur. According to one observer, scientists at ISC 
in agriculture, biology, and genetics by the 1920s regularly applied statistics in areas exemplified by 
the following: "Mendelian ratios, the size of the experimental errors in yield tests or feedlot trials, the 
growth rates of plants and animals, trends of all kinds,... (and) interpretation of a selection 
experiment." Additionally, economists on campus used statistics for such things as determining 
supply and demand curves. Statistical methods at ISC and elsewhere were elementary, more applied 
and descriptive than analytical. Methods emphasized fitting regression lines and calculating 
averages, dispersions, and simple correlations from total counts, as opposed to more sophisticated 
techniques that evolved later of drawing inferences from samples.55 Statistics thus occupied much the 
same rudimentary position mathematically as physics, but larger quantities of data handled by 
agricultural scientists and economists caused them to recognize a need for laborsaving calculating 
aids earlier. 
Initial interest at ISC in calculating devices can be traced to Henry A. Wallace, who began 
promoting new statistical techniques in the early 1920s. At the time, Wallace edited Wallaces' 
Fanner, a well-regarded farm journal based in Des Moines. He had been bom on a remote Iowa farm 
into a distinguished family. His father, Henry C. Wallace, became Secretary of Agriculture under 
Warren G. Harding and Calvin Coolidge. Wallace himself served as Secretary of Agriculture, Vice 
President, and Secretary of Commerce, respectively, all under Franklin D. Roosevelt. He also 
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produced the first hybrid corn sold commercially, and with partners organized the Hi-Bred Corn 
Company in 1926.56 It is known today as Pioneer Hi-Bred International. 
In "What is in the Com Judge's Mind?" published in 1923, Wallace explained how multiple 
correlation, that is, determination of causal relationships among three or more variables, could be 
used to analyze the opinions of experts on the most desirable attributes of an ear of com. Com judges 
advised farmers on what ears to retain as seed. Assumed to have common standards, experienced 
judges were asked to rate ears on six factors for impact on yield. Wallace used the scores to assign 
each factor a correlation coefficient with a method devised by evolutionary biologist Sewall Wright 
while at the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Wallace also determined "inter-correlations," and 
arranged the coefficients in a system of linear simultaneous equations for solution. He then 
calculated final correlation of the degree to which the judges thought each factor contributed to yield, 
weighted as a percentage. He compared the results to what he calculated each factor actually 
contributed after the seed was planted and subsequently harvested, and he identified significant 
differences. The judges considered length of ear most important, but based on two years data, 
Wallace found weight of kernel far and away the key determinant of yield.57 Wallace made a forceful 
and convincing case for the utility of multiple statistical correlations by such examples. 
An alumnus, Wallace maintained close ties with ISC. At the request of its faculty, Wallace 
organized and taught on campus a special course in statistical methods. The course ran over a series 
of Saturdays in early 1924 and included lectures on calculation of correlation coefficients, partial 
correlations, and regression lines.58 Wallace taught the course by practical example and with use of 
mechanical calculating machines. In most sessions he used various types of the common desktop 
calculators. In the final sessions, he borrowed punch-card tabulating equipment from an insurance 
company and demonstrated it. Tabulating equipment had been invented for compiling statistical data, 
but Wallace's use for complex calculations was among the first.59 
An enthusiastic response by course participants prompted Wallace to publish the methods he 
had demonstrated in Correlation and Machine Calculation. The practical guide was co-authored by 
George W. Snedecor. Snedecor. a physicist by education, had taught statistics at ISC since shortly 
after joining the Department of Mathematics in 1913. He also did consulting in statistics, mostly with 
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scientists in agriculture. Wallace and Snedecor's bulletin explained the fundamentals of correlation 
through familiar examples and for solution on calculating machines, both desktop and EAM 
equipment. It demanded prerequisite knowledge only in basic algebra and was distributed worldwide. 
Tabulating machines had become common in business and government offices, but ISC did 
not have such equipment, so Snedecor traveled to an insurance company in Des Moines on Saturdays 
to perform computations for colleagues. As demand grew for statistical calculations by its 
researchers. ISC established a Mathematical Statistical Service in 1927 and installed an assortment of 
calculating machines, including IBM tabulating equipment. The service reorganized in 1933 under 
Snedecor as the Statistical Laboratory to provide a centralized computing service for the entire 
college. It is believed to have been among the first such services in the world. 
Statistics methodology at ISC received a major boost with visits of several distinguished 
statisticians. Foremost among them was R. A. Fisher from England. During summer 1931, Fisher 
lectured about equally on topics selected from his two books. Statistical Methods for Research 
Workers ( 1925) and Genetical Theory of Natural Selection (1930). He also conducted clinic sessions 
to help scientists with their research. Fisher returned in summer 1936 and taught theory of statistics 
and design of experiments, having published Design of Experiments the previous year.60 
The year following Fisher s last visit, Snedecor published Statistical Methods. The text went 
beyond descriptive statistics to teach statistical inference.61 It became quite popular and remained in 
print through eight editions, the last in 1989. By the time Atanasoff began thinking about the ABC, 
therefore, ISC had established itself at the forefront in use of both statistical and computational 
methods. In neither area had ISC contributed to theory, however. 
Atanasoff began the ABC after realizing that existing equipment could not handle the large 
sets of algebraic equations derived from many partial differential equations. Extensive calculations 
with tabulators had by then become common, however. A watershed year was 1928. Snedecor 
published an article that year extolling EAM equipment for computation. The Mathematical 
Statistical Service had been operating for a year, and Snedecor was eager to publicize the variety of 
research it had aided. He reported that one researcher used tabulating equipment to solve a problem 
with eight variables. The researcher computed the regression equation and multiple correlation 
60 Lush, "Early Statistics at Iowa State University," 220-222. 
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coefficients in forty minutes, a significant improvement over that possible with desktop machines. 
Snedecor noted that another researcher used the machines at ISC to determine the relationship 
of grades of college students to the scores they had attained in high school.62 That problem also 
interested Benjamin D. Wood, who managed the Bureau of Collegiate Educational Research at 
Columbia University.63 In his case, he sought help from office appliance vendors. None offered 
assistance until he approached IBM, and then he got an overwhelming response. Watson decided 
Wood's problem provided an opportunity to explore new uses for IBM's equipment. In 1928, 
therefore, Watson gave three truckloads of standard EAM machines to Columbia, which established 
the Columbia University Statistical Bureau to house them. 
Furthermore, IBM initiated projects to develop special machines for Columbia, including a 
unique high-capacity tabulator. When Wood requested a device that could automatically score 
thousands of tests, IBM spent seven years and a large sum of money to develop it. The IBM Type 
805 International Test Scoring Machine became generally available in 1937. It generated thousands 
of dollars of revenue for IBM, although never anything other than a minor product. 
His interest piqued, Watson thought of other ways to foster non-traditional uses of IBM 
machines. As one, IBM opened computational centers for short-term, in-house rental of punched-
card equipment. As another example and specifically for scientists and engineers, IBM began 
offering mathematical tables in pre punched cards for use with EAM equipment.64 
The IBM machines at Columbia University attracted many scientists, including Wallace J. 
Eckert (no relation to J. Presper Eckert). Eckert was an astronomer, and astronomers, like 
statisticians, dealt with huge quantities of data. Astronomers have observed the heavens and collected 
data for various purposes since time immemorial. A new purpose arose when ships began sailing far 
out to sea, since navigation over oceans depended upon precise placing of longitude. Determining 
longitude meant making calculations based on the moon's position as a function of time. Mariners 
carried navigation tables giving those positions. Unfortunately, the tables were full of errors because 
the calculations behind them were devilishly complex, involving interactions of three bodies: the 
moon, earth, and sun. Newton worked out the rudiments of the equations, actually three 
6
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simultaneous second-order differential equations. Order refers to the highest derivative in the 
equation, and second-order differential equations are among the most useful. Mathematicians 
through the eighteenth century worked to improve Newton's equations, which remained difficult to 
solve. Thus, driven by the urgent need for accurate navigation, astronomers had long sought a 
mechanized numerical method for performing calculations and placing answers into error-free 
tables.65 
Eckert, like Wood, won Watson's backing. For instance, when Eckert designed a 
"Calculation Control Switch" that synchronized operations of several pieces of standard EAM 
equipment to perform complex computations, IBM built it for him. Eckert noted as a general 
observation that although tabulating equipment had wide application in business and statistics, its use 
in science was limited to astronomy. (He apparently categorized work at ISC as statistical.) 
However, he claimed that various EAM equipment existed for "practically all purposes," and "with 
slight modifications" was "ideal for scientific work," including numerical integration and 
differentiation. "The main question in any case," he wrote effusively in a 1940 publication, "is not 
can the problem be solved by these machines?' but rather 'have I enough operations of this type or 
that to justify such powerful equipment?"*66 
Eckert gained wide recognition for expertise in digital computing applications, and being 
such an enthusiastic cheerleader for its equipment, prompted IBM in 1933 to provide funding to 
establish a computing laboratory in Columbia's Department of Astronomy. The laboratory became 
the Thomas J. Watson Astronomical Computing Bureau.67 Then, as World War II wound down, 
Eckert became the first scientist employed at IBM. The company hired him to establish 
specifications for the SSEC. no doubt explaining its calculations on the positions of the moon.68 
Eckert was not first to perform astronomical calculations on punched-card equipment, 
however. That distinction belongs to Leslie J. Comrie, Superintendent of the Nautical Almanac 
Office of the Royal Naval College in England. He initially explored desktop machines and explained 
in a 1925 article why scientists had not made much use of them. The first reason was their high cost 
and poor reliability. However, Comrie reported that prices were falling and quality improving. The 
65 Herman H. Goldstine, The Computer from Pascal to von Neumann (Princeton. New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1972), 27-30; Eckert, Punched Card Methods in Scientific Computation, 
2. 
66 Eckert, Punched Card Methods in Scientific Computation, iii, 1, 8, and 43; Bashe, et al., IBM's 
Early Computers, 23-24. 
67 Goldstine, The Computer from Pascal to von Neumann, 109. 
68 Pugh, Building IBM, 67-72 and 123-126. 
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second reason was the inadequacy of numerical procedures. Finally, Comrie noted that the poor 
quality of mathematical tables was itself a cause for slow acceptance of mechanized calculations. 
That is. scientific calculations often incorporated mathematical values that were themselves laborious 
to calculate, compounding the overall difficulty.69 
In 1928, the watershed year, Comrie discovered tabulating machines. In particular, he found 
them a powerful tool for creating tables. As discussed, most values in mathematical and astronomical 
tables did not come directly from fundamental formulae; that took too much effort. Instead, a 
relatively few pivotal values were derived from basic formulae to create a framework from which to 
estimate intermediate values by interpolation with simpler formulae. Despite Eckert's exuberant 
claims, tabulating machines could not conveniently obtain pivotal values in many cases. Tabulators 
proved adept at interpolating, however.70 
Even if large calculations were not easily within the capacity of EAM equipment, Comrie 
demonstrated that it nevertheless could do them and provided substance to Eckert's claims. In 
particular, Comrie won international attention for computations on the orbits of the moon using data 
from Ernest W. Brown's Tables of the Motion of the Moon. Brown, who happened to be Eckert's 
former professor at Yale, had produced especially accurate tables.71 Using them was no easier for 
that, however. The Nautical Almanac Office dedicated the continuous labor of two (human) 
"computers" to the task. Comrie decided to reduce overall human involvement by using EAM 
equipment to compute the harmonic functions by time, the most labor-intensive part of the 
calculations. Making the calculations for twenty years into the future took thirteen months and half a 
million cards. Just punching the cards took six months. The superior results Comrie obtained at a 
fraction of the costs of manual computation made the project worthwhile and influenced other 
scientists to attempt similar large calculations. In particular, it set a precedent for the daunting first 
problem for the ENIAC, the calculations for the hydrogen bomb, which took several months and one 
million cards. 
Indeed, the two projects some fourteen years apart gives perspective to computing progress. 
Even if electromechanical, a prewar tabulator calculated similarly to ENIAC. That is, both 
fundamentally computed by counting with decimal numbers. Thus, numbers of cards provides a 
rough comparison of the relative complexity of the two problems involved. All this suggests that the 
69 L. J. Comrie, "The Application of Calculating Machines to Astronomical Computing," Popular 
Astronomy 33 (1925), 243-244. 
70 L. J. Comrie, "On the Construction of Tables by Interpolating," Monthly Notices of the Royal 
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ENIAC may have been on the order of five to twenty times as powerful a calculator as the tabulator 
that Comrie used, an older model designed for 45-column cards.72 The ENIAC is said to have been 
500 to 1,000 times faster than the best electromechanical computers, such as the ASCC.73 However, 
that estimate comes from comparing computational rates in operations per second. In overall 
performance—the more meaningful comparison—differences were probably negligible, as Comrie's 
use of comparatively antiquated equipment demonstrated. 
In 1940, when Atanasoff wrote an explanatory manuscript to accompany applications for 
funding to complete the ABC, he listed nine examples of problems the computer could help solve. 
The first three, multiple correlation, curve fitting, and method of least squares, dealt ordinarily with 
statistics, although the latter could refer to an approximate solution method of differential equations 
(the Boussinesq method).74 Atanasoff s placing of statistics-related uses as highest priority might 
suggest substance to a hoary rumor at Iowa State that a word from Wallace gave the inspiration for 
the ABC. Atanasoff did not arrive on campus until after the 1924 statistics course but did meet 
Wallace briefly. He also attended lectures by Fisher and knew him well enough to pay a social visit 
when in England. While Wallace and Fisher impressed Atanasoff, he claimed neither man had direct 
impact on the ABC.75 The specific priority in the listing of uses for the ABC, according to him, 
reflected less his interests than it did the ISC environment, which of course was influenced by 
Wallace and Fisher.76 
Atanasoff had long been interested in calculating devices, in fact. As a boy in Florida, along 
with his fascination with the slide rule, he read articles on computing machines in International 
Encyclopedia and explored various types of desktop calculators in the offices of his father's employer. 
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Amalgamated Phosphate Company.77 At ISC for a Master's, he did little serious computing but 
enjoyed hanging around the Mathematical Statistical Service, located for a time in the Physics 
Building.78 His first taste of truly demanding machine-assisted calculations came as he labored over 
his dissertation at the University of Wisconsin. The frustrating experience gave Atanasoff an 
appreciation of a need for better calculators. 
Several years after returning to ISC with his doctorate, Atanasoff tested the capabilities of 
EAM equipment by analyzing complex spectra.79 The spectra of radiation emitted by electrons 
correspond to their energy levels, or rather, changes in energy levels as they jump among possible 
orbits. Spectra analysis depended then upon tedious cut-and-try methods. One common procedure 
involved plotting frequencies of radiation lines on long strips of paper and using dividers to isolate 
equally spaced pairs of lines representing energy levels. Atanasoff had therefore chosen a problem 
important to quantum mechanics, but his larger purpose was to explore the potential of tabulating 
equipment. 
Atanasoff s method involved recording frequency data in punch cards and having a tabulator 
and sorter identify corresponding energy differences. An IBM tabulator did not have sufficient 
capacity to do the job unaided, however. Moreover, IBM only leased its equipment and did not 
permit modifications. Atanasoff therefore invented an attachment to extend the capabilities of a 
tabulator without altering it. Remarkably, he made his design without a full understanding of the 
inner workings of the tabulator. IBM jealously guarded that information. Atanasoff learned what 
little he could from the local IBM service representative and guessed on other pertinent details. The 
arrangement satisfactorily handled the analysis, and Atanasoff used it to analyze one or two spectra. 
A. E. Brandt, an ISC statistician and experienced EAM equipment hand, assisted in the project, 
largely by procuring information and parts from IBM, with which he enjoyed especially cordial 
relations.80 
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With his success enlarging the capacity of an IBM tabulator for analysis of complex spectra, 
Atanasoff decided to extend the machine further to aid with the more pressing and difficult problems 
his students faced.81 By the mid-1930s, they were already being constrained by the limited available 
capabilities for solving linear algebraic equation sets. However, Atanasoff offered to sell patent 
rights to his design to IBM rather than build another attachment. "I have good reasons to believe." he 
claimed in a letter to the company, "that this method will solve systems of equations with nine 
unknowns in one-tenth or less of the time needed by the methods used at present and do this with the 
accuracy and absence of fatigue of a fully mechanical method." By "this method," Atanasoff meant 
use of his proposed attachment and IBM tabulator. 
Besides a desire to sell his idea, Atanasoff had a personal purpose for telling IBM of his 
invention. He wanted to demonstrate that he was "not a too academic sort of person," because he 
wanted to work for the office appliance company. "I am interested in the possibilities of mechanized 
mathematics." he explained to an IBM official, before adding prophetically, "and your organization 
seems destined to play a dominant role in this field."82 He admitted that a second reason he wanted a 
job change was that the possibility of promotion at ISC seemed remote.83 However, he made clear 
that he would be leaving ISC on good terms and listed the heads of the mathematics and physics 
departments among his references.84 
To the question on the IBM job application form: "What is your formula for success?" 
Atanasoff characteristically emphasized his propensity for hard work: "Work long and earnestly." 
Some colleagues did not credit him with a sense of humor (indeed, he did not credit himself with 
one), but he then added tongue-in-cheek: "Choose four able grandparents. Hope that they transmit to 
you. as well as ability, a bit of humor to avoid a wreck on the rocks of adversity."85 
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IBM did not offer a job to Atanasoff. either then or to inquiries he made to World War H.86 
That seems a mistake. However. IBM did not do scientific research per se. Atanasoff claimed, quite 
honestly, "an easy working knowledge of mechanisms and a clear understanding of electronics and 
other applications of electricity." On the other hand, IBM probably did not know what to make of a 
job applicant who admitted that his. "experience has been mostly obtained in the teaching field,"87 
who specified employment as a "Research Mathematical Physicist,"88 and who demanded, 
"considerable liberty in doing research work."89 As noted. IBM hired Wallace Eckert for a specific 
project toward the end of the war. thereby selecting as its first scientist someone with whom it already 
had a close relationship. 
As for Atanasoffs offer to sell his design for a tabulator attachment for solving simultaneous 
equations, IBM gave it fair consideration but declined. The company naturally was curious and asked 
for more information, since Atanasoff had disclosed only generalities. To protect itself and 
Atanasoff, IBM recommended that he send a patent application, cautioning: "It is our experience ... 
that persons who may be working quite independently of one another often conceive ideas which are 
essentially alike."90 Multiple inventors devising the same invention is a surprisingly common 
phenomenon, and IBM recognized the real possibility of it already having rights to a similar device. 
Atanasoff had not applied for a patent, but in place of an application, sent notarized copies of a 
drawing and a short descriptive manuscript.91 IBM engineers looked over the materials and were 
impressed. Nonetheless, they found the information insufficient to give the device a thorough 
86 W. W. McDowell. Assistant to Vice President. IBM. letter to John V. Atanasoff, 6 April 1937; 
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evaluation. IBM thus wrote back to Atanasoff insisting that it needed the patent application.92 In 
fact, although not told to Atanasoff, the engineers were not as interested as they might have been, 
because they believed IBM already possessed a patent on technology that could solve simultaneous 
equations in a slightly different way.93 
Atanasoff was deeply disappointed, both at IBM's refusal to hire him and its seeming lack of 
interest in his invention. He complained to Theodore H. Brown. Harvard business professor and 
consultant to IBM (and who had introduced Howard Aiken to James Bryce, leading to the ASCC), 
that he suspected the company simply did not understand the scientific importance of solving systems 
of algebraic systems.94 However, he took IBM's advice and had a law firm search for related patents 
as a first step for an application.95 The firm, Dieterich and Rutley, sent him copies of several. The 
most pertinent was one by Bryce and was probably the patent the IBM engineers thought applicable 
for solving sets of linear algebraic equations.96 After Atanasoff reviewed it and the other patents, he 
decided his idea had novel aspects.97 
Even so, Atanasoff decided against pursuing a patent. He came to realize that the capabilities 
of even the best tabulators simply could not be expanded cost-effectively to solve the large sets of 
equations the work of his students demanded.98 Atanasoffs rule-of-thumb was that the difficulty of 
solving a set of linear equations varied roughly as the cube of the number of unknowns. Actual 
difficulty varied depending on accuracy required, but generally as the number of unknowns increased. 
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so did need for accuracy." Atanasoff was already anticipating the need to solve sets in twenty or 
more unknowns, far beyond what he could hope to do with a tabulator, at least at reasonable cost. 
Unwilling to give up. Atanasoff was therefore forced to consider ways to contrive a more 
powerful computing mechanism. One idea was to gang thirty or so mechanical calculators together 
on a common shaft to operate as one huge machine. Coefficients from a pair of equations were to be 
entered manually into consecutive calculators, and all machines operated in unison to eliminate one 
variable. After the results were recorded manually, the process would be repeated with another pair 
of equations, over and over, until all variables were identified.100 Atanasoff recognized the process as 
arduous and error prone, but desperate, asked Dieterich and Rutley to conduct a patent search on the 
concept.101 The search evidently turned up nothing, but even so, Atanasoff also discarded the ganged-
calculator idea as impractical. Buying so many calculators involved more money than he could hope 
to find, and in any case, calculators had insufficient accuracy for his needs. Furthermore, getting 
numbers in and out of the calculators looked too difficult.102 
EAM equipment had greater capabilities than normally acknowledged, but it nevertheless 
could not handle many computational problems of interest to researchers. Furthermore, a different 
type of computing mechanism existed, more powerful in some respects, but not accurate enough for 
Atanasoff s purpose. The two categories of computers are digital and analog, but the distinction 
became clear only about World War H, coincident with acceptance of the terminology. Atanasoff 
himself apparently coined the word analogue, meaning analog devices. His terms for digital 
mechanisms were either pulse.103 when electronic, or awkwardly, "computing machines proper."104 
Other terms for digital calculators were numerical, arithmetical, or discrete calculating machines.105 
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The mechanical and electromechanical tabulators and desktop calculators were not computers 
but digital machines whose essential operation involved counting with decimal numbers. Digital 
mechanisms existed long before desktop calculators, however. The abacus is a digital device of 
ancient origin. Indeed, digital calculation aids have been around as long as people have used ten 
digits, that is, fingers, to count. Perhaps for that reason, digital computers have been said to be those 
that perform computations by counting. That was true of the ENIAC but not the ABC or modem 
digital computers generally. 
A fundamental distinguishing trait is that all electronic digital devices depend upon 
operational signals of discrete voltage pulses. The valleys and peaks are typically referred to as zeros 
and ones. A relative high voltage is described as a one and a low voltage a zero, or vice versa. 
Atanasoff and Berry adopted the opposite convention, now called negative logic.106 Either way, all 
information a digital computer needs to perform its myriad functions is encoded within infinitely 
variable strings of binary voltages. Specific patterns can represent decimal numbers, letters of the 
alphabet, or other identifiable symbol. Moreover, as noted, digital signals can be manipulated to 
perform binary arithmetic and, thence, to approximate operations in higher mathematics through 
numerical methods. 
Analog computers are harder to define, yet more descriptive of their name. While a digital 
signal has only two important states, high or low, or on or off, all conditions in an analog signal are 
meaningful. Instead of being fundamentally discrete, analog signals are continuous—like the world 
we perceive. An analog computer represents numbers through some system of physical 
measurements and is directly analogous to the problem it was created to solve.107 That is. a 
mathematical equation is analogous to the physical phenomenon it models, and in turn, an analog 
computer is analogous to the mathematical expression it represents. 
A slide rule is an example of an early analog calculating device. In fact, slide rules were the 
most common form of calculating device used by scientists and engineers into the 1960s. However, 
analog computers far more advanced than slide rules were already established before Atanasoff began 
the ABC. Analog computers never had the versatility, power, or accuracy that electronic digital 
computers eventually came to have but could handle many mathematical problems. They are still 
used in specific applications. 
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Atanasoff naturally experimented with analog computing mechanisms along with digital 
ones. One idea was to create a super-accurate slide rule from 35mm film stock. He planned to wind 
the film around sprockets mounted in a framework about the size of a desk. Displacement of the 
slides provided the readings on a typical slide rule, but because film stretches. Atanasoff intended to 
take measurements from the rotations of the sprockets as their teeth meshed with holes in the film. 
Moreover, the device was to have multiple, interconnected slides for better accuracy. While a normal 
slide rule was good to 1 part in 2.500, Atanasoff thought his deluxe model might have accuracy as 
high as 1 part in 250,000.108 
Atanasoff did not build a super-slide rule, but he and graduate student Lynn Hannum 
fabricated a modeling device to solve a common second-order partial differential equation called 
Laplace's equation. They named their device a Laplaciometer. It was based on an earlier one that 
created a physical model of a differential equation in soap film. Atanasoff and Hannum chose 
paraffin for its advantages for stability and permanence.109 Thus, the Laplaciometer shaped 100-
pound blocks of paraffin into the physical embodiment of the solution to Laplace's equation. 
Atanasoff demonstrated that the Laplaciometer could solve torsion problems to get answers to within 
2 percent of theoretical values.110 Additionally, Atanasoff built a special analog calculator to estimate 
the "granularity index" of photographs, another area of research.111 
The partial differential equations that Atanasoff and his students faced could not be solved by 
conceivable analog methods, but in fact, the first computers with the capability to handle ordinary 
differential equations were analog machines called differential analyzers. They evolved from the 
1920s through World War II largely under Vannevar Bush at MIT. Son of a Boston Universalis! 
minister. Bush taught electrical engineering, which became mathematically complex early in the 
twentieth century. The first electrical circuits were direct current (dc) and comparatively easy to 
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analyze. Algebra did fine. Alternating current (ac) circuits gained popularity from the late nineteenth 
century, because they are more efficient and cost effective in many applications, particularly those 
involving transmission over long-distances. Alternating current constantly changes direction, so its 
rigorous description requires differential equations. Furthermore, design considerations forced 
engineers to account not only for steady-state (if continually changing) conditions, but also for 
transients introduced from short circuits, activation of switches, and other disturbances too critical to 
ignore. Transients added significant complexity to equations. 
As noted, differential equations are easier to develop than solve analytically. Because 
mathematicians disdained applications before World War H, engineers investigated solution methods 
themselves."2 Bush earned his Ph.D. at MTT attempting to transform certain differential equations 
into algebraic ones based on techniques of mathematician Oliver Heaviside. Not understanding 
applied mathematics particularly well themselves. Bush's professors failed to catch a major error in 
his dissertation."3 
With a huge growth in telephone and electrical services, the problem of analyzing ac circuits 
became critical by the 1920s. The high costs of building and operating long-distance networks meant 
utilities could ill afford failures. As an analog approach to the problem, MIT began considering ways 
to model large networks in the laboratory."4 One method entailed solution of simultaneous algebraic 
equations through use of an electrical replica called the Network Analyzer, associated in particular 
with Harold Hazen, a former student of Bush."5 Another line of inquiry led Bush to differential 
analyzers.116 
Despite their name, differential analyzers solved not differential equations, but integral 
equations. Mechanisms to perform integration were readily available, but no satisfactory 
differentiators existed. Fortunately, differentiation and integration are inverse operations, so an 
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equation in one form can be transformed to the other, although often not perfectly.117 To solve a 
differential equation on a differential analyzer, it was therefore rephrased in integral form.118 
Actually, the immediate ancestor of the differential analyzers was created to solve a particular 
integral equation. John R. Carson, a transmission engineer at AT&T, developed an integral formula 
for the response of an electrical network to a suddenly impressed voltage. The formula provided 
critical stability information, but like many differential equations, was too complex to calculate 
analytically. Engineers instead solved it through labor-intensive graphical methods. Seeking 
something more convenient. Bush and graduate students H. R. Stewart and F. D. Gage invented a 
mechanism in 1925 whose central component was a dc watt-hour meter, which did integration in 
ordinary operation. Hazen, then a student, added a mechanical wheel-and-disc integrator to create an 
integraph that solved second-order differential equations. Bush and his students called the device the 
Continuous or Product Integraph. 
A wheel-and-disc integrator included a metal wheel that both rolled over a rotating glass disc 
and slid across its radius. The two actions allowed the wheel to trace a curve, which the integrator 
transformed into an output via a rotating shaft analogous to defining an area. It thus performed 
integration, because finding an area under a curve is precisely what integration entails. The Product 
Integraph immediately prompted comparisons to the human brain. In a front-page article. The New-
York Times dubbed it a 'Thinking Machine,"119 a stigma computers still carry. 
With the Integraph proved viable. Bush began a more "comprehensive" machine in 1928 with 
money furnished by MIT. He may not have known, but somewhat similar devices had been built 
before. Notably, British physicist Lord Kelvin created a harmonic tide analyzer in the 1870s, and 
American Hannibal Ford devised an integrator for aiming battleship guns in 1919.120 
Still, the Differential Analyzer was a remarkable machine. A disc integrator was simpler and 
more precise than a watt-hour meter, so Bush abandoned the latter and incorporated six of the former. 
That allowed the Analyzer to solve sixth-order differential equations, a capability selected because of 
the "frequency with which problems are encountered involving two or three simultaneous second-
order equations." To prevent slippage within the integrators, which contributed to inaccuracy. Bush 
11 
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installed a mechanical torque amplifier with each. Other major components included electrical 
motors, gears, and shafts, all mounted in a large horizontal framework. 
Bush described the Differential Analyzer as follows: "a machine in which the values of the 
variables involved are represented by the positions of rotating shafts. These shafts are interconnected 
by mathematical units which force them to move in accordance with the functional relations 
expressed in the equation." That is, the components of the Differential Analyzer were bolted together 
to simulate the equation being solved. One computer historian noted that the machine, "did not so 
much compute as kinetically act out the mathematical problem." Each equation required a unique 
arrangement of components, so the form of the Analyzer changed for every problem solved. 
Interconnections could be quite complex. The solution of simultaneous differential equations, in 
particular, involved numerous "feedback connections." 
Operators used input boards to trace curves as input to the Differential Analyzer. Planetary 
differential gears added and subtracted. Spur gears multiplied by constants. Otherwise, 
multiplication depended upon a calculus technique called integration by parts.121 Integrators did 
integration, of course. All components were linked through rotating shafts, and solutions emerged as 
displacements of output shafts. The Analyzer converted the displacements to graphs on paper. The 
areas contained within the graphs gave final answers.122 
The characteristics of the Differential Analyzer allowed it to solve integral equations directly. 
It was not adept at arithmetical operations, however. As noted, a digital computer has the opposite 
traits. It does arithmetic rather naturally, and doing that, can contrive solutions to mathematical 
operations numerically. 
Starting in the early 1930s, the Differential Analyzer solved ordinary differential equations 
successfully within its limitations. It arguably represented the most advanced computing technology 
of its day, and a number of copies were built, including a few outside the United States. Some 
believed that the future of computing belonged to such devices. 
To grasp more of that potential. Bush built a more powerful analog computer. He turned to 
Warren Weaver for funding. Atanasoff s former professor had left the University of Wisconsin in 
1931 to become director of the Natural Sciences Division of the Rockefeller Foundation. Weaver 
went to see the Differential Analyzer and left quite impressed. Thus, in 1935, the Rockefeller 
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Foundation gave Bush $10,000 to study the possibility of an advanced analyzer. The next year, it 
presented him with $85,000 for construction. 
The Rockefeller Analyzer weighed approximately one hundred tons. Its essential elements 
remained those of the Differential Analyzer, but there were more of them, and they performed with 
greater precision and flexibility. Components included eighteen mechanical integrators and some 150 
electric motors. So much hardware gave the new analyzer a capacity to solve several problems 
simultaneously but also made elaborate and troublesome controls necessary. Many of the controls 
were electrical or electronic. The Analyzer contained some 2,000 vacuum tubes, used in such things 
as ten "high-speed" numerical counters, which were actually mostly mechanical. The automatic 
controls of the Rockefeller Analyzer included programming capabilities via three punched-paper 
tapes. Output could take the form of graphs, or more often, data in printed tables.123 The Rockefeller 
Analyzer finally began regular operation in 1942, about three years behind schedule. Immediately 
conscripted by the military for calculating ballistics tables and radar antenna profiles, its existence 
was not disclosed publicly until 1945. 
Bush received promotions to dean of engineering and vice-president of MTT. He left in 1939 
to become president of the Carnegie Institution of Washington, the largest private prewar funding 
source for research in the nation. While still at MIT. he moved the Carnegie Corporation to donate 
money to create a Center of Analysis on campus as a locus for fund raising for development of 
information-processing devices. The center also housed the machines, including the Rockefeller 
Analyzer. The director was Samuel Caldwell, who had been Bush's student and became his chief 
lieutenant on computing. 
MIT researchers had special interests in microfilm, photoelectricity, and electronics, so Bush 
explored ways to exploit those technologies under the auspices of the center. The Navy gave him 
funding to develop a cryptanalytic machine as one project. It wanted something faster at cracking 
coded messages than the EAM equipment it used. Bush therefore designed the Comparator, a 
machine comprised of the three technologies and intended to decipher cryptic messages at high 
speeds by statistically analyzing the occurrences of letters. 
The Comparator probably represented the first attempt to incorporate electronic counters into 
a computational device. Unfortunately, the counters did not work well. The project ran into other 
123 Owens, "Vannevar Bush," 3, 15-17, and 32; Bush and Caldwell, "A New Type of Differential 
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technical problems, and Bush abandoned microfilm data storage for paper tape. Worse, he became 
overextended. Forced to choose between projects, he directed most of the Center's resources to the 
Rockefeller Analyzer. The neglected Comparator failed to work when delivered to the Navy, which 
packed it away and suspended further efforts to develop cryptanalytic devices in the crucial years 
before the war. 
Washing his hands of the Comparator and behind schedule on the Rockefeller Analyzer. 
Bush nonetheless kept related projects going. Concerned with growth in printed materials, he saw a 
need for a Rapid Selector for tracking information important to scientists. The advanced storage and 
retrieval system was to search coded reels of microfilm at operational speeds about 150 times that of a 
tabulator. Frames of information could then be selected for printing. NCR and Eastman Kodak gave 
Bush $25,000 for the project. His students finished a version of the Selector in 1940, after he left 
MTT. It turned out larger, slower, and more expensive to operate than Bush anticipated. Manual 
library-card files actually performed better. Consequently, MTT found no sponsor for the Selector's 
further development, so it was abandoned like the Comparator. 
In 1941, Bush was appointed to head the National Defense Research Committee (NDRC) and 
given wide latitude to dispose of the public's money. He moved the Comparator out of storage and 
refurbished it for the Navy, which got some limited use from it. Bush spent more money on an 
advanced Comparator, which failed. The Selector, too, was taken from storage, modified for code 
breaking, operated briefly, and shut down forever. The Navy finally had enough, and over Bush's 
protests, took charge of its efforts to develop cryptanalytic machines. It contracted with NCR and 
Gray Manufacturing Company to construct some twenty code-breaking machines based on 
technologies similar to those of the Comparator. According to one historian, the Navy spent as much 
money developing such devices as the Army did on the ENIAC. 
Just how well the Navy's cryptanalytic equipment worked seems a matter of opinion. So 
great was the need that researchers from the Navy formed ERA after the war and continued 
investigating the technologies. Various other efforts also tried to perfect a Comparator or Selector 
using government money. Perhaps the most successful Selector-like machine was one for the Navy's 
Bureau of Ships. By its completion in the early 1960s, electronic digital computers had rendered it 
obsolete.124 
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While the Differential Analyzer, Comparator, and Rapid Selector are relegated to obscurity, a 
related machine, Memex,125 has attained cult status. "As We May Think," the popular article in 
which Bush described it, has been reprinted often but first appeared in Atlantic Monthly and Life 
magazines in 1945.126 Because of that date, inspiration for the futuristic information-processing 
machine has been assumed rooted in World War II. In fact, Memex was a product of the same times 
and thinking as the Comparator and Rapid Selector. Similar concepts appeared earlier in Europe, 
notably by H. G. Wells, the British science fiction writer.127 First documentation of Memex was in a 
memorandum that Bush sent to Weaver in 1937. Then in 1939, soon after leaving MTT, Bush wrote 
an unpublished essay, "Mechanization and the Record," providing a detailed description.128 
Bush conceived of Memex as a mechanical extension of the brain. Like the Rapid Selector, 
Memex depended upon microfilm, with which, "The Encyclopaedia Britannica could be reduced to 
the volume of a matchbox" at a cost of a nickel for materials. Thus, a "library of a million volumes 
could be compressed" into Memex. Images of documents and photographs were to be transferred to 
microfilm with a scanner-like device. Also involved were a tiny "Cyclops" camera to be worn on the 
user's head for taking microphotographs and a "Vocodor,"129 with which spoken words could be 
transformed to type: "The author need not write—he could talk his thoughts to a machine." Memex 
could quickly select and retrieve stored documents and a screen allowed their viewing. Finally, 
Memex could perform logical and arithmetic operations using digital technology. In short, Memex 
compared to a personal computer. It looked something like one: it was about the size of a desk and 
had a keyboard and monitor but could also be operated remotely by radio.130 
Bush never built Memex, and considering the poor ends of the Comparator and Rapid 
Selector, it was probably well he did not try. However, his vision served as a guide to creators of 
personal computers. E-mail, and the Internet. Key figures in the development of those technologies. 
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including J. C. R. Licklider, Theodor Nelson, and Douglas Engelbert, found inspiration in Memex. 
These men imagined interacting with computers the way Bush intended to use Memex. Information-
processing technologies have indeed come to resemble those Bush described. As a more esoteric 
feature, Memex allowed building a "mesh of associative trails" that did not "fade" through stored and 
linked information. That concept is attributed as a rough roadmap to hypertext.131 
Memex called for digital circuitry but consisted mainly of analog technologies. However, 
Bush initiated yet another project that probably constituted the first attempt to build a limitedly 
general-purpose electronic digital computer.132 Like Atanasoff s. Bush's thinking on digital 
computation originated mid-1930s with consideration of EAM equipment. Instead of an attachment 
to expand its capabilities. Bush attempted to harmonize multiple machines with a master controller 
like Wallace Eckert's.133 He graduated to the idea of a "highly versatile and amply rapid" computer 
whose operation was to "depend primarily upon summation of (electronic) pulses ' The integrated 
device would take "its information from previously prepared tapes, to perform the four operations of 
arithmetic as well as storage of partial results, extraction from storage for further manipulation, and 
printing of final results."134 Bush thought enough of the Rapid Arithmetical Computing Machine, or 
Arithmetical Machine for short, that he intended it to be the lead project for the Center of Analysis 
after the Rockefeller Analyzer.135 
The war intervened before that could happen. Nonetheless, much effort went into perfecting 
vacuum tube counting circuits with funding from NCR. Design engineers anticipated working speeds 
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of 100.000 or 150,000 pulses per second, but with 10,000 thought more likely.136 Moreover, the 
engineers considered switching circuits and magnetic storage devices, particularly steel tape.137 
Despite strides made, few tangible results came from the Arithmetical Machine. Bush 
refused any credit for helping invent the modern computer, in fact. In his autobiography, he declared 
unequivocally: "Who invented the digital computer? I can write at once that I did not, in fact I had 
little to do with that whole development."138 This denigration of his role was unfair. Computer 
historian Brian Randell speculated that Bush downplayed his contributions either because the 
Arithmetical Machine came to nothing, or because as far as he knew, it did not influence the 
ENIAC.139 
Among the reasons MTT did not progress further in digital computing prewar was that the 
Rockefeller Analyzer took longer than expected, and then the Arithmetical Machine was set aside 
with onset of war, like the ABC.140 Project engineers developed computing circuits but had not 
decided on an overall architecture before the chief engineer, W. P. Overbeck, left in 1942 to help with 
the atomic bomb. Caldwell had already followed Bush to the NDRC, where he served under Weaver. 
Moreover, the Center of Analysis had to give full effort to calculating ballistics tables.141 
Another reason MIT did not make greater progress was that Bush developed other priorities. 
He remained committed to the Arithmetical Machine as late as March 1940.142 By then, he had the 
much weightier issue of organizing research for national defense on his mind. In June, he proposed 
the NDRC and became its chairman. As such, he assumed responsibility for the great share of 
research in the United States. Urgent as the situation was, he emphasized short-term projects. The 
question that guided his selections was, "Will it help win the war, this war?" The digital computer. 
Bush believed, required long-term effort.143 
Coincidentally, Atanasoff introduced himself in April 1940 at the Carnegie Institution 
specifically to attempt to interest Bush in the ABC. Bush received him cordially but showed little 
136 W. H. Radford, "Brief Report of Progress in the Preliminary Study and Development of the Rapid 
Arithmetic Machine," unpublished report, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1939. 2 and 4. Charles Babbage Institute. Honeywell Collection. 
137 W. H. Radford, "Report on an Investigation of the Practicality of Developing a Rapid Computing 
Machine," unpublished report, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 15 
October 1939, 3. Charles Babbage Institute, Honeywell Collection. 
138 Vannevar Bush, Pieces of the Action (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1970), 185. 
139 Randell, The Origins of Digital Computers, 295. 
140 Bush, "Arithmetical Machine," 337; Owens, "Vannevar Bush," 19. 
141 Wildes and Lindgren. A Century of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science at MIT, 231. 
142 As evident by Bush's attitude expressed in "Arithmetical Machine." 
143 Vannevar Bush quoted in Zachary, Endless Frontier, 131; also, 95-102, 112-114, and 266. 
117 
interest. Atanasoff decided he had concern only for differential analyzers.144 That was not true; the 
NDRC did sponsor further development of electronic counters by NCR but not a full computer.145 
As a matter of fact, several months after meeting Atanasoff. Bush also refused to fund a 
computer that Norbert Wiener proposed.146 Wiener, a mathematician associated with Bush at MTT, 
wanted to build an advanced digital computer. Writing after the war, he did not mention the 
Arithmetical Machine but recalled: "These notions were all very much in the spirit of the thought of 
the time." Among the notions, his computer was to be binary and have flexible programming. 
Recognizing that an effective computer needed copious fast-acting memory, Wiener apparently 
considered cathode ray tubes. 
Wiener, like Atanasoff. was one of the few prewar mathematicians interested in applications 
and explained his desire for a digital computer as the need for solving partial differential equations. 
Too, he thought a sophisticated computer might prove useful if war came. However, Wiener, like 
Atanasoff, became involved with antiaircraft guns and had to abandon computers.147 
Bush's change of priorities helps explain why America did little on computers during the war 
before the ENIAC, which the Army built with money outside of his control. He cannot be blamed for 
failing to give urgency to electronic digital computers when no one else did either at the beginning of 
the war. The military did not yet give high priority to new methods for calculating ballistics tables. 
Code breaking furnished a critical need, but Bush thought his Comparator best for that. 
Unacknowledged by historians, intervention by government had serious negative 
consequences for private research, including that into computing. IBM converted some of its 
factories to build war materials. It also curtailed research. Patents issued to IBM plummeted from 
eighty-seven in 1940 to twenty-five in 1946. Moreover, to ensure full retention of employees after 
what it hoped might be a short war. IBM decided in 1943 to give priority to developing products to go 
to market quickly. That admirable policy further delayed work in electronic circuits begun before the 
war. IBM tried to reactivate electronics research later but found all experts committed to defense. 
Other office machine manufacturers were in similar straits, and their patents dropped 
precipitously as well. NCR. where design of electronic calculators had also started before the war 
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and which sponsored similar work at MIT, had its production of cash registers totally disrupted. It 
switched its factories to cryptoanalysis devices and other war-related projects.148 NCR did wartime 
research on electronic computing circuits but did not move into commercial computers until the mid-
1950s to concentrate on restoring its core business.149 Of course, Atanasoff and Berry, whose 
computer had greatest potential, were almost completely sidetracked by the war. 
However, despite Bush's opinion, his work at MTT did influence electronic digital computers. 
Much of that impact was indirect through his and Caldwell's students, including Perry Crawford and, 
especially, Claude Shannon. Shannon operated the Differential Analyzer as a graduate student in 
electrical engineering at MTT. He also assisted with the Rapid Selector. His Master's thesis (1937) 
must rank among the most important ever by describing how Boolean algebra could be used to design 
efficient switching circuits to mimic logical reasoning. George Boole was a nineteenth-century 
Englishman who devised an algebra based entirely on binary numbers and three essential operations: 
and, or, and not. Boolean algebra is perfect for working out many logical operations of digital 
computers.150 
Thornton Fry hired Shannon to apply his ideas. Telephone switching furnished a natural 
application, but Fry also had interest in computers. Urged by Fry, George Stibitz and Samuel B. 
Williams began building computers at the BTL in 1939. First came the Complex Number Computer, 
a binary-coded decimal calculator. Complex numbers are arranged in a two-part convention 
convenient for representing phase and amplitude of electrical signals and require slightly different 
rules of arithmetic manipulation. 
Public demonstration of the Complex Number Computer at a September 1940 conference at 
Dartmouth was a milestone in information processing because of its remote operation by 
teletypewriter. According to historian Paul Ceruzzi, the demonstration initiated telecommunications; 
that is, transport of digital signals over telephone lines. Von Neumann. Mauchly, and Wiener 
witnessed the event. Mauchly, in particular, took interest in the computer and within a couple of 
months recorded his intention of building his own electronic calculator.151 
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Stibitz left with Fry to work for Weaver at the NDRC, but he initiated the design of six other 
computers based on work started before the war. The computers were built by the BTL during and 
shortly after the war. All were relay machines, but several were general purpose and programmable. 
Most were for the military.152 As for Shannon, he got placed into related antiaircraft fire control 
work, like Atanasoff and Wiener.153 
With its few relay computers, however, the BTL pioneered important concepts. One 
computer, the general-purpose Model V, set a standard for reliability and versatility. Using about 
9,000 relays, it had a more balanced design and greater problem-solving capabilities than the ENIAC. 
Furthermore, design redundancy meant errors rarely, if ever, occurred due to internal malfunctions. 
Historians have assumed the Model V was slower than the ENIAC, but relative speeds of the two 
machines probably varied by situation.154 Despite the BTL's impressive achievements, antitrust 
actions by the federal government prevented it from producing commercial computers.155 
Returning again to Bush, he also had direct influence on the ENIAC through Mauchly. 
Mauchly may or may not have known about developments in digital technology at MIT, but he 
became well acquainted with differential analyzers. In a nutshell, the ENIAC mated the architecture 
of a differential analyzer with the computational design of a tabulator, which explains why it became 
such a cumbersome machine. 
The ancestry of the ENIAC provides a key to understanding Bush's reluctance to continue 
research wholeheartedly into digital computers under auspices of the NDRC. After he reviewed the 
ENIAC proposal, Caldwell recalled that a similar project had been rejected at MIT.156 Bush and his 
group certainly would have considered a computer whose main elements consisted of electronic 
accumulators incorporated into the architectural framework of a differential analyzer. The 
Rockefeller Analyzer represented a big step in that direction. Strong circumstantial evidence 
therefore suggests that Bush saw the Arithmetical Machine as becoming overly complex, like the 
ENIAC. Difficulties with the Rockefeller Analyzer could only have reinforced his skepticism. After 
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Bush left MIT. however. Overbeck simplified the Arithmetical Machine's circuitry, particularly with 
novel vacuum tubes.157 For his part. Caldwell remained optimistic, even if not impressed by the 
ENIAC. Historians of the Arithmetical Machine believe that, had war not intervened, a simplified 
version would have resulted by 1945.158 
After talking to Caldwell in 1941, it also occurred to Atanasoff how the ABC and a 
differential analyzer could be crossed to solve integral equations. He did not have the opportunity to 
go further but discussed his idea with Mauchly.159 Unfortunately, Eckert and Mauchly did not grasp 
the unorthodox beauty and simple elegance of the ABC as a superior basis on which to build. They 
failed to see that not only had Atanasoff and Berry pioneered a more efficient method of performing 
calculations, but also pointed the way to effective memories, without which great computational 
speed means little. Lacking the experience of Bush and Caldwell to comprehend the inherent 
limitations of accumulators. Eckert and Mauchly regressed to the model of the old technology. 
Caldwell's judgment of the ABC to be viable, but not the ENIAC, proved correct. 
The usual explanation for Bush's failure to continue development of digital computers is that 
he was too tied to analog, as Atanasoff suspected. There may have been truth to that, because analog 
computers had advantages. It took years before digital emerged as clearly superior. For example, 
eight years after startup of the ENIAC, one authority, voicing a still prevalent view, acknowledged 
that digital computers might have more potential but otherwise saw no absolute advantage. Digital 
computers had greater flexibility but tended to be bulkier. Moreover, while digital computers 
operated very fast, that did not mean faster completions of applications. For one thing, data input and 
output were usually easier in analog.160 As a bonus, some analog devices, such as the Laplaciometer 
or differential analyzer, allowed those not proficient in mathematics to "see" the unfolding of the 
solution to a problem. Thus, analog computers and hybrid digital differential analyzers continued to 
be built and used long after the ENIAC supposedly marked the end of such machines.161 
157 For example. Overbeck developed a vacuum tube with ten elements to replace ten ordinary tubes. 
Bush. "Arithmetical Machine," 339. 
158 Wildes and Lindgren. A Century of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science at MIT, 229-
235. See in particular, quotations from a letter from Caldwell to Warren Weaver, 232. 
159 J. V. Atanasoff, copy of letter to J. W. Mauchly, 31 May 1941. ISU, Parks, "John Vincent 
Atanasoff Papers" (box 25, folder 14): Atanasoff, interview with Merzbach, 5 May 1969, 80-82 
(actually unnumbered). 
160 Morris Rubinoff, "Analogue vs. Digital—A Comparison," Proceedings of the I.R.E. 41, no. 10 
(October 1953), 1,261-1.262. 
161 See for example. Max Palevsky, "The Design of the Bendix Digital Differential Analyzer," 
Proceedings of the I.R.E. 41. no. 10 (October 1953), 1352. 
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The deciding factor for Atanasoff was that only a digital computer could give the accuracy he 
needed. A digital computer becomes more accurate by expanding word size. By contrast, the 
precision of its mechanical components, including slippage and backlash, limited the accuracy of a 
differential analyzer and was normally less than that easily obtainable in a digital computer. 
Moreover, an analyzer lost accuracy as it wore. Wear is seldom a problem in a digital computer, 
which tends to work or not. 
In summary, it was the 1920s before there began to be much interest in using calculators for 
large computations. Interest coincided with the maturing of the devices but stemmed from a new 
appreciation for applied mathematics. Researchers concerned with statistical analysis led the way, 
pushed by proponents like Wallace and Snedecor. Astronomers and physicists followed, with Comrie 
and Hylleraas at forefront. Meanwhile, Bush, an engineer, began building the analog Differential 
Analyzer for solving electrical circuit equations. It was the most powerful calculator of the time but 
had less accuracy than the common digital machines. Accuracy was not so important in engineering 
applications, typically including safety factors. Moreover, the Analyzer did not rely upon numerical 
methods, still unsuited for extensive computations. 
Use of EAM equipment for information handling expanded in the 1930s, but desire for 
calculating power grew more. Development of electromechanical digital computers thus began. 
Bush conceived of electronic digital computers but devoted more effort to the Rockefeller Analyzer 
and futuristic information-processing machines like the Rapid Selector and Memex. Atanasoff and 
Berry built the ABC. 
The years before World War II therefore yielded a wealth of computer-related theory and 
technologies, including some not yet discussed. Scientists got such credit as has been given, but the 
office appliances formed the foundation of their efforts. Furthermore, imperious demands for 
improvements in information handling drove the office appliance industry forward as well. The ABC 
departed from the technology of the day and established the future direction for computers, but 
Atanasoff recognized its lineage. When preparing a patent application, he stipulated no "line of 
demarcation" between the ABC as "Scientific Machine" and EAM equipment.162 
The incremental nature of business dictated caution in commercial machines, but the office 
appliance industry was nonetheless quite creative. It boldly explored new technologies on its own 
162 Richard Trexler (attributed). Patent Attorney for Cox, Moore & Olson, copy of proposal for J. V. 
Atanasoff, 19 December 1940, 2. ISU, Parks. "John Vincent Atanasoff Papers" (box 25, folder 22). 
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and generously supported projects by outside inventors. It is not exaggerating too much to say that 
the history of IBM, directly and by association, is the history of computers, even if only a portion of 
related innovations originated within the company. That history begins with the tabulating equipment 
of Hollerith. It includes pioneering work in scientific applications at Columbia University. It 
includes the ASCC and missed opportunity with Atanasoff. It includes the SSEC, perhaps the first 
stored-program computer. IBM has since routinely built cutting-edge machines. A recent example is 
a computer nicknamed Blue Gene, which if completed satisfactorily on schedule in 2005 will have 
outpaced computing-power growth predicted by Moore's Law by a factor of three. Blue Gene will 
cost $100 million and operate at more than one quadrillion operations per second, making it the 
fastest computer ever.163 Otherwise, IBM continues as an innovation champion. In 1999, it received 
an astonishing 2,756 U.S. patents, more than any other entity. Meanwhile, IBM (including 
predecessors) has been the most successful vendor of computing equipment for most of its history, 
employing the same skills in mass manufacturing and sales of computers that it applied to EAM 
equipment. Even so, other firms created and garnered much of the business in personal computers, as 
Microsoft did for software. 
Government, too. has long been involved with the information-handling industry, but largely 
limited its role to customer and regulator until World War II. More was probably not needed. The 
private sector's interest in the ABC proved it was receptive to the electronic digital computer at its 
inception. The extent of its enthusiasm was demonstrated by its funding of expensive machines like 
the ASCC and Rockefeller Analyzer, among numerous other related projects, even in the Depression. 
The ABC suggests modest investments were sufficient. More generally, the successes of the private 
sector developing technology and science before the war suggests that government backing was not 
critical to either afterwards. 
163 IBM Press Release, "IBM Unveils S100 Million Research Initiative to Build World's Fastest 
Supercomputer," 6 December 1999. 
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CHAPTER 4. IN THE BEGINNING, THE ABC 
Atanasoff despaired by late 1937. He maintained a full load of teaching and research. Plus, 
he supervised a number of graduate students. He did not want to investigate computing technologies 
as an aside to all that, but believed he had little choice. Most research he or his students undertook 
involved partial differential equations that they transformed by necessity into linear algebraic 
equations. To obtain the solution accuracy desired, however, generally required large sets of 
equations unsolvable with ordinary calculators, much less by hand. Furthermore, Atanasoff found 
even the most advanced computing mechanisms inadequate and recently had rejected ideas for 
devising a more powerful but simple calculator, either with a tabulator and attachment or by ganging 
desktop machines. For his students to progress in their research, he therefore faced attempting to 
create a new type of computing machine from first principles. Yet, his efforts in that direction had 
also come to naught, other than he resolved that his computer had to be digital for sake of accuracy 
and economical to build and operate. 
He was not then even sure if a computer should be mechanical or electrical. He sensed that a 
digital computer might exhibit better stability made from mechanical components, but his education 
and experience inclined him toward electrical or electronic.1 As one advantage, electronic elements 
do not have frictional and inertial limitations that inhibit mechanical devices." Electromechanical 
mechanisms of various sorts were common, of course, but so were electronic ones. In fact, Atanasoff 
built electronic counters using technology then current. He had not been able to make them perform 
consistently enough for a high-capacity calculator, however. This failure, too, weighed heavily upon 
him. 
Like many things electrical, electronics began with Thomas Edison. The prolific inventor 
found in 1883 that placing a positively charged metal plate near the carbon filament in an evacuated 
incandescent light bulb incited current to flow from the filament to the plate. The phenomenon 
became known as the Edison effect and was his sole scientific discovery. He did nothing with it, 
however, probably because of his preoccupation with lighting systems. 
John Ambrose Fleming consulted with Edison and learned of the Edison effect. Years later. 
1 John Vincent Atanasoff. "Advent of Electronic Digital Computing," Annals of the History of 
Computing 6. no. 3 (July 1984). 237. 
J V. Atanasoff. New Market. Maryland, interview with B. Kaplan, 23 August 1972, 100-101. 
Smithsonian. 
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he used it to create the two-element vacuum tube, or diode. A diode is a circuit device characterized 
by low resistance in one direction and high resistance in the other. Current flows easily against the 
low resistance but is effectively blocked in the opposite direction. The consequence was that a 
vacuum diode acted as a rectifier; that is, input of an alternating current produced a unidirectional 
current output. An early application was demodulation of radio signals. 
Two years after Fleming invented the vacuum tube diode in 1904, Lee de Forest added a wire 
mesh grid between the two elements to create the three-element vacuum tube, or triode. A positive 
voltage applied at the grid caused current to flow from the negative cathode to the positive anode, or 
plate. The triode thus acted like a diode with an on-off switch. However, the current that flowed 
through the triode varied with grid voltage. As the grid became slightly positive relative to the 
cathode, current began flowing. As the grid became more positively charged, proportionally greater 
amounts of current flowed until the triode behaved roughly like a fixed résister.3 As a consequence, 
triodes could amplify the current or voltage applied at the grid. That is, a small voltage at the grid 
allowed control of a relatively large current between the cathode and anode. However, the first 
triodes had little amplification capabilities. Triodes became important in 1912 when Edwin Howard 
Armstrong and others working independently connected the plate to the grid so that a portion of the 
plate voltage simultaneously appeared at the grid. The result was the positive feedback, or 
regeneration, circuit. Furthermore, they discovered that with enough feedback an amplifier became 
an oscillator that produced constant frequency sine waves useful for single-channel radio 
transmission, among other things. 
Electronics matured by World War n. but historians regard the conflict as its turning point. 
One reason is that the value of electronics hardware manufactured in the United States increased by 
more than twelve times during the war. Even so, the war continued the long-term trend, because 
growth of the industry had been accelerating since the invention of the triode oscillator, thanks largely 
to telephone and radio.4 More telling, the pace of the war years did not match that of the Depression 
when measured by innovation, contrary to the assertion that government-sponsored research produced 
a proportional rise in new technologies.5 Of twelve or so circuits considered basic and from which all 
others derive, for example, most were invented by 1940, including the phase-locked loop, automatic 
3 Michael Riordan and Lillian Hoddeson, Crystal Fire: The Birth of the Information Age (New 
York: W. W Norton, 1997), 58. 
4 Editors of Electronics, An Age of Innovation: The World of Electronics 1930-2000 (McGraw-Hill, 
1981). 12. 44. and 178. 
5 See for example. W. C. White, "Evolution of Electronics," Electronics 25, no. 9 (September 1952), 
98. 
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frequency control, noise blanker, and operational amplifier in the 1930s alone. On the other hand, no 
fundamental circuit can be attributed to the war. Probably the greatest contribution of war-related 
electronics research was in circuit miniaturization, especially for proximity fuses, but miniaturization 
represented the inevitable long-range trend, war or no war. 
As another example of the fruits of prewar privately funded research, most categories of 
vacuum tubes were on the market by 1930. Available types of tubes doubled to three hundred 
between 1931 and 1932 alone. New uses for tubes evolved continually, including heavy-duty 
industrial applications previously performed by relays. Military equipment contained some 2,300 
types of vacuum tubes by the war and made standardization a major concern.6 
Many sophisticated electronic devices made appearances during the Depression. These 
ranged from the fluorescent lamp to the commercial electron microscope and cyclotron, to name 
several.7 The cathode ray tube can be traced to the late nineteenth century, and by 1940 the electron 
beam device had evolved into the oscilloscope. Among other things, it also became television. Some 
attribute television to Philo Farnsworth, an Idaho farm boy who when fourteen conceived of 
television while cutting hay. Without formal training, he was awarded over 150 related patents. 
Other in venters included Vladimir K. Zworykin, who invented a kinescope (picture tube) in 1933 and 
iconoscope (camera tube) in 1938. His employer, RCA, began regular television broadcasts from the 
Empire State Building in 1939. Furthermore, although usable transistors did not appear until the late 
1940s, research into solid-state devices began much earlier, largely as an outgrowth of research into 
crystal physics and vacuum tubes. Various inventors began considering transistor prototypes by 
1925. Solid-state diodes from copper oxide were produced in large numbers before and during the 
war, but much related research stopped for the duration.8 
Most of the impressive and numerous innovations in electronics resulted from capitalism in 
action, even in the dark days of the Depression, and not from government programs. Wartime 
developments, such as they were, also depended heavily on privately funded work. The electronic 
digital computer shares that genesis. That so much new technology has been attributed to the war is 
largely explained by the need to justify unprecedented amounts of money spent by government on 
research and the desire by many to have the funding continue, particularly to compete with the USSR 
in the Cold War. 
6 Editors of Electronics, An Age of Innovation, 9, 12, 26, 44, and 178-184. 
7 White. "Evolution of Electronics," 98. 
8 Editors of Electronics, An Age of Innovation, 17, 27-29, and 66-71. 
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Vacuum tubes through World War II were almost exclusively used in analog services, 
particularly in amplifying and oscillation circuits. Electronic digital circuits existed, however. W. H. 
Eccles and F. W. Jordan co-invented the first electronic digital circuit in 1919.* It consisted of two 
triodes interconnected so that the plate of each fed the grid of the other, resulting in only one tube 
conducting at a time.10 Eccles and Jordan called their invention a trigger relay, because the two tubes 
reversed states when triggered by an outside pulse. The formerly conducting tube became non­
conducting and vice versa. That is, the states of the tubes flip-flopped when triggered, and for that 
reason such circuits popularly came to be called flip-flops. The flip-flop and related circuits were 
inherently binary memory devices but could be chained together in stages to form counters, 
something like an odometer. In the early 1930s, C. E. Wynn-Williams began constructing "scale of 
two" counters from flip-flops for experiments in physics 11 Cosmic ray counters using such counters 
received much attention in the 1930s.12 
Of numerous efforts to construct electronic computing circuits before the war, most involved 
variations of flip-flop counters. A main impediment to the electronic digital computer was not so 
much creating an effective counter, as how to incorporate the devices into a machine of reasonable 
size and complexity. With the deep pockets of the U.S. Army opened for them, Eckert and Mauchly 
ignored those concerns and in the ENIAC produced a computer with limited capabilities or 
technological influence and no commercial value. 
Eckert perfected a decade counter from ten flip-flops as the essential element of the ENIAC. 
The counter needed ten flip-flops because the ENIAC computed with decimal numbers. Each flip-
flop in the decade counter represented a decimal digit, one through ten, and only one flip-flop of the 
ten was "set " (in the active position) at any time. Each new pulse advanced the counter one stage by 
disengaging the active flip-flop and setting the next. The ENIAC had twenty accumulators that 
performed arithmetic and served as memory, and each accumulator contained ten such decade 
9 W. H. Eccles and F. W. Jordan. "A Trigger Relay Utilising Three-Electrode Thermionic Vacuum 
Tubes," The Radio Review 1 (December 1919), 143-146. 
10 Arthur W Burks, "Electronic Computing Circuits of the ENIAC," Proceedings of the I.R.E. 35, 
no. 8 (August 1947), 758. 
11 C. E. Wynn-Williams, "A Thyratron 'Scale of Two' Automatic Counter," Proceedings of the 
Royal Society of London, Series A, 136 (June 1932). 312-324. 
u Brian Randell. ed.. The Origins of Digital Computers: Selected Papers, 3rd ed. (New York: 
Springer-Verlag, 1982), 293. 
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counters. ^  That gave the ENIAC its read-write memory capacity of twenty ten-digit numbers. 
Atanasoff experimented with scale-of-two counters through the last months of 1937. He got 
them to work but not reliably enough for a computer. Why the counters did not function better is 
unclear, but may lie in his application rather than the counters. Eckert and Mauchly deliberately 
patterned the accumulators of the ENIAC on a mechanical calculator. That is. an ENIAC 
accumulator functioned electronically like the common calculators did mechanically. Atanasoff 
considered mimicking mechanical calculators but wanted greater capabilities.14 Foremost among 
those, he recognized need for a larger memory. He therefore separated the memory from the 
arithmetic unit, permitting not only a memory of greater capacity but also overall flexibility. For 
example, a distinct memory could easily be structured as multiple memories, hierarchically 
arranged.15 Moreover, where mechanical calculators and the ENIAC acted on digits in parallel. 
Atanasoff chose sequential transfer of digits from the memory to the arithmetic unit. 
Sequential calculation with digits, Arthur Burks believed, may have been the source of 
difficulties that Atanasoff encountered with scale-of-two counters. Burks received a doctorate in 
philosophy before going to the University of Pennsylvania as an instructor of electrical engineering. 
He then became a principal designer of the ENIAC. In fact, he first heard of Atanasoff while 
assisting Eckert and Mauchly but thought little of it. Years later, Burks investigated the ABC after 
his interest became piqued by the Honeywell trial. Despite loyalty to the ENIAC and initial 
skepticism, he found that the ABC was indeed the first electronic digital computer. With his wife, 
Alice. Burks published The First Electronic Computer, providing a detailed description of the ABC 
and its operation. Based on his study of the ABC and long experience, Burks concluded that scale-of-
two counters simply did not lend themselves to the use Atanasoff attempted to make of them.16 
Burks. "Electronic Computing Circuits of the ENIAC," 757-759 and 763; Arthur W. Burks, "Super 
Electronic Computing Machine." Electronic Industries (July 1946). 64; Arthur W. Burks, and Alice 
R. Burks. "The ENIAC: First General-Purpose Electronic Computer," Annals of the History of 
Computing 3, no. 4 (October 1981), 348-349. 
14 Atanasoff, "Advent of Electronic Digital Computing," 239; John V. Atanasoff, transcript of 
interview with Henry S. Tropp, Smithsonian Institution, 24 April 1972, 21-24. Smithsonian. 
John V. Atanasoff, transcript of interview with Bonnie Kaplan. Smithsonian Institution. 10 August 
1972. 3. Smithsonian. 
16 Alice R. Burks and Arthur W Burks. The First Electronic Computer: The Atanasoff Story (Ann 
Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press. 1988), v-vi and 18-19. 
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Incidentally, flip-flops are another of the fundamental electronic circuits and continue to be 
important. They are still used in computers, in fact, particularly as fast-acting elements in registers.17 
Development of a reliable electronic digital counter was but one of the fundamental 
computer-related problems Atanasoff faced in late 1937. He also could not decide on a number base. 
Computing with binary, or base-2, numbers seems natural today, but that is because binary numbers 
match perfectly with digital circuitry and combinational logic. Before Atanasoff and others 
introduced those concepts, decimal, or base-10, numbers had overwhelming appeal. All the desktop 
calculators and EAM machines used decimal numbers. Decimal digital computers continued to be 
built through the 1950s, particulaily for accounting applications, but also including the LARC 
supercomputer completed by Sperry Rand in I960.18 Atanasoff defined many basic characteristics of 
electronic digital computing, including internal binary operations. Even so, concepts inherent to the 
ABC became universal only after considerable subsequent debate and experimentation. 
Mathematician that he was. Atanasoff recognized advantages to bases besides decimal or 
even binary. He understood that the selection of a base involved compromises. Higher bases offered 
compactness; that is, need for fewer digits to represent numbers, and Atanasoff considered bases to 
one hundred. On the other hand, lower bases stood out for ease of arithmetic operations. Atanasoff 
calculated that e. the natural base equal to approximately 2.7183, should permit fastest computations, 
but of course, a computer number base should be an integer.19 Atanasoff studied the matter at length 
before deciding that binary was best overall, allowing over 37 percent greater efficiency than 
decimal.20 Even so, he expected resistance if he selected anything but decimal.21 
17 Editors of Electronics, An Age of Innovation, 178-179; David A Patterson and John L. Hennessy. 
Computer Organization and Design: The Hardware / Software Interface (San Francisco: Morgan 
Kaufmann, 1994), B21-B24. 
18 LARC is an acronym for Livermore Automatic Research Computer. Charles J. Bashe, et al.. 
IBM's Early Computers (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MTT Press, 1986), 439. 
19 John V. Atanasoff, "Computing Machine for the Solution of large Systems of Linear Algebraic 
Equations," August 1940: reprinted in Brian Randell, ed.. The Origins of Digital Computers: Selected 
Papers, 3rd ed. (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1982), 317-318; Atanasoff. interview with Kaplan. 10 
August 1972. 12-16. 
20 Four binary digits are needed to represent the number ten in decimal. However, four binary digits 
are capable of representing numbers up to the decimal sixteen. Thus, a decimal computer using 
binary elements wastes six of sixteen possible alternatives. See Norbert Wiener. I am a 
Mathematician: The Later Life of a Prodigy (Garden City, New York: Doubleday. 1956). 236-237. 
In fact. Atanasoff continued to consider decimal computers himself. Atanasoff. interview with 
Kaplan. 10 August 1972. 21-22; Atanasoff, interview with Tropp, 24 April 1972, 11-13. 
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The issues of number base, memory medium, and whether the computer should be electrical 
or mechanical had to be considered together. For example, a mechanical computer with a base higher 
than two might use sliding or rotating memory elements that could be latched into any of a number of 
positions equal to the base. Alternatively, binary elements could be combined in sets equal to the 
number base, just as ten flip-flops could be fashioned into a decade counter.22 As a mechanical 
binary element, Atanasoff thought of something like a toy spring-loaded clicker that could be toggled 
from one stable position to the other.23 As an electromechanical possibility, he considered a. "moving 
reed like the armature of a polarized relay, moved by electromagnetic action." He also thought of 
vacuum tubes and capacitors.24 
Actually, magnetic elements had greatest appeal. Atanasoff got the idea from Valdemar 
Poulsen.25 a Danish physicist who in 1893 invented the first magnetic storage device, the 
telegraphone. Its purpose was to record telephone conversations on steel piano wire. The 
telegraphone worked well, except it produced low volume sound in those days before vacuum-tube 
amplification.26 Besides magnetic wire, Clifford Berry recalled that he and Atanasoff had "seriously 
considered using magnetic drums, but... abandoned this approach because of anticipated low signal 
voltage."27 Whether magnetic drums, discs, or wire, Atanasoff and Berry decided they could not 
afford the expense of amplification.28 
Thus, as things stood in late 1937, Atanasoff had a desperate need for a high-capacity 
computer and a tangle of ideas "rattling around" in his mind of how such a machine might work, but 
which had failed to jell into a coherent whole. Things came to a head one day in particular. That 
afternoon. Atanasoff met with some of his students, including probably Philip Hart and Charles 
Thome, to discuss the computational impediments to their work. He went home for dinner and 
returned to his office determined to make the decisions necessary to build a computer. He sat 
~ Atanasoff. "Advent of Electronic Digital Computing," 237-239. 
23 Atanasoff. interview with Tropp. 24 April 1972, 16-17; Honeywell v. Sperry Rand, United States 
District Court. District of Minnesota. Fourth Division. Civil Action File No. 4-67 Civil 138, 
^Transcript of Proceedings." 1.695. ISU. Parks, "John Vincent Atanasoff Papers" (box 43). 
"
4 Atanasoff. "Computing Machine for the Solution of large Systems of Linear Algebraic Equations." 
318. 
25 Atanasoff. "Advent of Electronic Digital Computing." 231 and 258. 
26 
"Poulsen Telegraphone." Scientific American 83, no. 12 (22 September 1900), 181. 
~
7 Clifford E. Berry, copy of letter to R. K. Richards. 12 July 1963. ISU, Parks, "John Vincent 
Atanasoff Papers " (box 25. folder 23). 
28 Atanasoff. interview with Kaplan. 10 August 1972. 27-28 and 37; Atanasoff, interview with 
Kaplan, 23 August 1972, 63-64; Honeywell, "Transcript of Proceedings," 1,733. 
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nervously at his desk and attempted to harness his mind to the effort but no answers came." 
Atanasoff himself best described events as follows: 
Well, I remember that the winter of 1937 was a desperate one for me because I had this 
problem and I had outlined my objectives but nothing was happening, and as the winter 
deepened, my despair grew and I have told you about the kind of items that were rattling 
around in my mind and we come to a day in the middle of winter when I went out to the 
office intending to spend the evening trying to resolve some of these questions and I was in 
such a mental state that no resolution was possible. I was just unhappy to an extreme, and at 
that time I did something that I had done on such occasions, that I used to do on such 
occasions—1 don't do it anymore—I went out to my automobile, got in and started driving 
over the good highways of Iowa at a high rate of speed. 
I remember the pavement was clean and dry, and I was forced to give attention to my 
driving, and as a consequence of that. I was less nervous, and I drove that way for several 
hours. Then I sort of became aware of my surroundings. I had, of course, been aware of the 
road before, but then I became aware of where I was and I had reached the Mississippi River, 
starting from Ames and was crossing the Mississippi River into Illinois at a place where there 
are three cities, one of which is Rock Island. 
I drove into Illinois and turned off the good highway into a little road, and went into a 
roadhouse there which had bright lights. It was extremely cold and I took off my overcoat. I 
had a very heavy coat, and hung it up, and sat down and ordered a drink, and as the delivery 
of the drink was made, I realized that I was no longer so nervous and my thoughts turned 
again to computing machines. 
Now, I don't know why my mind worked then when it had not worked previously, 
but things seemed to be good and cool and quiet. There were not many people in the tavern, 
and the waitress didn't bother me particularly with repetitious offers of drinks. I would 
suspect that I drank two drinks perhaps, and then I realized that thoughts were coming good 
and I had some positive results. 
During this evening in the tavern, I generated within my mind the possibility of the 
regenerative memory. I called it 'jogging' at that time. I'm thinking about the condensers for 
memory units, and the fact that the condensers would regenerate their own state, so their state 
would not change with time. If they were in the plus state, for instance, they would stay in 
the plus state; or, if they were in the negative state, they would stay in the negative state. 
They would not blink off to zero. Or if you used two positive charges, they would retain their 
individual identity and would not leak across to each other. 
During the same evening. I gained an initial concept of what is called today the logic 
circuits ' That is a non-ratcheting approach to the interaction between two memory units, or. 
as I called them in those days, abaci' ... I visualized a black box at that time but not the 
inner workings. There would be a black box, and a state of abacus 1 would pass into the box 
and the state of abacus 2 would pass into the box, and the box would then yield the correct 
results on output terminals. And sometime late in the evening I got in my car and drove 
home at a slower rate.30 
Atanasoff retold this story many times of how the ideas for the ABC came together while he 
"
9 John V. Atanasoff, New Market, Maryland, transcript of interview with Henry S. Tropp. 1 May 
1972. 75-76. Smithsonian. 
30 Honey well. "Transcript of Proceedings," 1.700-1,703. 
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sat in a madhouse in Illinois and nursed a drink, or "maybe two," of bourbon and soda one bitter cold 
winter evening.31 A couple of notes are in order. First, Atanasoff was an unusually aggressive driver 
and Iowa had no speed limit. Partial to V-8 Fords (also preferred by gangster John Dillinger for 
making a quick getaway). Atanasoff loved to drive fast while whipping in and out of traffic to pass. 
He found it therapeutic.32 In the days before seatbelts, all passengers could do. including his children 
being raced across town to school, was spread their legs to brace themselves and to hang on for dear 
life.3"1 One hapless passenger recalled Atanasoff telling him that he liked to drive so fast that if he 
took his mind off the road for a moment he would die. They were barreling down the highway at 
breakneck speed at the time.34 The point is that his mode of driving to Illinois, in which he traveled 
east an estimated 189 miles at night over a two-lane highway and through numerous towns in less 
than three hours, was not unusual.35 Second, as to when he returned home, Atanasoff recalled that it 
was "well towards daylight, if not daylight, when I got back. I spent the night at it."36 That, too, was 
not exceptional. He often spent the night, or its better part, working. 
To reiterate what Atanasoff accomplished in the madhouse, he made four decisions difficult 
to overestimate in importance. First, his computer would be electronic. Second, internal arithmetic 
would be conducted with binary numbers. Third, he decided to use capacitors, which he called 
condensers, as memory elements. Capacitors had the advantage that signals from them could be fed 
directly into vacuum tubes without intermediate amplification. However, a capacitor looses its charge 
in a few minutes or less, so it needs frequent recharging. Atanasoff used the term jogging for 
recharging, also called regeneration or refreshing. Thus, he decided to retain data in memory through 
periodic jogging. 
31 John V. Atanasoff, transcript of interview with Henry Halladay, et al., Dorsey, Marquait, 
Windhorst, West and Halladay, 9 July 1968, 17. ISU. Parks, "John Vincent Atanasoff Papers" (box 
32, folder 5). 
3
" Atanasoff. interview with Tropp, 1 May 1972, 75-76; Honeywell v. Sperry Rand, United States 
District Court, District of Minnesota. Fourth Division. Civil Action File No. 4-67 Civil 138, 
"Deposition of Dr. John V. Atanasoff," 1,073. ISU, Parks, "John Vincent Atanasoff Papers" (box 
31. folder 1). 
33 Joanne Gather, Laguna Miguel, California, tape-recorded interview over telephone with Paul 
Mobley, 1 July 1998. 
34 Robert M. Stewart, Ames, Iowa, tape-recorded interview with Paul Mobley, 14 November 1997. 
35 Atanasoff. interview with Halladay, et al., 9 July 1968. 18 and 25. 
36 Honeywell. "Deposition of Dr. John V. Atanasoff," 1,072. 
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Finally, and most nebulously, the computer would operate by "direct logical action."37 
Exactly how logical action might work, Atanasoff did not know.38 He simply imagined a logic circuit 
as a "black box," with details to be formulated later.39 More fundamentally, he imagined the black 
box as a human brain: "it is a black box into which go various sensory signals and which is capable of 
remembering previous sensory signals. Out of this black box came conclusions derived from the 
signals, both present and past.**10 He had considerable flexibility in design of the black box. since he 
had separated the arithmetic unit from the memory. Moreover, he could forget scale-of-two counters, 
because he now envisioned a superior method of computing. 
Scientists speak of "eureka" moments of penetrating insight, and no doubt Atanasoff had one 
that night. However, during a deposition he corrected a lawyer who commented on his "flash of 
genius." It was no such thing, Atanasoff admonished and continued: "I don't really much believe in 
genius. I believe in ditch digging and a lot of hard work. "41 His point was that, although the 
concepts for the ABC came together in the bar, he had actually been mulling them over separately for 
a long time. Reflecting back on the decisions years later, he elaborated: "I do not suppose that the 
actual decisions were made there (in the madhouse); they must have been latent in my mind, coming 
to incisive action there. I now knew how I would get ahead, even though I might change any of the 
four decisions. In the end, I accepted them all."42 
Actually, Atanasoff continued to fret over his key decisions for months before finally 
accepting them. If he had put in years of ditch digging before a coherent structure of a computer at 
last occurred to him in the tavern, it took months more hard labor in planning before he embarked on 
construction. Unfortunately, there are few extant records of Atanasoff s computer-related activities 
between the night in the Illinois tavern and spring 1939, when he first requested funds from ISC to 
begin the ABC. Atanasoff certainly spent time considering the details of the electronic logic circuits; 
that is. what was to go into the black box. Preparing for the Honeywell trial. Atanasoff recalled he 
37 Atanasoff, "Advent of Electronic Digital Computing," 240 and 242. 
38 Nor could Atanasoff say where he had gotten the idea of computation through logical action. 
Strictly speaking, he did not claim the concept, per se, as original to him. Atanasoff, interview with 
Kaplan. 10 August 1972. 1-4. 
39 John V. Atanasoff. New Market. Maryland, transcript of interview with Henry S. Tropp, 11 May 
1972, 132-135. Smithsonian. 
40 John Vincent Atanasoff. transcript of interview with Henry Halladay and Charles Call. 20 
September 1968. 9. ISU. Parks, "Henry L. Hanson Papers" (box 2, folder 7). 
4
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might have been ready to start fabrication sometimes in 1938. Upon inquiring informally about 
funding, however, he had found none available that year.43 
In 1940, at the request of Atanasoff. George Gross, a former student, wrote a "resume" as 
evidence of conception of the ABC 44 Gross summarized what he knew of ABC-related activities 
from about 1935, when he first remembered Atanasoff discussing a need for a "linear equation 
solver." He agreed that most concepts for the ABC had come together by end of 1938. although he 
could recall no discussion of vacuum tubes in a computing machine until probably 1939.45 
In any case, in March 1939, Atanasoff formally approached the Iowa State College Council 
on Research for funding. His letter read as follows: 
Gentlemen: 
For the mathematical treatment of many practical problems, one requires the solution 
of systems of linear simultaneous algebraic equations. As three examples of such problems 
of continual interest to investigators on our campus, one may mention, (1) Electrical circuit 
analysis, (2) Approximate solution of the differential equations of mathematical physics with 
special emphasis on their technological applications, (3) Multiple correlation in statistics. 
The theory and method of solution of such systems is well known and, if the number of 
unknowns is small (the number of equations is generally equal to the number of unknowns) 
the solution presents no difficulty. However, the satisfactory treatment of many problems, 
the three mentioned above, for instance, frequently requires the use of many unknowns. 
Since the time of solution of such a system varies roughly as the cube of the number of 
unknowns the solution of the larger systems becomes extremely arduous. 
About six years ago, I started to think about the possibility of mechanizing this 
solution. After I had succeeded in forming a rough outline of the process necessary, I 
attempted to realize this process by using the computational capacity of the punched card 
tabulating equipment. I finally abandoned this attempt because it would require considerable 
changes in the machines themselves which are leased to the user on a basis that would not 
permit such changes and because even the large computational capacity of these machines is 
not high enough. The construction, from the beginning, of a machine to perform necessary 
functions seemed too involved for successful completion with the means at hand. 
However, about two years ago I came to realize that computing machines can be 
much simplified by changing from the use of numbers to the base 10 to the use of numbers to 
the base 2. Further study has reinforced this point of view and it now seems possible to build 
into a small machine of perhaps the size and intricacy of a Monroe a computational capacity 
over twice that of the 8 bank punched card tabulation. This would be, as far as I am aware, 
the most powerful computing machine in existence and would furnish a direct and 
satisfactory method of solving simultaneous linear equations. 
4j Atanasoff, interview with Halladay. et al.. 9 July 1968. 55. 
44 J. V. Atanasoff, copy of letter to George L. Gross, Department of Mathematics. A&M College of 
Texas. 2 August 1940. ISU. Parks. "John Vincent Atanasoff Papers" (box 25. folder 9). 
45 George L. Gross, letter to J. V. Atanasoff. 19 August 1940. ISU, Parks. "John Vincent Atanasoff 
Papers" (box 23, folder 12). 
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While the basic idea of this machine is original. I have made careful calculations and 
it will work. Therefore. I wish to request a grant of $450 for a research fellow in physics to 
work on the plan and $200 for materials and mechanical assistance.46 
This memorandum is helpful in summarizing events to date but less so in understanding 
subsequent developments. Even Atanasoff could not completely explain what he had meant when 
asked about the memorandum by lawyers preparing for the Honeywell trial. For instance, it is not 
clear why he asked for only $650. far too little to build the ABC. More intriguing is how he thought 
he could create a computer the size of a Monroe, a relatively small desktop calculator, with twice the 
power of a large tabulator. 
Part of the answer is that $650 was the amount of money ISC could provide, not what 
Atanasoff needed. Furthermore, he may not have been requesting funding for the ABC but for a 
prototype to prove the underlying concepts. As it happened, he and Berry built a prototype that was a 
smaller and simpler version of the ABC. Atanasoff originally had in mind a different prototype, 
however, one to calculate pi to several hundred places. Considerable computational power would 
have been needed, and Atanasoff recalled that he had planned the pi calculator to be about the size of 
a Monroe.47 However, evidence suggests that the Research Council understood the money was for a 
prototype as built.48 
Finally, nowhere in the memorandum did Atanasoff mention electronics. Gross may not have 
been fully aware of Atanasoff s progress,49 but after his trip to the madhouse in Illinois, and 
subsequently abandoning scale-of-two counters. Atanasoff worked out most of the problems of 
computing with vacuum tubes and logical action. He documented that transition in thinking in a 1940 
manuscript as follows: 
The first plans made were to use the circuit of the scale-of-two counters but after months of 
experimental work this idea was abandoned because of the inherent instability of the circuits. 
At times these circuits could be made to work but obscure factors strongly influenced their 
operation. At last the writer hit upon another type of circuit that in the end proved very stable 
and entirely satisfactory in other ways. This circuit operates upon new principles in the 
computing art, principles that are rather analogous to the function of the human brain in 
mental calculation. The circuit takes cognizance of what is in a given abacus (memory) 
element, what is to be added into or subtracted from the element, and from a memory device 
it receives a signal indicating carry over from the previous place. Having been taught by a 
man with a soldering iron it selects the right answer and replaces what is in the counter by 
46 J. V. Atanasoff. memorandum to the Iowa State College Research Council, 24 March 1939. ISU, 
Parks, "John Vincent Atanasoff Papers" (box 26, folder 4). 
47 Atanasoff. interview with Halladay. et al., 9 July 1968.41. 51. 55, and 61. 
48 J. V. Atanasoff, copy of letter to E. W. Lindstrom. Chairman, Council on Research. 9 April 1940. 
ISU. Parks. "John Vincent Atanasoff Papers" (box 26. folder 4). 
49 Atanasoff. interview with Tropp. 1 May 1972, 86. 
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this result. The computing mechanism, being a vacuum-tube circuit, operates at such speed 
that it can be used over and over again to add the various digits, and additional places only 
require the use of additional abacus elements, that is, additional condensers. At the same 
time the over-all complexity and cost of the computing machine is greatly reduced.50 
This passage reflects Atanasoff s colorful language. For example, when he wrote of a circuit 
"taught by a man with a soldering iron," he meant that it could be designed and wired to perform 
particular logical operations. Moreover, the passage further emphasizes that, like von Neumann. 
Atanasoff thought of the brain as the model for a computer. In fact, Atanasoff and Berry sometimes 
referred to the main computing modules of the ABC, formally known as add-subtract mechanisms, or 
ASMs, as "electronic brains." Finally, Atanasoff realized that once he conceived of computing by 
logical action, he had no further need to consider flip-flop counters because of the advantages of the 
former for reduction of complexity and costs. 
One reason Atanasoff did not use the word electronics may have been that it was not yet 
common. That is, electronic circuits were not yet recognized as distinct from electrical ones, 
although his memorandum did not discuss electrical circuits either. Apparently another reason 
Atanasoff did not mention electronics is that he hoped to avoid detailed discussions. A computer 
based on scale-of-two counters would have been a bold undertaking, but he had something more 
radical planned, and even he had doubts that vacuum tubes could add and subtract through switching 
action. He believed his idea theoretically sound but nonetheless could not be satisfied with anything 
less than working proof. As Atanasoff put it. speaking of those anxious months before the prototype 
proved the concepts: "We had a feeling, an unhappy feeling, about vacuum tubes and we just had to 
see the thing really work ... It wasn't only to wipe out my fear, it was to wipe out the fear of every 
man."51 
Atanasoff s funding memorandum fulfilled its purpose despite its seeming vagueness, and 
about two months later the Research Council awarded him the full amount of his request.52 When 
Atanasoff returned a letter of thanks several days later, he had named the project, "Calculating 
Machines for the Solution of Linear Systems of Equations." More important, he mentioned he had 
50 Atanasoff, "Computing Machine for the Solution of large Systems of Linear Algebraic Equations," 
318-319. 
51 John V. Atanasoff, transcript of interview with Henry Halladay, et al., Dorsey, Marquait. 
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already found "a very promising student to assume this fellowship."53 Indeed he had. as "one of the 
best things that could have happened to the project," Atanasoff had hired Berry.54 
Atanasoff had asked Harold Anderson, a professor of electrical engineering, to suggest a 
student who might assist with the ABC Atanasoff wanted someone capable of grasping the new 
electronic arts involved, but who also had practical electrical and mechanical skills. Without 
hesitation. Anderson recommended Berry, a graduating senior in electrical engineering planning to 
continue for a Master's degree. Upon meeting Berry a day or two later, Atanasoff concurred.55 
The early lives of Atanasoff and Berry paralleled in certain aspects; notably, both were eldest 
children of largely self-taught electrical engineers. Clifford Berry's parents grew up on neighboring 
farms near Gladbrook, Iowa. His father. Fred Berry, completed tenth grade before dropping out of 
school to take employment with the local telephone company. He left for St. Paul. Minnesota, and 
found a job in electrical construction. After a few years, he returned to Gladbrook and the telephone 
company and married Grace Strohm. Cliff was born two years later on 19 April 1918. Two brothers 
and a sister followed. By his eldest son's birth, Fred Berry had opened a small appliance and repair 
business. That made it easier to impart his enthusiasm for electrical devices, especially radio. Cliff 
built his first ham radio at about age eleven or twelve and became an avid radio hobbyist. 
An all-American boy. Cliff was an Eagle Scout and assistant scoutmaster. He also excelled 
in school, like Atanasoff. He skipped fourth grade and graduated from high school at the top of his 
class at age fifteen. Advanced beyond his years in some ways, he was nonetheless exceedingly quiet 
and shy. so his mother kept him in high school an extra year to mature socially. The murder of his 
father had not helped. The family moved to Marengo. Iowa, when Fred Berry became a division 
manager for the Iowa Power Company. A fired ex-employee shot and killed him when Cliff was not 
yet fourteen. Cliff thereafter took over many family duties formerly handled by his father. His 
youngest brother said he filled those responsibilities "admirably."56 The widow and her four children 
53 Note that Atanasoff used the word machines in his title and not machine. J. V. Atanasoff. letter to 
E. W. Lindstrom, Chairman. Council on Research, 23 May 1939. ISU, Parks. "John Vincent 
Atanasoff Papers" (box 25. folder 24). 
54 Atanasoff, "Advent of Electronic Digital Computing," 241. 
55 J. V. Atanasoff, transcript of interview with H. Tropp. Smithsonian Institute, 7 June 1972, 177-
178; Atanasoff, interview with Kaplan. 17 July 1972. 1. 
56 Keith D. Berry, Consulting Micropaleontologist, Concord, California, copy of letter to Robert W. 
Stafford. 16 August 1997. Engineering Services Group, Ames Laboratory. See Atanasoff Berry 
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moved to Ames when Cliff entered ISC in 1935. Cliff worked part time at Gulliver Radio Service to 
help support the family.17 
Atanasoff and Berry had different personalities despite whatever similarities in backgrounds 
they shared. Characteristics of the two can perhaps be epitomized by the observation that while 
Atanasoff rubbed some people the wrong way. everyone liked Berry. A student who helped with the 
ABC recalled that Berry, not surprisingly, had greater patience.58 Atanasoff was all business, 
although it is unfair to say he had no sense of humor. Berry, even if normally quiet, had a lively 
sense of humor and streak of mischievousness. 
As an example. Berry loved classical music. Furthermore, he happened to be dating 
Atanasoff s secretary. Jean Reed. Reed had lived most of her life with her widowed mother in Ames 
and graduated from ISC in home economics. She taught high school for a year in a nearby small 
town, but returned home because she found teaching did not appeal to her. She then went to work as 
a secretary in the ISC English Department and met Berry on a blind date to a picnic in October 1941. 
She found him waiting the following morning in front of her office to ask for another date. The 
position with Atanasoff opened up because of Project X. the secret NDRC project By then she and 
Berry were seeing each other regularly. So she might enjoy the records he played in his basement 
alcove workshop. Berry installed a remote speaker in her desk. However, since Reed shared an office 
with Atanasoff, who did not like classical music, she had the speaker on only in his absence. The 
office had to be kept locked because of files for Project X, so she hastily turned off the music at the 
sound of a key in the lock. Atanasoff never caught on. as far as she knew. 
Whatever their differences. Berry, no less than Atanasoff, was an intense and deeply 
intelligent man. Berry won widespread recognition for his electronics skills, and graduate students 
went to him for help, which he gave freely. Some people who learned of the ABC after Berry became 
involved assumed it embodied mostly his genius, so capable was he and so completely did he take 
over responsibilities. Atanasoff stayed more active than those people understood, but largely behind 
the scenes. Notably, he more than Berry maintained vendor contacts and searched for funding. 
Reed, for one, saw Berry as the true project leader. She had a pot of coffee ready each day at 
10:00 a.m.. and Atanasoff and the students he employed gathered in his and her office to talk over 
their progress. She remembered Project X taking most of the discussions. Berry participated as an 
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electronics expert, although other students had more involvement. When conversation at last moved 
to the ABC, however. Berry took over and even Atanasoff listened.59 
Reed married Berry, so she might be suspected of bias. Others had a similar impression, 
however, including a person intimately familiar with the ABC. Robert Mather began on the project 
scavenging parts from old equipment to reuse. One day. Berry handed him a copy of a manuscript 
written by Atanasoff that provided a general description of the ABC but included electronics details. 
If he could master those details. Berry told him. he could have more interesting assignments. Mather 
passed the test and did much of the wiring on the ABC, taking his instructions and wiring diagrams 
from Berry. Mather saw "JV" occasionally, but Berry clearly worked with minimum supervision. As 
far as he could tell. Atanasoff Berry Computer is a fair name, implying as it does something of a fifty-
fifty attribution. Mather, who went on to earn a Ph.D. degree in physics from the University of 
California at Berkeley, recognized Atanasoff as highly intelligent, but so was Berry. Either man. he 
believed, could have "generated any of the key concepts" in the ABC. Furthermore. Mather regarded 
both men as friends.60 
Atanasoff and Berry designed the ABC, but Gross and William Mercer, another student. 
made initial calculations for the decimal-binary conversion table,61 and Mather figured out some 
minor circuits.62 Berry had responsibility for construction, doing some himself but also supervising 
the craftsmen and students who helped. They numbered six or more. For much of the project. Berry 
was on the books as half-time help, but Reed and Atanasoff remembered him spending far more than 
twenty hours per week on the ABC. He kept a cot near the computer and often worked late and 
stayed overnight. 
Atanasoff best knew the extent of Berry's contributions to the ABC, of course. He had great 
respect for Berry, as Berry did for him. Atanasoff did not consider Berry simply another student or 
employee but a fellow scientist of extraordinary ability who gave him "great emotional advantage." 
Although the outlines of the ABC had been formulated by the time Berry came onboard, he 
59 Jean Berry, Eagle River, Alaska, tape-recorded interview made over the telephone with Paul 
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contributed "many details" important to the ultimate success of the project. In fact, for details 
derived after Berry began work. Atanasoff "did some, but Berry did more." Atanasoff trusted him 
completely, noting: if "Berry said, "This circuit is working." the circuit was working." Furthermore. 
Berry always operated the ABC. Atanasoff never did.63 
Two things stand out as evidence of Atanasoff s high regard for Berry. First, he decided that 
the computer he conceived and then built with Berry should be remembered as the Atanasoff Berry 
Computer. Second, he and Berry signed an indenture stipulating that Berry assist with filing a patent 
application. Berry also agreed to forfeit his right to file for claims independently. In return, he was to 
get 10 percent of all gross income that Atanasoff derived from the ABC. In fact. Atanasoff probably 
could have claimed all rights to the ABC had he chosen to do so. The underlying ideas were his. after 
all. and he was the professor and Berry the student. Furthermore, Atanasoff had to pay patenting and 
other legal fees, but the indenture specified that Berry's portion of income came free and clear.64 
Berry therefore would have received more than 10 percent of profits, had there been any. and indeed. 
Atanasoff anticipated that patenting costs could have been high. Berry therefore might actually have 
made more money than Atanasoff. All this suggests that Atanasoff credited Berry with a large role in 
the project 
Atanasoff wanted to start work immediately once Berry agreed to assist in spring 1939. He 
had by then roughed out the designs of the principal parts of the ABC. He had even built a 
functioning model of the spark units for input and output of binary data.65 He had to wait until fall for 
his grant to become available, however, so Berry worked meanwhile at the Ames Electrical Products 
Company.66 The men met several times over the summer to discuss the project and study the crude 
sketches Atanasoff made. Atanasoff claimed a small, cramped workspace in the basement of the 
6j Atanasoff. interview with Tropp. 7 June 1972. 175-184; Atanasoff. interview with Kaplan, 17 July 
1972. 1-6. 
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circa 22 November 1986. ISU. Parks. "Clark Mollenhoff Papers, 1968-1990" (box I. folder 6). 
140 
Physics Building, and construction of a prototype began mid-September based on his drawings. 
Berry did not contribute to the design of the prototype, although he helped select its components.67 
The prototype incorporated essential elements of the ABC but on a scale small enough for the 
entire unit to rest on a table. It contained eleven vacuum tubes, including five twin triodes and four 
pentodes, a five-element tube with two grids. The ASM of the prototype used eight of the tubes.68 
An old washing machine motor served as the timing mechanism and drove the memory. The memory 
consisted of a ten-inch Bakelite disk with fifty capacitors attached, twenty-five per side, arranged 
radially and equally spaced, except for a gap of sixty degrees to allow for certain control operations.69 
The prototype memory rotated at sixty revolutions per minute, the same rate as that in the ABC. 
Berry input data by touching the terminals of the capacitors with charged leads, or more conveniently, 
with a special "converter" he contrived. He read data using an oscilloscope or voltmeter.70 Besides 
integral mechanisms for data input and output, major components of the ABC missing from the 
prototype were a method for automatic conversions of decimal and binary numbers and a full 
complement of controls. 
Atanasoff and Berry completed the prototype well before Christmas, probably in November, 
although they began testing as early as October. Not only could the prototype do additions without 
error, the memory and associated circuits stored and regenerated information without glitches in 
twenty-four hour trials.71 Atanasoff wrote of the prototype to an acquaintance on December 7 as 
follows: "We began actual construction about September 15th and since that time have been able to 
put one of the 20 computing elements into operation. It works very well and the structure is so simple 
that I anticipate no difficulties other than financial ones in completing the machine (the ABC)."72 
As this statement suggests, Atanasoff had intended to incorporate components of the 
prototype into the ABC as part of one of twenty parallel-computing elements for solving equations 
67 Atanasoff. interviews with Halladay. et al.. 9 July 1968. 57-58 and 8-9, and 10 July 1968,48; 
Atanasoff. interview with Tropp, 1 May 1972. 91. 
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Indiana). " 244. 
69 Atanasoff. interview with Halladay. et al.. 9 July 1968, 39-40. 
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sets to nineteen unknowns. He and Berry had been planning for the ABC concurrently with 
construction of the prototype and spent much of their time during the fall researching possible 
components. However, the men gained confidence with the unqualified success of the prototype. 
They now recognized that electronic digital computers had potential beyond what they had 
envisioned.73 They therefore rethought the ABC. which was in fact already under construction. As 
one consequence, they did not reuse the prototype but disposed of it several months later when 
enough of the ABC was completed to allow its demonstration. They needed the space the prototype 
occupied.74 
As it were, Atanasoff and Berry maintained the original purpose of the ABC, but changed its 
design to increase the number of unknowns it could handle to twenty-nine. Thus, instead of twenty 
elements, it needed thirty, including one for equation constants. Furthermore, Atanasoff and Berry 
discovered they could use smaller capacitors than anticipated 75 and decided to mount them inside 
drums instead of on disks to save money and make the ABC more compact.76 The new capacitors 
also allowed redesign of the ASMs to contain fewer and different vacuum tubes77 After 
experimentation and research, the men selected the twin-triode 6C8G tube for its operating 
characteristics and compactness. Each ASM needed thirteen triodes, so they used seven of the 
vacuum tubes. One triode in each ASM therefore sat idle.78 The ABC contained several hundred 
vacuum tubes plus thirty thyratrons, a gas-filled tube used in the binary-card punch units.79 
The 6C8G was intended as a "receiver," or radio, tube,80 and thus not particularly suited to 
digital service. However, neither was any of the great variety of standard production tubes. In analog 
circuits, a vacuum tube needed a long, linear, and upward-sloping middle operating range so that the 
gain in output current at the anode corresponded closely to a widely varying input voltage at the grid. 
That is. a vacuum tube needed to become conductive upon reaching a cutoff grid signal and then 
73 Atanasoff, "Advent of Electronic Digital Computing." 242 and 247. 
74 Atanasoff. interview with Halladay. et al.. 10 July 1968, 16. 
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because, once conducting, current continued to flow until the signal voltage went to zero. Moreover, 
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allow proportionally more current to pass as the signal became more positive over a broad range. On 
the other hand, a vacuum tube in digital applications served best if it simply snapped on upon 
reaching a trigger voltage since there were only two of interest: high and low. A vacuum tube with a 
sharply vertical transitional range functioned best. Digital and analog applications thus demanded 
quite different tubes. It might seem that digital service was less exacting, but it proved more difficult 
to make vacuum tubes for it. No manufacturer did for years after World War II The problem drove 
IBM to design and manufacture its own tubes beginning in the late 1940s.81 
If finding satisfactory vacuum tubes posed a problem for Atanasoff and Berry, so did how to 
incorporate them into switching circuits. They were in uncharted territory. As a fundamental 
problem, the performances of tubes varied widely, even within the same type.82 Moreover, early 
electronic logic circuits, including those in the ABC, were composed of vacuum tubes wired into 
resister networks so that some grids had more than one input. This became known as majority 
logic.83 The maximum number of inputs to a vacuum tube grid was called fan-in. The maximum 
number of outputs from a plate was called fan-out. Majority logic simplified circuits and made 
particular sense when resisters were cheap and tubes expensive. The downside was decreased 
stability. An initially well-behaved majority logic circuit could become unreliable as resisters and 
tubes aged. That probably posed little problem for the ABC, operating as it did at 3,600 pulses per 
minute. Even so. Berry took pains to measure all resisters and carefully match them in parallel 
networks. As important, Atanasoff limited fan-in to three and fan-out to four.84 Thus, although Berry 
conceived of a theoretically sound ASM with just five twin-triode vacuum tubes, he and Atanasoff 
decided not to use it because of concerns about long-term stability.85 As it were, the ABC could have 
operated satisfactorily at higher speeds, but had it been run at anything like the clock rate of postwar 
computers its circuits might have failed. As computers became faster, combinational logic evolved to 
one input per vacuum tube grid. 
Atanasoff and Berry did not apply Boolean algebra to the design of logic circuits. It did not 
occur to them, although Atanasoff was familiar with it. Rather, they designed circuits intuitively, or 
81 Bashe. et al., IBM's Early Computers. 65-67. 
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84 Atanasoff. interview with Kaplan. 10 August 1972, 9; Burks and Burks, The First Electronic 
Computer. 40-43. 311. and 323. 
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as Atanasoff put it. "by main strength and awkwardness."86 While electronic circuits could be 
troublesome to design.87 the logic behind those in the ABC was not difficult, even if "hit and miss."88 
In fact, none of the early computer builders used Boolean algebra, even after Shannon's prewar work 
became generally known.89 In a lecture in 1946, Eckert explained why: "As a practical matter, 
circuits which are simple enough to be usable in practical machines, are usually so easily analyzed 
that recourse to Boolean algebra is not necessary." 90 Boolean algebra became important as 
combinational logic circuits gained complexity. Incidentally, combinational logic circuits are defined 
as those containing no memory elements. Boolean algebra cannot be used for logic circuits with 
memory, such as those with flip-flops.91 
Atanasoff and Berry built the prototype with whatever parts were convenient, but they 
intended the ABC for rigorous long-term duty. It and its components had to be considered carefully. 
For example, early in 1939 Atanasoff began investigating capacitors,92 normally low-cost and reliable 
electronic circuit components produced by the millions. Berry continued the inquiries through the 
fall93 and provided vendors with the following specifications: "small paper condensers ... (that) must 
lose due to internal leakage, not more than half their charge in ten seconds, or even more slowly, and 
further that they be relatively long-lived. Small physical size is of considerable importance."94 Many 
types of capacitors held sufficient charge for longer than ten seconds, as it turned out.95 However, 
Atanasoff and Berry substantially complicated the application by deciding to mount 1.600 capacitors 
inside each of two cylinders 8" diameter by 11" long.96 Worse, due to limited space, they proposed 
86 Atanasoff, interview with Tropp. 11 May 1972, 135-136. 
87 Burks and Burks. The First Electronic Computer. 294. 
88 Atanasoff. interview with Halladay. et al.. 10 July 1968. 57; Atanasoff. interview with Kaplan. 10 
August 1972. 5-6. 
89 Burks and Burks, The First Electronic Computer. 348. 
90 J. Presper Eckert, Jr.. "Types of Circuits—General," 18 July 1946; reprinted in The Moore School 
Lectures: Theory and Techniques for Design of Electronic Digital Computers, ed. Martin Campbell-
Kelly and Michael R. Williams (Cambridge. Massachusetts: MIT Press. 1985). 188. 
' Patterson and Hennessy. Computer Organization and Design, B4-B5. 
9* J V. Atanasoff, copy of letter to John E. Fast and Co., 5 January 1939. ISU, Parks. "John Vincent 
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93 Atanasoff, interview with Halladay. et al.. 9 July 1968, 10. 
94 For example. Clifford E. Berry, copy of letter to Comell-Dubilier Corporation, 28 September 1939. 
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using uncased capacitors.97 They nonetheless demanded that the capacitors maintain integrity for 
years.98 Vendors balked, noting as one did that the application did, "not come under our usual routine 
capacitor requirements."99 Another vendor warned that condensers, "unless properly sealed, will pick 
up moisture, thereby giving a short life."100 Atanasoff and Berry did install uncased capacitors but 
took precautions that satisfied the manufacturer, including packing them in wax and operating at low 
voltages. 
Excellent engineers, Atanasoff and Berry took little for granted and made reliability a 
primary consideration. They gave the ABC a conservative design to ensure its trouble-free operation. 
The small number of vacuum tubes and simplicity of circuits constituted a first defense against 
failures. The foremost worry was vacuum tube life, so Atanasoff and Berry designed circuits for 
lower-than-rated plate and filament voltages. Furthermore, they fabricated a test set that allowed 
them to "age" tubes and test ASMs under variable operating conditions before installation. As a 
consequence, tubes did not fail in the computer through many hours of testing.101 Moreover, they 
limited memory circuits to 10 percent of rated voltage to extend the life of capacitors. The supplier 
assured them that the condensers in the ABC should have functioned indefinitely.102 
The design for reliability included means for easy repairs, since all machines sooner or later 
experience breakdowns. To that end, Atanasoff and Berry installed two spare bands of capacitors 
inside each memory drum.103 As another example, the ASMs were built as small, identical modules 
that could be replaced quickly. 
On the other hand, Mather believed that the emphasis on keeping costs low came at some 
sacrifice of reliability. He noted specifically the dependence on cheap but transient student labor.104 
97 John V. Atanasoff, copy of letter to D. Howard, Aerovar (sic: Aerovox) Corporation, 21 December 
1939. ISU, Parks, "John Vincent Atanasoff Papers" (box 23, folder 7). 
98 Clifford E. Berry, copy of letter to D. Howard, Aerovox Corporation, 21 October 1939. ISU, 
Parks. "John Vincent Atanasoff Papers" (box 23, folder 7). 
99 G. V. Peck. P. R. Mai lory & Co., letter to J. V. Atanasoff, 15 December 1939. ISU, Parks, "John 
Vincent Atanasoff Papers" (box 23, folder 7). 
100 D. Howard. Aerovox Corporation, copy of letter to John V. Atanasoff, 28 December 1939. ISU. 
Parks. "John Vincent Atanasoff Papers" (box 23, folder 7). 
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As for Mather, himself a transient student, Atanasoff considered his skills in wiring, "comparable in 
quality to the wiring done by experts in the telephone fields."105 
Otherwise, the electromechanical clock system of the ABC might have given more problems 
than an electronic equivalent. In particular, the transfer of electronic signals by mechanical 
commutation seems likely to have been vulnerable to wear. With further consideration. Atanasoff 
regretted that he had not chosen stainless steel for wear points instead of brass.106 Brass is normally 
used in such applications but stainless steel has superior wear resistance. 
All in all. the ABC involved compromises that proved effective. Atanasoff wanted magnetic 
memory but settled on capacitors. He compromised on fan-in and fan-out of logic circuits. He 
considered an electronic clock but used instead an electric motor. He employed relays in some 
controls instead of vacuum tubes. He made the ABC special instead of general purpose. He 
compromised in each case to keep the project within time and money constraints. Yet. none of these 
decisions seriously hindered capabilities of the ABC to fulfill its purpose. For example, Atanasoff 
and Berry certainly could have built an electronic clock, but the major bottleneck would still have 
been the import and export of data, just like the ENIAC.107 Moreover, had the ABC been made 
general purpose, it would have undoubtedly weakened its capabilities to solve partial differential 
equations, given limitations in memory technologies and applied mathematics. The ENIAC is again a 
case in point. Even von Neumann preferred solving partial differential equations as sets of linear 
algebraic equations. The IAS computer did not immediately change that. 
Had Atanasoff and Berry the resources to expand the ABC into something like the NOL or 
IAS computers, it would have been worthwhile. The ABC already incorporated essential features of a 
true computer except for means of easy reprogramming. Nonetheless, the ABC had significant 
capabilities at an amazingly small cost. Atanasoff could have spent much more money and had little 
extra to show for it, just as with the ENIAC. By making sound engineering decisions, Atanasoff and 
Berry produced a groundbreaking computer that could fulfill essential needs, but that also provided 
the direction for continued innovation. 
105 Atanasoff. copy of letter to Morris, 27 April 1942. 
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The importance of vendors to engineering projects is often overlooked. They provide not 
only products but also expert advice on how the products can be used. For the ABC. Atanasoff not 
only got valuable information from suppliers, he received significant financial aid in the form of price 
breaks. In dealing with vendors, Atanasoff sometimes gave a brief account of the ABC, shrewdly 
hinted at prospects for future sales, which assumed that the ABC might be manufactured in large 
numbers, and led the vendor into making the connection. For example, he wrote one manufacturer 
"it is quite possible that machines of this type will have commercial applications. The manufacture of 
such machines using as they do large numbers of condensers would be of interest to you."108 Indeed 
it was. One representative responded that his company had great interest and wanted to cooperate in 
"every respect."109 Another vendor offered Atanasoff prices for capacitors that were, "somewhat less 
than we would usually quote under the circumstances, but if we could contribute in some way to your 
development, we would be pleased indeed."110 Despite such enthusiasm from several capacitor 
manufacturers, Atanasoff found only one willing to risk selling them uncased.111 
Directness better suited Atanasoff, of course. After asking for technical assistance from one 
resister manufacturer, he added: "we are building a complicated machine for which we will require 
600 or more resisters . .. While the machine we are building is designed for research purposes it may 
have some commercial application. I am wondering if you would care to assist Iowa State College in 
the construction of this machine to the extent of granting us lower prices than we can secure in the 
open wholesale market."112 
Atanasoff made a similar pitch to R. M. Bowie of Hygrade Sylvania Corporation, a vacuum 
tube manufacturer.113 Bowie subsequently arranged to sell him 6C8G vacuum tubes for forty-eight 
cents apiece, considerably below market price.114 Bowie then reminded Atanasoff: "Let us know 
when you get to the stage of commercialization and we shall be pleased to submit you an attractive 
quotation on tubes."115 Although not to that stage yet, Atanasoff let him know he had immediate need 
108 Atanasoff, copy of letter to Howard. 21 December 1939. 
109 Howard, copy of letter to Atanasoff, 28 December 1939. 
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111 Atanasoff, interview with Tropp, 11 May 1972. 143-144. 
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for additional tubes, asserting as a sweetener "If this machine (the ABC) is manufactured in any 
considerable number, the tube and condenser manufacturers stand to do a good business."116 
Atanasoff actually had a long acquaintance with Bowie, who took the first Ph D. degree in 
physics from ISC in 1933. Atanasoff did not hesitate asking for help from any vendor, however. 
After being solicited by Atanasoff, a representative of Raytheon Production Corporation responded 
that, "management is definitely interested in your work."117 Raytheon subsequently gave him one 
hundred 6C8G vacuum tubes.118 As another example, Atanasoff tempted IBM with a low-key, 
cryptic come on: "I believe we have some ideas that will ultimately prove useful in the computing 
art." He then asked to be allowed to purchase several hundred of a type of brush commonly used in 
EAM equipment.119 IBM shipped five hundred or so at no charge. In announcing the first shipment, 
Clement Ehret, Director of Market Research, indicated IBM's interest in the ABC. While unclear on 
whether it was a continuation of Atanasoff s earlier tabulator attachment project or an entirely new 
machine, Ehret noted that either way IBM hoped to learn more and witness a demonstration.120 
Support from industry contributed significant savings to the ABC. Scavenging parts from old 
equipment gave additional savings. Atanasoff estimated that a full-cost copy might have run $10,000 
to $15,000,121 instead of the $3,600 the ABC probably cost. 
The heart, or as Atanasoff preferred, the brains, of the ABC were thirty ASMs operated in 
parallel to solve simultaneous equations with up to twenty-nine unknowns using a variation of the 
already well-known Gaussian elimination method. The ABC dealt with two equations at a time to 
reduce the original square matrix to a triangular one ending in one equation and one unknown. 
Instead of solving for the unknown, the operator reversed the process and paired the last equation 
with one of the two prior equations in two unknowns. That resulted in a new equation with one 
116 J. V. Atanasoff, copy of letter to R. M. Bowie, Hygrade Sylvania Corporation, 19 June 1940. ISU, 
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different unknown, which was itself paired with a previous equation for further solution. The ABC 
continued working backwards until every unknown was isolated. 
To begin the solution of a system of equations, the operator used a standard IBM keypunch to 
record the original decimal coefficients into eighty-column IBM punch cards.122 Each coefficient 
could have fifteen or sixteen places. Thus, one card could hold five coefficients, and twenty-nine 
unknowns required six cards per equation. The punched cards were entered with a special decimal 
card reader. The ABC transformed the decimal numbers into their binary equivalents with a rotating 
drum incorporating a mechanical conversion table. The digital signals emanating from the table were 
printed into special cards with the binary spark-punch device. All coefficients for one equation fit 
into one binary card. 
After the operator converted the coefficients for all equations, the result was a stack of cards 
with charred spots representing binary numbers. The operator fed those back into the ABC using the 
binary card reader. The reading unit operated much like the punch but at a lower voltage, because its 
purpose was not to char the paper further, but to detect differences in resistance caused by the charred 
spots. The punching voltage could be as high as 5,000 volts, the reading voltage as little as one-
fourth that.123 The operator worked with two equations at a time, feeding them into the ABC, one 
after the other, and each was stored on one of the two memory drums. Each coefficient of forty-nine 
binary digits and a sign got stored as electrical charges in one of thirty-two bands of fifty capacitors 
each that were arranged around the circumference of each drum. Two bands per drum served as 
spares. 
The memory drums rotated at one revolution per second. The capacitors were connected at 
the surface of the drums to metal studs arranged precisely six degrees apart except for a gap of sixty 
degrees for control operations. Atanasoff referred to each band as an abacus and the memory drums 
as abaci. Metal brushes swept the studs with each rotation and transmitted stored numbers as 
sequential streams of binary voltages. The signals were either reentered in reenergized form through 
another set of brushes or routed to the ASMs to use in calculations with the number streams coming 
from the second memory drum. 
The operator selected a variable for elimination by inserting a plug to make electrical 
connections. All coefficients from one equation were then simultaneously added to (or subtracted 
l
~ Otherwise, the ABC used no major pre-manufactured components. Atanasoff, interview with 
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from, as appropriate) the corresponding coefficients in the second equation. The process occurred as 
many times as necessary to eliminate the designated variable. Remaining coefficients were then 
printed with the binary punch, and the next set of cards containing the variable fed into the ABC. 
And so on the process went until the designated variable had been eliminated from all equations. The 
operator then selected the next variable to eliminate until the set was finally reduced to one equation 
and one unknown. As noted, the operator then had the ABC work backwards to isolate the other 
unknowns. Final answers appeared as decimal readouts on a mechanical counter.124 
Much of the operation of the ABC was automatic but nonetheless involved enormous 
amounts of data throughput, first as decimal numbers, but mostly binary. Atanasoff developed the 
binary input and output units because IBM mechanisms were not available to him, but more 
important, because he wanted faster data throughput than possible with ordinary punched-card 
equipment.125 Berry chose the development of these units as the subject of a Master's thesis. For a 
thorough description of the design and operation of the ABC, see The First Electronic Computer by 
Burks and Burks. 
Construction of the ABC began in November 1939, although its design continued into 
summer and beyond.126 To get fabrication moving, Atanasoff estimated the ABC's ultimate size, 
purchased lengths of structural steel, and had a framework welded together, although it was not 
finished in all details until April. It amused Berry that Atanasoff built the framework before they 
really knew what needed to go into it. Others also found it amusing, and Atanasoff got kidded for 
flying by the seat of his pants in this instance. Considering Atanasoff, however, perhaps it should not 
be attributed to dumb luck that the framework turned out the perfect size.127 
Under Berry's supervision, and because of his "ease in working with materials," and because 
of his and Atanasoff s "smooth, and easy, and systematic cooperation,"128 the ABC came together 
faster than Atanasoff had expected. In June 1940. he made the following report: 
!*4 Atanasoff. interview with Kaplan, 23 August 1972, 32-46. 
125 Atanasoff, "Computing Machine for the Solution of large Systems of Linear Algebraic Equations," 
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Work on the computing machine as (sic) proceeded in a way that is very gratifying. 
Although we are still designing as well as building, the details of design for most of the 
machine are completed and a large fraction of these details have been tested in natural 
operation. Perhaps half of actual construction on the machine has been completed. During 
the summer, I have been having a full time assistant, Mr. Berry, who worked has (sic) half-
time research assistant on the project last year. He combines in a way that I have scarcely 
observed before, a high degree of mental dexterity and manipulative skill with a keen 
theoretical understanding.1"9 
The going was not all smooth, of course. As one setback, upon advice from a supplier's 
engineer, Atanasoff and Berry tried fabricating memory drums from cast Bakelite cylinders. They 
broke the first two cylinders while drilling holes in them. They purchased two more and cracked 
them the same way. Disgusted, Atanasoff disregarded the engineer's advice and bought two phenolic 
cylinders, that is, laminated paper impregnated with plastic resin, which worked fine.130 The drums 
were finished by mid-August, as were all thirty ASMs and associated controls that Atanasoff termed 
"holder-shifter-circuits."131 As indicated above, Atanasoff estimated that half of the ABC had been 
finished by June 1940, about seven months after starting. 
The downside of pushing ahead of schedule was that money became depleted faster. In 
January 1940, Atanasoff expressed his anxiety to a friend: "I am faced with the necessity of raising 
more money. My hopes are that I will be able to secure enough money locally to prevent the 
interruption of the construction."132 Harold V. Gaskill, Dean of Science, provided a slight respite 
with S150 for supplies from his funds. In April, Atanasoff went back to the ISC Research Council for 
additional money. An excerpt from his request read as follows: 
I have no inclination to minimize the difficulties inherent in this development (the ABC). 
Most people to whom I have talked about this project have been surprised that we should 
undertake such a huge machine. A few. among them Prof. Urey of Columbia University, 
have been intrigued by the research possibilities of such a piece of equipment and have given 
us much encouragement and advice. We were well aware of these difficulties at the time we 
made the initial request from the Research Council and I only promised Prof. Lindstrom 
(Research Council Chairman) that I would try to place one computing element of this 
129 Atanasoff, letter to Bowie, 19 June 1940. 
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machine in operation during the year. In spite of my preliminary estimate, I could not 
convince myself that any substantial progress could be made on this project with the means 
that the Research Council could afford to grant us. 
Again I must not let my enthusiasm convince you that the difficulties are all 
overcome. However, the one computing element was in operation before January 1. We 
knew then that the fundamental principle was workable, simple, and surprisingly cheap. 
Since January 1 we have spent our time making plans and doing construction work on the 
entire machine. Curiously enough, the most irritating problem has been concerned with 
getting numbers into and out of the machine; the complication of the operations is so great 
that no keyboard pencil and paper methods are possible. Many new problems in machine and 
electrical design have been met. Recently numerous parts have been completed and finished 
assemblies for the entire machine are commencing to take form. I am more convinced than 
ever that our ideas are sound and suitable for the solution of this important problem in applied 
mathematics.133 
Atanasoff was careful what he said about the ABC, aware that it could impact his standing for 
a patent. He nonetheless discussed it with a number of people outside of ISC besides vendors, as the 
passage indicated. He had special reason for mentioning Urey. Harold C. Urey, a physical chemist, 
won the 1934 Nobel Prize in chemistry for the 1932 discovery of the hydrogen isotope deuterium. 
Urey was a frequent visitor to ISC and friend to Atanasoff, who talked with him freely. An 
endorsement by Urey carried substantial weight at a time when Atanasoff suspected some people 
believed him "half-crazy" for attempting the ABC 134 Note, too, that Atanasoff and Berry recognized 
early that the binary spark-punch units were going to cause the most trouble of any part of the ABC. 
In this second go around. Atanasoff asked for S750 from the Research Council. It gave him 
5700 and a warning that there might not be any more to follow.135 The small difference scarcely 
mattered, however. He told the Council that his. "estimate of the total cost of the machine has been 
greatly reduced,"136 but even so. he believed he needed several thousand dollars to finish the ABC. 
Moreover, with Berry working full time during the summer, money intended for the academic year 
would be gone by January.137 Atanasoff was thus forced to seek outside funding. 
Manufacturers of EAM equipment were an obvious source of money, since Atanasoff 
recognized the ABC as advancing their machines. He therefore cautiously approached IBM and 
Remington Rand to fund his work. His overture to Remington Rand read as follows: 
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I have made and am making some developments in the computing machine art which may be 
of interest to you since they apply rather specifically to tabulating machines. I believe my 
developments will enable one to build a computing machine which will perform all the 
operations of the standard tabulators and many more at much higher speeds and at a much 
lower cost of construction. 
I fully realize that this is a strong statement. However. I have one computing element 
of such a machine in operation and it works very satisfactorily. 
If you are interested in such developments please state what you consider is equitable 
basis to be followed in making disclosures to your company.138 
Atanasoff was deliberately vague because he did not want to disclose much without a signed 
agreement that ensured his rights. His claims nevertheless caught the attention of Remington Rand 
and further stimulated the interest of IBM. However, the corporations had legal positions to consider, 
and both, especially IBM, asked Atanasoff to first sign releases he considered too one-sided in their 
favor.139 In the case of Remington Rand, Atanasoff complained that its contract: "would furnish your 
company with all my information without any corresponding obligation on your part and would 
perhaps enable you to resuscitate some old investigation and file an application on it making my 
application the junior in the resulting interference." Not giving up, Atanasoff coaxed with a cogent 
prophecy: "I am rather sure that your firm will sooner or later by very interested in this type of 
machine. Its relative simplicity and high speed of operation constitutes advantages which will be 
hard to overcome."140 
In reply. Remington Rand noted, probably justifiably, that its contract format had been 
established for good reason: "because of experience with such matters over a period of years. Our 
own engineering and development departments have been working on projects for some time, 
endeavoring to achieve the same results which you are pointing toward. It might conceivably be that 
we both are. or have, traveled similar paths." Remington Rand knew, as did IBM, that a truly novel 
idea is rare without someone, somewhere, having a similar one. Through incessant searching for new 
technologies, the office appliance companies might have already possessed the essence of what 
138 John V. Atanasoff. copy of letter to Market Research Division. Remington Rand, Inc.. Buffalo, 
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Atanasoff had to sell. Remington Rand assured Atanasoff of its good intentions and keen interest but 
refused to modify its contract.141 
Atanasoff had greater interest in IBM in any case. He told Ehret that, "there is nothing that 
would please me more than to secure the cooperation of your company in the mutually advantageous 
development of these ideas (of the ABC) on any reasonable basis."142 To that end. he visited IBM's 
"World Headquarters" in New York City in April. Actually, he made a number of stops on an 
itinerary to investigate funding.143 
He first went to Washington, D C., to see Vannevar Bush at the Carnegie Institution. 
Endowed by steel magnate Andrew Carnegie, the Carnegie Institution gave away over $1.5 million 
each year for research. As its president. Bush had considerable discretion in making awards.144 As 
discussed, he listened politely but offered no support.145 
Why Bush did not have greater interest is a matter for speculation. Certainly he was 
preoccupied with national defense. Concerned about the coming war he thought inevitable. Bush 
worried about the U.S. being unprepared to give its soldiers the sophisticated weaponry they would 
need. In June, several weeks after meeting Atanasoff, Bush formally proposed the NDRC to aid 
development of those weapons. President Roosevelt immediately approved the bold plan. The 
NDRC supplemented research conducted by the military but had broad powers in its own right. As 
chairman. Bush answered directly to Roosevelt. Scientists worked under contract but in their own 
university or industrial laboratories.146 The NDRC within a year consumed the efforts of over 75 
percent of the nation's best physicists, including Atanasoff.147 
Not yet having any inkling of that involvement, Atanasoff continued to explore funding 
possibilities. He got a more favorable reception in Washington from C. G. Smith of Raytheon. 
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Another representative subsequently contacted Atanasoff to express his company's enthusiasm for the 
ABC: 
We are naturally very much interested in any such machine, and are especially so in view of 
Dr. Smith's hopes as the possibilities of your device. 
If you think this machine is ready for any commercial application, we would like 
very much to have an opportunity to discuss it with you. and if you think there is anything we 
could do in the line of manufacturing or marketing such equipment, we would also like to 
consider that.148 
Atanasoff needed information on thyratrons from Raytheon, but he was not ready to commit to a 
manufacturer until he had investigated other possible funding sources. However. Atanasoff assured 
the representative: "I shall try to see that your firm is treated fairly in any commercial application 
which my (sic) develop."149 
Atanasoff next went to Harvard to see Howard Aiken, involved with IBM on the ASCC. The 
men discussed design of computers but had radically different opinions, both on how a computer 
should be organized and the relative merits of relays and vacuum tubes. Neither changed the other's 
mind. For his part. Atanasoff thought the ASCC "primitive and not very valid," "the last throb of the 
old era."150 
Atanasoff then traveled to New York City. His meeting with Ehret at IBM went well, so 
much so. it revived his hope of finding employment with the company, although no promises were 
made. Atanasoff subsequently sent Ehret another employment application, noting: "I feel certain that 
I would enjoy working with your organization. Further I believe that I am in a position to realize the 
possibilities of new developments more fully than one with less background in Mathematics and the 
Physical Sciences." Atanasoff also expressed his conviction that the development of the computer, 
"represents the only escape from the mathematical intricacies of modern life."151 
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Finally, Atanasoff paid a visit in New York City to Warren Weaver, then in a hospital with a 
kidney infection.152 His former professor had become director of Natural Sciences of the Rockefeller 
Foundation and, as such, had the enviable duty of giving away millions of dollars in old, oil money. 
Among those that received Rockefeller Foundation funding for research or training included many of 
the great names of science, such as Bohr. Heisenberg, and others worldwide. The philanthropic 
organization funded the Rockefeller Analyzer, then under construction at MTT, but its largest gift. $6 
million, was for a two-hundred-inch telescope at the Mount Palomar Observatory in California. 
Against the backdrop of the Depression, however. Weaver decided that the biological 
sciences offered greatest benefit to humankind. The Rockefeller Foundation, and philanthropic 
organizations generally, therefore shifted resources from the physical sciences to public health. Its 
money now promoted such laudable endeavors as worldwide control of yellow fever, malaria, and 
hookworms, a once common parasite that afflicted peoples in warm climates. 
Admirable as that new policy otherwise was, it meant Weaver had to tell Atanasoff that he 
had little chance of getting the $5,000 he thought necessary to finish the first electronic digital 
computer. By contrast, about this time. Weaver approved $1,150,000 for physicist Ernest O. 
Lawrence to build a huge cyclotron at the University of California at Berkeley. Although there were 
already thirty-two or more cyclotrons or related nuclear accelerators in operation or under 
construction in the United States in 1940, atom smashers had use in medicine, particularly for fighting 
cancer. Lawrence, an old hand at the funding game, emphasized that in his application. He instructed 
Bohr that it was just "much easier to get funds for medical research."153 
Atanasoff did not have a biological angle but did find Weaver sympathetic.154 Weaver urged 
Atanasoff to present his case to other organizations that might have interest in computers. He gave 
Atanasoff the names of two. Moreover, Weaver told Atanasoff that if those leads did not bear fruit, 
then he should come back.155 
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Back in Ames. Atanasoff therefore applied to the Research Corporation156 and the Committee 
on Scientific Aids to Learning (CSAL). Frederick G. Cornell founded the Research Corporation. As 
a young, newly married chemistry instructor at the University of California, he had financial troubles 
and to overcome those invented an electrostatic precipitator to reduce smokestack effluvia. In 
controlling pollution it recovered valuable chemicals and eventually yielded large profits. However, 
his struggle to commercialize his invention stimulated Cornell in 1912 to forsake real wealth and pool 
his patents with money from associates to endow a private corporation in which profits went to 
scientific or educational institutions to promote promising research. Other scientists assigned their 
inventions, and the Corporation supported projects in a variety of fields. In 1923, it made a grant to 
the Smithsonian Institute for seminal work by Albert H. Goddard in rockets. Nuclear physics became 
a priority in the 1930s. The Corporation funded, in total or in part, a number of nuclear accelerators, 
most notably for Lawrence, including the first full-scale cyclotron. It also supported related research 
by R. J. Van de Graaff at MIT into electrostatic generators. There was even precedence for the ABC 
amidst the Corporation's many projects. Around 1924, it "uncovered a marvelous calculating 
machine that can compute algebraically" and paid for further development.157 
The latter invention would have been ideal for the CSAL. had it been around at the time. The 
Carnegie Corporation created the CSAL in 1937 to promote technologies associated with learning and 
thinking. Such an organization might seem tailor made for Bush, and in fact, he was a founding 
member and wrote its prospectus. Other members included Frank Jewett. head of the BTL, and 
James Conant, president of Harvard.158 Thus, Weaver provided Atanasoff with names of two quite 
appropriate foundations. 
The following excerpt from Atanasoff s initial letter to the CSAL is worth noting for the 
insight it gives to his estimate of the capacity of the ABC compared to other computing methods of 
the day: 
This machine will have a numerical capacity nearly six times that of the largest punched card 
tabulator which is, as far as I am aware, the largest computing machine ever built. At the 
same time its computing speed will be much greater so that what might be called the 
computing capacity will multiply that of the large tabulator by a factor of ten or twenty for 
the work for which it is designed. Its speed in the solution of systems of linear algebraic 
equations will be very great and here it should multiply the efforts of an expert computer with 
156 John V. Atanasoff, copy of letter to Howard A. Poil Ion, President, Research Corporation. 10 July 
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a calculator (which is the usual way of solving such systems at present) by a factor of more 
than one hundred ... 
In view of the very considerable value that the successful completion of this machine 
would have in scientific and technical applications would your organization be interested in 
advancing this grant? 
I have discussed these plans in some detail with Dr. Warren Weaver of the 
Rockefeller Foundation and I have reason to believe that he will be glad to discuss them with 
you. I have also had a brief conversation about these plans with Dr. Vannevar Bush who is. I 
believe, a member of your committee.159 
Doubtless. Atanasoff had reason to claim the ABC, "should multiply the efforts of an expert 
computer with a calculator... by a factor of more than one hundred." In fact, no number of human 
computers could replace the ABC, just as a team of horses, no matter how large, cannot substitute for 
an internal combustion engine. The problem Atanasoff and Berry designed the ABC to solve 
involved more than extension of rote power but organizing and concentrating that power. 
In any case, the president of the Research Corporation, Howard Poillon, replied in early 
August that its board of directors would not meet until late that year and could take no action until 
then.160 The director for the CSAL, Irvin Stewart, had better news. He responded that, "it is quite 
possible that this Committee might be interested in a machine to do the type of things which you 
outline." Stewart added that he needed a detailed description of the ABC to give to computing 
experts to evaluate.161 Weaver had already given the same advice.162 Atanasoff therefore wrote a 
thirty-one-page manuscript (including two-page financial statement) entitled "Computing Machine 
for the Solution of large Systems of Linear Algebraic Equations" that explained the ABC. He mailed 
a copy each to Stewart and Weaver.163 Stewart passed his copy on to Thornton Fry, of the BTL, and 
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began making arrangements for Samuel Caldwell, at MIT, to travel to Ames to investigate.164 Then, 
due to "an unexpected reduction in funds." the CSAL had to abandon consideration of the ABC.165 
The two foundations had close communications, and no sooner did the CSAL drop the ABC. 
then Poillon asked Atanasoff if he wanted his application reopened.166 It had been placed in inactive 
hold while the CSAL had the ABC under review. Atanasoff therefore sent Poillon a copy of his 
funding manuscript plus the news that progress had slowed considerably due to lack of funds, which 
in fact, were nearly exhausted.167 
Fry then sent Poillon his copy of Atanasoff s funding manuscript and the information that he 
and Caldwell, "both believe the machine (the ABC) would be operative, that it would serve a very 
useful purpose, and neither of us could think of a more promising mechanism for carry ing out this 
type of calculation." Moreover. Fry stated that his and Caldwell's only reservation was the small 
amount of money requested. They recommended funding the ABC even at twice the cost.168 
Caldwell did not go to Ames for the CSAL, but he did go in January 1941 for Project X. He 
subsequently reported confirmation of his favorable impression of the ABC obtained from reading 
Atanasoff s manuscript, and he exhorted the Research Corporation to grant Atanasoff the money 
requested.169 
The board of directors for the Research Corporation met in December 1940, but finding the 
situation of the ABC more complex than anticipated, took no action.170 Among those who meanwhile 
evaluated the project for the Research Corporation was Alan Hazeltine, Professor of Physical 
Mathematics at the Stevens Institute of Technology. He had invented the neutralized radio-frequency 
amplifier, making static-free radio possible and which became the basis for the Hazeltine 
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Corporation.171 It then took several months for the directors to consider the ABC, apparently 
individually, and report back to Poillon, all to the affirmative.172 A grant of $5,330 was not approved 
until late April 1941.173 Moreover, per its policy, the Research Corporation gave the money to ISC. 
not directly to Atanasoff.17-1 This became a point of contention because Atanasoff believed that ISC 
used its control to force him to sign a patent contract on terms he thought unfair. It is not clear how 
he kept the project going until July 1941. when he signed the contract, although circumstantial 
evidence suggests various departments may have provided small amounts of money. Starting early 
1941, however, both Atanasoff and Berry turned the preponderance of their energies to Project X.175 
With approval of Atanasoff s grant request. Fry wrote again to Poillon to say he "was very 
glad to learn" of it, and to add that the ABC "seems to me entirely realistic, and there is no doubt at 
all that the machine, when built, will find a wide field of usefulness."176 Fry asked to keep a copy of 
the funding manuscript,177 but Atanasoff had to refuse upon advice of his lawyer.178 Stewart troubled 
to write to Atanasoff to express his satisfaction with the Research Corporation's decision.179 
Hazeltine, too, wrote to say that he found the ABC, "very interesting and was impressed by the 
possibility of extending it to automatic operation by determinantal methods" (as another way of 
solving linear algebraic equations).180 
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Historians of computers regard the general disapproval by scientists for the ENIAC as 
indicating that they were resistant to change, unable to accept the new technology. How then to 
explain the earlier enthusiasm, equally widespread, evident from experts who knew of the ABC? 
Admittedly, Aiken may not have been impressed. However, several years later, when asked to 
evaluate the UNTVAC proposal. Aiken recommended building instead computers more in line with 
the ABC.181 This suggests that he came around to at least some of its merits. Bush, too, may not 
have appreciated the ABC, and he was an especially important figure. As head of the NDRC, Bush 
arguably became the most influential person in developing technologies in the United States, if not 
the world. What is interesting is that his most trusted advisors favored the ABC. These included 
Caldwell and Weaver. More important, it probably included Carroll L. Wilson. Wilson served as an 
official in the Research Corporation, which besides its philanthropic activities, handled patents for 
MIT and other universities.182 Wilson came to know Bush well in that capacity, and then became his 
right hand man at the NDRC, to the point of being described as his "alter ego."183 Certainly, Wilson 
must have approved funding the ABC. From the CSAL, Stewart became Bush's executive secretary. 
Jewett and Conant also became key aides at the NDRC. Thus, key people in the NDRD formerly had 
a hand in approving funding for the ABC. This suggests that perhaps Bush supported the ABC but 
had more pressing issues commanding his attention. 
Atanasoff seemed oblivious to support for the ABC; rather, he complained of widespread 
skepticism. A favorite anecdote epitomizing his view involved fellow ISC physics professor, Lester 
Earls, whom Atanasoff alleged had once mocked, "That thing (the ABC) will never drive a streetcar." 
However. Atanasoff remembered unfavorable comments, for which we have his recorded 
recollections. He evidently forgot about positive reviews the ABC garnered, of which ample proof 
exists. For his part. Earls denied making the comment.184 In any case, that so many authorities saw 
value in the ABC but not in the ENIAC suggests not reluctance to step into the future, but simply that 
they could tell the difference between a good invention and a bad one. 
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Atanasoff began efforts to patent the ABC concurrent with his search for funding. He asked 
A. E. Brandt to help, because he had better sources of information. The former ISC statistician had 
left Ames to take employment with the Department of Agriculture in Washington, D C Atanasoff 
specifically wanted an opinion on Albert Dieterich, who he used briefly on his tabulator attachment 
and ganged calculator proposals. If Dieterich should be thought unsuitable, then Atanasoff asked 
Brandt to obtain names of other patent lawyers.185 Brandt talked the matter over with attorneys 
within the USDA. They knew nothing about Dieterich but supplied names of four other lawyers as 
possibilities.186 
Atanasoff waited several months to contact the attorneys. All responded, and three thought 
they could help.187 The fourth confessed that he was not qualified, but took it upon himself to discuss 
Atanasoff s situation with a Mr. Buttner, Principal Examiner for Division 23 of the U.S. Patent 
Office. Division 23 included calculating machines and would handle an application for the ABC. 
Atanasoff stipulated a lawyer with no connections with Remington Rand or IBM, and given that 
limitation, Buttner suggested Richard Trexler, of Cox, Moore & Olson in Chicago, whom he knew 
personally.188 Trexler's experience included several years as an examiner in Division 23.189 
Atanasoff therefore retained Trexler. 
As first order of business, Atanasoff and Trexler decided to hunt for patents that might relate 
to the ABC. Clerks had just begun going through Patent Office files, however, when Trexler halted 
work. Expecting a "relatively small job," he found the opposite. In a letter to Atanasoff, he 
explained: "This case is out of the ordinary because of the unusual number of patents owned by 
International Business Machines Corporation. Apparently this company has about as many patents as 
any company owns."190 What they needed, Trexler suggested, was a way to narrow the search. 
Atanasoff eventually decided to go to Washington and conduct a search himself. 
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In the meantime, Atanasoff, urged by Trexler, attempted to clarify his rights with ISC in the 
prosecution of a patent application.191 ISC, like other schools in the 1920s and 1930s, had relatively 
little experience with patents. Patents traditionally had been left to inventors, who if they bothered to 
pursue them at universities and colleges, often simply turned them over to the public.192 However, 
institutions of higher learning depended on support from industry and discovered that it sponsored 
research more willingly with patent policies in place. Industry preferred not to spend money on 
development of technologies without protection from pirating. Thus, universities and colleges began 
implementing policies largely to attract funding. Institutions did not expect to make money from the 
patents themselves, and policies normally applied only to patents resulting from research financed by 
the institution or in cooperation with outside agencies.193 
ISC wrestled with the patent issue and eventually created the Iowa State College Research 
Foundation in 1938 as a nonprofit corporation legally separate from, but closely tied to, the college. 
Responsibilities included assisting faculty, staff, and student inventors obtain patents and ensuring 
availability of inventions by the public. Patents vested with the inventors, but ISC paid patenting and 
related expenses. In return, the school got a large portion of any ensuing income. However, in 
implementing its policy, ISC assumed that both expenses and commercial royalties would be low.194 
Atanasoff formally notified R. E Buchanan of his desire to patent the ABC in early 
November 1940. As Director of the Patent Committee, Buchanan had responsibility for making a 
preliminary decision on whether ISC should pursue a patent. He also served on the Research 
Foundation. These two duties covered only a small part of the remarkable man's official activities, 
however. A professor in bacteriology, he had a worldwide reputation in the field and headed the 
department at ISC. If not enough, he also served as Dean of the Graduate College. Atanasoff 
characterized Buchanan as "very shrewd," the man who "did everything at Iowa State College."195 
Atanasoff sent Buchanan a copy of his funding manuscript to explain the device, and he 
stated in a cover letter that a patent should cover the machine and "certain other basis (sic) 
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principles."196 Buchanan recognized the groundbreaking nature of the ABC, and in fact, became so 
enthusiastic that Atanasoff wondered if perhaps he had not "over-sold" his computer.197 Buchanan 
reported to the ISC Committee on Patents as follows: 
Doctor Atanasoff has rather independently made several discoveries which are not only 
useful in this machine (the ABC), but may well find a very extensive use in design of cheaper 
and far more efficient computing machines of many types (emphasis added). It is believed 
from every point of view to be desirable to hold and administer these patentable discoveries 
together. I would therefore specifically recommend that the patenting of the computing 
machine be handled in conformity with the standard practice of the Research Foundation, but 
that other matters and particularly the determination of the distribution of royalties and other 
income arising from application of the patent or patents to the general field of computing 
machines and similar devices be made a matter of direct negotiation and contract between the 
Foundation and Doctor Atanasoff. 
Inasmuch as this patent application is unusually technical and probably basic in a 
new field, it is urged that special care be used in selection of a patent attorney who is 
satisfactory to Doctor Atanasoff.198 
The Patent Committee met at end of November and, following Buchanan's lead, recommended that 
the Research Foundation accept responsibility for patenting the ABC 199 
Confident that the Foundation would choose to patent the ABC, Atanasoff had requested that 
it retain Trexler instead of another Chicago lawyer that normally got its business.200 Quincy C. 
Ayres, Secretary of the Patent Committee and Executive Secretary of the Research Foundation, and 
Associate Professor of Agriculture Engineering, therefore went to Chicago in early December to meet 
him.201 Trexler impressed Ayres, who advised that the Foundation accept Atanasoff s request. The 
ABC, he noted, was "away out of the class of anything we have heretofore dealt with." Moreover, 
"Dr. Atanasoff has informed himself to a surprising degree on patent law and patent procedure, 
particularly as applied to this invention, and it is believed he will be able to cooperate in such a way 
as to reduce to a minimum the time required of the patent attorney."202 In short, Ayres recognized 
196 J. V. Atanasoff. letter to R. E. Buchanan, Dean of Graduate College, 8 November 1940. ISU, 
Parks, "John Vincent Atanasoff Papers " (box 47, folder 3). 
19 
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198 R. E. Buchanan. Director, Committee on Patents, memorandum to Committee on Patents, 21 
November 1940. ISU, Parks, "John Vincent Atanasoff Papers" (box 47. folder 3). 
199 Q. C. Ayres. copy of memorandum entitled "Faculty Patent Committee," 30 November 1940. 
ISU. Parks, "John Vincent Atanasoff Papers" (box 47, folder 3). 
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"
01 Richard Trexler. Cox, Moore & Olson, letter to John V. Atanasoff, 28 November 1940. ISU. 
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that the ABC patent application demanded a specialist. Atanasoff was best qualified to determine 
whom that should be and could assist with the patent or patents, thereby reducing total costs. 
Not only could Atanasoff help with an application, but Ayres suggested he also render 
assistance coming to terms for a licensing agreement: "I think he can be trusted to do a good job of 
negotiating," noted Ayres.203 As Ayres's comments implied, Atanasoff had a grasp of patent law 
among his areas of expertise. Atanasoff later referred to himself self-deprecatingly as a "2,000-hour 
patent lawyer," meaning he had spent that many hours "monkeying" with patents.204 More important. 
Ayres's actions and comments implied deference to Atanasoff, the expectation that he lead the effort 
to patent the ABC. That was reasonable but led to disaster when first Ayres and then Atanasoff left, 
and the college itself got turned upside down, because of the war. No one else at ISC was prepared to 
keep the application on track. 
That the Foundation ought to patent the ABC, Ayres whole-heartedly approved: "if it is as 
good as Dr. Atanasoff, Dr. Woodrow, Dean Buchanan and Mr. Trexler think it is (in which opinion I 
concur), it is something which will command very substantial sums for commercial control." Jay W. 
Woodrow was Chairman of the Physics Department. Given the unique and complex nature of the 
invention, Ayres and Buchanan now proposed to deviate from the standard contract.205 Moreover, 
they recognized that the ABC resulted mostly from effort by Atanasoff on his own time,206 and that its 
potential value went beyond what ISC could expect in return for the money it had given him. 
The usual contract allowed an ISC inventor 15 percent of profits.207 Ayres suggested instead 
one modeled on contracts used by the Research Corporation, "in which the Foundation receives forty 
percent of the net proceeds and the inventor receives sixty per cent after all expenses have been 
deducted. In our case Atanasoff agrees to an equal division of profits; forty-five per cent to himself 
and five per cent to a Mr. Berry who is now assisting in building one type of a full-scale machine" 
(emphasis added).208 Atanasoff presumably agreed to a smaller share of profits because of the general 
expectation that the Foundation might incur unusually large patenting expenses. 
"°
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Meeting just after Christmas, the Board of Trustees for the Research Foundation considered 
the ABC but took no action, partly because of confusion over talk of an imminent commercial version 
different from the ABC. Ayres recorded in his minutes: "After due consideration of the very unusual 
nature and scope of this invention the group expressed great interest in the new principles but decided 
to withhold a decision on the matter pending an opportunity to inspect a commercial type machine in 
operation."209 In fact, although Atanasoff recognized that all manner of computers could derive from 
the ABC, he had no immediate plans for another version. 
To this point, matters with the Foundation had proceeded in a way entirely satisfactorily to 
Atanasoff.210 He, Buchanan, and Ayres had in fact roughed out the initial terms. The situation 
changed quickly, unfortunately. Ayres prepared a proposal that the Trustees considered on March 
22.211 At least one, T. R. Agg, Dean of Engineering, objected to the unprecedented deviation from 
the standard contract, apparently believing that inventions made privately should be handled like any 
other.212 The majority, led by Buchanan, stood their ground. They were especially concerned about 
Ayres*s estimate that patenting costs on the ABC could "run from $500.00 up to well over a 
thousand," even with Atanasoff assisting.213 Ayres therefore suggested equal division of profits and 
expenses, with the Foundation's share of expenses not to exceed five hundred dollars.214 
The majority view prevailed, but Atanasoff strenuously objected when he saw the details of 
the resulting proposal.215 As one problem, it did not specify that Berry get 10 percent of Atanasoff s 
209 Quincy C. Ayres, Secretary, Minutes of Special Meeting of Board of Trustees of ISC Research 
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share of pre-expense income.216 Atanasoff demanded the contract include that stipulation. More 
important, Atanasoff wanted the contract to read: "the costs of securing a patent be divided evenly 
without restriction (emphasis added)."217 As another point, Atanasoff apparently desired say over 
how ISC distributed income among departments, so that those that had rendered aid for the ABC 
might be reimbursed.218 
Atanasoff became embittered over subsequent negotiations and blamed Charles Friley, 
president of ISC, for using his control of the money from the Research Corporation to force him to 
sign an agreement he otherwise would not have.219 Such evidence as exists suggests that Friley 
followed the recommendation of the Foundation, however.220 For example, apparently no one but 
Atanasoff saw advantage to including Berry in the contract. Even Trexler took that view.221 Rather, 
he and the Foundation believed that division of profits between the two inventors could be better 
handled by separate agreement. Atanasoff later drew up the indenture with Berry for that purpose. 
More contentious was the issue of a ceiling on expenditures. The Research Foundation 
strongly believed it needed to be cautious about incurring expenses. As of June 1941 and since its 
creation in 1938. it had handled twenty-one active or pending patents, including the ABC. It had 
received total income of $10,596, yielding a profit of $5,980.222 That made ISC a profit leader among 
colleges or universities, since few made any money at all from patents.223 A patent at ISC for blue 
cheese gave most profits over the years but also greatest headaches due to numerous patent 
infringements.224 Thus, the Foundation gave primary consideration to avoiding large expenditures. 
~
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The Foundation agreed with Ayres in anticipating that the ABC might "command very 
substantial sums for commercial control," but saw that not as potential for millions or billions, as 
might be supposed today, but rather, thousands of dollars. Atanasoff admitted years later that he had 
expected the patent to sell for $25,000 to $50,000.225 The Foundation presumably thought it might 
get less. However, it is noteworthy that while no one saw commercial possibilities for computers 
based on the example of the ENIAC, even novices recognized such potential deriving from the ABC. 
After several months of haggling, the Foundation raised its expense ceiling to $750. 
Atanasoff grudgingly signed the slightly modified agreement on 5 July 1941,226 and the Research 
Corporation grant finally became available to him. Things might have gone better if Ayres had 
stayed, because Atanasoff had much respect for him. as he also had for Buchanan. However, after the 
March meeting, Ayres left for duty in the Naval Reserve as a Lieutenant Commander in the Civil 
Engineer Corps for the duration of the "present national emergency." Wallace E. Barron, Director of 
Alumni Affairs, assumed administrative responsibilities for the Foundation in his absence.227 Barron 
admitted knowing, "almost nothing about this patent business."228 
Atanasoff decided to make another trip east over Christmas break 1940 but neglected to tell 
his wife. Earls, a neighbor, took him aside and admonished that he could not leave his unsuspecting 
family at Christmas.229 Atanasoff had not thought about it, but reminded, he and his wife loaded their 
three children into the family car and left town on Friday the 20th. They drove to New York, visited 
relatives, and arrived in New York City on or before the 23rd. Atanasoff attended to business while 
his family saw the sights. 
He met with Ehret and J. B. Hayward of IBM. hoping, first, to come to an agreement on the 
ABC and, second, to finally clinch employment, but nothing on either materialized. IBM continued 
to be interested in the ABC, but with Atanasoff refusing to sign a disclosure agreement, and in fact 
unable to pending action by the Research Foundation, Ehret had his hands tied.230 Hayward sounded 
225 John V. Atanasoff, quoted in Clark Mollenhoff, "Court: Computer lowan's Idea," Des Moines 
Register, 27 January 1974, 8A. 
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more optimistic about prospects for employment but led Atanasoff to believe that IBM's "unsettled 
foreign situation" prevented it from adding an "academic" at that time.231 
Incidentally, Atanasoff claimed he had repeatedly tried over the years to interest IBM in the 
ABC but failed.232 On the contrary, Ehret continually pressed him to patent the ABC so IBM could 
inspect it.233 As his last words to Atanasoff in late 1942, Ehret said he was "keeping the matter in our 
active files awaiting further advice from you."234 
Also in New York City, Atanasoff tried to meet with Poillon on his pending grant application 
but apparently missed connections. Finally, Atanasoff met with Weaver, out of the hospital and 
distributing national defense projects.233 The NDRC had already approved well over one hundred by 
then, a year before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.236 Atanasoff had been offering ideas, and in 
particular, believed the method to direct antiaircraft fire could be simplified. Weaver therefore 
tentatively assigned him Project X.237 
The Atanasoff family spent Christmas in a New York City hotel (which the children 
thoroughly enjoyed).238 They drove to Philadelphia the next day so Atanasoff could attend a joint 
conference of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) and American 
Physical Society. While there, he sat in a lecture on analysis of weather data using an electrical 
harmonic analyzer, a type of analog computer. Mauchly presented the lecture and had built the 
analyzer based on one at MIT. Son of a physicist for the Carnegie Institution in Washington, D C., 
Mauchly had studied electrical engineering before switching to physics and obtaining a Ph.D. degree 
from John Hopkins University. He taught undergraduate physics courses at Ursinus College in 
Collegeville, near Philadelphia, but curiously, typically described himself as either a research 
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engineer or statistical geophysicist.239 What he said about himself when he met Atanasoff is not 
known, but Atanasoff made a point of talking with him after the lecture. Atanasoff claimed he did so 
only because he liked to meet people at conferences and actually had little interest in the analyzer or 
weather data. In any case, the two men had a discussion in which Atanasoff provided a vague 
description of the ABC. Upon parting, he invited Mauchly to Ames to see his computer. 
After several days in Philadelphia, the Atanasoff family drove to Washington, D C., and was 
joined by Berry, who arrived by bus.240 Atanasoff and Berry spent the week of the New Year going 
through files in the Patent Office with assistance from its personnel. Trexler provided instructions but 
otherwise did not help.241 Atanasoff believed they obtained a good understanding of the ABC 
compared to the "past art." He did not find it original in every detail; in particular, patents had been 
granted on somewhat similar ideas to his on recording and reading of binary numbers using high-
voltage arcs. On the whole, Atanasoff noted happily: "our basic notion of computing machine is 
quite in the clear, and this was confirmed by the examiners."242 
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CHAPTERS. MORE ON THE ABC 
January 1941 proved especially eventful for the ABC. Immediately after Atanasoff returned 
home together with his family and Berry from Washington. D C., Samuel Caldwell visited at the 
request of Warren Weaver. The trip was related to Project X. and it is likely that he specifically 
investigated use of the ABC in Project X.1 Weaver himself went to Ames on the 12th," and later in 
the month assigned Caldwell temporary responsibility for "steering Atanasoff."3 Caldwell then made 
an apparently unsolicited recommendation to the Research Corporation that it fund completion of the 
ABC, which it finally did that spring. 
January also saw first publicity of the ABC. On the 15th, the Des Moines Tribune ran a short 
article accompanied by a photograph under the caption "Machine Remembers." The photograph 
showed Berry holding a large component, heavy with vacuum tubes, mistakenly identified as a 
memory but actually control circuits. The article, entitled "Computing Device," and including the 
inevitable comparison to the human brain, read as follows: 
An electrical computing machine said here to operate more like the human brain than any 
other such machine known to exist is being built by Dr. John V. Atanasoff. Iowa State college 
(sic) physics professor. 
The machine will contain more than 300 vacuum tubes and will be used to compute 
complicated algebraic equations. Dr. Atanasoff said. It will occupy about as much space as a 
large office desk. 
The instrument will be entirely electrical, and will be used in research experiments. 
Dr. Atanasoff said he has been working on the machine several years, and probably 
will finish it in about a year.4 
Finally, Mauchly initiated a series of correspondences with Atanasoff that culminated in his 
driving to Iowa in June to examine the ABC. and then continued for some months afterward. The 
letters between the two men deserve quoting at length in chronological order. Mauchly's first letter. 
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on January 19. several weeks after meeting Atanasoff, read as follows: 
I am wondering how your plans with regard to computing devices are working out. Need I 
say again that I await with some suspense the time when you will be able to let me have more 
information? How the recording-end functions is the biggest puzzle, I guess—450 digits at 
less than $2 per digit sounds next to impossible, and yet that is what I understand you to say, 
approximately. 
Your suggestion about visiting Iowa seemed rather fantastic when first made, but the 
idea grows on me. I've gone so far as to note that our Spring Recess is March 21 to 31, 
whereas the meetings in Washington are about May 1. 
The financial questions involved in a long trip haven't been solved, though. If you 
aren't too busy, perhaps you can drop a few hints as to your progress.5 
Mauchly knew little about the ABC until he went to Ames. Atanasoff had told Mauchly no 
more than he said to anyone he did not know well. The computer had nevertheless gripped the 
interest of Mauchly; so much so, he contemplated making the trip west as early as March. Driving 
part way across the country is not notable now, but this was the Depression, and Mauchly worried 
about expenses. Finally, the comment about "450 digits at less than $2 per digit" has unclear origins. 
Atanasoff may have told him that total cost of the ABC might run about $2 per bit of storage 
capacity. That turned out a fair estimate if based on the combined 3,000 binary digit capacity of the 
two memory drums, but Atanasoff typically said that the ABC had 450 digits of memory, giving a 
figure based on the capacity of a single drum in its decimal digits equivalent.6 In court, however, he 
testified that $2 per digit was the marginal cost of adding memory to the ABC.7 
Delighted at Mauchly's interest, Atanasoff responded almost immediately, as follows: 
Your letter came as a pleasant surprise. I intended to write to you as soon as the effect of the 
new term on my activities had worn away. 
As you know we have been in active construction on the computing machine for 
more than a year, and now our plans have assumed rather definite form, and progress is good 
without too much attention on my part. I am expecting shortly to hear whether or not I will 
receive a grant-in-aid from an outside source to help in completing the machine. All in all 
progress is very satisfactory to me, and I expect that our plans will commence to mature in 
about a year. 
. . .  J u s t  a f t e r  m y  r e t u r n  w e  h a d  a  v i s i t  f r o m  D r .  S .  H .  C a l d w e l l  o f  M .  I .  T .  w h o  g a v e  
me a rather complete picture of calculating machine activities in the country. His visit gave 
me the urge to attempt the construction of a differential analyser on a dime store basis. I 
believe this attempt could be rather successful, and it is something I have laid away for future 
activity when my work gives out. 
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By all means arrange to pay us a visit in Ames during your spring recess if this is 
possible. Our spring recess is from March 19 to March 24. and I can think of many things that 
I would like to talk to you about. This list includes statistical Fourier analysis, resistance 
harmonic analysers, computing machines of all kinds, and I suspect there are plenty of other 
things. I will be glad to have you as my guest while you are in Ames. As an additional 
inducement I will explain the two dollar per digit business.8 
Atanasoff s idea about a differential analyzer on a "dime store basis" involved building an 
ingenious but simple attachment to the ABC. The attachment, actually an analog-to-digital converter, 
was to function something like input boards on a differential analyzer, except that tracing a curve 
would produce a digital signal that could be integrated numerically by the ABC.9 Put simply, the 
converter effectively divided the area under a curve into exceeding narrow rectangular blocks whose 
areas could be calculated easily and summed by the ABC to give an approximate total area. The 
attachment would not make the ABC a general-purpose computer, however, but significantly extend 
its capabilities and do it quite cheaply. 
Mauchly responded about a month later as follows: 
Your invitation and the promised explanation are indeed powerful inducements, and I hope 
that I shall be able to take advantage of them. 
Somewhere—was it in Nature? —I saw an article on differential analyzers which 
included a picture of an analyzer constructed largely from Meccano parts. I think the "dime-
store" analyzer ought to be successful. If it did no more, it would justify itself in merely 
aiding students to understand the process of mechanical solution of differential equations. 
Incidentally, do you consider the usual d.analyzer an "analogue" machine? If so, how about a 
polar planimeter? 
My crew of N Y. A. people has been augmented, but perhaps not for the better. The 
new members are fit only for adding machine work, and even then can't get the same total 
more than two out of three times (so it seems!). 
We recently had to take the back off of the harmonic analyzer for a few minor 
adjustments. Some of the IRC 50,000 ohm resistors had aged to the point where they were 
not within one percent, that we desire. Someday we'll put wire-wounds in and forget them, I 
hope. 
So far we have turned out about 1400 harmonic analyses—each one for eight Fourier 
coefficients. At 3 minutes per, this has taken just 70 hours. The tabular method that we 
would otherwise use takes about 5 times as long (but does yield more accurate values, which 
we do not need for this work). Hence we figure that we have saved 280 hours ... which is 
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about the amount of time it took to design and build the device. It wouldn't take that long to 
build another, of course, especially if one purchased precision wire-wound resistors to 
assemble. 
Here's hoping that you have made progress in Iowa, and that I'll get out to see it all.10 
Not surprisingly, Mauchly misapprehended what Atanasoff meant by a differential analyzer 
on a dime store basis. Differential analyzer implied analog, although few people yet grasped the 
difference between analog and digital. That Mauchly did not is clear by his asking Atanasoff if he 
considered a "d.analyzer (differential analyzer) an 'analogue* machine?" It was, of course, as was a 
polar planimeter, a device something like a wheel-and-disc integrator and used for finding areas on 
maps and scaled drawings." Thus, Mauchly naturally assumed Atanasoff had in mind building a 
miniature analyzer using kits available in toy stores. Meccano parts in Great Britain were roughly 
like Erector sets in the United States, and British physicist Douglas Hartree had constructed a 
functioning differential analyzer with them. 
The "N Y.A. people " were youths hired under a New Deal make-work program, the National 
Youth Administration. Mauchly had a dozen or so helping with analysis of weather data.12 
Specifically, his research involved investigating the relationship between activities on the sun and 
weather on earth. Finally, it is worth noting that Mauchly's harmonic analyzer was electrical, but not 
electronic, and obviously troublesome. 
In reply. Atanasoff continued to encourage Mauchly to visit, as follows: 
By all means pay us a visit if you can arrange it. Just drop me a line, letting me know when 
you will get here, so that I will be sure to be on hand. At present I am planning to attend the 
Washington meetings at the end of April. 
Several of the projects which I told you about are progressing satisfactorily. Pieces 
for the computing machine are coming off the production line, and I have developed a theory 
of how graininess in photographic material should be described, and have also devised and 
constructed a machine which directly makes estimates of graininess according to these 
principles. We will try to have something here to interest you when you arrive, if nothing 
more than a speech which you make.13 
In his initial letter on January 19. Mauchly mentioned Washington meetings around May 1 
that he evidently planned to attend. The reason for those meetings is not known, but the meetings in 
10 John W. Mauchly. letter to John V. Atanasoff, 24 February 1941. ISU, Parks, "John Vincent 
Atanasoff Papers" (box 25, folder 14). 
" Atanasoff, interview with Halladay, et al., 11 July 1968. 1-3. 
Alice R. Burks and Arthur W. Burks, The First Electronic Computer: The Atanasoff Story (Ann 
Arbor. Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1988), 75 and 124. 
13 J. V. Atanasoff. copy of letter to John W. Mauchly, 7 March 1941. ISU, Parks, "John Vincent 
Atanasoff Papers" (box 25, folder 14). 
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late April for Atanasoff were an orientation to Project X. and in particular, included a demonstration 
of antiaircraft fire at Ft. Monroe, Virginia. He and others with projects in fire control attended the 
live-fire exercise. Taking advantage of the trip, Atanasoff also met with Walter G. Cady. an authority 
in crystal physics. His comment about graininess in photographic material involved another of his 
research areas, which he must have broached with Mauchly in their introductory conversation in 
Philadelphia. Mauchly had interest because Atanasoff described granularity with a time-series 
analysis something like he needed for his study of barometric pressures.14 
Mauchly decided at the last moment not to drive to Iowa at end of March. He sent Atanasoff 
a telegram to tell him of his change of plans15 and followed with a letter 
Here is the letter which I said would "follow," and by this time there should be no question 
about it—no matter what theory of relativity you use, this letter should arrive after the night 
message. 
I was sorry not to get out there, but work that I wanted to get done here was piling up, 
a prospective passenger who might have shared the expense didn't think he could leave just 
now, and some one who used to live in Iowa painted an unattractive picture of the weather 
possibilities for driving at this time of year. 
Now I am trying to arrange a passenger for June—or won't you be around Ames 
during that time of year? I hope to see you in Washington when you come to the meetings, 
and you can let me know then how things would shape up for a June visit. 
I haven't been able to do more than just paper-work for a computing machine here, 
so I haven't yet found out how practical my ideas are. We've been very busy running 
barometric pressures through the harmonic analyzer in order to get some more information on 
the 12-hour tidal oscillation. 
It's good to hear that your "production line" is producing. Is there any chance that 
you can now disclose more information?16 
Important here is the evidence that Mauchly had been thinking about building a "computing 
machine. " Actually, first evidence comes in a letter he wrote to a colleague in November 1940." 
before he met Atanasoff. in fact. One proximate inspiration may have been his witness of a 
demonstration of the Complex Number Computer that September at Dartmouth. However, first 
evidence of him seriously considering requirements for a calculator came on 1 January 1941, about a 
14 Atanasoff. interview with Halladay, et al.. 11 July 1968. 45-46 and 49; Honeywell, "Transcript of 
Proceedings," 2.126; Walter G. Cady, letter to John V. Atanasoff, 19 May 1941. ISU, Parks, "John 
Vincent Atanasoff Papers" (box 7. folder 2). 
15 J. W. Mauchly. Western Union telegram to A. V. Atansoff (sic), 22 March 1941. ISU, Parks, 
"John Vincent Atanasoff Papers" (box 25, folder 14). 
16 John W. Mauchly. letter to J. V. Atanasoff. 31 March 1941. ISU, Parks, "John Vincent Atanasoff 
Papers" (box 25, folder 14). 
17 John W. Mauchly, letter to H. Helm Clayton. 15 November 1940. Quoted in John W. Mauchly, 
"Mauchly: Unpublished Remarks," Annals of the History of Computing 4, no. 3 (July 1982), 248. 
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week after meeting Atanasoff. Notes he jotted down that day included "At. Machin" and "150 tubes." 
evidently indicating that he had understood the ABC used about 150 vacuum tubes.18 
Atanasoff delayed almost a month before responding, involved as he was in wrangling with 
the ISC Research Foundation, but more urgently steeped in Project X. His reply to Mauchly said 
little except that he hoped they could meet back east.19 However, they missed connections in 
Washington, and pressing business forced Atanasoff to abandon any attempt to meet. Back in Iowa. 
Atanasoff wrote Mauchly a letter that included the following excerpt: 
It was one of my keen disappointments not to be able to see you while in the East. I planned 
to stop at Collegeville on my way from Washington to New York, but a sudden telephone call 
necessitated my making a continuous trip. Several matters connected with the defense 
project which I have undertaken made my visit in the East a very strenuous one. I am looking 
forward to seeing you in some way or another in the very near future.20 
Mauchly, in turn, replied in part as follows: 
It was a disappointment to me, too. not to get in touch with you while in Washington.... 
Well, anyway, there is more than a little prospect of my making the trip, starting from 
here about the tenth of June. I have a passenger who will very likely pay for the gas, and that 
will help. 
From your letters I have gathered that your national defense work is unconnected 
with the computing machine. This puzzles me, for as I understand it, rapid computation 
devices are involved in N.D. In a recent talk with Travis, of the E E. School at U. of Pa. I 
asked him about this, and the matter seemed the same way to him. But if Caldwell has 
looked over your plans (I think you said that he was out there) and hasn't seen any N.D. 
possibilities, I suppose that that means your computer is not considered adaptable to fire 
control devices, or that they have something even better. Travis (who goes into active duty 
with Navy this week) pointed out the advantages of lightness and mass-production for 
electronic computing methods, but said that when he was consulting with General Electric 
over plans for the G.E. differential integraph they figured it would take about one-half million 
dollars to the job electronically, and they would only spend 1/5 of that, so they built the 
mechanical type with Polaroid torque-amplifiers.21 
Having decided against a trip to ISC in March, Mauchly now determined to go in June. 
Especially intriguing in this letter is how he inferred so much about Atanasoff s national defense 
(N.D.) work; it is unlikely that Atanasoff had told him. Perhaps Mauchly knew enough about 
18 Honeywell, "Transcript of Proceedings," 11,844-11,856. ISU, Parks, "Clark R. Mollenhoff Papers, 
1968-1990" (box 8). 
19 John V. Atanasoff, copy of letter to J. W. Mauchly, 22 April 1941. ISU, Parks, "John Vincent 
Atanasoff Papers" (box 25, folder 14). 
20 J. V. Atanasoff, copy of letter to John W. Mauchly, 21 May 1941. ISU, Parks, "John Vincent 
Atanasoff Papers" (box 25, folder 14). 
21 J. W. Mauchly, letter to J. V. Atanasoff. 27 May 1941. ISU, Parks, "John Vincent Atanasoff 
Papers" (box 25, folder 14). 
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Caldwell's activities to guess. More likely, he got his information from Irven Travis, who, as noted, 
left that week for the Navy. Not coincidentally. Travis was yet another computing expert pulled into 
antiaircraft fire-control studies. However, the American scientific community was relatively small in 
the early 1940s and Atanasoff fairly well known, so Mauchly might have learned of Atanasoff s 
activities from a number of sources. 
As for Travis, he had supervised the building of two differential analyzers modeled on 
Vannevar Bush's, one for the Army and another for the University of Pennsylvania, where he taught 
electrical engineering. Mauchly used the word integraph here to mean differential analyzer, as did 
others. In 1939 and 1940, after building the analyzers, Travis prepared two proposals for the General 
Electric Corporation. The first suggested the possibility of an electronic differential analyzer, 
something like the Rockefeller Analyzer. The second recommendation was reminiscent of one of 
Atanasoff s ideas: a digital computer consisting of ganged calculators. Travis further proposed that 
the calculators, perhaps electronic, be organized roughly like components of a differential analyzer 
but with the calculators replacing integrators. He worried that mechanical calculators might not stand 
up well but did not give electronic ones serious consideration. Partly for that reason, apparently, GE 
did not act on Travis's reports. However, Mauchly's letter suggests that GE decided that such a 
complex but limited calculating machine could not be justified at that cost, just as Bush decided not to 
build the Arithmetical Machine until it could be simplified. As Mauchly reported, GE built a 
differential analyzer more of the old-style instead. 
Which proposal Mauchly meant in his letter is unclear, but regardless, Travis had come close 
to proposing an ENIAC, that is, an electronic digital differential analyzer with multipliers, 
accumulators, and interconnecting components. According to Travis, Mauchly had visited him at the 
University of Pennsylvania, "from time to time and we had numerous chats" on "automatic 
computation." Thus, it is likely that the essential concept of the ENIAC derived from Travis. To 
strengthen the connection, Travis had been a favorite instructor of Eckert.22 
The original name for the ENIAC was the Electronic Diff. Analyzer, a deliberate allusion to 
the Differential Analyzer. However, Diff. stood not for differential, but for difference, that is, for the 
numerical method of finite differences for solving differential equations. The April 1943 proposal to 
the Army for the ENIAC, written by Mauchly, Eckert, and John G. Brainerd, a director of research at 
Irven Travis quoted in Burks and Burks, The First Electronic Computer, 186; also 126-127, 182-
188. and 190-191. 
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the University of Pennsylvania and an authority on vacuum tubes and analog computers,23 stated that, 
"electronic difference analyzers have been considered for different applications in at least two 
previous cases, but have not been developed and used."24 One of Travis's proposals probably was 
one case and the ABC with integrating attachment the other.25 In testimony, however, Herman 
Goldstine recalled Mauchly telling him that the two machines were Atanasoff s and one at MIT, 
presumably the Rockefeller Analyzer.26 In any case, between the ABC and either Travis's or MIT's 
advanced computers, perhaps even the Arithmetical Machine, Mauchly had the basis for the ENIAC. 
However, it must be noted that the ENIAC solved problems fully digitally, and thus differently than 
the ABC and integrating attachment. 
Atanasoff was eager to accommodate Mauchly no matter when he could make it to Ames and 
responded at the end of May as follows: 
I think that it is an excellent idea for you to come west during the month of June or any other 
time for that matter... We have plenty of room and will be delighted to have you stay with us 
while here. 
As you may surmise, I am somewhat out of the beaten track of computing machine 
gossip, and so I am always interested in any details you can give me. The figures on the 
electronic differential integraph seem absolutely startling. During Dr. Caldwell's last visit 
here, I suddenly obtained an idea as to how the computing machine which we are building can 
be converted into an integraph. Its action would be analogous to numerical integration and not 
like that of the Bush Integraph which is, of course, an analogue machine, but it would be very 
rapid, and the steps in the numerical integration could be made arbitrarily small. It should 
therefore equal the Bush machine in speed and exell (sic) it in accuracy. 
Progress on the construction of this machine is excellent in spite of the amount of time 
that defense work is taking, and I am still in a high state of enthusiasm about its ultimate 
success. I hope to see you within two or three weeks.27 
Caldwell had been back at ISC on March 24.28 However, Atanasoff s sudden idea on 
converting the ABC into an integraph is presumably the same one he had in early January. The 
$500.000 for an electronic differential analyzer shocked Atanasoff, but the ENIAC cost that and 
more. Perhaps it was not coincidental that at this time GE inquired about the ABC. That March, a 
23 Honeywell, 'Transcript of Proceedings," 12,277-12,278; Herman H. Goldstine, The Computer 
from Pascal to von Neumann (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973), 133; John G. 
Brainerd, "Genesis of the ENIAC," Technology and Culture 17, no. 3 (July 1976), 483-486. 
^ Excerpt quoted in Burks and Burks, The First Electronic Computer, 110-111; also 186-190. 
^ Burks and Burks, The First Electronic Computer, 111 and 186-192. 
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"Testimony of Goldstine before Halladay," 871-872. ISU, Parks, "John Vincent Atanasoff 
Papers" (box 28, folder 3). 
"
7 J. V. Atanasoff, copy of letter to J. W. Mauchly, 31 May 1941. ISU, Parks, "John Vincent 
Atanasoff Papers" (box 25, folder 14). 
28 
"Atanasoff Chronology Event List (Master Copy)," compiled by Dorsey, Marquait, Windhorst, 
West & Halladay, 16 September 1968. 
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GE representative had written to Atanasoff as follows: "it is possible that the General Electric 
Company would have an interest in acquiring the right to make and use the machine or in cooperating 
with the college in its further development."29 Atanasoff responded to GE much like he did to all the 
corporations interested in the ABC: He thanked them but refused to sign any agreement until assured 
of patent rights.30 
Mauchly, now about ready to travel to Ames, replied to Atanasoff as follows: 
At present I can't say just when I shall arrive, but it (is) fairly certain when I shall start out, 
anyway. We wind up our year here with a faculty meeting Tuesday, June 10, in the evening. 
Then we (a friend and his mother are riding with me to Iowa to visit some of their relatives) 
will leave early Wednesday morning. I am not one of those 24-hour drivers, so I will not try 
to equal your record—there is no doubt but that it take us two days. 
And just where in Iowa my friends want to go I haven't found out yet. But I might 
spend Friday the thirteenth at the Univ. of Iowa Colloquium. That would mean that you 
might expect to hear from me that Friday or Saturday, or perhaps find me on your doorstep at 
some late or early hour. 
Enclosed is an announcement that you might find interesting as an example of what 
goes on around here. I suppose there are similar enterprises all over the country. 
Pennsylvania is going in for a defense training course for high school graduates, too. I 
thought I might be teaching in that program, but they haven't notified me of any need for my 
abilities—and they have hired one of our chemistry men. One hears, all around, that 
physicists are in so much demand, but it doesn't seem so in the neighborhood of Collegeville. 
I'll finish this letter when I see you.31 
Note the comment about Atanasoff s "record," alluding to his notorious high-speed driving. Note, 
too, that despite the practically insatiable demand for physicists in defense research, Mauchly, 
actively hunting, was having trouble finding a new position. 
Mauchly gave Atanasoff no further warning before arriving at his home on Friday evening, 
June 13.32 Moreover, he brought his six-year old son, telling his hosts that he had decided to give his 
wife a rest. Caught by surprise, Lura Atanasoff rushed to prepare the guest bedroom. Not only had 
she not expected the boy. she had not expected the father. For all his entreaties to Mauchly to be his 
guest in his home, Atanasoff had not told his wife, or at least had not kept her informed. 
29 H. B. Marvin, General Engineering Laboratory, General Electric Company, letter to John V. 
Atanasoff. 11 March 1941. ISU, Parks, "John Vincent Atanasoff Papers " (box 25, folder 12). 
30 J. V. Atanasoff, copy of letter to H. B. Marvin, General Engineering Laboratory, General Electric 
Company, 20 March 1941. ISU, Parks, "John Vincent Atanasoff Papers" (box 25, folder 12). 
31 John W. Mauchly, letter to J. V. Atanasoff, 7 June 1941. ISU, Parks, "John Vincent Atanasoff 
Papers" (box 25, folder 14). 
32 Atanasoff, interview with Halladay, et al., 11 July 1968, 19-20. 
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Worse, Mauchly behaved inexcusably. He left his son with Lura Atanasoff without a word, 
expecting her to take care of him, and largely ignored them both through his stay while she cooked 
meals for everyone. Mrs. Atanasoff loved guests and socializing, including the family parties held 
regularly by the faculty of the Physics Department, but she came to resent Mauchly and recalled his 
visit all too well when called to testify. She described him as "one of those superior professors," 
"always talking," but rarely in "polite conversation," and with a habit of saying condescendingly, 
"Now, that's interesting."33 
Perhaps Mauchly's deplorable deportment came partly from disappointment. The ABC was 
approaching completion when he saw it—Atanasoff thought several more months ought to do34—so 
Mauchly had opportunity to give it a thorough assessment. In initial deposing, however, he 
downplayed his visit, saying that he spent only thirty minutes or so at the ABC, that Atanasoff had 
been reluctant to speak of it, and anyway, there was not much to it. He could muster no recollection 
of Berry.35 In testimony, he emphasized that the ABC simply had not met his expectations. He 
hinted rather that he found it primitive. As far as he took interest in the computer, he claimed, he 
magnanimously offered suggestions on improvements.36 
Unfortunately for Mauchly, witnesses reported a different story. He "expressed joy" over it, 
countered Atanasoff, who recalled spending twenty-five or thirty hours in discussions on the ABC 
with him. Moreover, according to Atanasoff, all conversations had been open; he and Berry 
answered any question Mauchly asked.37 Likewise, Lura Atanasoff, divorced in 1949, remembered 
Mauchly in constant conversation with her ex-husband on the ABC when at home. Specifically, she 
recalled him asking questions, but he seemed to have trouble understanding explanations.38 
33 Sperry Rand Corporation v. Control Data Corporation, United States District Court, District of 
Maryland, Civil Actions Nos. 15,823-15,824, "Deposition of Lura Atanasoff," 5 December 1967, 9-
14. ISU, Parks, "Clark R. Mollenhoff Papers, 1968-1990" (box 8, folder "Dep-Lura"); Joanne 
Gather, Laguna Miguel, California, tape-recorded interview over telephone with Paul Mobley, 1 July 
1998. 
34 J. V. Atanasoff, copy of letter to R. M. Bowie, Hygrade Sylvania Corporation, 21 May 1941. ISU, 
Parks, "John Vincent Atanasoff Papers" (box 23, folder 5); J. V. Atanasoff, New Market, Maryland, 
interview with H. Tropp, 24 May 1972, 113-115. Smithsonian. 
35 Sperry Rand Corporation v. Control Data Corporation, United States District Court, District of 
Maryland, Civil Actions Nos. 15,823-15,824, "Deposition of John W. Mauchly," 88 and 140. ISU, 
Parks, "John Vincent Atanasoff Papers" (box 19). 
36 Honey well, "Transcript of Proceedings," 11,829-11,830 and 12,161-12,169. 
37 Honeywell, "Transcript of Proceedings," 2,136 and 2,166-2,167. 
38 Honeywell v. Sperry Rand, United States District Court, District of Minnesota, Fourth Division, 
Civil Action File No. 4-67 Civil 138, "Deposition of Lura Atanasoff, " 27-28. ISU, Parks, "Clark R. 
Mollenhoff Papers, 1968-1990" (box 8, folder "Dep-Lura"). 
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Others also refuted Mauchly. Sam Legvold. a graduate student in physics, had primary 
responsibility for Project X, like Berry for the ABC. Work areas for the projects were adjacent in the 
basement of the Physics Building, and Legvold and Berry were friends, so he was introduced to 
Mauchly and talked with him. Legvold remembered Mauchly spending considerable time over 
several days with Berry at the ABC, and even recalled him in shirtsleeves helping. He "was delighted 
with what he saw," according to Legvold. Furthermore, conversations were "no holds barred," 
completely "free and open."39 
Even Berry provided testimony in a letter he wrote in 1963, not long before he died. In the 
letter to R. K. Richards, who had graduated from ISC and vaguely remembered the ABC and wanted 
to know more for a book on digital computers he was researching,40 Berry added the note: "An 
interesting sidelight is that in 1940 or 1941 we had a visit from Dr. John Mauchly who spent a week 
learning all of the details of our computer and the philosophy of its design. He was the only person 
outside of the Research Corporation and the patent counsel who was given this opportunity.'"11 
Particularly important testimony concerned Mauchly's reading of the ABC funding 
manuscript. As mentioned, the manuscript gave an overall description of the computer. Computing 
experts including Caldwell and Thornton Fry had been deeply impressed by it. Atanasoff said that he 
let Mauchly borrow a copy, and it served to facilitate discussions. He thought those discussions had 
covered the entire manuscript. Moreover, Mauchly asked to keep the copy, but Atanasoff refused, as 
he had Fry, allowing him access only in Ames.42 Atanasoff did give Mauchly plenty of paper, 
however, and allowed him to take whatever notes he wished.43 It is conceivable that Mauchly copied 
the entire manuscript by hand. 
39 Sperry Rand Corporation v. Control Data Corporation, United States District Court, District of 
Maryland, Civil Actions Nos. 15,823-15,824, "Deposition of Sam Legvold," 6 December 1967, 22-
25; C. G. Call, memo entitled "Legvold Interview," 21 September 1967, 9-10. ISU, Parks, "Clark R. 
Mollenhoff Papers, 1968-1990" (box 8, folders "Sam Legvold Deposition " and "Call Memos"). 
40 Clark R. Mollenhoff, Atanasoff: Forgotten Father of the Computer (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State 
University Press, 1988), 93; R. K. Richards, copy of unsigned letter to Clifford Berry, 12 March 
1963. ISU, Parks, "Clark R. Mollenhoff Papers, 1968-1990" (box 1, folder "R. K. Richards '); 
Richards credited the ABC as the ancestor of all electronic digital systems. See, R. K. Richards, 
Electronic Digital Systems (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966), 3-4. 
41 Clifford E. Berry, Director of Engineering, Consolidated Electrodynamics Corporation, copy of 
letter to R. K. Richards, 22 March 1963. ISU, Parks, "Clark R Mollenhoff Papers, 1968-1990" (box 
1, folder "R. K. Richards"). 
42 Honeywell v. Sperry Rand, United States District Court, District of Minnesota. Fourth Division, 
Civil Action File No. 4-67 Civil 138, "Deposition of Dr. John V. Atanasoff," 765. ISU, Parks, "John 
Vincent Atanasoff Papers" (box 30); Honeywell, "Transcript of Proceedings," 2,133-2,138. 
43 John Vincent Atanasoff, "Advent of Electronic Digital Computing," in Annals of the History of 
Computing 6, no. 3 (July 1984), 255. 
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For his part, Mauchly barely remembered the manuscript He said he thought it rather 
inadequate and had not bothered with it much. As he phrased it with a haughty air: "there wasn't any 
great reward for me to try to memorize the details ' Oddly, he remembered any number of details on 
occasion. For example, he rather off-handedly recalled discussing magnetic storage devices, a topic 
mentioned in the manuscript. He finally confessed that he may have asked to keep a copy, but that 
was only because he had a habit of collecting "sales literature " and such.44 
It is a wonder that Atanasoff, otherwise cautious, trusted Mauchly. Certainly his family did 
not. His wife, suspicious, warned him not to talk too much.45 Daughter Joanne, about ten-years old 
then, remembered Mauchly intently studying the manuscript and taking notes. She grew alarmed at 
the way he "pumped" her father for further information.46 
In defense of Atanasoff, Mauchly could be charming and had a way of winning sympathy. 
Furthermore, if Atanasoff acted naively, it was partly out of virtue. A rigorously honorable man 
himself, he assumed the same of others, especially scientists. Moreover, not to be underestimated as 
a factor was the isolation that Atanasoff felt. If those feelings seem slightly unreasonable in light of 
full evidence, they were nonetheless real and often intense. He believed that only his graduate 
students appreciated the ABC, but he had found at last in Mauchly a kindred spirit. He put his guard 
down because he desperately wanted a peer who shared his enthusiasm.47 
It is unknown how long Mauchly intended to stay in Ames, but he and his son cut short their 
visit and left on Wednesday. June 18, after receiving a message from his wife of a pending job 
interview.48 Several days later, he sent a letter to Atanasoff, as follows: 
The trip back here was uneventful, except for the fact that I was carrying on a mental debate 
with myself on the question of whether to teach at Hazelton, or to learn something of (sic) U. 
of Pa. My natural avarice for knowledge vied with that for money, and won out, so after 
obtaining assurance ... that some one else to take the Hazelton work, I dropped that and 
prepared to become a student again. 
I drove to Southbridge, Mass., Friday evening, and looked through the American 
Optical plant on Saturday morning. They seemed quite serious in their intentions to me, but 
no decision is to be made for several weeks. 
On the way back east a lot of ideas came barging into my consciousness, but I 
haven't had time to sift them or organize them. They were on the subject of computing 
devices, of course. If any look promising, you may hear more later. 
44 Honeywell, 'Transcript of Proceedings," 11,833-11,835 and 12,161-12,167. 
45 Sperry Rand, "Deposition of Lura Atanasoff." 12 and 17. 
46 Gather, interview with Mobley, I July 1998. 
47 John V. Atanasoff, transcript of interview with Henry S. Tropp, Smithsonian Institution, 24 April 
1972, 14-15; J. V. Atanasoff, transcript of interview with B. Kaplan, Smithsonian Institution, 17 July 
1972, 14-15. Smithsonian. 
48 Honeywell, 'Transcript of Proceedings," 12,210-12,211. 
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I do hope that your amplifier problem has been licked by some adequate design. The 
tubes that I ordered two weeks ago aren't here yet, so I couldn't try anything here even if I 
had the time. 
I forgot to ask what happens to Cliff Berry after he gets a master's degree—does he 
stay on for Ph D. work? 
Please give the enclosed note to your wife. We enjoyed our trip very much, and hope 
you can stop here some time/9 
Mauchly's "mental debate" involved whether to teach a summer defense course to high 
school graduates or take such a course himself at the University of Pennsylvania. As it happened, he 
elected to become a student, and in fact, met Eckert during the course on electronics in which Eckert 
served as lab instructor. That Mauchly felt the need to take the course hints that he did not yet have 
the skills to have done much in electronic computers. Adding to his mental turmoil, Mauchly 
admitted having "a lot of ideas" on computing devices, suggesting that the ABC had indeed 
stimulated his thinking and gave impetus to his decision to enroll in the electronics course. 
Finally, although Atanasoff could not recall the amplifier problem during testimony, a 
contemporary document points to instability of "contact potential difference between (vacuum tube) 
grid and cathode." Atanasoff asked Hygrade Sylvania Corporation for assistance, and he 
subsequently took its advice on how to correct the problem in vacuum tubes in the ABC and, 
probably. Project X.50 
Further evidence that the ABC had impressed Mauchly far more than he later admitted comes 
from a letter he wrote to an acquaintance on 28 June 1941, not long after arriving home in 
Pennsylvania. The letter read in part as follows: 
Immediately after commencement here. I went out to Iowa State University (sic) to see the 
computing device which a friend of mine is constructing there. His machine, now nearing 
completion, is electronic in operation, and will solve within a very few minutes any system of 
linear equations involving no more than thirty variables. It can be adapted to do the job of the 
Bush differential analyzer more rapidly that the Bush machine does, and it costs a lot less. 
My own computing devices use a different principle, more likely to fit small 
computing jobs. 
While at Iowa, I talked on the construction of harmonic analyzers. But I haven't 
done anything about the 27-ordinate cost-estimate as yet. 
All of my time since coming back from Iowa has been taken up with an Emergency 
Defense Training Course at the Univ. of Pa. I had a chance to teach for the summer in a 
defense course given to high school graduates, but turned that down in order to become a 
student myself. I am working in electrical engineering and electronics. Whether or not I am 
49 J. W. Mauchly, letter to J. V. (Atanasoff), 22 June 1941, quoted in Honeywell, "Transcript of 
Proceedings," 2,169-2,170. 
50 J. V. Atanasoff, copy of letter to G. D. O'Neill, Hygrade Sylvania Corporation, 26 July 1941. ISU, 
Parks, "John Vincent Atanasoff Papers" (box 23, folder 5). 
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given a defense job involving electronics later on, the training will be helpful in connection 
with electronic computing devices. 
I haven't had any chance to work on weather problems recently. I did hear Rossby 
talk at Iowa City—concerning the training of students for meteorology, etc. Let's hope your 
own work is getting along well.51 
Note that, contrary to his trial testimony, Mauchly originally considered the ABC an 
electronic computer with significant capabilities. Moreover, this letter makes clear that whatever 
digital computing device he had considered to this point was smaller and based on a different 
principle. Mauchly never disclosed the principle, but presumably it involved flip-flop counting 
circuits. 
Within two months of visiting Atanasoff, Mauchly produced his first documentation of 
preliminary effort towards realizing an electronic digital calculating device. Included in these various 
notes and schematics made during August and September 1941 are references to Atanasoff. For 
example, in a document entitled "Notes on Electrical Calculating Devices," dated August 1941, 
Mauchly included such information as: "computing machines may be conveniently classified as either 
'analog' or 'impulse' types." In a footnote, he added that he was "indebted to Dr. J. V. Atanasoff' for 
that understanding. Mauchly went on to add: 
For speedy (and noiseless) operation, vacuum tubes and associated circuits are the obvious 
answer. There are no essential difficulties in designing V.T. apparatus to do the job of 
ordinary mechanical calculators—but after taking care of stability, freedom from error, ease 
of servicing, etc., one might conceivably wind up with a design too costly to build. But 
economically feasible designs are possible. At present it may not be possible to build a 
commercial competitor for the desk-type mechanical computer, but larger machines for more 
involved, more lengthy, or more specialized jobs are practical.52 
This summary accurately described the problem of the times: People saw the possibility of an 
electronic digital calculator but not how to make one of reasonable capabilities and cost. Atanasoff 
and Berry discovered the keys as embodied by the ABC. and then the computers of today. Eckert and 
Mauchly rather inexplicably regressed to old arts, and in the ENIAC built a computer too expensive 
and limited for anyone but government. 
In testimony, Mauchly proudly called attention to a schematic attached to "Notes on 
Electrical Calculating Devices." that showed, he claimed, "a layout for something which could almost 
be the present day electronic desk calculators that are being manufactured and sold all over the 
51 John W. Mauchly, copy of letter to (H. Helm) Clayton, 28 June 1941. Charles Babbage Institute, 
Honeywell Collection (box 3, folder 7). 
52 John W. Mauchly, "Notes on Electrical Calculating Devices," August 1941. Charles Babbage 
Institute, Honeywell Collection (box 3, folder 7). 
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country now." However, he pointedly failed to mention that in the upper left corner of the schematic 
were the underlined initials "JVA," certainly referring to Atanasoff. Moreover, the desktop machine 
was the most advanced calculator he could show that he had considered to that time, and it only in 
rudimentary form.53 
Also in August, Mauchly applied to the University of Pennsylvania for a position with its 
Moore School of Electrical Engineering.54 The school needed faculty but did not want to hire him. 
Even so, it could find no one else and gave him a job.55 
Mauchly then wrote to Atanasoff, providing best evidence of how enthusiastic he had become 
over the ABC and suggesting how meager his own efforts must have been. The letter, on 30 
September 1941, read as follows: 
This is to let you know that I still have the same living quarters, but a different job. During 
the summer I looked around a bit while sounding out the Ursinus people as to promotions and 
assistance; I finally gave up the idea of taking an industrial job (or a navy job) and stayed in 
the ranks of teaching. 
The Moore School of Electrical Engineering is what I have joined up with, and they 
have me teaching circuit theory and measurements and machinery—but only 11 hours a week 
instead of the 33 that Ursinus had developed into. 
As time goes on, I expect to get a first-hand knowledge of the operation of the 
differential analyzer—I have already spent a bit of time watching the process of setting up 
and operating the thing—and with more such background I hope I can outdo the analyzer 
electronically. 
A number of different ideas have come to me recently anant (sic) computing 
circuits—some of which are more or less hybrids, combining your methods with other things, 
and some of which are nothing like your machine. The question in my mind is this: Is there 
any objection, from your point of view, to my building some sort of computer which 
incorporates some of the features of your machine? For the time being, of course, I shall be 
lucky to find time and material to do more than merely make exploratory tests of some of my 
different ideas, with the hope of getting something very speedy, not too costly, etc. 
Ultimately a second question might come up, of course, and that is, in the event that 
your present design were to hold the field against all challengers, and I got the Moore School 
interested in having something of the sort, would the way be open for us to build an 
"Atanasoff Calculator" (à la Bush analyzer) here? 
I am occupying the office of Travis, the man who designed the analyzer here 
(duplicated at Aberdeen); I think I told you that he is now in the Navy, so I have no 
opportunity of benefiting by his rich experience. 
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I hope your defense efforts have been successful, but not so time-consuming as to 
stop progress on the computer. When you are East, arrange to see us. Perhaps you would 
like to look over the diff. analyzer, etc. 
Convey my best regards to your family, and Cliff Berry and all the gang.56 
First, note Mauchly's unabated interest in the differential analyzer that he hopes to "outdo" 
electronically. Moreover, based on what he had learned in Ames, he was thinking of new methods of 
computing, "hybrids," incorporating Atanasoff s ideas with others, including presumably counting 
circuits and analog methods. He asked to use some of those concepts, perhaps even to build an 
'"Atanasoff Calculator' (à la Bush analyzer)," that is, an ABC with integrating attachment. All this 
points to the ENIAC. Another hint is the mention of Travis, who in fact, had already imparted at least 
the rudiments of his "rich experience" to Mauchly. 
Atanasoff responded quickly to Mauchly's letter, no doubt alarmed at his request to use the 
ideas he had been keeping under guard. The letter, dated 7 October 1941, read as follows: 
I am delighted to hear that you are teaching in the Department of Electrical Engineering at the 
University of Pennsylvania, and I will be sure to get in touch with you the next time I come 
east which should be in the very near future. At that time we can discuss our mutual interest in 
calculators. 
Our attorney has emphasized the need of being careful about the dissemination of 
information about our device until a patent application is filed. This should not require too 
long, and, of course, I have no qualms about having informed you about our device, but it does 
require that we refrain from making public any details for the time being. It is. as a matter of 
fact, preventing me from making an invited address to the American Statistical Association. 
We greatly enjoyed your visit last spring and hope that it can be repeated in the not too 
distant future.57 
Atanasoff made another trip east during October, and wanted to see Mauchly, but could not 
stop in Philadelphia. With misgivings, he took an hour at MIT to look over the Rockefeller Analyzer, 
nearing completion. It impressed him as a "most pretentious structure." Otherwise, his time was 
filled with matters related to Project X. He wrote to Mauchly upon his return to Ames that the trip 
had been "among the most strenuous (times) in my life."58 That letter was their last communication 
until Mauchly went to see Atanasoff at the NOL early in 1943, before beginning the ENIAC. In the 
meantime, the ABC had to be set completely aside to give priority to projects for the national defense, 
beginning with Project X. 
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The purpose of Project X was to develop mechanisms to aid human operators aim antiaircraft 
guns. It and similar projects had urgent status because, at start of World War II, airplanes had 
become a dominant weapon with capabilities that had greatly outpaced countermeasures. Antiaircraft 
gun crews attempted to shoot down airplanes much like hunters kill ducks on the wing by leading 
with their fire. The task was more difficult for aircraft because the guns were much heavier, but to 
the point of Project X, because warplanes flew significantly higher and faster than birds. It took five 
to thirty seconds for a projectile to travel the distance to target, by which time the airplane had flown 
a long way. Compounding the problem, the pilot meanwhile likely made evasive maneuvers, 
including changing directions and speeds. Firing a shell close to target and having it explode on time 
to inflict significant damage was therefore largely luck. In late 1940 over Britain, for example, some 
10,000 rounds of 3-inch antiaircraft fire had to be expended for every German plane downed.59 
Even if ineffectual, antiaircraft equipment was sophisticated and complicated. A typical 
system for the heavier antiaircraft guns included a tracking device consisting of a constant velocity 
mechanism that drove a sighting telescope and measuring instruments. An observer tried to keep the 
crosshairs of the telescope on the target by turning cranks to change the driving velocity and adjust 
for target position. It took two or three members of an antiaircraft gun crew to determine the altitude, 
azimuth (direction), and range of a target.60 Information from the tracking device automatically fed 
into another device, the predictor, which calculated an estimate of the future position of the target 
when a shell might intersect. The prediction went to a ballistics computer that incorporated a pre-
calculated ballistics table and controlled the setting of the shell fuse and aiming of the gun.61 
Project X consisted largely of studies under two consecutive contracts generally dealing with 
aircraft tracking and flight-path prediction. Weaver probably assigned the project to Atanasoff 
because of his combined practical and theoretical skills, because of the project's high priority, and 
because it could be handled at ISC. Particularly important was Atanasoff s expertise in linear 
operators, such as functional, and especially Taylor expansions and similar mathematical techniques, 
typically used to predict, or as mathematicians said, extrapolate, the future positions of aircraft based 
59 Warren Weaver, Scene of Change: A Lifetime in American Science (New York City: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1970), 79; Honeywell, 'Transcript of Proceedings," 2,115. 
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on current positions, velocities, and accelerations.62 Since actions of a pilot under fire tended to be 
purposely erratic, extrapolation was the weakest link in antiaircraft fire control. 
Project X became effective on 1 March 1941, although the contract did not become official 
until May 28. It called for "preliminary studies relating to a fire control device," allowed for $5,000 
of expenditures (including a windfall 50 percent overhead to ISC), and was to terminate with a final 
report by 1 September 1941.63 In his proposal submitted in February, Atanasoff noted that a number 
of formulae had potential, but he suggested that one utilizing the first three terms of a Taylor 
expansion should have advantages in mechanization of the extrapolation process and ease of use.64 
Atanasoff subsequently conducted various studies, issued four associated reports,65 designed a 
predictor, and came in under budget.66 although several days late with the final report.67 He then took 
a rare and much needed vacation to visit his parents in Florida before the ISC fall term began.68 
Even before expiration of the original contract, however, the NDRC, or actually a newly 
created superior organization, the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD), expanded 
the project and issued another contract to continue work until 30 June 1942. The NDRC deemed that 
the predicting mechanism Atanasoff proposed had no "important advantage," although it contained 
"clever and original ideas." It nonetheless decided that certain associated studies "yielded indications 
of an important nature" and wanted to pursue them further. It first approved $18,000 additional 
money, but then decided to have Atanasoff build a prototype predictor after all and changed the value 
of the contract to $22,500.69 In December, the OSRD issued a supplemental agreement to increase 
6
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the amount to $40,500 to include yet more studies.70 It had actually budgeted $75,000 for work by 
Atanasoff at ISC.71 
The studies at ISC involved human subjects, since an observer formed a critical link as a 
"servo-mechanism" in the overall "psycho-mechanical complex" of fire control.72 Atanasoff had 
assistance from Harold V. Gas kill. Dean of Science and Professor of Psychology, and any student 
lingering around the Physics Department likely got conscripted as a test subject. As a basic matter. 
Atanasoff needed the studies to design a tracker-predictor for accurate and easy usage. Other studies 
attempted to define desirable qualifications and training for observers. For example, one study tested 
how well people retained training. It turned out that with "over-learning," that is, thorough training, 
they lost little skill.73 Other tests compared the performance of women and men and were conducted 
anticipating that women might serve as observers. Women did not do as well, but Atanasoff believed 
there was a bias in the tests and concluded that there was probably no actual difference in abilities.74 
Like many scientists thrust into defense research, Atanasoff found the secrecy a burden. It 
caused a "strange atmosphere," giving "rise to some irritation irrespective of the patriotism of the 
individuals," and made it difficult to stay "in an enthusiastic state of mind without contacts with 
others working in the same field." In short, it added to the isolation that Atanasoff felt. He wished 
for more discussions with others doing similar studies, and although there were many, all were far 
away. Thus, he valued the periodic visits made by Weaver and his lieutenants, Caldwell and Fry, 
who served mainly as information middlemen.75 
Actually, visits by the men were something of a mixed blessing. Caldwell came most often, 
but according to Atanasoff, he would, "bemoan the fact that he was in a country where culture was 
not as rampant as it is in Boston."76 When weary of the complaints, and to "demonstrate the cultural 
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atmosphere of Ames," Atanasoff hosted a "musical" at his house and arranged for a mathematics 
professor who was a "fiddler" to play. Shortly after the music began, however, Caldwell excused 
himself and disappeared for most of the performance. Atanasoff did not ordinarily like classical 
music but enjoyed it that night 
At least Caldwell behaved himself; Fry and Weaver did not always. Fry discovered how part 
of the alarm system protecting Project X worked and deliberately set it off as a boyish prank. That 
caused Atanasoff no shortage of trouble with security officials. Another time. Fry and Weaver 
insisted that Atanasoff accompany them out on the town. As they made their way from bar to bar. 
Fry and Weaver announced in each that Atanasoff was a ISC professor, knowing that ISC officials 
frowned on drinking by faculty, even in their homes.77 
When Atanasoff left ISC in September 1942, Project X had been substantially completed, but 
Legvold and Gaskill stayed behind and mopped up paperwork and assorted details. Atanasoff issued 
two major reports under the second contract,78 which came in far under budget.79 He believed he had 
taken visual tracking, or aided laying as it was called,80 about as far as it could go but could do little 
to eliminate extrapolation errors. In any case, aided laying constituted a stopgap effort until better 
technologies could be perfected. By mid-1942, the BTL developed the analog M-9 electrical director, 
which proved deadly to aircraft when used with radar and proximity fuses.81 Atanasoff nonetheless 
felt his research merited greater consideration for use in the war.82 
On the other hand. Weaver testified in Honeywell v. Sperry Rand that Project X had turned 
out "a great disappointment due to Atanasoff s bad behavior." He did not give substantiating 
evidence and there is nothing to support his allegation. Moreover, he made other, clearly spurious, 
charges. For instance, he maintained that as a student Atanasoff had been "near the end of the line," 
when in fact, he had been outstanding, and Weaver himself had given him an A grade in at least one 
class. As for the grant application Atanasoff submitted to the Rockefeller Foundation for the ABC, 
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Warren said he did not remember it but the, "odds were that he would have thrown Atanasoff s paper 
in the waste basket as soon as he opened the envelope." Furthermore, according to Weaver, 
Atanasoff got the NDRC contracts only because the government funded about any research with even 
"slim prospects" for success. When lawyers suggested that what he termed "imaginative" and 
"erratic" behavior in Atanasoff might also indicate brilliance. Weaver would have none of that. The 
essence of his testimony was that he considered Atanasoff, "not awfully able and not awfully 
sound."83 
It is unknown what specifically caused Weaver to bear such deep hatred for Atanasoff for so 
many years. When faced with Weaver's testimony, Atanasoff voiced surprise. He had thought their 
relations fine. Whatever the cause, Atanasoff did not deny some responsibility for the hard feelings. 
In particular, he recalled a time during Project X when Weaver sat in a classroom "sobbing," because 
"no one felt his ideas important." 84 Rather cryptically, Atanasoff explained: "One of my faults is that 
I have an absolutely independent mind and it is not easily controlled by others, and I gathered at that 
time that this was the cause of that."85 In short, he must have been ignoring Weaver's suggestions. It 
is well to remember that both Weaver and Atanasoff were under intense pressure during the war. 
As a side note, Norbert Wiener at MIT did similar studies in antiaircraft fire control as 
Atanasoff.86 Wiener also worked for Weaver, and in fact, Wiener and Atanasoff consulted together 
intensively during Atanasoff s trips back east. Atanasoff thought Wiener eccentric but "a very, very 
able man."87 Even so. Wiener had no better luck developing an effective aircraft flight predicting 
mechanism, but the experience in dealing with control mechanisms and statistical treatment of data, 
for both machines and humans, led him after the war to found cybernetics, described as the study of 
communication and control theory.88 To a smaller extent, Atanasoff interacted with Claude Shannon, 
who as noted, was another key figure in launching communications theory with Weaver.89 
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As another note, it may seem curious that Atanasoff did not incorporate the ABC into 
military activities, such as Project X. After all, as Atanasoff stated the obvious, a fire-control device 
could be "regarded as a combined measuring instrument and computing machine."90 Actually, 
months before Project X, Atanasoff wrote to Dunham Jackson, mathematics professor at the 
University of Minnesota and a rare authority on approximation techniques, and member of the War 
Preparedness Committee, about the ABC. Atanasoff closed by alluding to an earlier conversation 
between the two men, and continued: "I quite agree that it is likely that other applications of 
mathematics will likely be of greater importance (in a war) than the application of mathematics to 
ballistics."91 The implication was that he recognized that the ABC, or machines based on its 
principles, had applications for defense. 
However, when Atanasoff and other computing experts began military projects, fire control 
took priority over other applications of mathematics, including calculating ballistics tables. Despite 
what might be assumed today, analog computers were superior to digital ones for antiaircraft fire 
control, at least then. Atanasoff discussed both categories with Caldwell and Weaver before 
dispassionately recommending that the NDRC continue to use analog machines.92 On the other hand, 
Travis proposed digital computers. Weaver had to refuse under the circumstances.93 RCA, Eastman 
Kodak, and NCR did investigate electronic digital fire-control directors later, although none of the 
projects were completed during the war.94 Even if finished, however, it is doubtful that any could 
have served better than analog devices. 
Digital computers had accuracy as their main advantage. However, inaccuracies of 
computation for fire control were insignificant compared to errors in following, and much worse, 
extrapolation. Furthermore, although digital is associated with speed, analog machines came in great 
variety and some, particularly special-purpose and electrical ones, could operate as fast. Indeed, they 
had the potential to perform essentially in "real time," something digital computers could not do until 
the Whirlwind computer completed in the early 1950s. Whirlwind actually began, in part, as a project 
to build an analog computer, but as a digital machine was not suited for field duty because of its size 
and complexity. Moreover, an analog computer had a major advantage in that signals from 
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measuring instruments could be fed in directly without intermediate processing to digitize, or as 
Atanasoff said, "arithmetize" them. All this was true for both the calculations of extrapolations and 
ballistics in fire control.95 Analog computers served adequately and were simpler and more rugged 
than digital ones.96 
Berry made rapid advancements on the ABC for the first year or so, but with money about 
exhausted by Christmas 1940 and with the start of Project X soon thereafter, progress slowed 
considerably. Atanasoff wrote to Richard Trexler in May 1941, after beginning Project X but while 
waiting for the Research Corporation grant to be released to him: "I find it rather hard to express 
myself about the delays which our project has incurred, in a way that is both lucid and within the 
formal bounds of written correspondence."97 Optimistic nevertheless, he wrote to R. M. Bowie that 
same day: "You will be interested to know that our computing machine project has made great 
strides... I have had two very excellent men assisting me in the construction, and we expect to have 
the entire structure operating during the summer or soon thereafter."98 Besides Berry, the "two very 
excellent men" probably included a student in mechanical engineering, Gert H. Weiseman.99 Robert 
Mather went to work for Berry about this time,100 and Atanasoff came to regard him as excellent.101 
With such help, Atanasoff anticipated completion of the ABC within three or four months. 
A year later, however, he was still estimating that completion might take another two or three 
months. In May 1942. as a guest on an ISC radio program. Berry reported that his and Atanasoff s 
involvement in defense work had greatly hindered the ABC, but they hoped to see its completion 
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during the summer.102 Atanasoff, in equal measures exasperated and confident, likewise confided to 
Howard Poillon that progress on the ABC had been, "greatly retarded by the attention which my 
laboratory is giving to certain investigations in connection with national defense." Otherwise, the 
machine should have been in operation before this time."103 That same day in April, he made a 
formal report to the Research Corporation as follows: 
In spite of the conditions which have tended to draw off technical and scientific ability at all 
levels into war activities, excellent progress has been made during the past year in the 
construction of the computing machine for which you so generously made a grant-in-aid. 
This activity has consisted principally in the actual construction of parts, since a large portion 
of the design work was done before this period. However, considerable work has been done 
in the detail design of the actual working parts of the apparatus. The machine is largely 
completed. The main part left unfinished consists in certain details of the apparatus by which 
numbers are put into and extracted from the machine. In the course of this construction 
numerous tests have been made of working parts and we have this basis for believing that the 
machine will function properly when completed. Our present estimate is that a properly 
trained technician, if he were allowed to put his entire time on this project, could finish it 
within two or three months, but it has (been) and will be necessary to do this work with small 
amounts of several individuals' time when they are not necessarily employed on those 
activities regarded as essential for the nation's welfare.10* 
Sympathetic to Atanasoff s plight. Poillon asked if additional money might help push the 
ABC along.105 Atanasoff replied that the problem did not involve money, but rather 
(The) necessity of using all possible technical help on an N.D.R.C. investigation which we 
are doing under the direction of Dr. Warren Weaver. Yesterday in the laboratory Dr. Weaver 
suggested that it might not be entirely right to defer the construction of our computing 
machine too much in favor of the other work, because the computing machine itself probably 
carries some implications in connection with the national defense. 
I judged from your letter that you would prefer that we push construction on this 
machine even if the costs are somewhat greater (then) under present circumstances. In view 
of this and Dr Weaver's remarks, I shall attempt to advance the construction of the machine 
as rapidly as circumstances permit.106 
Note that Weaver recognized potential for the ABC for defense, even if electronic digital 
computers had not yet become a priority. Soon after this. Berry found a permanent job on the West 
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coast and prepared to leave ISC. He had been looking for a suitable position, hoping to avoid the 
draft while supporting a wife and helping his mother.107 Atanasoff testified that for the few months 
before Berry acquired the job, the local draft board had put heavy pressure upon him. and as a 
consequence. Berry was not his normal self and got little accomplished.108 Furthermore, the Navy 
was pressuring Atanasoff to help with its research.109 He considered several possibilities, and in early 
June flew to San Diego to spend a week examining a Navy sound laboratory.110 In California, he 
wrote to Legvold that he hoped Berry might complete the ABC in his absence.111 Berry did not, and 
Atanasoff made the following request of Poillon at the end of the month: 
We are aggressively continuing the work on the computing machine. I am losing the services 
of Mr. Berry, who has been my assistant since the beginning of the project, but I now have 
another man, Harry Frissel, to work on this project. Besides, I have the part time services of 
an excellent mechanic and some other technical assistants. 
I wish you would consider the possibility of giving this project some defense status 
so we could claim deferment for Mr. Frissel and, perhaps, also for our mechanic. Do you 
think that such steps would be justified, and if so how should we go about it?11" 
It might seem odd that Atanasoff asked the Research Corporation about defense status, since 
it had no authority over such designations. However, as noted. Carroll Wilson was both an official 
within the Research Corporation and Bush's right-hand man at the OSRD. Even so. Bush had no 
special powers with the Selective Service and expended considerable energy attempting to get 
exemptions for scientists, not always successfully.113 Still, Atanasoff thought that if the NDRC took 
the ABC under its wing, he might gain leverage. Poillon and Wilson batted the issue around, 
perplexed on why the ABC should not have a role in the national defense.114 However. Poillon also 
warned Atanasoff that NDRC sponsorship did not guarantee deferments but might jeopardize his 
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patent rights.115 That probably helps explain why Atanasoff did not push harder for defense status for 
the ABC. and why he remained silent about it during the next crucial months.116 Poillon had to 
conclude: "As I see it now, if he (Atanasoff) would have to shift a project (the ABC), which was of 
secondary importance to the war effort, over to N.D.R.C. to obtain exemption for his assistants, it 
would not be proper and investigations (on the ABC) could be better suspended until happier 
days."117 
In setting the ABC aside. Poillon, Wilson, Weaver, Caldwell, Atanasoff, and probably. Bush 
were not being shortsighted but realistic and selfless. These people and others saw merit to electronic 
digital computers, and even had professional and economic interests in them, but now the nation had 
to put its resources where they could do the most good for the war, and such computers simply had 
not yet risen to the top of that list.118 It was unfortunate that when calculating ballistics tables finally 
became a priority for the Army, Mauchly and Eckert were the ones available for the task, and they 
incorporated technologies in the ENIAC far behind those defined by Atanasoff, Berry, and others 
before the war. Electronic digital computers therefore got off on the wrong foot. Commercialization 
of the ABC could have been immediate, instead of the years it took because war and government 
intervened. As noted, low-cost, special-purpose or limitedly general-purpose computers for all 
manner of purposes could have been built based on the ABC without extensive development. Recall 
that the idea of general-purpose computing, but not the stored-program concept, was already well 
known and posed no particular conceptual problems. In going beyond the ABC, designing a 
sufficiently advanced memory posed the greatest challenge, just as with the NOL or LAS computers. 
However, in the case of ballistics equations specifically, there was nothing essential about doing the 
whole job numerically, and the ABC with the integrating attachment that Atanasoff envisioned could 
have been brought into operation quickly and handled the ballistics tables effectively and cheaply. 
Another reason Atanasoff did not make greater effort to have the NDRC sponsor the ABC was 
due to his lose of Berry, who graduated in June 1941 in physics with a thesis entitled "Design of 
Electrical Data Recording and Reading Mechanism." The project pertained to recording and reading 
of binary numbers by the ABC. Berry began his thesis by noting: "In order to realize to the fullest 
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extent the high-speed capabilities of the computing machine proper it is necessary to record and read 
numbers on cards at rates of the order of 60 holes per second." That ambitious goal beyond the 
capabilities of existing EAM equipment was selected to synchronize the operations of the read-write 
system with the rest of the ABC, and involved punching holes in paper cards using high-voltage arcs 
and reading back with lower-voltage arcs that could pass through the cards only at holes. Berry 
considered various circuits and selected two, one for punching and another for reading, promising 
economy and success. Always the consummate engineer. Berry designed circuits to operate under 
large tolerances."9 He then began a Ph.D. degree in physics, also under Atanasoff, and continued to 
develop the circuits. 
Berry, with Weiseman, finished the binary input and output devices but had trouble getting 
the system to function perfectly.120 He and Atanasoff decided the problem might be solved with 
better paper, since one sample performed well. Unfortunately, they did not find a regular supply.121 
Surprisingly, IBM had the same problem. Its recording equipment punched holes 
mechanically, but its readers detected the holes electrically using brushes. Contaminants caused false 
readings often enough that IBM established a laboratory to develop paper specifications and to 
analyze incoming stock, and gave justification to its demand that customers purchase cards 
exclusively from it.'22 
The binary recording and reading devices on the ABC operated at much higher voltages than 
the reading circuits on IBM equipment and, therefore, were far more sensitive to imperfections in the 
paper. Atanasoff and Berry had originally thought that IBM card stock might be satisfactory,123 given 
IBM's exacting standards, but that failing and finding no other available paper suitable, Atanasoff 
thought he might take raw paper and finish (or size) it to his own specifications.124 That plan had to 
be put aside because of the war. 
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Berry and Jean Reed married in a garden ceremony on the ISC campus on 30 May 1942. 
Atanasoff did not approve of the marriage. He believed their personalities too different, but wisely he 
said nothing.125 One month later. Berry and his bride left for Pasadena, California, where he had a 
job with Consolidated Engineering Corporation (CEC), a firm founded by the son of Herbert Hoover. 
As one product, CEC produced mass spectrometers, instruments that sort molecules by mass and 
thereby analyze chemicals. The oil and gas industry in particular found mass spectrometers useful, 
but the process of analysis resulted in sets of linear algebraic equations. Thus, CEC had great interest 
in the ABC, but Berry could only disclose generalities without a patent application on file.126 
However, although assigned to mass spectrometers at CEC, Berry led a team that in 1945 produced a 
popular commercial analog computer, the Model 30-103 Electrical Computer, that could solve 
algebraic equation sets up to twelve unknowns.127 
Incidentally, CEC changed its name to Consolidated Electrodynamics Corporation (still CEC) 
and moved into commercial electronic digital computers. In 1956, it sold its computer division, 
Electrodata, to Burroughs.128 In 1986, Burroughs merged with Sperry Corporation (formerly Sperry 
Rand). Berry had little involvement in CEC's digital computers, but he became a recognized 
authority in mass spectrometers. At his death, he held thirty-three patents, with another eleven 
pending. Most dealt with mass spectrometry. He had also authored seventeen technical publications, 
most single author. 
Berry leaving spelled the end of the ABC, because Atanasoff did not attend to it during his 
final two months at ISC.129 Mather had left shortly before Berry to take a job at the NOL. Atanasoff 
hired Harry Frissel to replace them but provided him with minimal guidance. Atanasoff, remember, 
depended upon Berry for practical understanding of the ABC. Frissel, a graduate student in physics, 
had several weeks with Berry, and although he had no experience in electronics, believed he 
understood the ABC. He thought it complete and spent his time investigating paper for binary punch 
cards. He recalled Atanasoff being quite enthusiastic about the ABC, considering it "vital," but saw 
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little of him and made no progress as a result.130 However, even if Frissel did not know, Atanasoff 
thought that the ABC contained a few minor wiring problems. Mid-summer, he wrote to Mather that 
the "maze of wiring still hides several 'bugs!'"131 In August, Atanasoff wrote to another ex-student: 
"The computing machine is not finished, and I have been forced to the conclusion that I must 
abandon it for the duration. The difficulty is that I cannot keep men working on it under the present 
circumstances."132 
Atanasoff worked hard his last summer in Ames to wrap up Project X. The OSRD wanted to 
extend the contract until 1 February 1943. However, Atanasoff decided that all related research worth 
doing could be completed by September 1. At end of July, he offered his services to the government 
however else it might need them.133 A month later, he wrote to his parents: "It is commencing to 
seem likely that I will feel duty bound to take a position on the east coast for the duration of the 
war."134 The NOL by then had taken a keen interest in Atanasoff. Although he had little knowledge 
of acoustics, his expertise in crystal physics and electronics made him invaluable for development of 
instrumentation for acoustic testing.135 By September 2, the red tape had been mostly cleared, 
including taking leave of absence from ISC and arranging for Legvold to handle his classes, and the 
Navy told Atanasoff to report for duty in Washington, D C., on September 14.136 
Atanasoff went to the NOL because he felt it his patriotic duty. Still, he might have found 
another defense project at ISC. With the school already topsy-turvy due to the war, in January 1942 
he took it upon himself to write to the NDRC. which preferred giving its lucrative contracts to the 
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same elite institutions represented by its officials, that ISC was being underutilized. ISC had three 
NDRC projects, his and two in chemistry, but he believed more ISC scientists should be involved.137 
The following month, the OSRD established the Ames Project at ISC to purify uranium for the 
atomic bomb, but presumably Atanasoff s letter had no impact on that decision.138 
Of course, leaving Iowa gave Atanasoff the opportunity to become involved in the "big 
science" projects that the war established. It also increased his salary significantly. Finally, his 
marriage was in trouble and going to the NOL provided a way out.139 To this point in his life, 
Atanasoff had put the preponderance of his formidable energies into his professional work; his family 
had never gotten more than an afterthought. For instance, Lura Atanasoff testified that her ex-
husband had spent "every spare minute working on his computer," first "dreaming" about it, then 
building it: "Well, of course, that affects a family," she recalled.140 
Leaving Ames did not solve his personal problems, and perhaps only aggravated them. He 
had always left most family matters to his wife, so that did not change, but now he was far away and 
unable to assist when needed. Sadly, his wife desperately needed his help. In November 1943, 
Gaskill wrote to him most urgently as follows: 
I am distressed by Mrs. Atanasoff s condition ... (and) suggest that you return for a brief 
'check up' on your family. Apparently Elsie's remarkable recovery which I reported to you 
verbally recently in Washington was premature and optimistic. She has recently been 
confined again to bed and I think Mrs. Atanasoff is very greatly in need of confidence and 
reassurance from you. She has undoubtedly gone through severe strain and has not wanted 
you to know.141 
Elsie had severe asthma, a condition afflicting most of the family to a lesser extent. Some 
months later, and after weeks of frantic and lonely preparation, Lura Atanasoff loaded her children, 
and a kettle of boiled hypodermic needles needed to give Elsie her shots, into the family car and 
moved to Florida. Atanasoff thought Florida had a healthful climate, and he wanted his family where 
his relatives could help. However. Elsie spent much of her time there in a hospital, so Lura Atanasoff 
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moved again, this time to Boulder, Colorado.142 Atanasoff visited home perhaps six times during the 
war143 but mostly worried helplessly. 
Over a month before leaving Ames, Atanasoff sent Trexler, recently promoted to full partner, a 
package of information to be used in a patent application. It included a written description prepared 
mostly by Berry, associated drawings, and a list of claims that Atanasoff proposed. He kept the 
claims simple upon advice from the Patent Office.144 The drawings were not finished, but Atanasoff 
wanted Trexler's criticisms first.145 
Unfortunately, Trexler had started a large legal case that he could not relinquish. He proposed 
that someone else handle the application until he could be freed, but Atanasoff refused.146 Trexler did 
not thus turn his attention to the ABC until November.147 By then Atanasoff had been at the NOL for 
a couple of months. At first, Trexler thought the materials essentially complete,148 but upon close 
study found references to drawings he did not have. Just before Christmas, he asked for an 
explanation.149 Atanasoff responded in early January that the omissions were deliberate. He and 
Berry had decided that the drawings sent represented a "continuous and quite complete picture."150 
Trexler insisted on having the others, because they showed components that "are integral parts of the 
machine which must be disclosed."151 Atanasoff did not agree, but asked Legvold at ISC to forward 
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the omitted drawings.152 Legvold could not locate the drawings,153 and in March, Atanasoff visited 
ISC. Atanasoff did not find the missing drawings either, but remained as enthusiastic as ever about 
the ABC He therefore arranged for new ones to be made.154 They were completed,155 but then 
Trexler asked for revisions to the written description. Months went by with Trexler prodding 
Atanasoff to finish,156 and then the records stop. The last correspondence until years later came in 
November 1943, when in a letter, Trexler warned Atanasoff not to delay in revising the description 
because of the "current activity in electronics and calculators."157 
So why did the ABC not get patented? No one during litigation could explain, including 
Atanasoff, although he tended to blame ISC and Trexler.158 Trexler stated during deposing that, 
"there was no definite reason why it (the application on the ABC) was not filed. It just was not filed. 
We just did not complete it."159 In his defense, Trexler had suggested to Atanasoff at the beginning 
that he consider filing multiple applications instead of one that covered everything, and that might 
have made it easier to get at least part of the ABC patented.160 At ISC, R. E. Buchanan faulted the 
war. "Had it not been for war interference," he averred, "I believe our Research Foundation would 
have played a large part in computer development."161 Weight of evidence suggests that Buchanan 
had it most right. All agreed, however, that the ABC was an invention well worth patenting. 
The world's first electronic digital computer got stripped and consigned to the junk pile, 
instead. Legvold eventually joined Atanasoff at the NOL. Moreover, he finished his Ph.D. degree 
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there under Atanasoff, since Atanasoff remained on the ISC faculty. Legvold graduated with a 
dissertation entitled "Naval Ordnance Laboratory Report #831."162 ISC got one copy and locked it in 
a safe. Anyone who read it had to have proper security clearances. Legvold returned to ISC in 1946 
and become a faculty member in physics. He asked Atanasoff, first in 1946 and again in 1947, if he 
could revitalize the ABC. He even found an interested graduate student.163 Atanasoff, still at the 
NOL, approved.164 However, Legvold got little accomplished before it was too late. 
The ABC required rebuilding because graduate students had been robbing parts. Berry 
himself had a hand in that. In 1948, he finished a doctorate under Legvold with a dissertation entitled 
"Effects of Initial Energies on Mass Spectra." He conducted his research at CEC under physicist 
Harold Washburn but made it back to ISC intermittently. When there, students eagerly sought his 
help. For example, Harry Svec, ISU Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Chemistry, remembered 
Berry, with perhaps the glint of a tear in his eye, telling him what parts to take from the ABC to use in 
fabricating a mass spectrometer for his graduate research.165 
Then, with available space in the Physics Building scarce, Gerald Fox, by now head of a 
growing physics department, told a student that if he cleaned the area where the ABC was stored, he 
could use it as a laboratory. Thus, without Atanasoff s permission, the ABC got stripped of its 
remaining usable parts and scrapped by Robert Stewart, who later worked with Atanasoff at the NOL 
and finally became chairman of the computer science department at ISC. Stewart had no idea what it 
was he junked, but recalled years later that he probably had to disassemble the ABC to allow its safe 
removal up rickety stairs and out the basement. Atanasoff felt certain that Fox ordered the ABC 
destroyed out of spite, but Stewart had no sense of that.166 
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Atanasoff became Chief Scientist, Army Field Forces, in 1949. In 1951, he went back to the 
NOL as director of the Navy Fuze167 Program. He left in 1952 to establish The Ordnance 
Engineering Corporation, which he and other shareholders sold to Aerojet-General Corporation in 
1956. He stayed on as an executive until resigning in 1961. He voiced regret at having spent so 
much of his career in weapons research, but never lost interest in computers. Meeting with Sperry 
Rand in 1959, for example, he inquired if it might have need for a "machine in which the operating 
characteristics would be somewhere between a desk calculator and a punch card input electronic 
tabulator."168 About this same time, he discussed with Berry his plans for a binary pneumatic digital 
computer.169 He did nothing with these ideas, however. 
Atanasoff and his wife divorced in June 1949. He married Alice Crosby two days later. 
Originally from Webster City. Iowa, Crosby went to Washington, D C., during the war and learned 
drafting. The two met when she did work for him.170 They made a good couple, helped, no doubt, by 
his mellowing slightly with time. Happily, time also brought him closer to his children. What is the 
purpose of life? Feeding babies, according to Atanasoff in his autumn years. Preoccupied during his 
children's childhoods, he found enjoyment in their children. 
Ex-wives have a reputation for being bitter, but Lura Atanasoff spoke of her former husband 
with admiration. She testified that he was "really kind," "always doing good for people," and a man 
who always spoke the truth.171 Similarly. Atanasoff was quite proud of his ex-wife. She proved as 
remarkable as he. The climate in Colorado agreed with Elsie, so Lura Atanasoff and her children 
settled permanently in Boulder. She taught Navajo children who had tuberculosis. As part of that 
experience, she developed her artistic talents and became a self-supported artist of some renown.172 
Sadly for such a genuinely decent and creative person. Berry's story ended tragically. He had 
a solid marriage and two children, despite Atanasoff s misgivings. His life went downhill after an 
automobile wreck in 1957. Driving to work one morning, he got bumped from behind at an 
167 Fuze was the Navy spelling for fuse. 
168 R. H. Sorensen, Assistant to the Vice President of Engineering, Remington Rand, Division of 
Sperry Rand, letter to John V. Atanasoff, 17 April 1959. ISU, Parks, "John Vincent Atanasoff 
Papers " (box 6. folder 6). 
169 Clifford E. Berry, letter to J. V. Atanasoff, 13 May 1959. ISU. Parks, "John Vincent Atanasoff 
Papers" (box 25. folder 23). 
170 Atanasoff. interview with Turner, 27 October 1986, 76-77. 
171 Sperry Rand, "Deposition of Lura Atanasoff." 16. 24, and 33; Philip Hart, as another, described 
Atanasoff as "warm and caring." Philip J. Hart, letter to Clark R Mollenhoff, 17 September 1988. 
ISU. Parks. "Clark R. Mollenhoff Papers, 1968-1990" (box 3, folder 30). 
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~ Gather, interview with Mobley, 1 July 1998; Joanne Gather. Laguna Miguel, California, tape-
recorded interview over telephone with Paul Mobley, 6 July 1998. 
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intersection. Berry exchanged information with the other driver, got back into his car, but then 
blacked out and hit a parked car himself. His physician suspected that antihistamines he took to 
counter an allergic reaction to a tetanus shot might have been a factor. In any case. Berry sustained 
brain and spinal damage that left him susceptible to convulsive seizures.173 Moreover, although a star 
within CEC, he became unhappy after it was acquired by Bell & Howell Company. At some time in 
this, but probably as a result of the automobile wreck, he began drinking heavily. By 1963, he had 
shaken his alcohol problem, although he may have backslid. He took a job with Vacuum Electronics 
Corporation (VEECO) on Long Island, New York. Leaving his wife in California to wrap up matters 
there. Berry began his new job. He died in the hotel in which he lived on 30 October 1963. He had 
suffocated, a plastic bag tied with shoestrings over his head.174 The death was ruled a suicide, but 
both Jean Berry and Atanasoff suspected murder. Atanasoff reached his conclusion after personally 
investigating several years later,175 but whatever evidence he found was not enough to convince the 
police to reopen the case.176 
The ABC was never forgotten completely. Both Atanasoff and Berry had discreet inquiries 
over the years, mostly from lawyers representing computer firms.177 Atanasoff s meeting in 1959 
with Sperry Rand was part of an investigation it conducted into the ABC. for example.178 The 
representative for Sperry Rand noted that Atanasoff received him cordially but refused to allow a 
review of his records, and furthermore, for "personal and other reasons. Dr. Atanasoff seems anxious 
not to become embroiled in any legal entanglements on behalf of ourselves or others."179 
173 Robert H. Pudenz. M.D., copy of letter to J. C. Conn, Driver Improvement Analyst, Department of 
Motor Vehicles. State of California, 13 May 1957; Robert H. Pudenz, M.D, copy of letter to Frank J. 
Weiss, 5 November 1957; G. Butler, Driver Improvement Analyst, Department of Motor Vehicles. 
State of California, copy of letter to Clifford Edward Berry, 29 May 1963; Jean Berry, letter to Clark 
R Mollenhoff, 9 September 1986. ISU, Parks, "Clark R. Mollenhoff Papers, 1968-1990" (box 7, 
envelopes postmarked 12 September 1986). 
174 Leon Schechterman, M.D., copy of autopsy of Clifford E. Berry, Suffolk County, New York, 30 
October 1963. ISU, Parks, "Clark R. Mollenhoff Papers, 1968-1990" (box 7, envelopes dated 12 
September 1986). 
175 Jean Berry, letter to Clark R. Mollenhoff, 2 August 1988; John V. Atanasoff, copy of letter to 
(Chas. R.) Dillon, 15 February 1974. ISU, Parks, "Clark R. Mollenhoff Papers, 1968-1990" (box 7, 
folder entitled "Jean Berry" and envelope from Clayton Morlan). 
176 For more on the death of Berry, see Mollenhoff, Atanasoff, 103-105 and 121-122. 
177 Atanasoff, "Advent of Electronic Digital Computing," 261. 
178 Honeywell, "Transcript of Proceedings," 2,305-2.308. 
179 R. H. Sorensen, memorandum entitled "Visit with Dr. J. Atanasoff," to C A. Norton, T. C. Fry, F. 
J McNamara, and H. Engstrom, 30 April 1959, quoted in Honeywell, "Transcript of Proceedings," 
2,314-2.317. 
205 
The ABC finally became an issue with the awarding of a patent on the ENIAC in 1964. 
Eckert and Mauchly had by then sold much of their rights to it and other patents and applications to 
Remington Rand, which merged with Sperry Corporation in 1955 to become Sperry Rand 
Corporation. It assigned the ENIAC patent to Illinois Scientific Developments (ISD), a wholly 
owned subsidiary created for handling matters related to the patent.180 Ensuing legal actions pitted 
Sperry Rand against other manufacturers of computers and associated equipment that desired to avoid 
paying the royalties demanded by Sperry Rand. Of note is a lawsuit filed in 1964 in which Sperry 
Rand sued the Control Data Corporation for infringing on the regenerative memory patent associated 
with the EDVAC. Tried briefly without resolution in 1972, Sperry Rand v. Control Data Corp. was 
finally settled outside of court for undisclosed terms in 1981.181 
A second lawsuit involved the ENIAC patent and twenty-five other Sperry Rand patents and 
patent applications, including the regenerative memory patent. Most of these gave Eckert and 
Mauchly as the inventors or named Eckert alone.182 The case began as two lawsuits filed the same 
day. On 26 May 1967. Sperry Rand sued Honeywell, Inc.. in the U.S. District Court for the District 
of Columbia for infringing on the ENIAC patent. Honeywell had gotten into the computer business 
in 1955 in a joint venture with Raytheon. It soon bought out Raytheon's interests and made other 
acquisitions. By 1972. Honeywell had become a distant second to IBM in computer sales.183 
A mere fifteen minutes earlier that same day, 26 May 1967, Honeywell had sued Sperry Rand 
in the U.S. District Court for Minnesota in Minneapolis. Honeywell initially charged Sperry Rand 
with violating the Sherman Act by enforcing a fraudulently procured patent. The suit at this point 
involved only the ENIAC patent. Honeywell sought damages and to have the ENIAC patent declared 
invalid and unenforceable. Honeywell later expanded its lawsuit to include other Sperry Rand patents 
and applications and a violation of the Clayton Act. They also added a charge under the Sherman Act 
dealing with an exclusive cross-licensing agreement that Sperry Rand entered into with IBM in 1956. 
Summarized briefly, in its legal actions Honeywell accused Sperry Rand of violating antitrust laws by 
180 Honeywell Inc. vs. Sperry Rand Corporation and Illinois Scientific Developments, Inc., United 
States District Court, District of Minnesota, Fourth Division. Civil Action File No. 4-67 Civil 138, 
Earl R. Larson, "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order for Judgment," 19 October 1973, 
sections 0.1.3 and 15.13.1. ISU. Parks, "Henry L. Hanson Papers " (box 5, folders 4-8). 
181 Atanasoff, "Advent of Electronic Digital Computing," 278. The patent involved in Sperry Rand 
v. Control Data was Patent No. 2.629.827. The legal case was often referred to as the regenerative 
memory case, or the Baltimore case, since it was assigned to the Federal District Court in Baltimore. 
Maryland. 
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attempting to monopolize the computer industry, and with trying to charge royalties for patents that 
for a number of reasons were not valid or enforceable patents. The federal government consolidated 
all charges from the two lawsuits, and John Sirica. Chief Judge of the District of Columbia and later 
famous in Watergate hearings, assigned them to the U.S. District Court in Minneapolis as Honeywell 
v. Sperry Rand and ISD. 
While preparing for trial, lawyers for Control Data and Honeywell came to realize that claims 
from the ENIAC, regenerative memory, and other Eckert-Mauchly patents derived in part from the 
ABC. A patent is awarded only for an original invention made by the claimant. Therefore, Control 
Data knew that if it could prove the connection between the work of Atanasoff and Berry and that of 
Eckert and Mauchly, it could invalidate the regenerative memory patent. Sperry Rand would then be 
forced to drop its suit and could not collect royalties. Thus, proving that connection became key to 
Control Data's defense strategy, although it did not make much in-court use of it because, as noted, 
the lawsuit eventually got settled outside of court. 
For its part, Honeywell hoped to invalidate the ENIAC patent using the same plan of proving 
derivation from the ABC. among other unrelated strategies. Honeywell actually had easier way of 
invalidating the patent, although patents are generally assumed relatively secure from attack. Sperry 
Rand insisted that the ENIAC be recognized as the first automatic electronic digital computer, and 
that its patent be read so broadly as to cover almost all computers. To invalidate the ENIAC patent, 
then, Honeywell only had to demonstrate that the ABC was an automatic electronic digital computer 
that came before the ENIAC.184 Honeywell did not need to prove the ENIAC derived from it. As the 
case turned out, Honeywell had it both ways by proving the ABC was the computer that came first 
and that the ENIAC depended upon it. Eckert, Mauchly, and Sperry Rand did not give in easily, 
however. Mauchly denied learning or using anything of importance from Atanasoff and Berry. He 
admitted telling Eckert about the ABC. but in his testimony Eckert agreed that the information had 
been of no value to them.185 The evidence indicated the contrary, and for this reason and others. 
184 The ENIAC patent is No. 3,120.606. "Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer," filed 26 
June 1947. On page 1. column 2. Eckert and Mauchly made the claim that the ENIAC "is the first 
general purpose automatic electronic digital computing machine known to us." If Sperry Rand had 
stood by this distinction of the ENIAC being general purpose, instead of insisting that it was the first 
electronic digital computer of any kind, its case might have done better in court. 
185 In testimony for Honeywell v. Sperry Rand, Mauchly said he had little memory of discussing the 
ABC with Eckert. In earlier deposition for Sperry Rand v. Control Data, however, he had said that he 
talked about it with a number of people at the University of Pennsylvania, including Eckert. 
Honeywell, "Transcript of Proceedings," 12.213-12,218 and 12,279-12,283; Sperry Rand, 
"Deposition of John W. Mauchly," 94. 
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Judge Larson declared the ENIAC patent invalid and unenforceable, as had been requested by 
Honeywell. He ruled the other Sperry Rand patents, including the regenerating memory patent, 
unenforceable but not invalid. Honeywell had not asked for a ruling on the validity of those 
patents.186 
Honeywell v. Sperry Rand remains one of the longest and most complex federal trials in 
history. In 135 days of trial, lawyers from both sides introduced some 33,000 exhibits and heard 
depositions and testimony from 157 witnesses.187 Honeywell won the lawsuit as a practical matter, 
although it did not win on all points or get damages it sought. Even before trial began, for example. 
Judge Larson disallowed Honeywell's charge under the Clayton Act. That charge dealt with the right 
of Remington Rand to buy the ENIAC patent Then at close of trial, heard without a jury. Judge 
Larson ruled that Sperry Rand had not monopolized the industry, which concerned Honeywell's first 
charge under the Sherman Act. He did find that Sperry Rand had conspired with IBM to create a 
monopoly. This ruling dealt with Honeywell's expansion of their original charge under the Sherman 
Act. Moreover, Judge Larson believed Honeywell had suffered injury but awarded no damages 
because Honeywell had not acted with diligence. 
Even without damages, the royalties Honeywell avoided paying by invalidating the ENIAC 
patent made the lawsuit worthwhile for it. Sperry Rand had demanded $250 million in royalties from 
Honeywell, although it eventually dropped the figure to about $20 million.188 Moreover, Honeywell 
received some money because of the trial. Sperry Rand paid Honeywell not to appeal Judge Larson's 
decisions. The amount of money has not been disclosed, but Atanasoff understood it covered 
litigation costs for Honeywell. As badly as the trial went for Sperry Rand, it obviously believed the 
outcome could have been worse and did not appeal the rulings itself. 
Atanasoff won little in the lawsuits other than the satisfaction of having the ABC legally 
recognized as the computer that came before the ENIAC. and therefore, for lack of evidence of an 
earlier one, as the first electronic digital computer. He received no financial gain from either trial 
other than consultant's fees. Early on, Atanasoff and Iowa State University (formerly ISC) sought to 
intervene in both lawsuits to have Atanasoff recognized as a joint inventor of the ENIAC and other 
186 Henry Halladay, Dorsey, Marquait, Windhorst, West and Halladay, for Honeywell, "Plaintiffs 
Final Brief on the Merits." 30 September 1972, 481. ISU, Parks, "Clark R. Mollenhoff Papers, 1968-
1990 " (box 6). 
187 Honeywell, "Findings of Fact," sections 0.4 - 0.4.6. 
188 Honeywell. "Findings of Fact," sections 15.25, 15.25.12, 15.25.23.6, 15.28, 15.38, 15.39, 19.4, 
19.5. 21.1-21.6. 24.1, and 26.1-26.1.4. 
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Eckert-Mauchly devices. If the interventions had been successful, patents involved could not have 
been declared invalid for reasons of derivation from him. If the patents had then withstood other 
legal attacks, Atanasoff and ISU could have made a lot of money. Atanasoff s name was not added to 
any of the patents, however. In the suit involving Honeywell, intervention was not timely. By the 
time Atanasoff and ISU agreed on terms of intervention, and after some legal maneuvering and a false 
start or two. Judge Larson ruled they were too late.189 Litigation had progressed too far to be 
interrupted. The issue became moot when he declared the patents unenforceable or invalid for 
reasons other than derivation from Atanasoff. That is, it served no purpose to add an inventor's name 
to a patent already declared invalid or unenforceable. Likewise, once the regenerative memory patent 
was declared unenforceable in the Honeywell case, there was no reason to pursue intervention in the 
Control Data suit, which was settled later outside of court. 
The computer industry as a whole came out the real winner in Honeywell v. Sperry Rand. 
Sperry Rand had been claiming nothing less than: "No data processing machine of any consequence . 
.. in the United States today is being made that does not make use of inventions covered by this 
(ENIAC) patent."190 In other words, without considering its other patents, but based solely on the one 
for the ENIAC, Sperry Rand demanded the right to collect royalties for practically every computer 
made in the United States. They were asking major sums of money, too, as the experience of 
Honeywell attests. Had the patent been upheld, the computer industry might have been stifled for the 
seventeen-year life of the patent. Judge Larson's decisions therefore had momentous ramifications 
for the computer industry and the nation, but it got little news coverage. He released his decisions on 
19 October 1973 in the midst of the turmoil surrounding the beginning of the end of the Nixon 
presidency. In particular, 20 October 1973 is the date of the infamous Saturday Night Massacre in 
which President Nixon had Watergate special prosecutor Archibald Cox fired, but not before 
Attorney General Elliot Richardson and Deputy Attorney General William Rickelshaus resigned 
rather than do the firing themselves. The resulting controversy pushed out other news. 
Although the outcome of Honeywell v. Sperry Rand suggests that Mauchly stole ideas from 
Atanasoff and Berry for use in the ENIAC, that conclusion is unjustified based strictly on legally 
determined fact. Honeywell alleged that Eckert and Mauchly committed fraud by not crediting 
189 Atanasoff, "Advent of Electronic Digital Computing," 273-274 and 278; For a summary of the 
details of the attempt by Atanasoff and ISU to intervene in the lawsuits, see Mary Greenwood, 
memorandum to Steve Knudsen. 28 November 1977, in ISU, Parks, "John Vincent Atanasoff Papers" 
(box 46, folder 5). 
190 The quotation is from Honeywell. "Findings of Fact," section 12.2.1.1. 
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Atanasoff s work, so Judge Larson considered the matter, but he did not find the two men guilty of 
fraud for that reason.'91 Nor did Judge Larson find fraud in ten other categories in which Honeywell 
charged fraud.'92 Fraud found in all cases would have been against the Patent Office, not against 
Honeywell or Atanasoff. The standard of evidence for a finding of fraud is high, however. As Judge 
Larson put it. a finding of fraud requires more than a preponderance of evidence; it requires "clear 
and convincing evidence."193 Evidence presented by Honeywell fell short of that rightly rigorous 
standard, although Judge Larson gave the impression in a "Findings of Fact," in which he presented 
his verdict, that if evidence for a finding of fraud in several categories fell short, it fell short by not 
much. 
Indeed, while not finding enough evidence of "willful and intentional" fraud to warrant 
invalidating the patent on that basis. Judge Larson found enough "inequitable conduct" to declare the 
patent unenforceable.194 His citations of "various derelictions of Eckert and Mauchly and their 
counsel" in pursuit of the ENIAC and other patents do cast them in suspicious light. Evidence 
suggested that they had suppressed information, withheld documents, and made misleading 
statements, among other reprehensible behaviors. Even so, in each case Judge Larson added that 
extenuating circumstances might absolve Eckert and Mauchly of some guilt.195 
As one example. Judge Larson considered the issue of "delay before the Patent Office" as an 
area of potential fraud related to the ENIAC patent. Approval of the patent application took almost 
seventeen years, and much of that extraordinary approval time resulted from interferences that Eckert 
and Mauchly with Remington Rand or Sperry Rand instigated. From 1951 through 1957, for 
example, after the ENIAC patent application had been filed, they "copied" 152 claims from other 
patents and then initiated interferences while the claims were sorted out. The Patent Office ruled 
against them on 147 of those claims, and Judge Larson believed many had been "unwarranted." The 
interferences served not to gain credit for other inventions, or to protect the ENIAC, but to take up 
191 The legal actions rarely cited Berry, because Honeywell decided it better served its purposes to 
focus on Atanasoff. 
19
~ Judge Larson took all the complaints from Sperry Rand and Honeywell and parsed them into the 
decision categories that made up the sections in his "Findings of Fact." The first eleven sections deal 
with specific categories of complaints by Honeywell in which it asked for rulings invalidating the 
ENIAC patent. He then added a twelfth section, dealing generally with validity, and a thirteenth for 
fraud. These latter two sections, like the previous eleven sections, concern only the ENIAC patent. 
The "Findings of Fact" then addressed the other issues in additional sections. 
193 Honeywell, "Findings of Fact," section 13.1. 
194 Honeywell, "Findings of Fact," sections 12.3.3-12.3.3.20. 
195 Honeywell, "Findings of Fact," sections 13.12, 13.12.1, 13.12.17, 13.34, 13.36.1, and 13.37.7, as 
examples. 
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time. The longer it took to grant the ENIAC patent, the longer its effective life and greater its value. 
The interferences also gave Sperry Rand leverage in royalty agreements. Judge Larson believed that 
Eckert, Mauchly, and Sperry Rand had crossed ethical lines, although he also understood that a new 
technology like the computer might foster interferences while details got resolved. In the end he 
found delay, but not "intentional delay," and it was only "with reluctance" that he did not invalidate 
the ENIAC patent on that basis. Once again he ruled it unenforceable.196 
As another example of misconduct, Eckert, Mauchly, and Sperry Rand modified the ENIAC 
patent application after its initial submittal to keep it current. In particular, they originally included a 
definition of "pulse," a word that gets at the essence of a digital computer, but that they had defined 
by its duration, or width, consistent with the ENIAC. By the 1960 s, that definition had become 
inadequate to describe the narrower pulse widths of newer computers, so they modified the definition 
to cover all digital computers. Judge Larson ruled that they had thus "improperly broadened" the 
application and invalidated nine claims in which the word pulse or related words appeared.197 
If not quite sufficient for a finding of fraud, ample evidence existed for Judge Larson to 
declare the entire ENIAC patent invalid and unenforceable in four separate categories of complaints. 
That is. of eleven categories of complaints filed by Honeywell specifically pertaining to the ENIAC 
patent, and in which it sought to rule the patent invalid for reasons of fraud. Judge Larson found 
blatant fraud in none. In four categories he nonetheless found justification to render the patent both 
invalid and unenforceable. These four are in addition to the two categories noted above, "delay" and 
"fraud," in which the patent was declared simply unenforceable. Furthermore, for various reasons he 
invalidated nineteen of 148 specific claims made in the ENIAC patent. It should be noted that Judge 
Larson did not examine all 148 claims in the patent, one by one, for validity. Rather, he considered a 
few claims as representative. Thus, that Judge Larson found nine claims had been improperly 
broadened means that nine claims had been improperly broadened out of seventeen claims he 
happened to consider. He did not examine the other 131 claims. It must also be noted that the 
seventeen representative claims were not chosen randomly, nor did Honeywell select them; rather, 
ISD picked them as evidence for its charge of patent infringement against Honeywell. It is therefore 
safe to assume that Sperry Rand used those claims because it believed they best represented its case 
196 Judge Larson defined interferences as "proceedings in the Patent Office to determine who, 
between two or more parties, is entitled to priority of invention." Honeywell, "Findings of Fact," 
section 11.51; also sections 11.5, 11.5.5, 11.5.6, 11.14-11.14.5, and 12.3.2. 
197 Honeywell. "Findings of Fact." sections 10.1.6-10.1.7. 
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against Honeywell. In addition. Judge Larson invalidated three claims for "derivation from 
Atanasoff." These three include one on the ISD list.198 
Concerning the patent as a whole, the four categories in which Judge Larson declared it 
invalid and unenforceable were "public use," "on sale," "publication," and of course, "derivation 
from Atanasoff." The first three deal with much the same thing: public disclosure. By law, once an 
invention has seen public use, been made available for sale, or had material of a substantial nature 
published on it, there is a one-year limit for submission of the patent application. The purpose is to 
ensure the public gets the benefit of inventions quickly. The application for the ENIAC was 
submitted on 26 June 1947, so the so-called critical, or one-year-prior, date was 26 June 1946. " Any 
disclosures before that date could have constituted grounds for invalidating the patent. Judge Larson 
determined that the ENIAC patent application had failed to meet the test of that critical date in the 
three public disclosure areas, and therefore, he ruled the patent invalid and unenforceable in each. 
First public use of the ENIAC began late in 1945 for calculations on the feasibility of the 
"Super."200 After its public unveiling in February 1946, the ENIAIC did other tasks of a public use 
nature before the critical date.201 In addition to finding the patent as a whole invalid for reason of 
public use. Judge Larson invalidated all seventeen of the representative claims for the same reason.202 
As for its sale. Judge Larson noted that the ENIAC had been built under contract to the Army, 
which took delivery on 31 December 1945.203 That constituted sale of the ENIAC and made it 
necessary to invalidate the patent.204 Judge Larson also found that First Draft of a Report on the 
198 Honeywell, "Findings of Fact," sections 3.1.3 and 12.2.7.1 - 12.2.7.6. Specifically, Judge Larson 
invalidated all seventeen claims on the list submitted by ISD because of public use. These claims 
were 8, 9, 36, 52, 55, 56, 57, 65,69, 75, 78, 83, 86, 88, 109, 122, and 142. He invalidated nine 
claims because they had been improperly broadened. These claims were 8, 9, 52, 65, 83, 86, 88, 109, 
and 122. Ten claims were invalidated because of their association with "The First Draft Report on 
the EDVAC." These claims were 8, 9, 52, 55, 56, 57, 65, 69, 75, and 78. Three claims, 83, 86, and 
88, were invalidated because of the prior work of Byron Phelps, an engineer for IBM. Phelps had 
developed a multiplier similar to the one used in the ENIAC, both of which were based on the IBM 
601 multiplier. In addition. Judge Larson found that claims 88, 89, and 90 were invalid because of 
the prior work of Atanasoff. How Judge Larson came to consider these three claims for derivation 
from Atanasoff is not clear. Arthur Burks said Honeywell submitted them for consideration {The 
First Electronic Computer, 242). but its summarization included only claim 89. Honeywell, 
"Plaintiff s Final Brief on the Merits," 84. 
199 Honeywell, "Findings of Fact," section 1.1.1.11. 
^°° Honeywell, "Findings of Fact," section 1.1.4. 
J0' Honeywell, "Findings of Fact," section 1.1.3. 
^°" Honeywell, "Findings of Fact." section 12.2.7.1. 
203 Honeywell. "Findings of Fact." sections 2.1.3.10 and 2.1.5.5. 
204 Official acceptance by the Army did not occur until 30 June 1946. Goldstine, The Computer from 
Pascal to von Neumann. 234. 
212 
EDVAC, distributed in June 1945, violated the restriction against publication. Since von Neumann 
used the report to discuss the possibilities of computer design generally, he necessarily disclosed 
claims from the ENIAC patent. Judge Larson found ten of the seventeen representative claims 
invalid because of publication,205 in addition to finding the entire patent invalid for the same reason. 
Finally, Judge Larson invalidated the ENIAC patent and ruled it unenforceable because he 
determined that the ABC had been an automatic electronic digital computer that came before the 
ENIAC. Furthermore, he found that the ENIAC derived from the earlier computer. Derivation from 
the ABC was general, over the entire ENIAC patent, and by specific claims. 
Both Mauchly and Atanasoff gave extensive testimony on the issue of derivation in pretrial 
depositions and in court. At the conclusion of the trial. Judge Larson said that he, "heard the 
testimony at trial of both Atanasoff and Mauchly, and finds the testimony of Atanasoff with respect to 
the knowledge and information derived by Mauchly to be credible."206 Atanasoff was a man of 
integrity, and there is no record of him ever behaving otherwise. On the other hand. Judge Larson 
pointedly said nothing about the testimony of Mauchly, strongly implying that he believed it to have 
been less than credible. Indeed, Mauchly had dissembled, obscured, and evaded throughout. 
In fairness, some of the difference in credibility in testimony may have been due to litigation 
tactics. Lawyers for Honeywell coached Atanasoff to remember details. Attorneys representing 
Mauchly apparently preferred that he did not. Furthermore, testifying became an ordeal for both men. 
Atanasoff suffered excruciating back pain207 and Mauchly from poor health.208 Regardless, the facts 
were undeniable, and Judge Larson found substantial connection between the ABC and ENIAC, 
noting that the, "work of Atanasoff was current and was of great importance to M" (Mauchly).209 
Judge Larson carefully avoided saying Mauchly knowingly used ideas from the ABC in the 
ENIAC. On the other hand, had he considered derivation of the EDVAC, he might have found it 
difficult to avoid a verdict of fraud, much closer was it to the ABC. As it were, scrupulously fair and 
dealing only with issues specifically on the table. Judge Larson gave Mauchly the benefit of the doubt 
and declared, he "may in good faith have believed that the monstrous machine (the ENIAC) he helped 
to create had no relationship to the ABC."210 This pronouncement may seem at odds with other of his 
205 Honeywell, "Findings of Fact." sections 12.2.7.6. 
206 Honeywell, "Findings of Fact." sections 3.1. 3.1.19, and 12.2.7.3. 
207 Atanasoff. "Advent of Electronic Digital Computing," 266-267 and 271. 
208 McCartney, ENIAC, 187. 
209 Honeywell, "Findings of Fact," section 13.19. 
210 Honeywell, "Findings of Fact," section 13.25. 
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statements, but it was not. Given wartime conditions, Mauchly and Eckert had access to almost any 
technology they might find useful, most in industry. Indeed, they began the ENIAC on the 
assumption that they need not develop any major circuits.211 They borrowed ideas promiscuously and 
in most cases legitimately. 
The ENIAC on that basis became a marvel of Rube Goldberg engineering. It consisted of 
thirty major electromechanical and electronic components initially developed mostly elsewhere and 
cobbled together. As an outfall, the various pieces of the ENIAC operated on some seventy-eight 
different voltages.212 As examples of the motley genesis of the ENIAC, its multiplier was its most 
complex component. The ENIAC engineers based it on the IBM 601 cross-footing multiplier, the 
most powerful commercially available calculator. However, they improved it for the ENIAC by 
incorporating resister-matrix circuits independently invented by Perry Crawford, of MIT. and Jan 
Rajchman, of RCA. Resister-matrix circuits also formed the basis for the three function tables. 
Twenty accumulators of ten counters each formed the heart of the ENIAC, and the counters came 
from a design by Igor Grosdoff, of RCA, and modified by Eckert. Before selecting the RCA counter, 
several other electronic circuits had been considered, including one from NCR that could count at 
100,000 cycles per second.213 The ENIAC also incorporated a buffer storage made from relays and 
designed by Samuel B. Williams of the BTL,214 and a card reader and cardpunch specially developed 
by IBM.215 The Army gave IBM and the BTL specifications for the equipment without disclosing 
anything else.216 
In short, the ENIAC had many parents, unlike the ABC, built from the ground up as one 
compact, integral, and original machine. Atanasoff and Berry even invented input and output units, 
although they did not work perfectly. The ENIAC crew did not attempt such difficult-to-build 
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devices despite huge resources and despite a critical need for faster input and output.217 Industry 
contributed to the ABC, but the ENIAC was unthinkable without its unstinting support. 
Mauchly could have chosen any number of architectures in which to incorporate the sundry 
components, but rather than the ABC or IAS computer, he chose one like a differential analyzer. 
Analyzers at the University of Pennsylvania and Army labored full time at ballistics calculations 
during the war but fell further and further behind. The Army requested human computers be placed 
into service at the University of Pennsylvania, and when they proved insufficient, it funded the 
ENIAC. Since the Army had an established relationship with the University of Pennsylvania in 
ballistics, the school had an advantage in contractor selection.218 Mauchly happened to be in the right 
place at the right time and, greater luck for him, with more knowledgeable authorities committed to 
higher priority projects. Fascinated by the differential analyzer, he took its distributed, or parallel, 
architecture for the ENIAC. 
The ENIAC therefore inherited characteristics from a differential analyzer, despite the 
ENIAC being digital and analyzer analog. For example, just as the solution of an integral equation 
was distributed over parts of a differential analyzer for the coordinated and simultaneous execution of 
all terms, so too, the ENIAC could calculate with multiple numbers at the same time. Despite its 
highly parallel design, however, solutions on the ENIAC evolved sequentially, not simultaneously. It 
solved equations step by step, and at each step as dictated by programming, drew from components 
needed for that calculation.219 
Mauchly thought the architecture of the differential analyzer the obvious model for the 
ENIAC.220 After all. the ENIAC had to solve ordinary differential equations, because ballistics 
equations take that form, and that was also the purpose of a differential analyzer. Moreover, a 
differential analyzer was adaptable, and the ENIAC also needed flexibility, because no one knew 
what numerical algorithm might work best. As noted, computerized numerical methods did not 
become well defined until later. The Army could not simply automate what human ballistics 
computers had been doing, because the ENIAC could not handle an algorithm even that rudimentary. 
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Designing adaptability into the ENIAC gave it capabilities to solve ballistics equations and print 
results into tables, and also allowed it to attack other types of equations. 
A differential analyzer and a digital computer solved problems fundamentally different, 
however. By choosing the architecture he did, Mauchly made problem solutions more difficult than 
necessary. Like a differential analyzer, the ENIAC became a huge, complicated machine. If both 
could perform multiple tasks, the ENIAC more than the differential analyzer, neither could be 
conveniently reprogrammed. Preparing a differential analyzer to solve a new equation could take 
several days and involved taking the machine apart and bolting it back together in rearranged form. 
Likewise, the ENIAC could take a couple of days to program and involved reconnecting its numerous 
jumper cables and painstakingly resetting its switches. This meant the ENIAC, like a differential 
analyzer, was most useful when performing many calculations using the same equations.221 
Performing many calculations with the same equations but slightly different variables met the 
Army's needs. It funded the ENIAC because it wanted ballistics calculations done faster. The 
University of Pennsylvania promised that could be accomplished with digital and vacuum tube 
technologies. Mauchly knew this was feasible because of the ABC. Even so, he did not choose the 
ABC as the model of how the ENIAC would compute. Rather, like his choice of architecture, he 
looked to familiar technology. He selected in this case the common mechanical calculators, with 
which he had experience. Hardly an original thinker, Mauchly conceived of the ENIAC as "exactly 
analogous to the ordinary mechanical computing machine."222 Like the old machines, the ENIAC 
used decimal numbers, and its basic computational elements were accumulators, which combined 
arithmetic and memory functions. As an outfall, modeling the ENIAC counters on mechanical 
calculators meant that they too could compute with all digits simultaneously. 
Thus, the essence of the ENIAC was that Mauchly replaced the integrators of the differential 
analyzer with electronic digital counters modeled on mechanical calculators.223 Eckert and Mauchly 
added function tables, multiplier, and other components, following closely on Travis. Finally, they 
including manual programming apparatus derived from the plugboards of EAM equipment by 
Burks, "The ENIAC," 340 and 344. See also Burks, The First Electronic Computer, 111. 
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IBM.234 What might be loosely termed the ENIAC s software involved physically making wiring 
connections to get the computer to step through an algorithm for an approximate numerical solution 
to a differential equation or other mathematical problem. Mauchly noted that the ENIAC must have 
appeared nothing more than "a giant plugboard."225 Described by major technologies from which it 
derived, an explanation of the ENIAC to the Army read as follows: 
(The ENIAC) should operate in steps rather than on the continuous variable principle of the 
differential analyzer. Such step operations requires the utilization of numerical calculating 
procedures, and in order to make such numerical calculating methods practical it is necessary 
to have a device which will operate at speeds far exceeding those of the usual mechanical 
computing machines.226 
Publicity on the ENIAC always emphasized its speed. The following excerpt from an article 
by Arthur Burks was typical: "A skilled (human) computer with a desk machine can compute a 60-
second trajectory in about twenty hours; a differential analyzer can produce the same results in about 
fifteen minutes; the ENIAC can do it in thirty seconds, that is, it can compute the trajectory of a shell 
faster than the shell itself flies!"227 However, the only meaningful measurement is completed 
ballistics tables, and there the ENIAC lost much of its supposed advantage. From start to finish, the 
ENIAC actually could produce ballistics tables about eight times faster than a differential analyzer 
but cost thirty times as much.228 
An Army review committee recommended that the officer who authorized the ENIAC be 
reprimanded for spending so much on something that did not contribute to the fight.229 Nothing came 
of that, however, perhaps because the Army wanted to avoid adverse publicity. Instead of taking its 
lumps, the Army turned its sponsorship of the behemoth into a propaganda coup. 
Although the ENIAC remained in service until October 1955, for most of that time it was a 
much different computer than the one that Eckert and Mauchly built. A 1948 modification, for 
example, gave it a serial architecture and capabilities to store a program internally. In 1953, it 
acquired an iron core memory.230 
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Perhaps it was no wonder that Judge Larson questioned whether Eckert and Mauchly 
intended to deceive by use of technology from the ABC. By all appearances the ENIAC could not 
have been more different. Moreover, concepts used in the ENIAC came from a variety of sources 
under pressing circumstances, so he thought it might have been unreasonable to expect Eckert and 
Mauchly to have kept careful accounting.231 
Furthermore, while evidence indicated that Mauchly had been impressed with the ABC, other 
evidence suggested that he had not intended to copy from it, at least for the ENIAC. Judge Larson 
cited a summary that Mauchly wrote in 1944 in which he made note of the ABC's motor-driven 
timing and rotating components. Mauchly went on to say that it, "was not by any means what I had 
in mind." The implication is that he had wanted a computer more electronic, and faster, than the 
ABC and rejected it as a model.232 
In historical context, however, that summary looks questionable. Recall that after seeing the 
ABC, Mauchly asked to duplicate it. Then after the ENIAC proved a disappointment, Eckert 
proposed a motor-driven computer that sounded much like the ABC except with magnetic storage, 
which of course, Atanasoff had also proposed. Obviously, Eckert and Mauchly thought the motor-
driven ABC had something going for it. Thus, in his summary, Mauchly may simply have been 
covering his and Eckert's tracks, since at the time, he and Eckert had decided to commercialize 
computing technology. Indeed, Mauchly wrote the summary just after visiting Atanasoff, which 
occurred the same day he and Eckert consulted with a patent attorney. In deposing, Mauchly 
recounted his surprise that Atanasoff that day showed little interest in computers and hinted that he 
was therefore justified in patenting features attributable to the ABC.233 
As another note, Mauchly invited Atanasoff to the unveiling of the ENIAC, which does not 
sound like a man with something to hide. Of course, Mauchly was quite safe: no one could discern 
the connections with the ABC without careful study far beyond that obtainable from a casual viewing. 
Atanasoff did see the ENIAC. although it is not clear when, but received only superficial explanation. 
Furthermore, Mauchly always refused to discuss the ENIAC with Atanasoff, citing national security. 
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Finally, Judge Larson pointed out that Atanasoff waited until the 1960s to present his case. If 
fraud had occurred, he should have spoken sooner.234 In defense of Atanasoff, he entered litigation 
only after his professional life had wound down and at the behest of others, and it was through related 
discovery that he recognized that the ABC had been fundamental. Until then, with no obvious 
similarities between the two machines, he had not assumed there were important connections, 
although he had been given hints over the years.235 
Instead of speaking of fraud based on derivation from Atanasoff and Berry, one might ask: 
Given that the ENIAC was modeled on a differential analyzer and mechanical calculator, and that the 
ABC and ENIAC were otherwise so different, how can any ideas in the ENIAC be said to have come 
from the ABC? Part of the answer is that Eckert and Mauchly wrote the ENIAC patent so broadly 
that it coincided in general terms with all electronic digital computers, including the ABC and true 
computers, with which the ENIAC also shared few characteristics. 
Beyond that, it was difficult to make definitive comparisons between the details of the ABC 
and ENIAC. Both were complex machines. For the ENIAC, the patent contained enormous but 
often-vague information in its 91 drawings, 104 pages of specifications, plus 148 claims. For the 
ABC, while simpler than the ENIAC, there was little extant evidence to consider. What was known 
came mostly from the funding manuscript that Atanasoff wrote, from a description Berry prepared for 
a patent application, and from his thesis. Thus, there was too general information in the one case and 
too little in the other to easily determine how much of the ENIAC derived from the ABC. 
Judge Larson selected three claims as having been derived from the ABC, but he could only 
say that those claims were representative. He made no attempt to consider all claims. Nor did 
Honeywell try to determine the extent of the derivation of the ENIAC from the ABC. Its litigation 
strategy avoided wrangling over individual claims.236 Atanasoff himself could not say how much 
234 Atanasoff did not attend the unveiling ceremony of the ENIAC but saw it later in association with 
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came from the ABC. He instead focused on one claim, claim 100, as a flagrant example of 
technology used in both computers, but that was unlikely to have made its way into the ENIAC by 
coincidental discovery. Claim 100 was not considered in Honeywell v. Sperry Rand, however, so 
Judge Larson did not rule on it. The subject dealt with a special type of division called non-restoring 
division that Atanasoff invented, although he did not call it by that name. Atanasoff s funding 
manuscript covered the division, and adding insult to injury, he remembered explaining it to Mauchly 
during his visit in 1941 to Ames.237 
Fortunately, Burks examined derivation from the ABC, and he was singularly qualified for 
the task. Although Eckert and Mauchly claimed to be its sole inventors, the ENIAC, like the 
ED VAC, involved the efforts of many people. Burks was one principal designer; Kite Sharpless and 
John Davis were others. The team included at least fourteen engineers and mathematicians besides 
Eckert and Mauchly, and not including Brainerd, who supervised.238 Naturally there were hard 
feelings when Eckert and Mauchly designated themselves the inventors and got the University of 
Pennsylvania and the Army to support them as such. 
Eckert did ask the other ENIAC designers of any claims they might have. At least Sharpless 
and Robert Shaw replied that they should be listed as co-inventors. Eckert had not been authorized to 
make the inquiry, however, and Brainerd reprimanded him. It may be that the others made no reply 
because Eckert had not acted in an official capacity.239 If so, they made a mistake because they got 
no other opportunity to state their claims. Eckert and Mauchly thereafter ignored claims by others 
and demanded to be allowed to file for the patent as sole inventors and assignees. The University of 
Pennsylvania finally agreed to the former but not the latter. Eckert and Mauchly responded by 
threatening to quit work on the ENIAC if not given commercial rights, and never mind the war. 
Faced with not being able to fulfill its contractual obligations, the University relented. When Army 
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attorneys then asked Eckert and Mauchly of any co-inventor claims by others, they said that there 
were none. The attorneys took the two men at their word. The other designers were not told of the 
agreement Eckert and Mauchly made with the Army.240 
The Army for its part wanted a patent application filed quickly. It, like the federal 
government generally, maintained a "shop right" policy. It typically paid for employees' inventions, 
including patenting costs, in return for the right to use the inventions free of royalties.241 The same 
held true for the NDRC, incidentally. Most patents resulting from NDRC contracts, paid for by 
taxpayers, went to the contractors.242 In this case, the Army worried that Samuel Williams might file 
on a computer he was designing for the BTL before an application could be submitted on the ENIAC, 
and it might therefore lose free rights to technology inherent to both. Thus, when Eckert and 
Mauchly came out the winners in their haggling with the University of Pennsylvania, the Army asked 
few questions but quickly negotiated a deal giving it the same royalty-free use that had been part of 
the original agreement with the school.243 
Contributing to the sense of injustice and a source of tension during the project was that 
Mauchly made little discernible ongoing contribution. He was not even an official member of the 
team; Brainerd designated him a consultant instead. As such, he spent much of his time writing 
progress reports, a task he did poorly. He performed better helping to integrate old-style calculator 
technology into the composite machine. He assisted IBM engineers coordinate input and output units 
with the rest of the ENIAC. for instance. It could be argued that incorporating existing technologies 
constituted the essence of the ENIAC. but others did not see Mauchly's role as sufficiently 
innovative. Nor did Mauchly help much with administrative duties.244 It was therefore not surprising 
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done for the war effort, and there were no questions asked about authorship or patent rights. A great 
deal of intangible and undocumented information was transmitted." Jan Rajchman, "Early Research 
on Computers at RCA," in A History of Computing in the Twentieth Century: A Collection of Essays, 
ed. N. Metropolis, et al. (New York: Academic Press, 1980), 467. 
"
41 Douglas Robillard. Jr., "A History of the Iowa State University Research Foundation, Inc., 1938-
1988, " unpublished paper, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa, circa 1988, 16. 
"
4
~ Daniel J. Kevles, The Phvsicists: The History of a Scientific Community in Modern America (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1978), 342. 
243 Williams did eventually get credit for two claims made in the ENIAC patent. Honeywell, 
"Findings of Fact," sections 11.5.8.1-11.5.8.2; Stem. From ENIAC to UNIVAC, 48. Some 
information comes from a letter that Stem quoted from Colonel Leslie Simon, letter to Colonel C. E. 
Herrstrom. 2 September 1944. 
244 Stem, From ENIAC to UNIVAC, 15. 38-39, and 55-57. 
221 
that others believed they contributed as much to the ENIAC and deserved equal billing on the patent. 
No one begrudged Mauchly's right to be acknowledged an inventor, however, because the team 
agreed he had supplied the underlying plan.245 
Eckert enjoyed a different situation than Mauchly. His electronics skills commanded the 
admiration of everyone. Brainerd had "the highest respect for Eckert," but less for Mauchly; "he was 
much more of a sounding board."246 However, Brainerd recognized that others on the team made 
"substantial contributions."247 Likewise, Goldstine, who believed the ENIAC resulted from "the 
work of the group,"248 gave Mauchly faint praise but described Eckert's contributions in glowing 
terms: 
Eckert's standards were the highest, his energies almost limitless, his ingenuity remarkable, 
and his intelligence extraordinary. From start to finish it was he who gave the project its 
integrity and ensured its success. This is of course not to say that the ENIAC development 
was a one-man show. It was most clearly not. But it was Eckert's omnipresence that drove 
everything forward at whatever cost to humans including himself.249 
These comments sound excessive, but the team as a whole gave Eckert the most credit for the 
ENIAC. In fact, best evidence for a contribution by Mauchly is that Eckert was his biggest supporter. 
Eckert never complained about him not pulling his weight. The two men formed a partnership that 
lasted years. Perhaps Mauchly's ongoing contributions became manifest through Eckert. Nancy 
Stem, a historian of the ENIAC, considered the situation and concluded, "Eckert depended and relied 
upon him in an inexplicable way. Mauchly served as a catalyst for Eckert and provided a direction 
for the latter's genius."250 
Genius or not, Eckert is best described as the chief engineer of the ENIAC and Mauchly as its 
architect. Evidence that Eckert depended on Mauchly on architectural matters comes from a series of 
245 As an example, Robert W. Shaw was a designer of the ENIAC who believed that he should have 
been cited on the patent as a co-inventor. Nonetheless, in an interview with a lawyer for Honeywell, 
he refused to downgrade his opinion of the role Mauchly played in the development of the ENIAC. 
He remembered Mauchly writing reports, but he also believed that Mauchly had helped develop "the 
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lectures that Eckert gave during summer of 1946. He reportedly did not prepare. That mattered little 
in lectures on electronics, but when touching on computer architecture or logic, he acted less sure.251 
In litigation, Honeywell sought to exploit the other designers' claims of co-inventing the 
ENIAC. One complaint filed by Honeywell asked that the patent be ruled invalid because the others 
had not been credited. Judge Larson ruled otherwise, however. He agreed the project had been a 
team effort, and that others, including Burks, made "inventive contributions," but nonetheless 
concluded that Honeywell had not presented sufficient evidence on contributions by others to warrant 
invalidating the patent on that basis. Presented evidence indicated that not only was the conceptual 
design of the ENIAC largely due to Eckert and Mauchly, but that the two men, especially Eckert. 
functionally supervised engineering, but not the project overall. It also troubled Judge Larson that the 
parties alleging they had been wronged had not presented their cases years earlier.252 The team 
members with strongest claims did not testify, however.253 
It is worth adding that while the ENIAC, the machine, has received all the historical and legal 
attention, a significant part of the project involved how to program it. Without algorithms that could 
run on it, the ENIAC was of no more use than a computer is today without software. Mathematicians 
on the project therefore also deserve credit. 
Anyway, even if not officially classified an inventor, Burks came to understand the ENIAC 
as one of its designers. In addition, he had overall responsibility for writing reports, including 
maintenance and operating manuals.254 The tasks gave Burks a good overview of the machine. He 
also published several papers on the ENIAC, including the first one available to the public.255 It is 
fair to characterize Burks as an authority on the ENIAC. 
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As noted. Burks also became an authority on the ABC. Besides describing the ABC and its 
operation. The First Electronic Computer traced how the ABC led to the ENIAC and subsequent 
computers through Mauchly.256 In their investigation, Burks and his wife, Alice, who had helped 
program the ENIAC, found that at least eighteen claims in the ENIAC patent derived from the ABC. 
These claims included the three Judge Larson cited and claim 100 to which Atanasoff took issue. The 
Burkses noted that many of the eighteen were general claims that apply to any digital computer. Of 
course, not all were, such as claim 100, which was specific. Although eighteen out of 148 claims 
may not seem overwhelming, the Burkses stated flatly that these eighteen claims were so vital, "that 
there would have been no ENIAC if Mauchly had not visited Atanasoff." The Burkses also believed 
that their list of eighteen claims was conservative, and numerous other claims in the ENIAC patent 
could be "read" in part on the work of Atanasoff and Berry. Thus, in Arthur Burks, supported by his 
wife, the most qualified expert confirmed the wisdom of Judge Larson's ruling. 
In general terms, the Burkses cited five main areas in which Atanasoff and Berry's work had 
impact on the ENIAC. The first and second dealt with how Atanasoff and Berry used vacuum tubes. 
First, they recognized that vacuum tubes can be binary devices, and second, vacuum tubes as binary 
devices can be arranged into complex switching circuits. These concepts were fundamental to the 
ABC but were also critical to the ENIAC. Unlike a differential analyzer in which all parts were 
linked mechanically so that control derived naturally, the ENIAC needed extensive and sophisticated 
controls for all its components to operate in concert. Many controls in the ENIAC depended upon 
vacuum tubes arranged in the same manner as those in the ABC for performing computations, that is, 
as binary devices arranged into switching circuits. Eckert and Mauchly found other uses for vacuum 
tubes as binary devices, although they did not use them in the ENIAC in the fundamental way for 
computing that the ABC and subsequent true computers did. 
256 Despite the unparalleled expertise of Arthur Burks for comparing the ABC and ENIAC, some 
historians of computers have suspected that he harbored resentment against Eckert and Mauchly, 
since he considered himself a co-inventor of the ENIAC, and thus could not be trusted to be objective. 
Lawyers for Honeywell thought that might be true, too, which might make him a good witness for 
them. Upon investigating, however, they found the opposite of what they had expected: "a very 
strong bias by Dr. Burks on behalf of Mauchly," an "attitude" they attributed to the men's friendship. 
The Honeywell lawyers therefore characterized Burks as a hostile witness and did not call him to 
testify. It is of great credit to Burks that he put aside that bias, investigated with an open mind, and 
thus found that the ENIAC did derive from the ABC. D. D. Allegretti, of Bair, Freeman and 
Molinare, copy of letter to Henry L. Hanson, Corporate Patent Counsel, Honeywell, 13 October 1967. 
ISU. Parks, "Henry L. Hanson Papers" (box 2, folder 4); see also, Nancy Stem, in Saul Rosen, 'The 
Origins of Modern Computing," Computing Reviews (September 1990), 470; Nancy Stern, "Who 
Invented the First Electronic Digital Computer?" Abacus 1, no. 1 (Fall 1983), 14. 
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As the third major contribution of the ABC to the ENIAC, the Burkses cited the synchronized 
clock. Mauchly may not have liked that the ABC timed its operations with an electric motor, but he 
recognized the brilliance of the concept for coordinating the operations of a computer. Eckert and 
Mauchly substituted electronic timing in the ENIAC in place of the motor. This allowed the ENIAC 
to operate faster than the ABC. The downside of Mauchly's design was that he made the ENIAC 
exceedingly complicated and eliminated the opportunity to employ a larger memory. The Burkses 
believed use of modular units in the ENIAC derived from the ABC, and that constituted the fourth 
derivation. As the last derivation, the Burkses gave Atanasoff s method for non-restoring division.257 
The Burkses' analysis explains why at once the ENIAC could look and operate differently 
from the ABC and yet be dependent on its technology. In hardware, architecture, and general 
operating principles, the ENIAC had little in common with the ABC. It was in timing and controls, 
things essential but not obvious, that the ENIAC shared kinship with the ABC. It was one thing to 
build an electronic computer based on the mechanical calculator and differential analyzer. It was 
quite another to control it. For that. Eckert and Mauchly needed the innovations of Atanasoff and 
Berry. 
The Burkses do not mention it, but the innovation widely considered Eckert's most important, 
his "critical engineering insight," was use of conservative design principles. This included rigorous 
pre-testing of components and operating them at lower than design voltages.258 Authorities believe 
that without that conservative design, the ENIAC could not have been reliable enough to succeed. 
Eckert no doubt contributed ideas for computer reliability, but here too, as discussed, the essential 
concepts came from Atanasoff and Berry. That is, Eckert's "critical engineering insight," like many 
of his and Mauchly's insights into computers, can be traced back to the ABC 
Thus, at the fundamental level, the ENIAC borrowed from the ABC, even if it retained none of 
the earlier machine's elegance. What the ABC contributed to the ENIAC is of little consequence, of 
course, since the ENIAC was a technological dead end. Far more important were features from the 
ABC that reappeared in the ED VAC and IAS computer. 
It might be suspected that technologies shared by the ABC with the ENIAC, and the EDVAC, 
could have resulted from coincidental invention. That is unlikely for several reasons: First, Mauchly 
provided no evidence in court of any significant work in electronic digital devices, much less 
computers, before he met Atanasoff. Second, before beginning the ENIAC, Mauchly studied the 
257 Burks, The First Electronic Computer, 247, 251. and 278-282. 
258 Martin Campbell-Kelly and William Aspray, Computer: A History of the Information Machine 
(New York City: BasicBooks. 1996), 88. 
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ABC carefully. It was a well-designed and nearly complete computer at the time. It was 
disingenuous for Mauchly to claim he learned nothing from it. Third, certain features the ENIAC 
shared with the ABC, such as its method of division, were based on concepts too obscure to have 
resulted from coincidental invention. Furthermore, the number of ENIAC patent claims that the 
Burkses found that read on the ABC suggests coincidental discovery cannot account for them all. 
Fourth, authorities close to the situation believed the ENIAC derived from the ABC. Burks has been 
cited, but Goldstine thought so too.259 Unlike Burks, Goldstine helped with the project from its 
beginning. In fact, he was most responsible for convincing the Army to fund it.260 Finally, Judge 
Larson heard and weighed all the evidence and concluded without equivocation that the ENIAC 
derived from the ABC. 
As a closing note. Judge Larson invalidated its patent, but the ENIAC had original features. 
Had Eckert and Mauchly submitted the application on time, had they cited earlier inventions as 
appropriate, and had they been more modest in their claims, the ENIAC patent could have withstood 
legal challenges. So why did they overreach? It may be that they took a gamble and lost. As it were, 
the patent came close to dominating the industry. On the other hand, had Eckert and Mauchly applied 
for a patent for only their innovations, it would have had little value. The future of computers did not 
lie in the direction provided by the ENIAC, but rather, that of the ABC 
^9 Goldstine, The Computer from Pascal to von Neumann, 125-126, 153-154, and 208. 
260 Mauchly, "Mauchly on the Trials of Building the ENIAC," 72-73. 
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CHAPTER 6. ADAM SMITH AND THE POPULAR VITALITY 
The Atanasoff Berry Computer was a breakthrough in computing but owed its existence to 
private funding. It is possible that federal money found its way into the ABC, since Iowa State 
College received some public support. However, whatever the source of the initial money from ISC. 
it was not nearly enough, so Atanasoff reluctantly turned to "outside" private sources and easily 
obtained more money than he needed, even then in the Depression. Furthermore, importance of 
government monies to innovation, generally, is probably overestimated. Governments have 
promoted technological developments, but contrary to the prevalent impression of accelerating 
progress, rate of invention declined roughly coincident with that support. Other evidence suggests 
the quality of inventions may also have declined. Such evidence casts doubt upon the common belief 
that public funding of research benefits innovation and the economy. 
A widespread view that sponsorship of research by government ensures economic 
competitiveness is fairly recent in the United States. The wise men that created the nation had 
appreciation for science but more for history, which suggested that republics inevitably slide into 
tyranny. Hoping to forestall that eventuality, the Founding Fathers affected compromises ending in a 
U.S. Constitution that severely constrained federal powers. It was no accident that the document 
permitted only negligible support of science.1 It expressly allowed the new nation's government to 
"promote the progress of science and useful arts by," first, implementing a system of patents and 
copyrights, and second, setting "standard weights and measures" (Article I, Section 8). Worried 
about abuse of power, the framers of the Constitution decided money to advance science and 
technology beyond the two activities specified had to come from outside the central authority. 
Despite slight public support for science, the young nation thrived. The United States passed 
a Patent Act in 1790. It did not begin efforts to standardize weights and measure until 1836, and 
waited until 1901 to create the National Bureau of Standards, and thus fulfilling, and likely 
exceeding, the limits of support allowed by the Constitution for science and technology.2 
The variety and extent of purposes to which federal funding was put nonetheless grew 
steadily from the beginning of the Republic. The Louisiana Purchase by Thomas Jefferson stretched 
the Constitution, but he justified the scientific-oriented Lewis and Clark expedition to explore the 
territory under the federal government's responsibility for interstate commerce. Government paid for 
1 A. Hunter Dupree, Science in the Federal Government: A History of Policies and Activities to 
1940 (Cambridge. Massachusetts: Belknap Press. 1957), 3-6. 
Terence Kealey. The Economic Laws of Scientific Research (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 
140. 
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coastal surveys for the same reason, but in 1842 the Naval Observatory had to be disguised in the 
budget as the Depot of Charts and Instruments to get funded.3 
The Smithsonian Institution became the premier scientific establishment in nineteenth-
century America, and it derived from private money. Englishman James Smithson died in 1829 and 
left 100,000 pounds sterling to the United States. Years of acrimonious debate ensued over what to 
do with the gift until Congress finally authorized the Institution in 1846/ Land-grant colleges such as 
ISC became centers for agricultural research, but the Morrill Act of 1862 that provided for them got 
approved only because Southern States, staunch defenders of states' rights, forfeited their votes in 
Congress during the Civil War. Also in 1862, and also due to absence of Southerners, Congress 
authorized the Department of Agriculture. It eventually got a large share of the federal budget for 
research. The latter two Congressional initiatives hint at how war has been good for public funding 
of science, if not probably for science itself. The National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics 
(NACA) and the National Research Council (NRC) were both created to help with World War I, for 
example, and left in existence. 
Remarkable though it may seem, most people into the Great Depression probably 
disapproved of greater government support for science, even as they believed science beneficial. 
This attitude extended to scientists, as exemplified in the extreme by the nineteenth-century physicist 
Joseph Henry. He discovered electromagnetic induction about the same time as Michael Faraday in 
England. Induction is the basis of how generators, motors, transformers, and electromechanical 
relays operate, and therefore also the basis of manmade electrical power. Henry became the first 
Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution. When scientists proposed the National Academy of 
Sciences during the Civil War to act as an advisory body to the federal government, Henry objected. 
According to his strict standards, even though privately funded, such a body would be "at variance 
with our democratic institutions" and could be "perverted ... to the support of partisan politics." He 
did become the Academy's president but refused to grovel for funding or engage in politics.5 More 
generally, scientists groused as always about not having enough money, but recognized, especially at 
universities, that accepting federal funds meant losing freedom to choose the research they pursued 
3 Dupree. Science in the Federal Government, 61-63. 
4 Thereafter, the federal government became guardian of the Smithsonian Institute and source of its 
operating budget. Science Policy Study Background Report No. I: A History of Science Policy in the 
United States, 1940-1985 (Washington, D C.; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), 6. 
5 Joseph Henry to Louis Agassiz, letter, 13 August 1864. Quoted in Daniel J. Kevles, The 
Physicists: The Historv of a Scientific Community in Modern America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1978), 42. 
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and the manner in which they conducted it. Popular belief had it that laissez-faire capitalism could 
best take care of science, innovation, and the economic health of the nation. Starting with the Menlo 
Park laboratory of Thomas Edison, for example, the common industrial laboratories spawned 
dizzying numbers of important inventions. 
The Great Depression severely undercut faith in the free market and science. Many people 
blamed mass production for the Depression and its associated high unemployment. The problem, or 
so went a common explanation, stemmed from capitalistic- and science-driven industry becoming too 
productive.6 Accordingly, federal monies for science were cut an average of 12.5 percent in the early 
1930s.7 Faring worse, the Department of Agriculture saw its budget chopped from $21.5 million in 
1932 to $16.5 million in 1934. The Bureau of Standards budget fell by more than half: from $3.9 
million in 1931 to $1.8 million in 1934.8 
Some thought it best scientists take a holiday altogether. As one critic plaintively put it, the 
physicist and the chemist seem to be traveling so fast as not to heed or care where or how or why they 
are going. Nor do they heed or care what misapplications are made of their discoveries."9 Many 
believed that attaining a balance between production and consumption, and science and human needs, 
could only be accomplished through national planning, something on the model of the Soviet Union. 
As one, Henry A. Wallace, Secretary of Agriculture at the time, chastised engineers and scientists for 
being, "a handicap rather than a help," for turning, "loose upon the world new productive power 
without regard to the social implications." Engineers and scientists remained mired in laissez-faire 
economic thinking, he complained, when, "highly centralized forms of industrial and government 
control" were needed.10 
An article in Science the following year, 1935. elaborated on why America needed to 
abandon market-oriented policies. The author conceded that under capitalism as expounded by Adam 
Smith in Wealth of Nations, published coincident with America's Declaration of Independence, "the 
masses of mankind attained a higher degree of material comfort and a larger measure of liberty than 
at any earlier time." The world had changed since 1776, however. "Social organization has become 
6 For a full treatment of technological unemployment, see Amy Sue Bix, Inventing Ourselves Out of 
Jobs?: America's Debate Over Technological Unemployment, 1929-1981 (Baltimore: John Hopkins 
University. 2000). 
7 Kevles, The Physicists, 236. 
8 Dupree, Science in the Federal Government, 344-346. 
9 L. Magruder Passano. "Ploughing Under the Science Crop," Science 81, no. 2089 (11 January 
1935), 46. 
10 Henry A. Wallace. "The Social Advantages and Disadvantages of the Engineering-Scientific 
Approach to Civilization." Science 79, no. 2036 (5 January 1934), 3. 
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vastly more complex than it was in the eighteenth century; business planning and government 
planning have become closely intertwined." While attempts at national planning had usually gone 
awry, a notable few showed promise. The author found particularly impressive the case of Japan 
(already occupying Manchuria at the time). Other "constructive government planning" examples 
included, "the grandiose experiments of communism in Russia and of fascism in Italy." The point 
being, "any one who attempts to check the practise (sic) of national planning will argue in vain ... 
The course of wisdom is not to oppose national planning, but to make that planning more 
intelligent."11 
American engineers and scientist did tend to be conservative, but others fell naturally into the 
Progressive Movement as it gained momentum in the twentieth century. As a defining characteristic, 
progressives bristled at the freewheeling democracy and capitalism of the late nineteenth century, and 
as the remedy, pushed to reform society through application of expertise through government.12 
Expertise implied science, although more social science. Some progressives agreed with Wallace in 
finding the Soviet Union the ideal. Franklin D. Roosevelt, too, argued that the old laissez-faire 
policies were "bankrupt" and soon after becoming president in 1933 called for "a partnership in 
planning between government and business," enforced "by the authority of government."13 With 
progressives at the helm with Roosevelt and the nation in depression, federal government rushed to 
create the torrent of laws, regulations, programs, and "alphabet-soup" agencies that comprised the 
New Deal. Likewise, in his second inaugural address, having initially slashed federal research 
budgets, Roosevelt turned to rational planning in science, too, and proposed that government must. 
11 Wesley C. Mitchell, "The Social Sciences and National Planning," Science 81. no. 2090 (18 
January 1935), 56, 59, and 61. 
Historian Richard Hofstadter, for one, dated the Progressive Era from about 1900 to 1914, but the 
term here will include most of the twentieth century because of the tendency throughout for social 
reform by accruing ever more power to government. The key trait of progressives, then and now, is 
moral imperiousness. They began as moral absolutes but became moral relativists, a distinction, 
Hofstadter noted, that "has sometimes been blurred because an excessively consistent practice of 
either leads to the same practical result—ruthlessness in political life." That is, while the point of 
capitalism is individual freedom, progressivism aims to force the views of the progressives on 
everyone. Note that progressives started calling themselves liberals by the New Deal, never mind 
that liberals had traditionally advocated free markets and small government and still do outside the 
United States. Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1968), 3 and 15-16; Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw, The Commanding Heights: The 
Battle between Government and the Marketplace that is Remaking the Modern World (New York: 
Simon and Schuster: 1998), 15. 
13 Franklin Roosevelt quoted in Yergin and Stanislaw, The Commanding Heights, 51-52. 
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create those moral controls over the services of science which are necessary to make science a useful 
servant instead of a ruthless master of mankind."14 
The person most responsible for putting science under federal dominance was Vannevar 
Bush, and he did it by articulating massive government support for research postwar.15 That Bush 
should find common ground with Roosevelt might have seemed unlikely to the casual observer in the 
1930s. Bush vehemently opposed the New Deal and ardently supported laissez-faire economic 
policies. Unfortunately, he had little of the optimism typical of supporters of capitalism as espoused 
by Adam Smith on the intelligence and integrity of humanity. Bush, according to biographer G. 
Pascal Zachary, "shared with other elitists a stark and not altogether distorted view of American 
society that pitted sober, pragmatic elites against the untutored, volatile masses." Bush looked at 
people as "a blind mass (that) rushes on." "emotionally unstable," and too easily "swayed by 
propaganda." Sounding like a progressive, he mused darkly in 1939 that the country might need 
radical modification: "The totalitarian state can cut rings around the democracy, and ineffectiveness 
is the price of freedom ... I wonder whether, if democracy is going to be successful, it has not got to 
include much more military organization of its units." 
Bush's political star rose exponentially with his move to Washington, DC, in 1939 to take 
charge at the Carnegie Institution. At the same time he became a member of the NACA and soon its 
chairman.16 In mid-1940, Roosevelt put aside whatever political differences he had with Bush and 
appointed him to head the NDRC, which Bush modeled on the NACA. A year later, Roosevelt 
signed an executive order—most likely written by Bush—creating a more powerful civilian research 
management organization, the OSRD. The NDRC had been created from emergency funds available 
to Roosevelt. It became an operating division of the OSRD, and Bush directed both organizations. 
Bush continued to report directly to Roosevelt but with funding from Congress, which tended to 
rubberstamp his requests during the war.17 
The NDRC and OSRD were counted great successes, although they concentrated lucrative 
contracts among favored organizations. MIT, associated closely with Bush, got by far the largest 
share among universities. Raytheon, a company Bush helped found and in which he owned stock, 
saw its wartime sales increase some sixty times, five times the industry average. On the whole. Bush 
14 Franklin Roosevelt quoted in Kevles, The Physicists, 264. 
15 Science Policy Study Background Report No. 1, 24. 
16 Vannevar Bush quoted in G. Pascal Zachary, Endless Frontier: Vannevar Bush, Engineer of the 
American Century (New York: The Free Press, 1997), 64 and 95; see also 85, 98-99, 254, and 324. 
17 Kevles, The Physicists, 292-293 and 297-301. 
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deserves credit for organizing on short order the development of desperately needed weapons. With 
peace in sight and encouraged by Roosevelt, Bush proposed that the ad hoc wartime effort be 
replaced with a permanent government agency to give experts control over both military and civilian 
research. To that end, he published his famous science policy manifesto. Science—The Endless 
Frontier, calling for establishment of the National Research Foundation (NRF).18 By then, July 1945, 
Harry S. Truman had assumed the presidency upon the death of Roosevelt. 
Need for an NRF might be supposed to have been that Bush feared postwar science might 
otherwise go without funding. However, his own figures indicated that money available for research 
in the United States had undergone tremendous growth, even through the Depression. Between 1930 
and 1940, prewar and in grips of depression and despite the early cut, and although national income 
fell overall, total expenditures on research and development19 by government, both state and federal, 
and industry had more that doubled, climbing from $140 million to $309 million. Industrial research 
expenditures alone skyrocketed from $29.5 million in 1920, to $117 million in 1930, to $240 million 
in 1940. Furthermore, funding came from a growing number of sources, as indicated by the statistic 
that 288 new philanthropic foundations sprang up in the 1930s compared to 173 endowed during the 
prosperous 1920s. Total monies available from foundations had fallen slightly, but growth in 
research expenditures at universities and colleges compensated many times over. The evidence 
contradicts the notion that the private sector will not fund research quite generously. 
Despite remarkable levels in overall research funding, particularly from private sources. Bush 
justified the NRF to give health-related research more money. He also wanted to continue defense 
research started during the war and thought government should take more responsibility for training 
new scientists at universities. Most important. Bush did not trust the various funding sources, left 
alone, to back the "pure" research he favored. According to him, research in the U.S. involved 
applications. Lacking was basic research to expand the "frontiers of knowledge." 
Bush specifically espoused the linear model of innovation and economic development. That 
is, he thought scientists should be paid to conduct research without heed of applications. He claimed 
that such research furnished the seed from which innovation sprouted; it led inevitably to practical 
uses and full employment. "Basic research leads to new knowledge," he opined. "It provides 
scientific capital. It creates the fund from which the practical applications of knowledge must be 
drawn. New products and new processes do not appear full-grown. They are founded on new 
18 Zachary, Endless Frontier, 44-45, 136-137, 218-221, 226-227, and 248. 
19 Although rigorous distinction is normally made between research and development, no such care 
will be taken here. The two are in fact inextricably interconnected. 
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principles and new conceptions, which in turn are painstakingly developed by research in the purest 
realms of science." Bush implied that the nation had muddled through in the past by importing basic 
research, but because of war devastation in Europe, that was no longer an option. The U.S. therefore 
had to shoulder the burden of basic research but lacked a national science policy and the coordinating 
agency he thought essential.20 
It may be too much to say that Bush intentionally misinformed the public, but Science—The 
Endless Frontier hardly squared with the evidence. Objectivity was beside the point, however. As 
Zachary put it. Bush wanted his report to annunciate a "fable," to "become a kind of creation myth, a 
founding story about the new world conceived by the union of science and government."21 
The report received widespread approval from those who accepted the linear model of 
innovation and equated the performance of the OSRD with that anticipated from a NRF. Unlike the 
stated primary purpose of the NRF. however, the OSRD and the military had not attempted basic 
research. They assigned projects with a reasonable chance of completion in a short time. Thus, 
OSRD projects built upon research and development accomplished before the war. Financed by the 
Army, the ENIAC was otherwise no exception. The atomic bomb was the most daring of wartime 
projects, but even it derived from extensive prewar research in nuclear physics, notably the first man-
induced atomic fission in 1938 by Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassman in Germany, but including studies 
conducted with numerous cyclotrons in operation beginning in the early1930s. 
Such major breakthroughs as jet engines, rockets, DDT, and penicillin, all supposed triumphs 
of government-sponsored, war-related invention actually came before the war. Several inventors 
independently designed turbojet engines by the mid-1930s. Among them, for example, Frank 
Whittle, a Royal Air Force officer, turned to the British Thomason-Houston Company, and not the 
British Government, to build an engine in 1937.22 American Robert Goddard began launching liquid-
powered rockets in the mid-1920s with funding from the Research Corporation and Guggenheim 
Foundation. DDT was first synthesized in 1874, and Paul Muller, of the J R. Geigy Chemical 
Company in Switzerland, found it to be an insecticide in 1939. DDT saved the health and lives of 
millions, as did penicillin. The OSRD oversaw the first large-scale production of penicillin by drug 
20 Vannevar Bush, Science—The Endless Frontier (Washington, D C : Government Printing Office, 
1945), 1-3, 6-7, 13-14, and 17. Some information is from, "Table I Scientific Research Expenditures 
and National Income," 80; Kevles, The Physicists, 267. For numbers of foundations endowed, see 
footnote 1. 
21 Vannevar Bush quoted in Zachary, Endless Frontier, 222-223. 
22 Edward W. Constant II, "A Model for Technological Change Applied to the Turbojet Revolution," 
Technology and Culture 14, no. 4 (October 1973), 562-565. 
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corporations, but Alexander Fleming, Howard Florey, and Ernst Chain discovered and developed 
penicillin in Great Britain sponsored largely by the Rockefeller Foundation.23 
Bush and scientists had little incentive to correct the popular miscomprehension. Rather, 
they basked in the windfall of adulation and public money now streaming their way. Nor did they 
care to admit that, as far as technology contributed to winning the war, the great share of credit 
should go to the private sector. Not only had it accomplished most of the applied and basic research 
attributed to government, but also American industry produced fully half the world's manufactured 
output and more than the combined total of the Axis countries. As a sample, the U.S. during World 
War II produced some 300,000 military airplanes, 86,000 tanks, and 6,000,000 tons of bombs. By 
1945, American shipbuilders were launching a new cargo ship every day. The unleashed 
manufacturing might of the United States was truly awesome.24 
Moreover, while Bush was right that Americans had historically focused on applications, that 
lopsided emphasis began changing before the war, partly because of the numbers of ambitious people 
entering science. For example, universities in the United States granted thirty-one Ph D. degrees in 
physics in 1920. Ten years later, 105 physics doctorates graduated with Atanasoff. The trend 
continued steadily upward, never mind the Depression, peaking at 186 in 1941, and then falling 
precipitously with onset of war. Only forty-three physics Ph.D. degrees were awarded in 1945.25 
Furthermore, many scientists from Europe settled in the U.S. in the 1930s. Over one hundred 
physicists had emigrated by 1941, including von Neumann, Teller, and Einstein. Some scientists 
came to escape growing political turmoil in Europe, but others simply wanted to partake of the wealth 
of money available in America, even though the Depression hit harder overall in the U.S. than 
Europe. By 1940, physics research in America clearly stood head-and-shoulders above that 
anywhere. Bush conceded the same was true in medicine. As one indication of the improved quality, 
Americans begin winning or sharing Nobel Prizes at an increasing rate, including seven in medicine, 
two in chemistry, and four in physics during the 1930s alone. 
Scientific advancements came because of the quality of practitioners and because private 
sources sponsored research unstintingly. Already by 1936, long before ISC got its government-
funded synchrotron, the U.S. had more cyclotrons or related nuclear accelerators than all the rest of 
the world, and all privately funded.26 Nor had sources held back in contributions to public health. 
23 Fleming, Florey, and Chain shared the Nobel Prize in medicine in 1945; Miiller won it in 1948. 
^ Zachary, Endless Frontier, 224-225. 
L. R. Harmon, "Physics PhD's: Whence, Whither, When?" Physics Today 15, no. 10 (October 
1962), 21. 
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Indeed, funding such research had become a hot area. Frank Jewett, a loyal supporter of Bush but 
clinging to an idea of scientific integrity and independence already old fashioned, noted rightly that it 
was "easy" to raise money "from a willing public in connection with any one of a number of specific 
diseases."27 In short, basic research thrived in the U.S.. as nowhere else, even before the war. 
Careful choice of words is crucial to spinning a successful fable, and the language in 
Science—The Endless Frontier bordered on the disingenuous. Bush wrote in elegant and elevated 
prose of honored traditions he proposed to continue in science, as exemplified by the following 
passage: 
It has been basic United States policy that Government should foster the opening of new 
frontiers. It opened the seas to clipper ships and furnished land for pioneers. Although these 
frontiers have more or less disappeared, the frontier of science remains. It is in keeping with 
the American tradition—one which has made the United States great—that new frontiers 
shall be made accessible for development by all American citizens.28 
Bush's reassuring diction provided cover for what was in truth a break with the American past. He 
wanted to restrict the frontier of science to the select few, ignoring the fact that land on the frontier of 
the American West had been open to most, if not all, takers, who had pushed westward regardless of 
hardship or what government did. 
Bush slanted history because he thought it imperative that science and the nation be protected 
from that "blind mass" whose courageous and resourceful ancestors settled America, but who he and 
progressives believed incapable of acting responsibly. Bush accordingly advocated, "a rigidity of 
control and a pyramidal system for the operation of the entire effort."29 Thus, government 
sponsorship had less to do with better science and more with its control. On the other hand, what 
served for others did not for him. With the talk of prewar progressives still weighing on his mind. 
Bush worried, "whether science in this country is going to be supported or whether it is also going to 
be controlled."30 That is, he wanted scientists free of government tentacles. He thought government 
should impose taxes on people to transfer to the NRF, no strings attached. Scientists, actually an elite 
cohort, would ultimately control research largely independent of accountability, including the 
president. To build his aristocracy of scientists. Bush asked for a budget to reach $122.5 million 
annually in five years.31 
"
7 Zachary, Endless Frontier, 252-253. 
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8 Bush, Science—The Endless Frontier, 6. 
"
9 Vannevar Bush quoted in Zachary, Endless Frontier, 226-227. 
30 Vannevar Bush quoted in Kevles, The Physicists, 347, footnote 8; Zachary, Endless Frontier, 8. 
31 Bush, Science—The Endless Frontier, 28-33. 
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That science needed government funding now had broad agreement, although many held 
strongly opposing ideas on a program structure, some ostensibly more democratic. For example, one 
bureaucrat argued in response to Bush: "Let us all bear in mind that we have a political Government 
and that our Constitution is a political instrument. The political character of our Government 
guarantees democracy and freedom, in which the people, through their Government, decide what they 
want."32 A key phrase was "through their Government." Democracy and freedom now meant 
something quite different than in Henry's day. when self-reliant people made do with minimal state 
assistance. Progressives envisioned democracy as citizens voting for the officials who would oversee 
the machinery to restrain them, the people. Progressives might argue over who among them should 
hold what powers, but agreed in expanding governmental bureaucracy to take greater responsibility 
for American life, even as they endeavored to give more Americans more direct say in government. 
In similar vein. Western nations in the 1930s became "mixed economies," in which 
governments came into dominating roles. However. Americans proved more recalcitrant than 
Europeans in accepting that change. For instance, early in his administration, Roosevelt attempted to 
implement his "partnership in planning between government and business" through a major new 
organization called the National Recovery Administration (NRA). It was to work in concert with 
industry to solve the imagined problem of overproduction by reducing output and setting prices. 
Americans did not trust business and government in such intimate relationship, however, and the 
Supreme Court ruled the NRA unconstitutional. Roosevelt created numerous other agencies and 
regulations that survived, but a bad experience with rationing and other wartime economic policies, in 
particular, made Americans wary of further expansions of federal government.33 In the case of 
science, however, many found Bush's linear economic model compelling, particularly because they 
feared losing the Cold War. The USSR reportedly had spent the equivalent of $200 million a year on 
science as early as the mid-1930s.34 
Thus, out of the postwar political process fell a haphazard science policy with funding 
coming from diverse sources within government. Bush by no means got all he otherwise wanted. 
His insistence that the NRF be largely free of the president's influence caused Truman to balk, as one 
obstacle.35 Congress finally approved the National Science Foundation (NSF) in 1950, but with a 
32 Maury Maverick, head of the Smaller War Plants Administration, October 1945, quoted in Kevles, 
The Physicists, 348. 
33 Yergin and Stanislaw, The Commanding Heights, 12, 21-38, 51-52, and 56. 
34 Kevles. The Physicists, 336-337. 
35 William A. Blanpied, "Inventing US Science Policy." Physics Today 51, no. 2 (February 1998). 
34-40: Kevles. The Physicists, 357 and 365-366. 
more restricted purview and greater accountability than Bush envisioned. Moreover, the NSF got 
about one-tenth the money he had anticipated.36 Even so, there emerged by the early 1950s what 
historian Daniel Kevles called a "victory for elitism." a "revolution" in America in which scientists 
(actually physicists, with physics being the elite science) wielded considerable political power.37 
If the NSF failed to become what Bush had hoped, overall federal spending on research 
nonetheless mushroomed. It dropped off slightly after World War II but soon jumped sharply thanks 
to heating of the Cold War. The October 1957 launching by the Soviet Union of Sputnik. first 
artificial satellite, really propelled science-related funding into orbit in the U.S. If not enough that the 
economy of the USSR outpaced those of Western nations, or so many thought, the communists also 
seemed to be outstripping everybody else in innovation. President Dwight Eisenhower warned that 
the Soviet Union had more scientists and engineers than the U.S. and was widening its lead every 
year. The virtue of state management seemed increasingly clear; the question was no longer should 
governments guide the markets, but specific means to use. Few now disagreed that Bush had the 
right idea: Inventions derived from basic research, which had gotten too expensive and risky for the 
private sector to manage. Government through its agencies should fund basic research, some applied 
research, and even development, in good part for defense, but also for long-term economic welfare, 
because industry could commercialize discoveries. This arrangement ensured both ongoing national 
security and prosperity. The concept remains entrenched to this day.38 
Federal government provided less than 20 percent of total expenditures for research in the 
1930s, and most years less. The low was 12 percent in 1934. It averaged 83 percent of total during 
World War H, about $600 million per year. Percentage of research sponsored by federal government 
dropped to around 54 percent by the early 1950s, even as amounts increased steadily to $625 million 
in 1947 and to $2.8 billion in 1953 with the Korean War. By 1961. after Sputnik, spending by federal 
government on research rocketed to $9.3 billion, 64 percent of total.39 Public support for science as a 
percentage of total spending then decreased after the 1969 moon landing. Federal contribution stood 
at 57 percent of total at 1970. By 1980, federal government funding of research had fallen to 47 
percent of total, and in 1995 to 35.5 percent. Nonetheless, corresponding amounts of federal funding 
36 Kealey, The Economic Laws of Scientific Research, 150-156. 
37 Kevles. The Physicists, 365-366. 
38 Bruce L. R. Smith, American Science Policy since World War II (Washington, D C.: Brookings 
Institution. 1990), 1-37; Kevles. The Physicists, 384. 
39 Kenneth Flamm. Targeting the Computer: Governmental Support and International Competition 
(Washington, D C : Brookings Institution. 1987), 7. See, "Table 1-3. U.S. Expenditures on Research 
and Development by Source of Funds, Selected Years, 1930-61." 
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continued climbing steeply, from $14.9 billion in 1970, to $29.5 billion in 1980, to $60.7 billion in 
1995. This indicates that while federal funding has grown dramatically, private research has 
increased more. Incidentally, of 1995 federal funding, 28.1 percent went for basic research, 23.7 
percent went for applied research, and the rest to development.'" 
Although Americans still believe government oversight of science essential to the welfare of 
their nation, it is now possible to measure promise against performance, which has been none too 
encouraging. For example, did the tidal wave of public money result in a similar upswell in patents? 
It did not. A high water mark for issued patents was 53,458 in 1932. Because of several years delay 
normal before an application is granted, most of the applications probably had been submitted before 
the Depression. Numbers of patents ebbed until 1937, with 37,683 patents granted that year, and then 
recovery began. With the war, however, patents went into freefall, to a low of 20,139 in 1947; this 
despite the federal government allowing private citizens to take out patents on inventions made with 
public funds. Not only did Eckert and Mauchly patent the ENIAC, for example, but also Atanasoff 
patented a sweep for destroying pressure mines. War is said to be a fount of innovation, but the 
opposite is actually true. The tide in patents started upward again but took until 1965 for those 
granted to finally exceed that of 1932. Actually, the trend in growth of patent applications by 
Americans has probably never matched that prewar.41 Thus, as far as numbers of patents measure 
innovation, government intervention appears to have been an abject failure. 
Neither is there evidence that inventions are any better. The National Academy of 
Engineering ranked what it considered the greatest engineering achievements of the twentieth century 
based on impact on quality of life. The top ten achievements are attributable primarily to inventions 
made before widespread state involvement.42 Economist Robert J. Gordon went further to note that a 
disproportionate number of fundamental inventions, what he called the "Great Inventions," came in 
40 National Science Board, Science and Engineering Indicators—1996. See, "Appendix Table 4-4: 
National Expenditures for Total R & D. by Source of Funds and Performer: 1970-95," 107. See also 
corresponding tables for basic and applied research and development, 108-110. 
41 Patent figures were taken from the United States Patent Office web site and include only domestic 
patents referred to as "patents for inventions." Economists warn that patent statistics are difficult to 
interpret. Zvi Griliches. for example, believed something changed in what patents measure. Zvi 
Griliches, "Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey," in R&D and Productivity: The 
Econometric Evidence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 287-300 and 322-336. See, in 
particular, "Fig. 13.9 Patent applications by U.S. residents and real GNP and investment, 1880-1989, 
log scale," 329. 
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" The National Academy of Engineering ranked the top ten engineering achievements of the 
twentieth century as electrification, automobile, airplane, water supply and distribution, electronics, 
radio and television, agricultural mechanization, computers, telephone, and air conditioning. 
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the second half of the nineteenth century. The immediate predecessors to the computer were invented 
then, of course, but just one decade or so, 1876 to 1886. saw inventions of the electric light, electric 
transformer, steam turbine generator, internal combustion engine, automobile, reinforced concrete, 
skyscraper, refrigerator, telephone, phonograph, fountain pen, theory of vaccines, indoor flush toilet, 
and more, including the cathode ray tube and Nipkow scanning disk, another precursor to television.43 
Other decades in the late nineteenth century were almost as astoundingly fecund. 
The greatest inventor of the age, or of any age, Edison, was considered "addled" as a child 
and had only three months formal schooling but accumulated 1.093 patents. Edison insisted he 
created through hard work and common sense, not genius. Nor did he need government handouts. 
On the other hand, in 1898 the Army gave $50,(XX) to the head of the Smithsonian Institution, Samuel 
Langley, to develop an airplane, but it took two bicycle mechanics from Ohio, Orville and Wilbur 
Wright, working without such largess, to make one that flew.44 The plethora of great and privately 
funded inventions of over a century ago formed the very basis of modernity, transforming, noted 
Gordon, "often abysmal living conditions to today's much easier and more pleasant life." As one 
happy consequence, life expectancy in America rose 0.72 percent per year from 1900 to 1950. 
As another consequence, the great inventions of the last decades of the nineteenth century 
ushered in productivity increases that more than doubled the already unprecedented figures of the 
century as a whole, and that lasted through much of the next century, but highlighted by progressives 
as a cause of the Depression. If the period was a golden age of invention that instigated a golden age 
of productivity and standards of living improvements, it is fair to note that the late nineteenth century 
was also a golden age of laissez-faire capitalism. Historians disparage the 1870s to 1890s, or so, as 
the "Gilded Age"45 because of immense wealth amassed by a few, but an outfall of the rambunctious 
but creative era has been more prosperous lives for the vast majority of people.46 Moreover, some 
43 The list of inventions here is taken from Bryan H. Bunch and Alexander Hellemans, The 
Timetables of Technology: A Chronology of the Most Important People and Events in the History of 
Technology (New York City: Simon & Schuster, 1993). 
44 Alan I Marcus and Howard P. Segal. Technology in America: A Brief History, 2nd. ed. (New York 
City: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1999), 201-202. 
45 The term "Gilded Age" came originally from a novel of that title by Mark Twain and Charles 
Dudley Warner. 
46 As an aside, it is assumed that, in articulating a "struggle for existence" as a prime mover within 
his theory of evolution by natural selection, Charles Darwin was influenced by nineteenth-century 
capitalism. Karl Marx, impressed with Darwin's theory, was one of the first to make that connection 
explicit. Struggle for existence escalated into the more brutal phrase "survival of the fittest" 
thereafter associated with cutthroat capitalism. In fact, before Darwin, economists generally thought 
that capitalism benefited all participants, although some people do better than others. Even Thomas 
Malthus. gloomiest of the early economic philosophers and who used the phrase struggle for 
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personages of wealth, such as John D. Rockefeller and Andrew Carnegie, founded great philanthropic 
organizations. Unfortunately, productivity improvements lost steam approximately in step with the 
steadily increasing role of government. By 1972, productivity growth rates had ground down 
significantly. Increases in life expectancy also slowed considerably. 
Productivity has evidently improved lately, and some analysts attribute that to the computer. 
However, Gordon concluded that any productivity improvement has been in fact narrowly limited to 
computers and related equipment and not shared by the 88 percent of the economy beyond durable 
manufacturing, although the service sector has made great use of computers. Moreover, in his 
analysis, the computer and Internet have not matched the contributions of the great inventions of the 
nineteenth century. To anyone who doubted that. Gordon asked them to consider whether they would 
rather give up the Internet or indoor plumbing. It is possible that computers and the Internet will gain 
new significance, of course. However, Gordon pointed out that the marginal utility of computers 
appears to be declining, hinting that its greatest contribution is past. Consider, for example, that the 
first word processing software packages were a big improvement over typewriters, but subsequent 
packages have consistently offered less gain in marginal effectiveness, even as computers have grown 
in power exponentially.47 
If there has been no evident improvement in innovation with government intervention, 
neither is there a clear rise in quality of basic research. There seems to have been no new theories in 
physics matching the impact of relativity or quantum mechanics, for example. A discovery that came 
as close as any also occurred before the war and resulted from private money. American Edwin 
Hubble used the 100-inch Hooker telescope at the Mount Wilson observatory to observe in patterns 
of heavenly light that the universe is, for all practical purposes, infinite but expanding. The Wilson 
observatory owed its existence to the Carnegie Institute and the Hooker telescope to a gift from a 
businessman. 
Perhaps the most beneficial research of the last century was that represented by Wallace 
breeding hybrid corn, based partially on government-funded research. However, just before taking 
office as vice president in 1941. Wallace visited Mexico. Upon return, he asked the Rockefeller 
Foundation if it might do something to alleviate subsistence conditions common there. Led by 
existence and whom Darwin cited as an influence, believed competition served to help the poor live 
better lives, not drive them further into poverty. Peter J. Bowler, Evolution: The History of an Idea 
(Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1989), 19, 99-103, 107-108, and 172-173. 
47 Robert J. Gordon. "Does the 'New Economy' Measure Up to the Great Inventions of the Past?" 
Journal of Economic Perspectives. 14, no. 4 (Fall 2000), 49-74. See, in particular, "Table I. Growth 
Rates of Output, Inputs, and Multifactor Productivity, Selected Intervals, 1870-1999," 53. 
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officials including Warren Weaver and J. George Harrar. the foundation funded research by Norman 
Borlaug and others that, in a "green revolution." yielded superior varieties of com. rice, and wheat 
that kept an estimated one billion people worldwide from starvation.48 As far as scientific research 
has served humane purposes, arguably more credit must go to Rockefeller and Carnegie than Uncle 
Sam. even if federal government spent more money. 
Finally, did money the government put into research at least improve the defense of the 
United States? Again, the answer is perhaps not. In the late 1960s, the Department of Defense 
commissioned Project Hindsight to investigate what it had gotten for its estimated $10 billion spent 
on basic research since World War II. The study concluded that the great majority of new weapons 
emerged from preexisting technologies and not from scientific breakthroughs.49 What had been true 
during the war continued to be true. 
Eisenhower more than any modem president retained a sense of restraint and balance toward 
public support of science. In his presidential "Farewell Address," he famously warned of the dangers 
posed by an unregulated "military-industrial complex," even as he believed the Cold War made that 
alliance necessary. However, rarely noted is that in the same speech he also emphasized that "public 
policy could itself become captive of a scientific-technological elite," subverting the nation's 
democratic processes. Furthermore, the other side of that problem, according to Eisenhower, was that 
the "prospect of domination of the nation's scholars by Federal Government, project allocations, and 
the power of money is ever present—and is gravely to be regarded." Moreover, because of lavish 
spending on research by government, "a government contract becomes virtually a substitute for 
intellectual curiosity."50 In short, just as the Founding Fathers feared concentration of power, a 
danger was that scientists could come to control public policy, dispense money generously to 
themselves, but not do enough to earn it, while placing democracy in jeopardy. 
In summary, if public financing of research may have yielded new technologies, perhaps 
even a few possible no other way, it is doubtful the nation is better off as a result. Rather, there may 
48 Warren Weaver. Scene of Change: A Lifetime in American Science (New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1970), 94-104; John C. Culver and John Hyde, American Dreamer: The Live and Times of 
Henry A. Wallace (New York: W. W Norton. 2000), 247-251. 
49 Concerned about the implications of Project Hindsight, the National Science Foundation 
commissioned its own study. Project TRACES, to review the conclusions of Hindsight. It claimed 
that Hindsight was mistaken and basic research was fundamental for new weapons. Science Policy 
Study Background Report No. /, 59-61. 
50 Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Farewell Radio and Television Address to the American People," 17 
January 1961, in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960-
61 (Washington. D C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), 1,038-1,039. 
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have been a net lose, considering the apparent slowing of progress. Note that, despite continual 
promises by scientists of a marvelous new world lying just ahead due to their efforts and government 
funding, the essential technologies of the twenty-first century remain mostly those invented before 
World War n. It may be that state financing has made life easier for scientists, but that should not 
impress taxpayers, forced to give up hard-earned wages to pay for it. 
Science and technology flourished before the federal government got involved to any great 
degree. They did so well in the days of little or no income taxes, in fact, that many people believed 
their very fruitfulness behind the Depression. After World War II, however, advocates for big 
government, including now scientists, insisted that not only the more science the better but also that 
research had become so expensive that only a powerful state could afford it. However, if true that the 
private sector would no longer back research sufficiently, then computers, as a high-tech product, 
ought to provide evidence. Yet even superficial examination of the evolution of computers casts 
doubt on need for public assistance. The fundamental advances occurred before the war, and with the 
examples of the ABC and similar machines, a von Neumann-type computer certainly would have 
resulted as industry regained its stride after being sidetracked in defense projects. Recall that IBM 
gladly funded the ASCC and other expensive machines, but put aside related research to help with the 
war. Then, von Neumann deliberately snubbed industry for the IAS computer. Furthermore, of the 
four major innovations in computing technology after the computer itself, that is, transistors, 
integrated circuits, rotating magnetic memory, and magnetic core memory, government's 
contribution to all has been overstated. 
As discussed, research into solid-state devices began long before World War II and before 
quantum mechanics could satisfactorily explain them. Semiconductors actually became objects of 
scientific curiosity a century earlier, beginning with Faraday's discovery in 1833 that conductivity 
and temperature of silver sulfide are directly related. Most metals have the opposite characteristic: 
conductivities go up as temperature goes down. Several years later. Frenchman Alexander-Edmond 
Becquerel found that a voltage resulted when light impinged on the point where a semiconductor and 
electrolyte met. This was the phenomenon Einstein explained as the photoelectric effect. Uses for 
semiconductors did not wait, however. A notable example was the "cat's whisker" rectifier for 
detecting signals in early crude radios. It consisted of a metal wire touched against a crystal of galena 
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(lead sulfide) or pyrite (iron sulfide). Interest in the unreliable cat's whisker rectifier waned with 
Fleming's invention of the vacuum-tube diode.51 
Theoretical explanation for semiconductors came several years after the Copenhagen 
interpretation of quantum mechanics. In 1931, after explaining the difference between conductors 
and insulators at the atomic level, British physicist Alan H. Wilson expanded his theory to include 
semiconductors. It was understood by the war that semiconductors are typically elements in the 
fourth column of the periodic chart and neither good conductors nor insulators in pure form. 
Semiconductors become conductors when combined with elements from the third or fifth columns. 
In the 1930s, before scientific details could be ironed out, mass manufacture of rugged diodes began 
from plates of copper oxidized on one side.52 Julius E. Lilienfeld, a German émigré, earlier 
experimented with an amplifier made from copper sulfide. In Germany, Oskar Heil designed a triode 
consisting of copper oxide, vanadium pentoxide. tellurium, and iodine. R. W. Pohl, another German, 
created an amplifier from a potassium bromide crystal in 1938. At the BTL the next year. William 
Shockley suggested an amplifier using copper oxide. 
The BTL largely put aside its substantial efforts in semiconductors during the war. Shockley 
and Walter Brattain got pulled into various defense activities. John Bardeen helped with mine 
research at the NOL. The federal government did not sponsor research into transistors but continued 
that into germanium diodes.53 Such diodes performed combinational logic in computers after the 
ENIAC. Numbers of fragile and power-hungry vacuum tubes could thus be greatly reduced, 
particularly since one diode could often replace multiple vacuum tubes.54 
Transistors eventually replaced the rest of the tubes, of course, but it took the BTL several 
years after the war to regain momentum and create the first crude transistors, quite independent of 
government. While government paid 25 percent of the transistor's subsequent development costs 
through the 1950s, that still left the great share to the BTL. Had government not provided its fraction 
of support, the BTL would have continued development of transistors for the simple reason that it 
needed them.55 It might have taken a little longer to perfect their manufacture, but that was unlikely 
to have made much difference to consumers, since the military monopolized production for the first 
51 Editors of Electronics, An Age of Innovation: The World of Electronics 1930-2000 (McGraw-Hill, 
1981). 66. 
52 Michael Riordan and Lillian Hoddeson. Crvstal Fire: The Birth of the Information Age (New 
York: W. W. Norton, 1997), 65-68, 90-92, and 97-98. 
53 Editors of Electronics, An Age of Innovation, 26 and 67-71. 
54 Charles J. Bashe, et al.. IBM's Earlv Computers (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1986), 
118-119. 
55 Riordan and Hoddeson, Crystal Fire, 116. 
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years.56 Much the same story occurred with integrated circuits. Public funding contributed nothing 
to the invention of integrated circuits but helped with their continued development. Industry certainly 
would otherwise have shouldered the burden by itself. Government's greatest contribution was 
providing a market in the early years before manufacturing techniques became perfected. 
Government sponsored development of rotating magnetic storage mechanisms by ERA, but 
similar devices had been proposed before the war, including by Atanasoff and Bush. The Germans 
during the war recorded sound on plastic tape coated with iron oxide.57 Also in Germany. Gerhard 
Dirks designed electronic computing machines that included magnetic storage. After he won a patent 
for a rotating magnetic storage drum with a clock track, it was inexplicably revoked. The German 
Patent Office deemed the mechanism not sufficiently inventive.58 In 1946, Andrew Booth, at the 
University of London, proposed a number of magnetic storage devices, including disc.59 IBM began 
work on magnetic-disc storage in 1949, although it used that by ERA instead.60 In summary, rotating 
magnetic storage was a common concept posing no inordinate developmental obstacles. 
Magnetic core storage deserves greater elaboration. Historians of computers attribute it and 
other technologies, including timesharing, computer graphics, and certain reliability mechanisms, to 
the Whirlwind computer project. Whirlwind is also interesting because better records were kept on it 
than most projects, and they provide a cautionary tale of the waste that can result when scientists have 
free reign and unlimited budgets. 
Whirlwind began relatively modestly in 1944 as a flight simulator called ASCA61 to train 
naval bomber pilots. The Navy preferred giving the project to the BTL but asked MIT to do a 
preliminary investigation, in part because it anticipated the school could do it cheaper. MIT assigned 
ASCA to Jay W. Forrester, a graduate student in electrical engineering and associated with the 
school's Servomechanisms Laboratory. Forrester proposed a training cockpit controlled by analog 
mechanisms that could compute, among other things, the thirty-three simultaneous equations needed 
56 Kenneth Flamm. Creating the Computer: Government, Industry, and High Technology 
(Washington. D C.: Brookings Institution. 1988), 16. 
57 Bashe. et al., IBM's Early Computers. 188. 
58 Konrad Zuse, The Computer—My Life, trans. Patricia McKenna and J. Andrews Ross (New York: 
Springer-Verlag, 1993), 106, 107, and 111. 
59 Andrew D. Booth, "Computers in the University of London. 1945-1962." in A History of 
Computing in the Twentieth Century: A Collection of Essays, ed. N. Metropolis, et al. (New York: 
Academic Press, 1980). 553. 
60 Emerson W. Pugh, Building IBM: Shaping an Industry and its Technology (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press. 1995). 168 and 178-179. 
61 ASCA is an acronym for Airplane Stability and Control Analyzer. 
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to mimic the responses of an airplane in flight. MTT estimated a prototype could be built in one year 
for $200,000. Wary, the Navy asked for further study, and by mid-1945, MIT recognized that 
building a simulator was significantly more difficult than originally thought. It negotiated a contract 
to give it $875,000 and eighteen months to complete the job. About then. Perry Crawford and 
Samuel Caldwell urged Forrester to consider digital controls.62 
Caldwell independently planned to reactivate the Arithmetical Machine, the project the 
Center of Analysis had started before the war with funding from NCR. Then, with World War II 
over, Caldwell returned to MIT. Weaver, his boss at the NDRC, went back to his former job. After 
Weaver showed him an application von Neumann submitted to the Rockefeller Foundation for 
funding what became the IAS computer, Caldwell claimed the Arithmetical Machine had greater 
potential, at least in certain aspects. Like von Neumann, Caldwell emphasized applied mathematics, 
stating: "There is a strong feeling that mathematics is entering a period of great new accomplishment 
by way of the mass production of numerical solutions, and we are potentially situated to operate 
among the leaders in that advance." MTT followed up with a formal request for funding and a 
promise that Norbert Weiner would thenceforth be closely associated with the Arithmetical Machine. 
Caldwell thus got $100,000 from the Rockefeller Foundation and von Neumann got nothing.63 
Meanwhile, Forrester learned of the ENIAC and ED VAC projects, the former nearing 
completion and the latter under consideration. By January 1946, Forrester and his partner, Robert 
Everett, agreed that flight simulation was too complex for analog mechanisms alone, so they added a 
digital computer to the project. MIT accordingly renegotiated its contract to give it until June 1950 to 
deliver a simulator at the hugely increased price of $2.434,000. MIT also changed the name of the 
project to Whirlwind. 
The Navy still wanted a simulator, but as the name change hinted, Forrester and the youthful 
design team he assembled decided to focus on a general-purpose digital computer capable of 
operating in real time. As two historians of the project aptly put it: "the tail had passed through and 
beyond the point of wagging the dog and had become the dog." If that means the cockpit became the 
tail, then it got chopped off. The Whirlwind team deferred the cockpit and devoted all efforts to the 
computer. Worse, Forrester had a cavalier attitude toward expenditures. He believed Whirlwind 
worth whatever it cost and spent as if he had no limit. One critic complained the project employed, 
6
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"hot and cold running secretaries." The Navy watched the transformation of ASCA with growing 
anxiety and might have canceled the project if not for the political clout of MIT. Meanwhile, 
Crawford left MTT to head the Navy division responsible for Whirlwind, and he championed the 
project as an insider. 
Adding to the discord was confusion over the design of Whirlwind. It began something like 
the ED VAC It became more like the IAS computer, including parallel transmission of data and. for 
a time, cathode ray tube memories.64 As it were. MTT had two computer projects proceeding along 
roughly similar paths. However, with so much money being sucked into Whirlwind, the Arithmetical 
Machine could not compete, and MIT discontinued it in 1947,65 Critics compared Whirlwind 
unfavorably to the IAS computer and Arithmetical Machine, questioning why it cost so much more. 
Forrester responded, with some merit, that criteria for his machine were more demanding. Whirlwind 
needed to be faster and more reliable to control a simulator in real time. Actually, the simulator was 
all but forgotten, but to justify his project and keep money coming in, Forrester began promoting 
Whirlwind as the center of a large information system for military applications with an estimated cost 
of $2 billion. 
Grandiose thinking became key to Whirlwind's ultimate success. The Navy finally had 
enough and extracted itself as best it could from project obligations, although in return, it had to 
establish a new center at MIT for machine computation and numerical analysis.66 Fortunately for 
Whirlwind, the Cold War intensified in the knick of time. The Soviet Union exploded its first atomic 
weapon in August 1949, and the next year the Korean War began. The Air Force worried that the 
nation urgently needed protection against long-range bomber attack. It therefore took over much of 
the funding for Whirlwind, intending it to be part of development of an early warning system of radar 
installations and computers called SAGE.67 Forrester thus finished Whirlwind in 1951. It contained 
about 4.200 vacuum tubes 68 and cost as much as $5 million, making it by far the most expensive of 
the early computers. Whirlwind became the computer for the Cape Cod system, the prototype to 
SAGE.69 Forrester and the Air Force then selected IBM to develop and build computers for SAGE, 
64 Robert R. Everett, "Whirlwind." in A History of Computing in the Twentieth Century: A Collection 
of Essays, ed. N. Metropolis, et al. (New York: Academic Press, 1980), 366-367. 
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66 Wildes and Lindgren. A Century of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science at MIT, 293. 
67 SAGE is an acronym for Semiautomatic Ground Environment. 
68 Redmond and Smith. Project Whirlwind, 25-27, 41-43, 46, 69, 116-117, 131, and 138. 
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twenty-six mammoth ANZFSQ-7 and AN/FSQ-8 computers, each actually two machines operated in 
tandem for reliability.70 Estimates of SAGE's cost range from $4 billion to $12 billion. 
The stated lesson of Whirlwind has been that public funding of science, no matter its purpose 
or how extravagant, is always worthwhile. Whirlwind did seem serendipitously to fill a critical 
military need. However, ballistic missiles had become the major threat by completion of SAGE. 
Timely detection of missiles or newer airplanes was beyond its capabilities. Thus, the United States 
built another system, the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS), to detect those threats.71 
It is also true that by 1952 Forrester gave Whirlwind a magnetic core memory capacity of 
2,048 sixteen-bit words.72 Others invented magnetic core memory simultaneously, however. 
Mauchly claimed that he and Eckert discussed it as they designed the ENIAC, making theirs the 
earliest consideration if true.73 IBM began considering core memory as early as 1946. It hired 
Munro K. Haynes after he completed a dissertation in 1950 entitled, "Magnetic Cores as Elements of 
Digital Computing Systems."74 He helped fabricate a prototype in 1952.75 In Great Britain, Booth 
proposed core memory in 1947.76 Ralph Slutz and Richard Snyder independently applied for a patent 
on it that same year. The two men helped with the IAS computer, but its project team made speed of 
implementation a higher priority and chose to stay with cathode ray tubes.77 At RCA, Jan Rajchman 
successfully implemented iron core memory in 1952.78 Whatever its benefit to defense. Whirlwind 
was not essential to invention of magnetic core memory.79 Moreover, private interests doubtlessly 
would have independently developed all the mechanisms associated with Whirlwind.80 
70 Pugh, Building IBM, 215. 
71 Editors of Electronics, An Age of Innovation, 99. 
72 Flamm, Creating the Computer, 58 and 88-90. See also, "Table 3-1. Early U.S. Support for 
Computers." 76-77; David A. Patterson and John L. Hennessy, Computer Organization and Design: 
The Hardware /Software Interface (San Francisco: Morgan Kaufmann, 1994), 522-523. 
73 Sperry Rand Corporation v. Control Data Corporation. United States District Court, District of 
Maryland, Civil Actions Nos. 15.823-15,824, "Deposition of John W. Mauchly," 210-215. ISU, 
Parks. "John Vincent Atanasoff Papers" (box 19). 
74 Pugh. Building IBM, 209. 
75 Bashe, et al.. IBM's Early Computers . 232-237. 
76 Herman H. Goldstine, The Computer from Pascal to von Neumann (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1972). 310. 
77 William Aspray, John von Neumann and the Origins of Modem Computing (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MTT Press, 1990), 80-81. 
78 Jan Rajchman, "Early Research on Computers at RCA," in A History of Computing in the 
Twentieth Centurv: A Collection ofEssavs, ed. N. Metropolis, et al. (New York: Academic Press, 
1980), 468. 
79 Bashe, et al., IBM's Early Computers,  232 and 271-272. 
80 For example. IBM finished the NORC a couple of years after completion of Whirlwind but with its 
own money and a different design. The NORC operated much faster than Whirlwind. Flamm, 
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More fundamental technologies originated in the ABC, a computer costing one-thousandth as 
much. That shows extraordinary things can be accomplished with little money. Indeed, a lesson of 
the ABC might be that scarcity spurs creativity. Moreover, considering the fate of the Arithmetical 
Machine, Whirlwind suggests a variation of Gresham's Law: the federal government can choke out 
privately funded research. Worst of all. Whirlwind demonstrated that government funding tends to 
go to those with political advantage, not to uses with citizens' interests at heart. Historians assume 
government poured so much money into computers, that it must have been proportionally responsible 
for their success. Money spent is not necessarily money wisely spent, however.81 Words Adam 
Smith wrote in the eighteenth century retain potent implications today: 
The natural effort of every individual to better his own condition, when suffered to exert 
itself with freedom and security, is so powerful a principle, that it is alone, and without any 
assistance, not only capable of carrying on the society to wealth and prosperity, but of 
surmounting a hundred impertinent obstructions with which the folly of human laws too 
often incumbers its operations; though the effect of these obstructions is always more or less 
either to encroach upon its freedom, or to diminish its security.82 
Coincident with the electronic digital computer has been the great rise of the federal 
government as a major source of funding for research. A relationship between governments and 
computers began much earlier than World War II. however. The very concept of the digital 
computer—and simultaneously government spending huge amounts on it—originated in England in 
the early nineteenth century with Charles Babbage. Calculating devices existed before, but none 
Creating the Computer, 9. The information is contained in "Table 2-1. Progress in Machine 
Computation Speeds." 
81 As told by historian David F. Noble, the development of computer-controlled machine tools has 
striking parallels to Whirlwind. Soon after World War II, American manufacturer John T. Parsons hit 
upon an idea to use EAM equipment to guide machine tools to make helicopter blades with greater 
precision than possible with conventional manual control, which was actually unsuitable. Parsons 
approached IBM and found the company enthusiastic, and it agreed to jointly develop the concept. 
However, Parsons also went to the Air Force to finance part of the project. To his lasting regret, he 
then asked MIT for technical advice. By hook and by crook, MIT and the Air Force took over, 
eventually eliminating both IBM and Parsons from the effort and reformulating the concept to their 
own ends. The result was numerical controlled machine tools so complex and expensive that only 
machine shops receiving government subsidies could afford them. Eventually, machine tools based 
on Parson's simpler idea did find common use. Involvement by MIT and the government set back 
numerical controlled machine tools by years and wasted tremendous amounts of money. See, Noble 
in Forces of Production: A Social Histoid çf Industrial Automation -(New York City: Alfred A. 
Knopf. 1984), 79-143 and 195-239. 
82 Adam Smith. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 5th ed. (New York: 
Modern Library, 1985). 261. 
248 
nearly so advanced. Babbage conceived of calculators that approached, and one that perhaps met, all 
requirements for a true computer, albeit mechanical. 
How Babbage got his ideas is not clear, although a project directed by engineer Gaspard 
Riche de Prony in France to construct trigonometric and logarithmic tables provided an inspiration. 
While organizing the effort, involving so many calculations it might otherwise have been impossible 
to accomplish, de Prony happened to read the first of Wealth of Nations, and it struck him to 
"manufacture logarithms" as Smith described the manufacture of pins using division of labor.83 His 
employees thus came in three groups. One consisted of five or six mathematicians who determined 
formulae and supervised. Seven or eight calculators made worksheets for some sixty to eighty 
assistants to complete.84 Interestingly, the latter group comprised mostly ex-hairdressers no longer 
employable in their original occupation because of the French Revolution and changing styles.85 
The assistants did not understand mathematics but no matter. De Prony arranged the effort 
around the numerical technique of finite differences. Mathematics is full of delightful hidden 
patterns that emerge miraculously for those privy to its secrets, and the method of differences takes 
advantage of one. It happens that if a polynomial is solved for enough successive values, and if the 
differences of the answers are calculated, and the differences of those, and so on for enough 
differences, eventually the differences become a constant. A consistent pattern has at that point 
revealed itself in full. As many values as are wanted can be found by repetitively tracking through 
the steps in the pattern and making similar successive calculations, either additions or subtractions 
depending on the method used. Each sequence of calculations becomes the basis for the next 
iteration, beginning each time with the constant and ending with a new value. 
It was a laborious process but worked for creating tables. The assistants used arithmetic to 
complete the worksheets, which they gave back to the calculators for checking. Mathematicians had 
the critical task of selecting formulae. The precise one might not be a polynomial, as with 
logarithmic or trigonometric functions. The mathematicians then had to find a polynomial that 
approximated the function and could be substituted over at least part of the argument.86 
83 I. Grattan-Guinness. "Work for the Hairdressers: The Production of de Prony's Logarithmic and 
Trigonometric Tables," Annals of the History of Computing 12, no. 3 (1990), 178-179. 
84 Charles Babbage, "A Letter to Sir Humphry Davy,... on the Application of Machinery to the 
Purpose of Calculating and Printing Mathematical Tables," 1822; reprint in Martin Campbell-Kelly, 
ed.. The Works of Charles Babbage (London: Pickering and Chatto, 1989), Vol. 2, 11-12. 
85 Grattan-Guinness, "Work for the Hairdressers," 179. 
86 Paul Ceruzzi, The Reckoners: The Prehistory of the Digital Computer, From Relays to the Stored 
Program Concept (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1983), 63-64. 
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Babbage was enough of a mathematician that he won the prestigious Lucasian Professorship 
at Cambridge in 1828. Isaac Newton once held that same chair.87 It carried a stipend of eighty to 
ninety pounds sterling per year,88 but Babbage did not so much as deliver a lecture for his pay.89 He 
continued doing instead what he had always done: pursue numerous personal interests and travel 
extensively. On a trip to France, probably in 1819, he learned of de Prony's project, which impressed 
him immensely both for its methods and because the French Government paid for it.90 A few months 
later Babbage helped his friend John Herschel, son of eminent astronomer William Herschel, 
construct astronomical tables. Babbage and Herschel made decisions and left routine calculations to 
be "distributed amongst several computers," something like de Prony. Babbage nonetheless found 
the work tedious and unavoidably full of errors, and it occurred to him that table making could be 
mechanized.91 After due reflection, he built what he called a Difference Engine that could calculate 
two orders of differences. He wrote the President of the Royal Society of London, Humphry Davy, in 
1822 to solicit money from the British Government for construction of a full-scale version.92 The 
possibility of having error-free navigation tables enticed the government to agree.93 
The Difference Engine was intended to substitute for the bottom echelon of de Prony's 
mental laborers, the assistants. Its design allowed solutions to six orders of differences and answers 
to sixteen decimal places. A mathematician still had to set up the problem into repetitive steps. The 
machine could then emulate the algorithm, solving consecutive new values by addition, without error, 
as long as someone turned its crank handle. To further eliminate errors, the engine was to 
automatically print values in tables. The Difference Engine must surely rank among the great 
inventive ideas of all time. 
87 The Lucasian Professorship of Mathematics had been privately endowed by Henry Lucas in 1640. 
Kealey. The Economic Laws of Scientific Research, 79. 
88 Charles Babbage, Passages from the Life of a Philosopher, ed. Martin Campbell-Kelly (New 
Brunswick. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press. 1994), 24. 
89 Martin Campbell-Kelly, Introduction to Passages from the Life of a Philosopher by Charles 
Babbage, ed. Martin Campbell-Kelly (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1994), 
18. 
90 Babbage, "A Letter to Sir Humphry Davy," 10. 
91 Charles Babbage, 'The Science of Number Reduced to Mechanism," 1822; reprint in Martin 
Campbell-Kelly, ed.. The Works of Charles Babbage (London: Pickering and Chatto, 1989), Vol. 2, 
15. 
92 Babbage, "A Letter to Sir Humphry Davy," 6-14. 
93 Starting 1766. the British Government paid for the yearly production of the Nautical Almanac, sets 
of hand-calculated nautical tables. Martin Campbell-Kelly and William Aspray, Computer: A 
History of the Information Machine (New York City: BasicBooks, 1996), 10. 
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The architecture of the Difference Engine involved calculation with digits in parallel but 
number sets sequentially. Calculating mechanisms consisted of linked trains of gears that also stored 
numbers. Such dual-purpose elements are called accumulators, although Babbage did not use that 
terminology. A different accumulator activated to process each step of the algorithm. Rather than 
have accumulators sit idle, Babbage had upstream ones began the sequence of calculations leading to 
the next value even as downstream accumulators finished the current value. This parallel-computing 
technique is now called pipelining, and a somewhat similar method is common today.94 The 
Difference Engine was to measure eight feet high, seven feet long, and three feet wide and contain 
some 25,000 pieces, but it was never finished. Babbage manufactured less than one-half the total 
parts, assembled a demonstration model with 2,000 of them, and the rest were eventually scrapped. 
He spent a substantial fortune, partly his own, but also 17,470 pounds sterling of public money.95 
Among the reasons Babbage did not complete the Difference Engine was that he did not get 
along with his chief engineer, Joseph Clement. A final break between the two men occurred in 1833 
in a dispute over expenses and relocating to a new shop. Clement refused to do any more on the 
project and retained all drawings and machine tools, as permitted legally. That effectively put an end 
to the Difference Engine.96 Babbage always had a number of endeavors underway simultaneously, 
another reason he did not finish the Difference Engine, and coincident with work on it published 
Reflections on the Decline of Science and Some of its Causes in 1830. He wrote the book to excoriate 
the Royal Society, of which he was a member, for reasons unnecessary to discuss here. The book 
also sought greater support of science by government. Babbage then helped found the British 
Association for the Advancement of Science to provide an alternative to the Royal Society for 
94 Allan G. Bromley, The Evolution of Babbage s Calculating Engines," Annals of the History of 
Computing 9, no. 2 ( 1987), 115-117. Babbage claimed the Difference Engine could calculate with 
numbers to twenty decimal places. Babbage, Passages from the Life of a Philosopher, 34. 
95 Doron D. S wade, "Redeeming Charles Babbage's Mechanical Computer," Scientific American 
268, no. 2 (February 1993). 87-88. 
96 It has been thought that machine tools of the early nineteenth century lacked the precision needed 
to build a difference engine. Historian Doron Swade found otherwise. Measuring parts from the 
original Difference Engine, Swade discovered that Clement routinely achieved tolerances of 1.5 to 
2.0 thousandths of an inch. Using the same tolerances, Swade fabricated a working replica of the 
Difference Engine No. 2, a later version. See, Swade, "Redeeming Charles Babbage's Mechanical 
Computer," 90-91. 
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representing science to government. The Association became more controversial than effective, and 
true to his famously irascible nature, Babbage had a falling out with that organization as well.97 
Babbage had a decidedly modem viewpoint on science and government funding its pursuit. 
As Babbage saw things, the chief strength of Britain lay in manufacturing. Manufacturing expertise 
derived from applied sciences, which found its sources in "abstract Science." Moreover, following 
Adam Smith, division of labor could be as productively applied to exertions mental as those physical. 
It therefore followed that manufacturing could benefit from further specialization of mental labors 
and increased emphasis on theoretical studies. As Babbage put it: "Discovery of the great principles 
of nature demands a mind almost exclusively devoted to such investigations; and these, in the present 
state of science, frequently require costly apparatus, and exact an expense of time quite incompatible 
with professional avocations." Thus, sounding like Bush, he proposed that it might be, "politic in the 
state to compensate for some of these privations, to which the cultivators of the higher departments of 
science are exposed."98 He believed government backing of science gave Britain its best hope of 
improving its manufacturing capabilities and economic situation.99 
Modern ideas or not, Babbage had questionable justification for promoting government 
funding of science. Government gave him a huge sum of money, but he did fulfill his part of the 
bargain. More to the point, Britain did quite well without the funding. Most tellingly, Europe 
experienced a population boom during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Historical precedent 
suggested that people should have starved with the next inevitable crop failure. People did starve, in 
fact, but no longer in Britain. It had bad harvests, certainly, but the British thrived, confounding 
expectations. From 1780 to 1860 the population of Great Britain almost tripled but per capita 
income rose from eleven to twenty-eight pounds sterling, a major increase even with cost of living 
changes. Costs of many items went down. For instance, cloth that cost seventy or eighty shillings in 
1780 went for five shillings in 1850.100 Britain did so well because of productivity improvements 
associated with the Industrial Revolution, thanks in good part to new textile machinery, steam 
97 Anthony Hyman, Charles Babbage: Pioneer of the Computer (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1982), 88-93, 130-133, and 149-156. 
98 Charles Babbage, On the Economy of Machinery and Manufactures, 4th ed. (1835; reprint New 
York: Augustus M. Kelly, 1971), 379-380. 
99 The linear model of innovation can be traced back at least to Francis Bacon (1561-1626), more 
lawyer than scientist, but who advocated organized scientific research funded by the state. 
100 D. N. McCloskey. 'The Industrial Revolution 1780-1860: A Survey," in Roderick Floud and 
Donald McCloskey. eds.. The Economic History of Britain since 1700, (Cambridge, England: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981), Vol. 1. 103-110. Charles Babbage gave numerous examples of 
common items that experienced dramatic price decreases during approximately the period 1800 to 
1830. Babbage, On the Economy of Machinery and Manufactures, 153-159. 
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engines, iron making processes, and the like, all in consequence of investment of private capital. The 
exception was Ireland, which remained primarily agrarian and suffered brutal famine. 
Deprivation occurred in Great Britain and the negative side of capitalism must shoulder some 
blame. In particular, building industry required investment of savings, and much of the sacrifice was 
initially borne by laborers in the form of lower wages. However, the unsavory reputation of the 
Industrial Revolution has less to do with deterioration of quality of life—living standards improved as 
never before—than the fact that capitalism rose together with modern democracy, both stemming 
from popular demand for more freedoms and equality. Economic historian Robert L. Heilbroner has 
noted that the forces of democracy subjected capitalism to scathing criticism and reforming 
influences from the beginning and with little regard to actual amelioration in conditions.101 
Furthermore, as far as social misery existed during the Industrial Revolution, responsibility 
must largely be attributed to natural causes, such as poor harvests, or to actions by government. 
Antiquated monetary policies and frequent wars caused hardships, for example. Bad laws did too. 
Poor Law encouraged people to stay put in poverty instead of relocating to find readily available 
work. Corn Laws meant people unnecessarily went hungry during lean years by restricting 
importation of grains.102 Com Laws curiously also gave impetus for the rise of railroads. It became 
more cost effective to move goods with steam engines than with horses, a million of which had 
provided locomotive power in England, and each consumed on average enough grain to feed eight 
people.103 Adam Smith's famous "invisible hand," paraphrased here as the collective genius of 
individuals, looks after nations better than their governments do. 
As for the wars in which the British Government involved the nation and their impact on 
innovation, historian T. S. Ashton noted the same, if underreported, phenomenon evident from World 
War II, as follows: 
Those who take the perverse view that war is a spring of technological progress may be 
reminded that each of the major peaks (in numbers of British patents filed)—1766, 1769, 
1783, 1792, 1802. and 1824-5—came in a time of peace. And those who believe that the 
wind bloweth where it listeth may well ponder the fact that at each of these dates the rate of 
interest was below the prevailing level, and that at each of them expectations of profit were 
running high.104 
101 Robert L. Heilbroner, The Making of Economic Society (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-
Hall, 1962), 81-88 and 97. 
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" T. S. Ashton, The Industrial Revolution: 1760-1830 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), 
76-81 and 108-111. 
103 Wolfgang Schivelbusch, The Railway Journey: The Industrialization of Time and Space in the 
19th Century (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1986), 4-5. Schivelbusch 
attributed Adam Smith for information on the ratio of food consumed by horses to that by people. 
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Government played only an indirect role in the prosperity of nineteenth-century Great Britain, 
and the influence of science was equally ambiguous, although usually cited as a major factor. For 
instance, according to Ashton: "Physicists and chemists, such as Franklin, Black, Priestley, Dalton, 
and Davy, were in intimate contact with the leading figures in British industry: there was much 
coming and going between the laboratory and the workshop, and men like James Watt, Josiah 
Wedgwood, William Reynolds, and James Keir were at home in the one as much as in the other." It 
is worth noting that Keir was a physician but Watt and Wedgewood had little formal education. Most 
inventors created more by cleverness and hard work than application of science, in fact. Among the 
more famous innovators of the Industrial Revolution, and in parenthesis their backgrounds, were 
Thomas Newcomen (ironmonger), John Kay (clockmaker), James Hargreaves (weaver), Richard 
Arkwright (barber), Peter Stubs (innkeeper), Benjamin Huntsman (clockmaker), Samuel Crompton 
(weaver), Henry Maudslay (mechanic), George Stephenson (engine-wright). John Wilkinson 
(ironmaster), Abraham Darby (ironmaster), and Henry Cort (navy agent).105 The ingenious men 
responsible for the technology of the Industrial Revolution were overwhelmingly of the most 
common sort, with humble births and modest educations.106 
Indeed, Babbage had an arguably valid point about the poor quality of science in Britain. 
Many thought British science in decline since Newton. Insistence on the archaic notation of 
Newtonian calculus as opposed to the more powerful and independently developed notation of 
Gottfried W. Leibniz used elsewhere in Europe epitomized the situation. Babbage bridled at the 
failure to adopt Leibnizian calculus even as a student. Never one to refrain from exerting his opinion, 
he and Herschel published an essay, "The Principles of pure D-ism in opposition to the Dot-age of the 
University," advocating the change.107 The title is an epigram that got to the essence of the notational 
differences and simultaneously tweaked the sensibilities of his professors at Cambridge. Some of 
Reflections on the Decline of Science reflected that same spirit. 
Even if not as sophisticated for a time as some of that on the Continent, and though it had 
minimal influence on the Industrial Revolution to 1860, or so, British science did have remarkable 
achievements. In 1831, for example, a year after Babbage published his polemic warning of neglect 
105 Ashton, The Industrial Revolution. 12-14. Keir made his name in chemicals; Wedgwood in 
crockery; Watt, Newcomen, and Stephenson in steam engines or locomotives; Reynolds, Stubs, 
Huntsman, Wilkinson, Maudslay, Darby, and Cort in iron, steel, or metalworking; and Kay, 
Hargreaves, Arkwright, and Crompton in textile machinery. 
106 Heilbroner, The Making of Economic Society, 77-81. 
107 Babbage, Passages from the Life of a Philosopher, 21. 
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of science, Faraday discovered electromagnetic induction. He moved a coil of wire in a magnetic 
field and produced an electrical current. Faraday's discovery is an example of how scientific 
discoveries increasingly became important for practical applications, as Babbage anticipated. Even 
so, British science continued to be mostly privately funded into the twentieth century. 
France also had distinguished scientists doing first-class work, but unlike in Great Britain, the 
French Government backed science generously. De Prony's project was typical. Oddly, despite 
massive public spending on science, and despite its high quality, France remained relatively poor. It 
lagged Britain by fifty years going into an industrial revolution. All this suggests that, its science 
notwithstanding, France suffered because of dirigisme, its system of centralized economic control and 
onerous taxes. Britain did better because it enjoyed a freer market and light taxes.108 In France, 
"trade is in disgrace," while in England, "it is highly respected," reported the no-nonsense Adam 
Smith, giving a characteristically trenchant explanation.109 It is instructive that the French gained no 
more from the computing project of de Prony than the British did from that of Babbage. De Prony 
finished the mathematics tables, nineteen volumes at end of 1801, but financial troubles forced 
France to cancel plans to print them.110 
No doubt Babbage advocated government funding for science because he believed it best for 
his nation, as Bush did for his, and as other people have for theirs. Adam Smith, of a different mind, 
commented sagely, if cynically, that he had, "never known much good done by those who affected to 
trade for the public good." That person, he said, "who should attempt to direct private people in what 
manner they ought to employ their capitals, would not only load himself with a most unnecessary 
attention, but assume an authority which could safely be trusted, not only to no single person, but to 
no council or senate whatever, and which would nowhere be so dangerous as in the hands of a man 
who had folly and presumption enough to fancy himself fit to exercise it."111 Little wonder that, with 
the ascendancy of progressive thinking in the twentieth century. Smith fell out of favor. 
With the failure of the Difference Engine, the British Government temporarily learned its 
lesson, and Babbage got no more money. Babbage doggedly turned his prodigious talents to a more 
advanced machine. Useful though a calculator that solved problems by the method of finite 
differences could have been, it had limitations. It occurred to him to create a more flexible calculator 
108 Kealey, The Economic Laws of Scientific Research, 60-89. 
109 Smith, Wealth of Nations, 92-93. 
110 Grattan-Guinness. "Work for the Hairdressers," 180-181. 
111 Smith. Wealth of Nations, 225-226. 
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by linking the accumulators to allow modification of the constant by feedback of the last calculated 
value. He phrased the concept as the "engine eating its own tail."112 He thought such a machine must 
be forbiddingly complex, but then realized it could be simplified by separating the mechanism that 
stored numbers from the one that performed computations. On that basis, Babbage began design of 
the Analytical Engine. Taking terminology from textile mills, he called the computational and 
storage parts of the engine the mill and store, respectively (and suggesting that comparisons to the 
brain were not inevitable, after all).113 The Difference Engine did only addition, but the Analytical 
Engine could also subtract, multiply, divide, and find roots. 
It might seem that a machine that does only arithmetic can hardly be considered a computer, 
but remember, that and conditional logic are about all any digital computer does mathematically. The 
Analytic Engine was to be more powerful than the Difference Engine, not so much by performing 
more arithmetic operations, but because it could solve disparate algorithms. Babbage considered 
alternative programming methods and. like Hollerith, adopted punched card technology from the 
Jacquard loom to enter mathematical formulae and data. Babbage declared his Analytical Engine a 
"finite machine" that could do "calculations of unlimited extent"114 A friend, Ada Augusta, 
Countess of Lovelace and only legitimate daughter of Lord Byron, described the Analytical Engine 
more eloquently as befitted her heritage. She averred poetically, "We may say most aptly that the 
Analytical Engine weaves algebraical patterns just as the Jacquard loom weaves flowers and 
leaves."115 
No complete description of the Analytical Engine exists unfortunately, at least in part 
because Babbage, a perfectionist, kept modifying its design. He worked on it sporadically for the rest 
of his life but built little or none of it. He also designed a more efficient difference engine, referred to 
as Difference Engine No. 2, to entice the British Government to supply more funding so he might 
fulfill his original bargain. The government would have none of it. After Babbage died in 1871, just 
shy of his eightieth birthday, his son Henry succeeded in building some of the Analytical Engine. He 
also inherited his father's obsession of begging money from government. The British Association for 
the Advancement of Science reviewed his request but denied it. The review committee was 
obviously impressed with the Analytical Engine and thought it could be useful. However, it worried 
112 Bromley, "The Evolution of Babbage's Calculating Engines," 120. 
113 Campbell-Kelly, Introduction to Passages from the Life of a Philosopher, 23. 
114 Charles Babbage quoted in Brian Randell, The Origins of Digital Computers: Selected Papers, 3rd 
ed. (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1982), 13. 
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27. 
256 
the engine might take "tens of thousands of pounds at least" to construct. Moreover, since Babbage 
had never finished the design, there was some chance that it could not be made to work. The 
committee closed by recommending consideration instead of a special-purpose engine for solving 
simultaneous algebraic equations.116 It is on that note that Atanasoff and Berry undertook their 
initiative in digital computers approximately sixty years later. 
If Babbage failed to complete an engine, he did leave posterity the idea of the digital 
computer. Some historians of computers believe that among his numerous insights may even have 
been that of the stored-program concept.117 However, no one argues that the stored-program concept 
in the twentieth century came from Babbage, and it is difficult to gauge his overall impact. Eckert 
and Mauchly claimed not to know of him at the time that they built the ENIAC, for example.118 
Other pioneers had at least an awareness of Babbage. References to him and his engines were 
common in the 1930s, so anyone doing even cursory study of computational devices should have 
encountered them.119 An article in 1936 by Bush referred to Babbage's work, for example.120 The 
next year, Aiken mentioned Babbage in his proposal for the ASCC 121 Atanasoff knew of him but 
apparently by reading encyclopedia articles so general as not to be of much practical value.122 
Whatever it owed to Babbage, the next major attempt to build a digital computer by the 
British succeeded admirably. They devised electronic digital computers called Colossi to do 
cryptanalysis during World War II. One person who had some influence on the Colossi was the 
mathematical genius Alan Turing. Turing admired Babbage, although evidence for this comes later. 
116 
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after Colossi and the war, while Turing designed a computer named ACE.123 ACE stands for 
Automatic Computing Engine, a name deliberately reminiscent of the engines of Babbage. However, 
copies of First Draft had been distributed by the time Turing began ACE, and he cited von Neumann 
and not Babbage in his proposal.124 In any case, Turing's legacy is largely derived from a 1937 
publication that established theoretical underpinnings for the capabilities and, perhaps, limitations of 
computers, and there was not a clear connection to Babbage in it. The reason is that the paper, "On 
Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem," paradoxically did not 
explicitly propose a physical machine. Turing imagined instead an idealized device as a means to 
solve a problem posed by German mathematician David Hilbert. It happened that Turing's 
abstraction bore remarkable resemblance in concept to the modern digital computer, although there is 
evidence that Turing may have thought at the time about eventually building one.125 
Hilbert wanted to establish a solid foundation for mathematics, and as part of that program 
proposed the Entscheidungsproblem, or decision problem, in which he asked if there existed a general 
procedure that in theory could solve all problems in mathematics. Turing attacked the question by 
first attempting to model how a machine might reason like a human being. The theoretical 
"computing machine" he conceived had a finite number of internal states and limitless external 
storage, imagined as an infinitely long paper tape arranged in discrete blocks. The machine dealt 
with one block at a time. It could read a block; it could make a mark; and it could erase a mark 
already there. It could also move the tape right or left, but still only one block at a time.126 Given a 
problem, the machine labored on automatically, assiduously making decisions from information on 
tape and in memory, until coming to a stop, the answer appearing as a sequence of marks on the tape 
to one side. 
Simplistic as this may seem, Turing's imaginary mind machine was quite powerful, if 
plodding. Turing recognized that such a device could manipulate detailed instructions and numbers 
alike as binary coding. Indeed, a Turing machine, as these idealized computers were called, could be 
created to run any algorithm. Furthermore, a universal Turing machine could encompass the 
capabilities of all Turing machines. Even so, Turing found the Entscheidungsproblem had no 
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solution. There was no general algorithm guaranteed to solve all conceivable problems. No matter 
the algorithm chosen, there was a chance that a particular problem might run forever, the machine 
unable to stop.127 We might alternatively say that no program exists guaranteed to solve all problems 
without the computer crashing or becoming caught in an endless loop. 
A universal Turing machine manifested physically could be like the EDVAC, or any general-
purpose digital computer for that matter. Conversely, modem computers are said to be universal 
Turing machines, since Turing implied the stored-program concept. Furthermore, a key characteristic 
of a Turing machine was its ability to make decisions, known as conditional branching. That 
capability is sometimes said to separate a computer from a calculator.128 Despite the power of his 
ideas, Turing has not been credited much for modem computers.129 His paper remained largely 
unknown until after the war. 
Turing did influence computer development, nonetheless, and probably more than historians 
realize. One influence was through von Neumann, who met him in 1935 at Cambridge, England, 
where Turing was an undergraduate and von Neumann lectured as visiting professor.130 The men had 
similar mathematical tastes (in fact, von Neumann had used a Rockefeller Foundation grant for 
postdoctoral study under Hilbert), and Turing had submitted for publication an improvement to 
something von Neumann had done. The next year, Turing went to Princeton to study under 
mathematician Alonzo Church, who had derived a negative answer to the Entscheidungsproblem 
using a different method of "effective calculability."131 Von Neumann also had residence at 
Princeton at the IAS 132 In his dissertation at Princeton, Turing defined the O-machine, a universal 
Turing machine outfitted with an "oracle" that allowed it to solve problems otherwise not 
computable. Fantastic though that sounds, computer scientists in the field of hypercomputation are 
attempting to create something similar, although they have yet to catch up with Turing.133 Von 
Neumann recommended Turing for a prestigious fellowship, which he received,134 and then offered to 
make him his assistant. Turing declined to return to England. Von Neumann later made "On 
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Computable Numbers" mandatory study for designers of the IAS computer. His famous work in 
automata also derived in part from Turing. Moreover, von Neumann wrote First Draft around the 
logical calculus of McCulloch and Pitts, who later cited Turing as important to their understanding.135 
Given his and Turing's association and interest in the brain, there seems no reason to attribute any of 
von Neumann's theoretical thinking on computers to Eckert and Mauchly. 
Back in England, Turing became part of a secret effort to break German military codes. His 
exact contributions are unknown, but he first helped improve cryptanalytic machines called 
Bombes.136 He also assisted with design of a series of decoding devices called Heath Robinsons, 
each of which used electronic circuits to compare input from two paper tapes scanned at high speeds 
by photoelectric readers. Coordinating the tapes proved difficult and after failing to make tracking 
mechanisms reliable, a team member. Tommy Flowers, suggested Colossus.137 It was a digital 
computer with about 1,500 vacuum and gas tubes, and including electronic binary counting and logic 
circuits. Plugboards permitted programming, much like the ENIAC. It had a high-speed input 
similar to a Heath Robinson but needed only one tape, because a small internal memory allowed 
derivation of data that the second tape supplied in the earlier machines. Colossus was completed in 
December 1943, eleven months after start of the project and two years before the ENIAC. 
Colossus was actually a prototype, and nine or ten MARK II Colossi followed. No two 
turned out exactly alike, but the MARK II Colossi needed about 2.400 tubes each and operated 
approximately five times faster than the original. More important, the Colossi proved reliable and, 
with the other cryptanalytic machines developed by the British, made significant contributions to 
defeating the Germans. Turing's paper, "On Computable Numbers," influenced the design of the 
Colossi, but he did not otherwise. Turing spent his time on related code-breaking projects. The 
Colossi did not qualify as universal Turing machines, that is, as general-purpose computers. Neither 
did the ENIAC. but it is famous while the Colossi are not because they were kept secret until the mid-
1970s and still have not been fully revealed.138 
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Many who helped with the Colossi continued computer developments in Great Britain after 
the war. Turing began ACE at the National Physical Laboratory in England using the basic design of 
the EDVAC. He incorporated his own ideas to increase its speed, including a technique called 
optimal coding that allowed faster retrieval of data from storage. He left the project in 1947, after 
changing the design of ACE several times. A miniature version. Pilot ACE, with 800 vacuum tubes 
was finished in 1951 and proved to be a useful computer.139 MOSAIC140 then got built based on an 
early design of ACE. MOSAIC apparently served in air defense something like Whirlwind did in the 
U.S. ACE itself was not finished until 1957. by which time magnetic core memory had made its 
mercury delay tube memory obsolete. As noted, EDS AC was completed in 1949, before similar 
computers in the United States. The British Government supported a number of other projects, 
including Muse, also called Atlas, a supercomputer finished in 1962 and equal to any at the time. 
Nor did the British lack for commercial efforts. The British firm Ferranti Limited installed a 
commercial computer, the Ferranti Mark I, before Remington Rand delivered its first UNIVAC and 
then delivered eight more by 1958. The company J. Lyons produced a version of the EDSAC, the 
Leo,'4' for business applications. Nevertheless, the British computer industry failed to take off 
despite government support and availability of experienced designers. Ten times the number of 
companies went into computer manufacturing in the United States in the 1950s than in Britain. 
Prime Minister Harold Wilson felt compelled in 1964 to implement a special program to support his 
nation's computer makers. Even so, the British computer industry all but disappeared.142 
Great Britain and the United States were not the only countries developing computers around 
World War n. Especially intriguing were machines in Germany made by Konrad Zuse. In fact, Zuse 
claimed to be the original inventor of the computer.'43 His claim has merit, although his machines 
through 1945 were neither electronic nor true computers. Independent of work elsewhere, however, 
Zuse conceived of computers approximating von Neumann machines, including the stored-program 
concept. That he did not make greater progress was more due to circumstances than lack of vision. 
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A friend. Helmet Schreyer, introduced him to electronics, and Schreyer, if not Zuse, probably would 
have built an electronic computer using Zuse's basic design if not for the war. 
Zuse became interested in computers for the same reason that many pioneers did: He grew 
tired of making tedious mathematical calculations by hand. Zuse graduated from the Technical 
University of Berlin-Charlottenburg in 1935 and took employment as a structural engineer for the 
Henschel Aircraft Company. Problems in structures were frequently cumbersome or impossible to 
solve, including algebraic equation sets containing thirty or more unknowns. Zuse resolved to find a 
better way.144 He quit his job and set up a workshop in his parent's apartment in Berlin to build a 
computer, although he knew nothing about them Zuse attributed his subsequent success to hard 
work, but it built on remarkable ingenuity. 
Zuse also studied wisely. He did not know at first of Babbage, but learned of him from an 
American patent examiner who denied his 1937 application for a program control and arithmetic unit. 
The examiner cited Babbage against the application.145 However, Zuse had by then acquired such a 
sophisticated understanding of computers that Babbage had little to teach him. More important was 
Leibniz, who Zuse credited but gave few details. Zuse fortunately had studied Latin,146 so he could 
read what were then obscure but topical writings by Leibniz that a friend with library privileges 
borrowed for him.147 Besides the calculus. Leibniz invented a highly successful machine that could 
add, subtract, multiply, and divide.148 He also did early work in two related areas basic to modern 
computers. The first was the binary number system, which Leibniz termed the "diadic" system149 
The calculator he invented used decimal numbers, but he discussed the possibility of building binary 
calculators that represented digits with moving balls.150 To complement his consideration of binary 
numbers, at least from the perspective of today, he also helped initiate mathematical logic. In 1666, 
when twenty years old, Leibniz proposed to establish a universal system of reasoning in De Arte 
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Combinatoria. He failed in that ambitious goal despite a lifetime of off-and-on-again effort, but in 
the attempt posited elementary concepts in logical mathematics.151 
Finally, upon advice of a former teacher, Zuse studied more contemporary mathematicians. 
These included Hilbert. who besides posing the Entscheidungsproblem, advanced understanding of 
mathematical logic, among other things.152 On this solid theoretical foundation, Zuse made 
substantial innovations in computing. 
Zuse built six computers by end of World War H. All used binary numbers and logical 
switching. Their architectures separated arithmetic from memory units and performed calculations in 
parallel by digits but sequentially by number sets.153 Most of his computers used floating-point 
number representation. Most were program controlled, but none fully general purpose. Finally, Zuse 
recognized the potential of stored-programs and programming languages. In a diary entry from 1937, 
for example, he discussed development plans including a, "stored or working plan (program)" that 
can "result from the preceding operations" ... "and in this way (can) be built from itself."154 
However, none of the computers built by mid-1945 had the capability of storing a program.155 
Zuse created his first computer with support from friends and family. About "the size of (an) 
8-place dining-room table,"156 the Z1 was entirely mechanical. Its compact and dependable sixteen-
word memory contained hundreds of relays made with steel pins and strips of sheet metal and 
glass.157 Zuse had less luck devising an arithmetic unit, necessarily more complex than the memory. 
He actually needed two arithmetic units working in parallel, one to process each of the two parts of 
floating-point notation. Furthermore, the arithmetic unit for digits did double service converting 
numbers between decimal and binary.158 Four-digit decimal numbers were entered with a keyboard 
and converted to either seven binary places for magnitude or sixteen for digits.159 A mechanical 
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display gave output.160 Zuse completed the Z1 in 1938, but it functioned only well enough to 
convince him to keep trying.161 
Zuse had to find additional money before finishing the ZI. A manufacturer of specialized 
calculators gave him enough to complete the Z1 and build a second computer. Actually, the only 
thing new about the Z2 was a small, fixed-point arithmetic unit that Zuse connected to the old 
memory from the Zl. Schreyer, an electrical engineer, wanted to make the Z2 electronic,162 but Zuse 
deemed it too risky. He compromised by using electromechanical relays in the arithmetic unit, which 
took about two hundred.163 
When fabrication of Z2 was well along, Zuse got drafted into the German Army. He served 
six months before being sent back to the Henschel Aircraft Company to help design flying bombs. 
His job became part time, so with colleagues he established a business, Zuse Ingenieurburo und 
Apparatebau, and continued construction of the Z2. He finished it in 1940, but the second-hand 
telephone relays he used were not suited for the application, and the Z2 worked only long enough to 
demonstrate to a representative of the German Aeronautics Research Institute (DVL). The man was 
sufficiently impressed that he arranged for money for Zuse to build another computer.164 
Zuse finished the Z3 in December 1941. Some consider it the first operational digital 
computer in history. However, the Z3 was not a true computer and had little memory. In its primary 
purpose of solving simultaneous equations, the largest determinant it could handle was apparently a 
three by three, easily done by hand.165 The logical design of the Z3 followed closely on the Zl, but 
the Z3 contained electromechanical relays throughout, including 600 for the arithmetic units, 1,400 
for memory, and 600 for controls and miscellaneous purposes. The relays were second-hand and of 
varying specifications, which made orchestrating their operations difficult.166 Input of instructions 
came from tape made from discarded celluloid motion picture film punched by hand. Data was 
entered with a keyboard and output indicated by lamp display. Like the Zl, the Z3 used floating­
point notation. It had a memory of sixty-four words of twenty-two binary digits each.167 
A rotating drum synchronized operations, much like the ABC. However, while the ABC 
operated at sixty pulses per second, the maximum clock rate of the Z3 was about five pulses per 
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second. Furthermore, while the Z3 could be programmed for a variety of tasks, its small memory 
limited its usefulness. Its cost has been estimated at the equivalent of $6,000 to $7,000, comparable 
to the ABC.168 
Shortly after finishing the Z3, Zuse was inducted back into the army and marched east to war. 
Luckily, he got another exemption to return to the Henschel Aircraft Company to develop special-
purpose computers for calculating the aerodynamics of the wings and tails of flying bombs. The SI, 
completed in 1942, contained about 800 relays. Bomb measurements had to be entered manually. 
The next year, Zuse built the more advanced S2, which allowed readings to be taken at the bridge that 
cradled the bombs, converted into electrical signals, and fed in automatically. 
Schreyer assisted Zuse and found time to explore vacuum tube technology. He paired 
vacuum tubes with gas-filled lamps (such as small neon lights) to create circuits that conducted 
electricity only upon reaching a threshold voltage, but that continued to conduct at lower voltages. 
The combination made a more reliable discrete device than a vacuum tube alone. Zuse compared the 
arrangement to a relay, in which the tube substituted for the coil and the lamp for contacts.169 Based 
on his investigations, Schreyer earned a doctorate from the Technical University of Berlin-
Charlottenburg with a dissertation entitled. The Tube Relay and the Techniques of its Switching."170 
He proposed a computer using some 2,000 vacuum tubes and equal number of lamps,171 and with an 
anticipated clock rate of 10,000 pulses per second. Military officials refused, believing the war 
would be won before Schreyer finished. As a consolation, he received a contract to build a small test 
unit with one hundred tubes.172 
Schreyer* s test device became operational, but it and most of Zuse's computers did not 
survive the intense bombing of Berlin by the Allies. The S2 may have survived and been captured by 
the Soviets.173 The one computer saved was begun in 1942 and completed just at war's end. That 
computer, the Z4, was like the Z3, but with a longer word length (thirty-two bits) and a mechanical 
memory, to which Zuse returned because of its compactness. He had wanted a memory of 1,024 
words but settled for 512.174 
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Deteriorating conditions caused Zuse to flee Berlin in the final weeks of the war Original 
designations for his computers were the VI, V2, V3, and V4, respectively, where V stood for 
Versuchmodell (Experimental). Zuse changed the names to avoid confusion with the infamous VI 
and V2 rockets, where V meant Vergeltungswaffen (Retaliatory weapon). In relocating the Z4, the 
confusion proved helpful. Authorities cut red tape to help evacuate what they thought was a new 
weapon. Zuse thus procured a truck and moved the Z4 and his wife (also brand new) to safety. They 
eventually landed in a small town in Bavaria, where Zuse stored the computer in a stable. There it 
stayed until 1949, when the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology contracted for its use in Zurich. It 
proved useful and reliable. 
Zuse continued in computers despite tough postwar conditions. In 1946, he finished 
developing the programming language he first envisioned in 1937. He called it the Plankalkul (Plan 
calculus). Thomas Watson learned of the Z4 and purchased an options contract for Zuse's patents. 
Moreover, Zuse, like Atanasoff, hoped to work for IBM. However, he ceased negotiations when 
IBM showed little interest in further development of the Z4. He then established a company he 
named Zuse KG and contracted with Remington Rand to build a tabulating machine using 
mechanical relays. That was what Remington Rand wanted, curiously. Zuse utilized pipelining to 
increase its speed, much like Babbage envisioned. The machine did not find regular service, but 
heralded a profitable business for Zuse designing and building electromechanical EAM equipment for 
Remington Rand through 1957.175 
Zuse also built commercial computers, both general-purpose scientific and special-purpose 
business machines. He delivered the Z5 to an optics company in 1952. It used relays but operated 
six times faster than the Z4 and could make conditional jumps, unlike Zuse's earlier computers.176 
He built other computers, but none was electronic because of stipulations in the terms of Germany's 
surrender. The prohibition was lifted in 1955, and the Z22 shipped in 1958.177 It used vacuum tubes, 
had a magnetic core memory, and sold well. The Z22 transitioned into the Z23, a transistorized 
computer. Zuse KG employed around 1.000 people at its peak in the early 1960s, but by then had 
financial troubles. Among the reasons was the difficulty of keeping abreast of rapidly changing 
technologies and demands of customers. Zuse produced relatively small machines that fit the modest 
budgets of European organizations in the 1950s. The market changed as the economy of Europe 
improved. Customers increasingly wanted large mainframe computers, which Zuse complained often 
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had more to do with prestige than need. Whatever the case, he sold his company in 1964 to Brown, 
Boveri and Company AG, which sold it in turn to Siemens.178 
Siemens performed poorly as a computer manufacturer despite (or because of) the West 
German Government making it the nationally favored producer. Siemens survived by making IBM-
compatible computers, which for its mainframes used Japanese designs. Another company, Nixdorf. 
started in 1968, became the most successful manufacturer of computers in Germany. Instead of 
relying on government guidance and handouts, it specialized in minicomputers as they became 
popular again and aggressively sought markets around the world. 
A slowdown in technical progress in the last century might be attributable to some marginal 
invention factor, in which innovation came easily at first but progressively more difficult. Perhaps 
the emphasis on basic research as opposed to invention itself helps account for the decline. More 
generally, however, the experiences of the various nations suggest that public sponsorship has been 
central to decreasing rates of invention. Evidence is that the more governments tried to foster science 
and technology, the less innovation and economic growth resulted. Admittedly, the government of 
the United States invested lavishly in computer research, and its industry thrived. However, the 
British Government also spent heavily, but its industry fizzled, and not because of the inferiority of 
British research. Into the 1950s, Great Britain often equaled, or surpassed, America in computer-
related innovation. The usual explanation for why the industry failed in Britain is that, burdened with 
rebuilding after the war, its government simply could not contribute as much toward research.179 
How then to explain the disparity of outcomes including Japan and former Soviet Union? No 
nation identified itself more closely with science, esteemed scientists and engineers so highly, or 
spent a greater percentage of its GDP on research as the USSR. Even so, it had amazingly little to 
show for its investment and is not remembered for technologies other than weapons and spacecraft.180 
The Soviet Union did well building heavy industry, as long as it could derive technology from other 
countries. It stood about equal to the West through the 1950s in computer technology, and indeed, 
had a budding computer industry. A decade later, the USSR lagged the U.S. by about five years, total 
state control notwithstanding. Crucial as computers must be for managing a command economy, it 
unabashedly started copying IBM equipment, but to no avail: it kept falling further behind.181 It looks 
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in retrospect that the only reason the USSR could compete in weapons and spacecraft is because 
those technologies were only slightly less government dominated in the U.S. 
By contrast, Japan by the 1970s built a computer industry second only to the U.S. despite 
having been more devastated by war than Great Britain.182 Moreover, the Japanese did not have the 
initial expertise of the British. Of course, the short answer of how the Japanese did it is that they 
worked hard and copied American technology, something like the Soviets. But a complete answer 
must admit that Japan, unlike the USSR and Britain, fostered a better environment for business. 
Policy analysts used to credit Japan's economic success to its special form of capitalism, 
which mixed intense domestic competition with governmental guidance. It was believed that the 
high growth rate of the Japanese economy was primarily due to a policy of targeting key industries, 
such as computers, with extra funding. So impressive were the results that many strongly advocated 
adopting a similar policy in the U.S. With the severe downturn in the Japanese economy in the 
1990s, however, economists took a second look at targeting and found its alleged benefits 
exaggerated. The chief Japanese government agency responsible for targeting in manufacturing has 
been the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MTTI). Rather than dispassionately picking 
industries with best growth potential, as had been supposed, MTTI was rife with politics and gave 
something to everyone. To the extent that MTTI favored industries, it tended to be those that then had 
low growth. As critics put it, MTTI picked losers, not winners. Industries succeeded in spite of 
MTTI.183 MITI insisted that Honda stick with motorcycles, for example, and it had almost nothing to 
do with the rise of the consumer-electronics industry in Japan, a major success.184 
An example of MITI targeting was the highly touted fifth-generation computer, a huge 
parallel computer with 1,000 processors begun in 1982. The supercomputer was to be so advanced 
that experts warned it might put Japan in a position to dominate the computer market worldwide. 
Some countries reacted by attempting to establish similar initiatives. For its part, the U.S. instigated 
several related collaborations with the Japanese. It all turned out much ado about nothing. MITI 
realized as early as 1985 that its design was flawed. It nevertheless continued to pour money into the 
computer until 1992, when the project was finally killed after having spent more than $400 million 
but achieving only a fraction of the original goals.185 
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(1955-1990)," Harvard Institute of Economic Research, Discussion Paper 1644 (10 June 1994), 1-9. 
184 Yergin and Stanislaw, The Commanding Heights, 162-164. 
185 David Swinbanks and Christopher Anderson, "Japan Stubs its Toes on Fifth-Generation 
Computer," Nature 356, no. 6367 (26 March 1992), 273-274. 
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Government involvement in research looks to have been counterproductive in Japan, like 
other places it has been tried. Fortunately for Japan, and contrary to popular belief, science there has 
been predominantly privately supported. The failures of MTTI and low expenditures in government-
financed research suggest that the Japanese computer industry built itself on its own.186 The U.S. 
succeeded spectacularly in computers because it already had a vibrant office appliance industry, in 
particular, an IBM. In fact, the Japanese computer industry only became viable after the companies 
Fujitsu and Hitachi began producing IBM-compatible machines, aided by Gene M. Amdahl, a former 
designer for IBM.187 More generally, that Japan and America have computer industries, while Great 
Britain. Germany, and Russia do not, probably has more to do with greater competitive spirit, lower 
public expenditure ratios (general government outlay as a percentage of nominal GDP), and 
commensurately moderate tax rates of the former. 
As examples, in 1970 the public expenditure ratios of the U.S., Japan, and Great Britain were 
30.0, 19.0, and 36.7, respectively. In 1996, the figures were 32.7, 36.2, and 41.8, respectively.188 The 
great increase in Japan's public expenditure ratio may help explain its current economic malaise. As 
for taxes. Great Britain took the lead in the West after World War II in nationalization of industry and 
construction of a welfare state.189 Its tax rate has averaged 40 to 50 percent of GNP. Taxes have 
been lower in Japan and the U.S., generally no more than 35 percent of GNP.190 
Bush created a fable to justify sponsorship of science by the federal government, but he did 
so in the progressive spirit. Government had been slowly but inexorably expanding from the nation's 
beginning, but a fundamental shift in expectations of Americans began with the Great Depression. 
Those years of misery and deprivation have blithely been blamed on a failure of capitalism. The U.S. 
moved out of the Depression, it is asserted, when the federal government belatedly took responsibility 
for society through the myriad programs of the New Deal. Americans thus came to depend upon 
government to keep the economy moving, and its programs for science constituted a handful of many 
new spending initiatives. 
186 Beason and Weinstein, "Growth. Economies of Scale, and Targeting in Japan (1955-1990)," 4. 
187 Flamm, Creating the Computer, 194-195. 
188 Henderson, The Changing Fortunes of Economic Liberalism, 52. Figures are from, "Table 4: 
Public Expenditure Ratios, 1970-96. for Core OECD Countries, Selected Years." 
189 Yergin and Stanislaw, The Commanding Heights, 22-27. 
190 Kealey. The Economic Laws of Scientific Research, 86 and 112. See also, "Figure 10.1. Business: 
Government Funding (part I)," 241. 
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The Depression involved a mix of factors not fully understood, but the truth is less flattering 
to government. Business cycles and financial miscalculations are intrinsic to capitalism, but 
government was itself implicated as the leading cause of the economic disaster. Federal government 
did not support science to any large extent before the Depression but exercised considerable influence 
over the economy, although nineteenth-century policies stressed free trade, the gold standard, and 
balanced budgets. Classical policies enforced discipline but gave little thought to dealing with the 
depressions that occurred regularly.191 The next century brought progressive strategies, as 
exemplified by the creation of the Federal Reserve System in 1913. Wrong-headed monetary and 
fiscal policies transformed what should have been a relatively mild, nineteenth-century kind of 
depression into the Great Depression. The Economist magazine summarized the matter thusly: 
"Capitalism will always have dramas. It is governments that turn them into crises." 
Charges that the Depression resulted from overproduction of manufactured goods or because 
of the 1929 stock market crash have little credibility among economists. However, most accept that 
flawed governmental policies were a primary cause.192 Of special note, Nobel laureate Milton 
Friedman has long argued that "bad monetary policy" must shoulder much of the blame.193 Another 
Nobel Prize winner, Robert Mundell, blamed the Depression on an attempt to reestablish the gold 
exchange standard after World War I "on too slender a gold base."194 Similarly, economic historian 
Peter Temin argued that the roots of the Depression lay in a zealous adherence to the gold standard by 
Western nations after World War I even when the policy became deflationary.195 
Fiscal policies made things worse. In the United States, the Ford-McCumber ( 1922) and 
Smoot-Hawley (1930) tariffs pushed rates to all-time highs. Other countries followed, resulting in a 
two-thirds reduction in world trade within three years.196 Furthermore, New Deal policies had minor 
impact on ending the Depression. Although the U.S. money supply had fallen by one-third since 
1929. for instance, Roosevelt insisted on maintaining high prices and wages. High unemployment 
191 Robert A. Mundell, "Debt and Deficits in Alternative Macroeconomic Models," in Debt, Deficit 
and Economic Performance, eds. Mario Baldassarri, Robert Mundell, and John McCallum (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1993). 6-7 and 59. 
19
" "A Survey of the 20th Century." The Economist 352, no. 8136 (11 September 1999), 12-21; "The 
World Economy," The Economist, 22; "Desperately Seeking a Perfect Model," The Economist 351, 
no. 8114(10 April 1999), 69. 
193 For example, Milton Friedman, Monetarist Economics (Cambridge, Massachusetts; Basil 
Blackwell, 1991), 4-10. 
m Mundell, "Debt and Deficits in Alternative Macroeconomic Models," 61-62 and 122. 
195 Peter Temin, Lessons from the Great Depression: The Lionel Robbins Lectures for 1989 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1989), 7-8, 33, and 43-45. 
196 
"A Survey of the 20th Century," The Economist, 12. 
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quite predictably continued. Furthermore, while Roosevelt's attempt to limit manufacturing output 
through the NRA failed, similarly inspired farm policies did not, and the nation witnessed the absurd 
spectacle of farmers getting paid to destroy crops while millions of Americans went hungry.197 The 
situation would never have gotten so desperate or lasted so long had markets simply been allowed to 
operate. Recall as an example and as Bush admitted, the private sector's fast growing investment in 
research, which resulted in, among other things, a cornucopia of new electronic devices in the 1930s. 
Conditions did improve, perhaps due in part to the expansionist leanings of the New Deal, but notably 
after the U.S. effectively left the gold standard in 1933.198 However, after being thwarted in his reach 
to have the NRA coordinate industry, Roosevelt switched course in 1935 and pushed programs, laws, 
and regulations inimical to business but more favored by his progressive base. These included the 
Wagner Act. which promoted unions, and the Social Security and Revenue Acts, which raised taxes. 
The "Roosevelt recession" resulted, and the Depression only ended with war. 
Massive fiscal interventions by governments continued after the war. Theoretical 
underpinnings for the involvement came from John Maynard Keynes of Great Britain, the most 
influential economist of the twentieth century. According to Temin, Keynes agreed that monetary 
factors underlie the Depression,199 but the more immediate problem was low investments by 
businesses. To make up for that, governments had to spend more. Politicians were persuaded, 
overcame the resistance of citizens (of Americans, that is), and complied. 
Keynes actually advocated state intervention only as needed and temporarily. States should 
stabilize the economy without directly controlling it. When the private sector failed to invest 
sufficiently to maintain satisfactory performance, government had to spend on things like public 
works, even if that meant incurring a budget deficit. On the other hand, when investment by the 
private sector picked up, government should decrease spending. Keynes's disciples, who dominated 
Western economic policies through the 1970s, emphasized the former and often overlooked the latter. 
The legacy has been to saddle countries with inefficient and exorbitantly expensive state programs 
that are difficult to end or abate. Adopted to gain flexibility for government officials, Keynesian 
economic policies led to inflation, deficits, debt, and economic rigidity.200 
197 Thomas Sowell, Basic Economics: A Citizen's Guide to the Economy (New York City: Basic 
Books, 2000), 33-34 and 215. 
198 Friedman. Monetarist Economics, 5; Mundell, "Debt and Deficits in Alternative Macroeconomic 
Models," 69-70 and 77; Temin, Lessons from the Great Depression, 96-98. 
199 Temin, Lessons from the Great Depression, 7. 
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State support of research meshed perfectly with postwar progressive. Cold War, and 
Keynesian thinking. To understand the impact of that sponsorship. British biochemist Terence 
Kealey studied relationships among science, technology, and economic progress, and stances 
government should assume on the former two to best foster the latter. His conclusions in The 
Economic Laws of Scientific Research make sense of long-ignored evidence. Specifically, Kealey 
examined statistics on civil (not defense) research for the OECD201 nations and derived three 
economic laws of scientific research. His first law is as follows: "the percentage of national GDP 
spent (on civil research) increases with national GDP per capita." In other words, the richer a 
country, the more it spends on civil research, including all sources of funding. Countries spend on 
research when they can afford it, and because they must to remain competitive. Next, Kealey 
compared each country's percentage of GDP spent on civil research to the ratio of its business to 
government funding. This provided the basis for his second law: "public and private funding displace 
each other." That is, government-sponsored research does not simply add to what industry would 
otherwise do, but deprives it of money for its own research. Research is thus transferred from the 
private sector to government or its agents. The data indicate that the trade is to the disadvantage of 
total funding, unfortunately, as articulated by the third law: "public and private displacements are not 
equal: public funds displace more than they do themselves provide." 
An obvious reason for the decrease is that governmental bureaucracy needed to administer 
research is expensive. More generally, new taxes must be imposed to cover costs of ever-expanding 
obligations that are not research, but which governments inevitably accrue. Also, nationalization of 
research raises the costs of entry for industry to conduct its own research. Industry after being taxed 
will do reduced amounts of research or, sometimes, none at all.202 That is, some research can be all 
or nothing. Worse, government sponsorship substitutes the judgments of politicians for those of 
entrepreneurs and inventors. This is a mistake when economic progress is the goal, but it also means 
that industry may not participate in government-funded research it sees as unbeneficial. 
201 OECD is an acronym for Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The 
organization includes the wealthiest capitalistic-tending countries. Kealey used historic data to 1985, 
when there were twenty-four OECD countries including the United States. He excluded Yugoslavia 
as not truly capitalistic. Yugoslavia is now an economic disaster, but in 1985 it had the best economy 
of any Eastern European nation. Kealey also excluded Luxembourg and Iceland as too small. 
Kealey, The Economic Laws of Scientific Research, 237. See also, "Table 10.1 Research statistics, 
OECD countries, 1985," 254-255. Five more countries have been admitted to the OECD in the 
1990s. David Henderson, The Changing Fortunes of Economic Liberalism: Yesterday, Today and 
Tomorrow (London: Institute of Economic Affairs. 1998), 26-27. 
Kealey, The Economic Laws of Scientific Research, 245-250. 
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All this applies to basic research by itself. A linear model of economic progress, in which 
basic research leads to new technologies that lead to economic growth, is too simplistic, and Bush 
likely knew it.203 For one thing, there are no clear dividing lines between technology and science or 
applied and basic research. Furthermore, research, development, and economic progress derive in 
complex ways, and the relationships are better modeled as an interconnected network with numerous 
feedback loops.204 For example, new science often sprouts from new technology, as in the case of 
steam engines leading to the science of thermodynamics. The Big Bang theory of the creation of the 
universe began with two Bell Laboratory technicians inexplicably finding background radiation in 
microwave transmissions.205 The transistor is an instance of creativity going both directions, since it 
involved quantum mechanics, but initial developments did not wait. Moreover, the need to 
understand transistors resulted in solid-state physics. 
As Project Hindsight found, most new technology comes from old technology, but industry 
will nonetheless invest in basic research. Economists have found that industry performs basic 
research for the simple reason that it pays. The more basic research industry does, the greater its 
increases in productivity.206 Kealey believed that industry does not so much benefit directly from 
basic research as from what he called secondary-mover advantages. Industry hopes for scientific 
breakthroughs to exploit, of course, but the main reason it funds basic research is to keep its scientists 
abreast of what others are doing. That is, as scientists conduct research, they read scientific journals 
and learn about other research, thereby greatly increasing odds of uncovering useful information.207 
Furthermore, industry will fund basic research at universities for the problem solving skills it teaches 
students it hopes to employ.208 Overall evidence therefore suggests that without government 
interference more, not less, technology would have resulted and of higher commercial quality. It is 
fortunate for Americans that governments of other countries have pursued much the same wasteful 
policies of funding research as their government. 
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How unfortunate it is that Adam Smith has been forgotten, or more exactly, misconstrued. 
Much waste and misery could have been avoided. Smith's minimalist philosophy is synonymous 
with laissez faire (a term he did not use), but with interventionist government in favor, he has been 
wrongfully dismissed as either an apologist for big business or hopelessly out-of-date. For example, 
it is commonly asserted that free-market policies might have been viable in eighteenth-century 
Britain, supposedly a simple world of independent shopkeepers, but are inadequate to protect 
consumers in an age of complexity and oligopolistic corporations. However, there is no reason to 
think free-market policies are not at least as appropriate in a complex society as a simple one. It is 
likely that the clout of consumers increased with the proliferation of choices that capitalism (another 
word Smith did not use) made available. While there may have been proportionally more butchers 
and bakers in the eighteenth century, it is doubtful consumers enjoyed more choices. It would have 
been as difficult to walk the extra blocks to a second butcher as it is today to drive the extra miles to a 
competing supermarket. Nor were people necessarily more independent. Smith recorded that the 
preponderance of laborers, including in agriculture, served "under a master" even in his time before 
giant industry.209 Furthermore, the enormous turnover among major U.S. corporations suggests 
competition is greater than assumed.210 
Contrary to reputation, if Wealth of Nations had an overriding theme, it was to protest the 
numerous combinations and monopolies of the time. Moreover, if Smith had a bias, it was not to the 
capitalist, but to the consumer. "Consumption is the sole end and purpose of all production," opined 
the admirable Smith, "and the interest of the producer ought to be attended to, only so far as it may be 
necessary for promoting that of the consumer." Smith found instead that businessmen often became 
rich by "oppression of the poor" and contriving laws against consumers. In that skullduggery, they 
had the assistance of, "that insidious and crafty animal, vulgarly called a statesman or politician, 
whose councils are directed by the momentary fluctuations of affairs." Politicians and businessmen 
got little sympathy from Smith. He commented caustically, for example, that merchants and 
manufacturers were, "silent with regard to the pernicious effects of their own gains. They complain 
only of those of other people." As for government officials: "They are themselves always, and 
without any exception, the greatest spendthrifts in the society. Let them look well after their own 
expence, and they may safely trust private people with theirs. If their own extravagance does not ruin 
the state, that of their subjects never will." Smith actually thought merchants and manufacturers 
unproductive. He argued nonetheless that fewer restraints placed upon them by government would 
209 Smith. Wealth of Nations, 67. 
210 Editors of Forbes, "Steel versus Silicon," Forbes 160, no. 1 (7 July 1997), 130. 
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result in greater competition and cheaper goods. Smith promoted a free-market orientation to best 
serve most people, even as it undermined entrenched interests. He acknowledged that government 
might establish a particular industry sooner than it otherwise could be created. Still, he believed the 
overall wealth of a nation was best served by investment seeking its natural ends. Without 
regulations erected against free trade: "the private interests and passions of men naturally lead them 
to divide and distribute the stock of every society, among all the different employments carried on in 
it, as nearly as possible in the proportion which is most agreeable to the interest of the whole society." 
Critics insist that capitalism exploits labor, but it did not mean that for Smith. It was the 
"skill, dexterity, and judgment," of active workers, after all, which constituted the true wealth of 
nations. Manufacturers should treat labor well partly out of fairness: "It is but equity, besides, that 
they who feed, cloath and lodge the whole body of the people, should have such a share of the 
produce of their own labour as to be themselves tolerably well fed, cloathed and lodged." Smith 
believed people had natural empathy with others, and was a philanthropist himself, but rather than 
appeal to the kindness of manufacturers, he asserted that they had selfish reasons to pay labor 
generously: "Where wages are high,... we shall always find the workmen more active, diligent, and 
expeditious, than where they are low." High wages were more than compensated by productivity 
increases, many deriving from labor, "inventing the most proper machinery for executing the work." 
Smith had great confidence in people. Wealth of Nations resonated with the same optimism 
as its contemporary, the Declaration of Independence. Both implied limited government. Where 
Thomas Jefferson wrote of "certain unalienable rights," including "life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness," Smith had his "invisible hand," the belief that free people on their own organize their 
activities to best serve society, even if unintentional. And where the American document declared, 
"all men are created equal," Smith more verbosely but similarly claimed, "The difference of natural 
talents in different men is, in reality, much less than we are aware of; and the very different genius 
which appears to distinguish men of different professions, when grown up to maturity, is not upon 
many occasions so much the cause, as the effect of the division of labour." 
Smith believed inventions typically resulted because workmen sought to lighten their labors 
by leveraging the benefits of division of labor. Factories, he reported, were full of, "very pretty 
machines, which were the inventions of such workman, in order to facilitate and quicken their own 
particular part of the work." He thought a second source of innovations came from, "the ingenuity of 
the makers of the machines, when to make them became the business of a peculiar trade." 
Division of labor allowed some people to specialize in engineering. Others combined 
"together the powers of the most distant and dissimilar objects" to increase "the quantity of science." 
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The implication is that Smith saw science as important but not deserving of privilege. Taken in total, 
"the great multiplication of the productions of all the different arts" brings, "in a well-governed 
society,... universal opulence that extends itself to the lowest ranks of the people." In short, free 
people in a free society will invent and produce and everyone will prosper. History bears him out. 
Not least among Smith's virtues was pragmatism Free markets served society best but could 
never be realized fully. To expect a society to adopt such policies wholeheartedly, according to 
Smith's famous assessment, "is as absurd as to expect that an Oceana or Utopia should ever be 
established." The "prejudices of the public" would be against it, and governments had no choice but 
to accede to those prejudices. Worse, "the private interests of many individuals irresistibly oppose 
it." By this he meant merchants and manufacturers, who, "like an overgrown standing army,... have 
become formidable to the government, and upon many occasions intimidate the legislature." A 
government official who supported big business was, "sure to acquire not only the reputation of 
understanding trade, but great popularity and influence with an order of men whose numbers and 
wealth render them of great importance." If that official opposed big business, on the other hand, 
"neither the most acknowledged probity, nor the highest rank, nor the greatest public service, can 
protect him from the most infamous abuse and detraction." In short, governments tended to collude 
with businesses in using their combined powers against consumers. Smith believed ordinary people 
gained countervailing power to the extent they insisted on free-market policies. 
True to his practical nature. Smith wisely understood that government could never be made 
perfect but recognized its necessity. Government should be kept to a minimum but nonetheless had 
important roles to play. Among its duties, government must provide the legal framework to ensure 
effective functioning of competitive markets and protection of private property. It needed to provide 
for defense and the "dignity of the sovereign ' Government also must take responsibility for public 
works, but Smith thought most such projects could be made to defray their own costs. On the other 
hand, he worried that division of labor, for all the good that comes from it, could have the effect of 
rendering people stupid. Government should therefore take action to ensure that everyone acquired at 
least the fundamentals of an education. "Invention is kept alive," in this way, "and the mind is not 
suffered to fall into that drowsy stupidity."211 
211 Smith, Wealth of Nations. 3, 11-12. 17, 80, 83, 88-89, 97, 100, 146, 152, 227, 238, 240-241, 306, 
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In summary, during the nineteenth century the Wealth of Nations increasingly served "as a 
court of appeal on matters of economics and politics,"212 and free markets reached their apogee. The 
next century turned to government intervention guided by experts. That appeared to work for a time, 
but nonetheless, nations that prospered most had democratic governments that meddled least. States 
fostered new technologies, and indeed, it could be argued that few became viable in the last half of 
the twentieth century without that support, so pervasive did government become. Still, weight of 
evidence suggests that direct involvement by government has a dampening effect overall on emerging 
technologies. At one extreme, for example, the Soviet Union attempted to eliminate market 
mechanisms. It was characterized by horrendous human rights abuses, but try mightily as it did, 
showed little propensity for innovation and ultimately failed. To the other extreme. Great Britain and 
the United States were invention powerhouses in the nineteenth century. They lost ground as they 
evolved from laissez-faire capitalism into mixed economies. Great Britain more than America as it 
became more socialistic. Evidence thus points to a correlation between economic freedom and 
innovation, and also with standard of living and human rights. 
The case in point is the electronic digital computer, on the cusp of reality by private interests 
on the eve of World War II, both as a tool of applied mathematics and for information processing. 
Turing had articulated its theory and Atanasoff and Berry much of its essential technology. It all 
came together, one might say. with the human brain in mind and under von Neumann after the war, 
but certainly would have happened anyway. The computer was not the product of a few geniuses, but 
of many. Leibniz. Babbage, Patterson. Hollerith, Watson Sr., Bryce, Bush, W. J. Eckert, Stibitz, 
Shannon, and Zuse were other major figures prewar. Countless others contributed in anonymity or 
near-anonymity. However, if the history of computing is a history of genius, so is the history of 
technology generally, although inventors usually are not otherwise regarded as exceptional people. 
Adam Smith had it right: Ordinary people have extraordinary ingenuity given the inclination, and 
laissez-faire capitalism provides the best environment to bring it to fruit. 
On the other hand, government promotes not only inefficiency, but also mediocrity. An 
example was the ENIAC. Huge, clunky, costly, and ineffectual, it stood as a fitting metaphor of the 
government that created it, as if in its own burgeoning image. Designers of subsequent computers 
returned to fundamental principles: smaller is better but compromise is necessary. The United States 
was founded on those same principles, but advocates for the federal government have found ever 
more excuses to expand its suffocating powers. 
212 Ashton, The Industrial Revolution, 17 
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